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THK ROUBD TABLE, 1910 - 66

Alexander C. May
St John's College. Oxford

Thesis submitted for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy.

Oxford, January 1995

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The Round Table, 1910-66

AUTHOR: Alexander Kay

SOCIETY: St John's College, Oxford

DECREE: Doctor of Philosophy

SUBMISSION DATE: January 1995

This thesis traces the history of the London Found Table group
and cf the Rcur.d Table magazine from their origins in 1009-10 until the
decision to launch a "now" Round Table in 1966. It takes as its focus
the ideas put forward by members of the group, in the Round Table and
elsewhere, on a range of Imperial and international problems. It
utilises knowledge of the authorship cf Round Table articles in order tc
clarify the processes by which Round Table policy was made, and the role
of different individuals within the group. It examines the role cf the
Sound Table as a pressure group for Imperial reform ar.d in particular
Sts relationship to Empire federalism, seeking to elucidate the extent
to which it was able to act coherently, and attempting to describe its
a ins, netheds and influence. On the question of federalism, the thesis
finds an inability to agree on details, but also a continuing belief in
the necessity for constitutional unity until the late 1940s. It
suggests that this belief was not entirely unrealistic. The thesis
argues that, despite differences of emphasis, the Round Table was able
to develop a distinctive ideology of Imperial isn which was strongly
supportive of the Imperial role yet also responsive tc the need for
change. It finds that the group was only briefly influential on
government policy, under Lloyd George's administration, but it argues
that the group saw its main purpose as that cf influencing long-term
opinion rather than short-tern policy. It suggests that the group was
able tc play an important mediating role, between conservatism and
radicalism, and between pol icy-isaiing and opir.icr..

ABSTRACT; THE RQUED TABLE, 1910-6$

Historians of British Imperialism have long beer, fascinated by
the Round Tabic group. There are a number of reasons for this: tho
group's role as a movement for Empire federalism at a crucial stage in
Anglo- Domini on relations, its development of a progressive idoology of
Imperialism, its embodiment of metropolitan liberalism and its part in
the demission of British power, its attempts to influence British
foreign policy, and its reputation as a secretive "camarilla" exercising
power by means of "backstairs influence". The history of the Round
Table thus has a bearing on a number of important questions, including
the nature of the metropolitan-colonial relationship and of the process
of decolonisation, the relationship between British Imperial and foreign
policy, and the role of pressure groups in the making of policy.

The origins and early history of the Pound Table have been the
subject of a number of studies, including two books, by Walter Niraocks
and John Kendle. Both concentrate on the "imperial federation" aspect
of the Round Table project, and argue that the Round Table "failed"
because, within a few years of Its foundation, it ran up against the
brick wall of Dominion nationalism. Both also argue that after the
First World War the Round Table lost its sense of cohesion as well as of
purpose, and that son? of its leading figures (especially Lionel Curtis
and Philip Kerr) abandoned Imperialism for a liberal internationalism.
Sriram Kehrot.ra and Deborah Lavin have looked at the early Round Table
from a somewhat different perspective, concentrating on Curtis's
development of a philosophy of • Common wealth" which helped to bring
about progressive self-government in India and the dependencies, and

foreshadowed the creation of the multi-racial Commonwealth. A third
historical tradition, which includes works by G 3 Allison and Carroll
Quigley, has associated the Round Table with the policy of
■appeasement", and suggested that in the 1930s the Round Table exorcised
a powerful influence on British foreign policy. Finally, Loonie Foster
Las locked at the history of the Australian Round Table groups fron
their foundation in 1910 until their demise in the 1970s. Taking as her
locus the Found Tabic magazine she has elucidated the Australian Round
Tablers' views on a wide range of questions, and argued that the Round
Table's influonco on public opinion was significant. On the question of
Doninicn nationalism she has argued that tho Australians gave priority
to Australian intorostc, but th3t tho incompatibility between British
and Australian intorostc only slowly became apparent.

This thesis is closest in model to Leonie Foster's work. It
aims to provide a history of the London Round Table group, and takes as
its focus the group's role as an editorial committee for the Round Table
magazine. Utilising the manuscript sources left by a number of the
original Sound Tablers, and benefiting from access to the Pound Table's
office papers, it seeks to explain as well as to describe the Pound
Tablers' views on a wide variety of Imperial and international problems.
It concentrates on the nakir.g of Round Table policy, on the role of
individual members and the dynamics of the group. It is primarily an
intellectual history, seeking to reconstruct the mental i t6 of the early
Round Tablers, and to clarify the changes in their views as a result of
confrontation with the challenges posed by Imperial and international
politics. nevertheless, it is also a political history, seeking to
assess the Pound Table's role as a pressure group, particularly in the

field of Anglo-Doninion relations, but also in other areas of policy.

It tries to elucidate the Round Tablers* alms and methods ond to
describe their views of the political process, as well as attenpting to
answer the difficult question of Influence.

This thesis is not a history of the Round Table organisation ac
a whole. It touches on the histories of the Dominion groups only where
these seen relevant to the theme. There are a number of reasons,
including limitations of space and the author's incompetence. The
Dominion groups enjoyed a semi-autonomous existence, and the Canadian,
South African and New Zealand groups are undoubtedly deserving of
treatment along the lines followed by Leonie Foster in Australia.

Again, this thesis covers the Round Tablers* views on British politico
and on financial and economic questions only where this seems necessary.
A similar set of reasons apply. The main focus of this thesis is on
problems of international ar.d Imperial politics. Vhile the Pound
Table 1 c coverage of financial and oconomic questions, in particular, is
interesting and deserving of study, it is largely a separate topic.
Perhaps one of the noct striking conclusions might be the United extent
to which financial and economic considerations were held to influence
British Imperial and foreign policy. One further limitation of this
thesis is that it is primarily a study of the Round Table ac a group,
and not of individual Round Tablers. The members of the Round Table had
cany interests in common, but many interests apart. Again, it has
seemed necessary to touch on these only where they have been relevant to
the question under discussion.

The main part of the thesis is divided into ton chapters. The
first gives a brief outline of the history of the group, and explores

the extent to which it sought to use the Found Table magazine as a
vehicle for its collective views. An examination of contemporary and
historical assessnects of the group suggests some of the many ways in
which the group has been viewed, and notes a wide divergence on the
question of influence. A short section seeks to elucidate some cf tho
questions raised, and to indicate possible lines of progress.

The second chapter looks in more detail at the origins of the
Round Table in Milner's South African "Kindergarten", outlining Milner's
political and intellectual legacy, and examining the "Kindergarten's"
r«le in the unification of South Africa. A section on the "Imperial
problem" seeks to explain why it was that the Round Tablers adopted an
optimistic evaluation of Dominion nationalism, and suggests that, in tho
Edwardian period at least, Dominion nationalism and Imperial federalism
generally worked in the same direction. A briof description of the
Round Table's founding aims is followed by ar. assessment of its initial
strategy. In contrast to the assumption of nar.y historians, it is
argued that tho Round Tablers sought to bring about constitutional
change by acting on public opinion rather than on a handful of well-
placed politicians. Their notion of public opinion was admittedly
limited and Elitist, but it is suggested that this was by no means
unusual. Again in contrast to earlier assumptions, the extent of
disagreement between Curtis and others in the group is noted, even at
such an early stage. A final section on the "original Moot" looks at
the personalities and careers of the early Round Tablers, suggesting
some of the ways in which these affected the dynamics of the group and
the extent of its influence.

Chapter Three looks at the Round Table “movement" and again
emphasises the differences between Curtis and other members of the
group. There was a broad consensus on the eventual need for some form
of Imperial reconstruction, but this tended to disappear once the
details of a scheme emerged. Curtis’s attempts to produce a philosophy
of Imperialism initially exacerbated the problem Perhaps more
importantly, there was a strong body of opinion in the group which
rejected Curtis's hostility to Imperial co-operation, and which also
believed that a longer-term strategy was necessary. nevertheless, it is
argued that it was the outbreak of war which put paid to Curtis's
efforts, by magnifying the disagreements over co-operation, transforming
Doainion atitudes and (eventually) renoviug the main argument for union.
The 1917 Imperial Cabinet and Conference Is seen as a pivotal episode,
because it appeared at the tise to signal a decisive step towards
constitutional unity.

Chapters Four and Five examine the Round Tablers* ideas and
their attempts to influence policy in the periods 1910-14 and 1914-22
respectively. It is argued that in the earlier period the Found Tablers
were relatively marginal political figures, and that they achieved
little success in influencing decisions in Britain. The group's
inability to evolve coherent policies on cone of the major issues of the
day (such as tariff reform and Ireland) is noted, as is the initial
conservatism of the group's views on India and the dependencies. By
contrast, the years 1916-22 saw many of the Round Tablers moving Into
positions of considerable power. Nevertheless, the group was unable to
make much progress on the central issue of Anglo- Domini on relations.
Where members of the Round Table were influential was in smoothing the

course of Imperial retreat, ia India, Ireland and Egypt. In all three
cases, examination of Round Table views reveals a sudden shift in
perspectives, brought about by a realisation of the weakness cf
Britain's position. Once some equivalent shift in British policy became
inevitable, the Round Ta biers helped to effect it by nafcing out a
persuasive case for change. They also helped to Unit it, by portraying
concessions as the natural outcome of British political ideals, and by
insisting on full Imperial control of the process.

The role of the Round Table group between the wars is examined
in Chapter Six. The need for some new strategy to bring about Imperial
union is emphasised, but so too is the extent to which even Curtis's
fiercest critics continued to believe in the possibility and necessity
of some form of union. It is argued that, if anything, the group was
more cohesive than before, despite the fact that Individual members
sometimes went off at tangents. The development of new spheres of
influence is examined, and it is suggested that the range of the Round
Tablers' influence was at least greater than before 1914.

Chapters Seven and Sight again look at the Found Tablers' ideas
on specific problems of Imperial and foreign policy, and the extent to
which they sought or were able to act as a pressure group. Their
attitudes towards constitutional developments in Anglo- Dominion
relations were again renarkably optimistic: indeed, they both
anticipated and supported the new equality between Britain and the
Dominions symbolised by the Balfour Report. The Found Tablers
themselves interpreted these changes as a necessary reassurance to
Dominion opinion, which would enable those who believed in Imperial
unity to build on surer foundations. On India, Ireland and the Middle

Bast the Rouad Table again adopted a line of conciliation and cautious
reform, which led the group to support British concessions, but not to
argue for them ia advaace. "Commonweal th" came into its own as a
progressive ideology of Imperialism, helpiag to disarm the critics of
Empire but also to counteract the influence of "diehards* whom the Round
Tablers saw as an equal danger. The practical implications of
"Commonwealth" were few: it was an ideological tool, not a political
prograome .

The Round Tablers' belief in the necessity of Imperial unity in
foreign policy brought then into conflict with much of British policy
between the wars. Kerr in particular, but to a lesser extent the Round
Table as a whole, now saw the United States as the key to an "Oceanic"
alliance. The Round Table was highly critical of the Treaty of
Versailles, doubtful of the value of the League, and hostile towards any
British entanglenent in Europe. Fron 1919 onwards the Rouad Table urged
a conbinatior. of "Oceanic" withdrawal and conciliation towards Germany,
which anticipated later "appeasenent" . In the mid-1980s the policy was
still strongly supported by Dawson and Kerr/Lothian but not by other
Round Tablers. Lothian changed tack at the tiae of the Austrian crisis,
and the Round Table as a whole can safely be discounted as an influence
on Chamberlain's policy.

Chapter Fine exaninec the Round Table's policy during and
immediately after the Second World War, and concludes that the late
1940s saw a crisis of Empire in which nany of the assumptions which
underlay the early Round Table project were discarded. The idea of
Imperial unity in defence and foreign policy was itself now rejected.

The reason, it is argued, is that Britain now looked to America for the

framework of its security. There was a revival of Imperial purpose in
Africa and the Caribbean, but the independence of India and the London
Declaration (which the Pound Table supported) were recognised as
transforming the nature of the Commonwealth.

Chapter Ten studies the Round Table's views of the postwar
world. Atlanticism is again an important theme, but there were few
illusions as to the unequal nature of the "special relationship". The
Pound Table's coverage of decolonisation again highlights a vision of
Commonwealth which was responsive to change, but still fundamentally
conservative. A conflict between older and younger generations of Round
Tablers appears especially in attitudes towards South Africa and
Rhodesia. Re-examination of the value of the Commonwealth led to a new
emphasis on diversity rather than unity, and on the Commonwealth's role
as a "bridge* rather than as a "unit of power".

Two characteristics of Round Table thinking stand out: tenacity
and adaptability. Both derived from a belief in the Empire /Commonwealth
as a valuable end in itself, and one worth preserving. Through the
Round Table and elsewhere, the Round Tablers sought to put forward an
imperial or Commonwealth view which was loyal to this higher unity and
not just to British interests. This was unusual in Britain, and
undoubtedly the main reason why the Round Table was not able to exercise
a more continuous influence on British policy. Successive British
governments were unwilling to sake the sacrifices necessary to translate
the idealism of the Round Tablers' vision into a reality.

TABLS QF CQAIESTg

List of Abbreviations iii

1. The Round Table in History 1

2. The Founders 25

3. The Round Table "Movement" 64

4. Problens of Empire and Foreign Policy, 1910-14 111

5. Problens of Var and Adjustnent, 1914-22 157

6. The Round Table between the Vars 214

7. Problems of Empire and Commonweal th, 1919-39 257

8. Problens of Foreign Policy, 2919-39 316

9. Var and Adjustment, 1939-49 360

10. The Round Table and the Post-Var Comconweal th 402

11. Conclusions 446

Appendix A; Round Table Editors 450

Appendix D. Members of the London Moot before 1931 451

Appendix C: Round Table Coverage, by Subject, 1910-66 454

Appendix D . Round Table Articles, by Author, 1910-66 453

Appendix E The London Hoot before 1966: Biographical Notes 456
Appendix F ; Round Table Authors (Vhere Known) 469

Appendix G . Round Table Authors (Index) 548

Bi bl i ogra ph y 558

MASUSCRIPT SOURCES

Brand Papers
Coupland Papers
Curtis Papers
Dawson Papers
Grigg Papers

Lothian Papers

Milner Papers

Oliver Papers

RT Papers

RT (0) Papers
Se I borne Papers

All other manuscript

aWMALS

Can Hist Rev
SHR

Scon HR
Hist Journal
IA

J Con temp Hist

JCPS

J1CH

HZ J of Hist
Proc RCI
ST

111

LIST OF ABBREVIATION

Brand Papers, Bodleian Library, MSS 3rand
(followed by box number)

Couplaad Papers, Rhodes House, MSS Brit. Emp. s 403
(followed by box, file and fol numbers)

Curtis Papers, Bodleian Library, MSS Curtis
(followed by box and fol numbers)

Dawson Papers, Bodleian Library, MSS Dawson
(followed by box and fol numbers)

Grigg Papers, Bodleian Library, MSS Microfilm

(followed by film number) l Microfilm copies of
originals in Douglas Library, Kingston, OntarioJ
Lothian Papers, Scottish Record Office, Edinburgh,

GD 40/17 (followed by box and fol numbers)

Milner Papers, Bodleian Library, MSS Milner Dep.

(followed by box and fol numbers)

Oliver Papers, National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh,
MSS Acc. 7726 (followed by box and fol numbers)
Round Table Papers, Bodleian Library, MSS Eng. Hist.

(followed by box and fol numbers)

Uncata.ogued papers transferred to Bodleian, 1994
Se 2 borne Papers, Bodleian Library, MSS Sel borne
(followed by box and fol numbers)

sources cited in full.

Canadian Historical Review

English Historical Review

Economic History Review

Historical Journal

International Affairs

Journal of Contemporary History

Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies

Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History

Hew Zealand Journal of History

Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute

Round Table

1

•. THE FPL' HE TABLE IN HISTORY

The Found Table is the name given to a quarterly review of
international, Imperial and Commonwealth affairs which first appeared in
Jovenber 1910 and which, after a brief demise in the early 1980s, is still
published today. Originally the magazine was an offshcot of a Round Table
study movement, with branches in Britain, Canada, Sewfcundland, Australia,
Hew Zealand and South Africa. The purpose of these groups was to discuss
Imperial problems and their solutions, using material supplied by the
central London group, or "Hoot". The Moot preceded both the magazine and
the study groups, and created both with the "one and only purpose", as a
iund-raislng document of 1913 put it, of orchestrating a movement "to bring
about the closer union of the Eritish Empire". '

The Moot had its origins in "Milner's Kindergarten", the group of
young British officials and administrators whom Lord Milr.er recruited after
the South African war of 1899-1902. Initially Just a close-knit fraternity
of Oxford graduates, the "Kindergarten" (like the later Moot) had no formal
constitution. There has often been some confusion as to its membership.
Robert (later Lord) Brand recalled that the key members were himself,

Lionel Curtis, John Dove, (Sir) Patrick Duncan, Richard Feetbam, Lionel
Hichens, J F (Peter) Perry and Geoffrey Robinson (who in 1917 changed his
name to Dawson). Other, more peripheral members were (Sir) Herbert Baker,
John Buchan (later Lord Tweedsmuir), (Sir) George Craik, (Sir) William
Karris, (Sir) James (later Lord) Meston and the Hon Hugh Vyndham (later

1

Round Table Statement", 1913, RT Papers c 778, fols 195-208.

2

Lord Leconfiold). ' Already the meobore of the "Kindergarten" called
themselves "the Moot", partly by way of reference to the " Anglo-Saxon ism"
which thoy and Xilner espoused, partly to indicate their role as a forum
for the diccucsion of "moot", ie debatable and undecided, points. The name
"Round Table", with similar connotations, also appears at this stage: in
1906 John Buchan (now bach in England) paid tribute to "the brilliant minds
of the Round Table". 2

Under Milner's successor Lord Sol borne, the "Kindergarten" - now

joined by Philip Kerr (later Lord Lothian) and (Sir) Dougal Xalcoln -

played an inportant part in the movement leading to South African

unification. Ever, before this object was accomplished, the Moot was

looking further afield. As Curtis wrote to Selborne in 1007,

"It begins to dawn on one that South Africa is a
microcosm and much that we thought peculiar to it is
equally true of the Empire itself .... When we
have done all we can do and should do for South
Africa it may be that we shall have the tine and the
training to begin some work of the same kind in
respect of Imperial Relations." 3 4

The following year, Curtis was more explicit about the new objective.

"It becomes more and more apparent every day to ny
mind that the various countries Included in the
Empire must come to some definite business
arrangement for the support and control of Imperial
defence and foreign policy or the Empire must break
up."* 1

1 Brand, Kote on "Kindergarten", 9 Aug 1958, R? Paperc c 867, fols
51-54. For biographical notes, see Appendix E. Robinson is
hereafter referred to as Dawson throughout.

2 Buchan. The Ledge fn the Vi ldernoss (Edinburgh, 1906), Preface.

3 Curtis to Selborne. 18 Oct 1907, Selborne Papers 71, fol 127.

4 Curtis to Milner. 31 Oct 1908, Milner Papers 195, fols 155-58.

3

At a series of meetings in South Africa and Britain during 1900-10,
what Xilner called "Curtis's scheme"’ was given concrete shape, and the
Round Table organization was born. Duncan, Feethan and Vyndhan stayed on
in South Africa and provided the core of the Round Table group there;

Brand, Craik, Curtis, Dawson, Dove, Hichens, Kerr and Xalcoln returned to
England, where they constituted the nucleus of the metropolitan Koot.
Besides Xilner and Selborne, others who were active in the London group
during its early years were Lord Robert Cecil, Lord Lovat, F S Oliver, Leo
Anery, (Sir) Arthur Steel-Mai tland, (Sir) Edward Grigg (later Lord
Altrincham), (Sir) Reginald Couplaad and (Sir) Alfred Zinaern. 1 2

Most of the early members of the Koot saw the purpose of the Round
Table as being to work towards the creation of "an Imperial government
constitutionally responsible to all the electors of the Empire, and with
power to act directly on the individual citizens". 2 nevertheless there
were, fron the beginning, different views as to how this objective should
be attained, the powers which such a government should exercise, and the
time-scale within which the movement's aims night be achieved.

Curtis was employed by the Moot to produce an argument for "closer
union" which would be acceptable to the London and overseas groups. His
drafts provided a focus for Round Tabic activities for the first half-
decade. But he was ultimately unsuccessful. As H V Hcdson (editor of the

1 Milner's diaries, 26 Aug 1909 and 4 Sept 1909, Milner Papers 60.

2 For a fuller list, sec Appendix B.

Minutes of RT Meeting, 15 to 18 Jan 1910, Lothian Pacers 11,
fols 7-11.

3

4

Found Table from 1934 to 1939) has recently emphasised, Curtis's "federal
aspirations" remained "an agenda to be discussed, not a plan to be
promoted" . 1

Curtis never abandoned his faith in federalism. Vith few
exceptions, his colleagues were and remined more ambivalent. Kerr/Lothian
was a prominent advocate of federalism at various stages of an illustrious
career, but, as Brand later emphasised, he "certainly never held the fixed
unwavering faith of Lionel". 2 Nevertheless, the Hoot as a whole was
reluctant to abandon the ultimate objective which had inspired the creation
of the Round Table, and an Undefined) "organic union" of the Empire
appeared In statements of the Moot's alms as late as 1945.

Even while Curtis was trying to cajole his colleagues into
supporting his own version of federalism, the Round Table magazine was
enjoying a life of Its own, as the vehicle for the Hoot's opinions on a
wide range of domestic, Imperial and International issues. After the First
Vorld Var there were many discussions on whether and how to revitalise the
Round Table “movement". 3ut there was never any question of closing down
the magazine. As an Instrument for broadcasting "Instructive Ideas to the
world at large"* the Round Table was Invaluable.

Like The Times and the SBC, the Round Table aspired to a reputation
for Olympian judgment. Potential subscribers to the magazine in 1947 were

1 Hodson, foreword to Curtis, Vorld Var: Its Cause and Cure (London,
1992 edition), p ii.

2 Brand to Hurrah, 26 Sept 1946, Brand Papers, box 171.

Curtis to Sir Arthur Salter (draft), 17 Apr 1930, Lothian Papers
251, fols 596-99.

3

5

promised "a clear true picture ol world events" and "the factual background
to news with authority and without party bias".’ The provision of
information was an lnportant part of the magazine's role; but information
was balanced by, and delivered In the context of, analysis and argument
which, 11 seldom overtly partisan, was rarely uncommitted.

Until 1966, all articles in the magazine were anonymous. Alaost
half ol each issue consisted ol "chronicles": initially, from Britain and
from Canada, Australia, Sew Zealand and South Africa, where sections of the
local Pound Table groups acted as editorial sub-committees until the late
19C0s. After the First World War, the Round Table published additional
regular articles from correspondents In Ireland, India and the United
States; after the Second, also from Northern Ireland (appended to the
British "chronicle"), Pakistan (from 1947), Central Africa and (briefly)
East Africa. In theory these "chronicles" were meant to be especially
unpartisan, although in practice It was recognised that "no writer who Is
capable of independent thought is likely to be wholly free of bias".*

The remainder of each issue consisted of "policy" articles either
written or commissioned by the Mcot. In time, the leading article came to
bear a special editorial imprimatur. Nevertheless, with a few exceptions
which were introduced as such, all articles were hammered Into an
editorially consistent shape, by a judicious selection of contributors and
a sometimes fundamental revision of the text by the editor and his
conmittee. Unsolicited articles were rarely published, and there was no

1

2

Advertisement in The Sunday Times, 21 Sept 1947.

Morrah to L F G Anthony, nd C Aug 19593 (Rhodesias file), RT <□)
Papers.

6

provision far readers to criticise views expressed in the publication

through letters or other means. As a result, the magazine was able to

convey an identity of viewpoint both as between different articles in the

same issue and as between articles on the same subject over a period of

time. As one editor put it, privately, in 1933,

"... the position is totally different to that of
the 'nineteenth Century' or any other review. Our
articles are anonymous, and the Round Table expresses
its own view in then, whoever writes them. It is
this characteristic which gives us most of our
influence* . '

The core of the London group in the interwar period, as before, was
the "Kindergarten*. Grigg and (to a lesser extent) Coupland retained a
strong interest in the work of the Round Table, but most of the other early
non-" Kindergarten" nenbers either drifted away or resigned. Their places
were taken by new members. Percy Horsfall was recruited in the early
1920s; H V Hodson, (Sir) Ivison Macadam and (Sir) John Xaud (later Lord
Redcliffe-Maud) in the early 1930s; Lord Hailey and Vincent Harlow later in
the decade; Henry (later Lord) Brooke and Dernot Xorrah in the early 1940s;
Sir Olaf Caroe, Nicholas Xansergh and Denzil Xarris in the late 1940s; Sir
Oliver (later Lord) Franks in the 1950s. Further members were recruited
fron 1960 onwards. Hodson later remarked that the names of his older
colleagues "sound like a roll-call of the 'great and good' of the 1930s". 1 2
The description is equally apt in any subsequent decade. Certainly, the
Moot contained many individuals who were eminent and influential in a wide
variety of fields.

1 Dove to Brand, 23 June 1933, Lothian Papers 276, fols 608-11.

2 Hodson, "The Round Table, 1910-81", RT, Oct 1981, p 308.

7

Contemporary Assessments

The Found Table quickly established an enviable reputation as the
leading review of Imperial politics, notable both for its informative
"chronicle" articles and for the readability and judiciousness of its
"policy" contributions. The Round Table archives contain many cuttings
from other newspapers and magazines of all political shades <and from all
parts of the Empire) commanding individual articles or the magazine as a
whole. The Daily Chronicle thought it "indispensable to all serious
students of politics"; the Fat ion praised it as "careful, weighty and
responsible"; and the Pall Hall Gazette declared that "there is no
publication that surpasses it in clearness of thought and statement" . 1

One of the objects of the Moot in producing the magazine was to reach
"the thinking and reading class of people who really make public opinion". 2
In this the Moot appears to have been relatively successful. J C Smuts
told Curtis in 1921 that "the Round Table is the one thing of its kind
which is read by nearly everyone who determines public policy or originates
public opinion" . 3 The Moot was especially keen to reach Dominion opinion,
which it aimed to do at one remove, via the editors of local papers. Again
thoro were grounds for claiming success. In Australia, for instance, 57
papers published in Victoria alone carried prbeis of Round Table articles

1 "Rewspaper Criticisms of the Round Table Quarterly" 11917], RT Papers
c 845, fols 131-34; cf "The Round Table: Opinions of the Press
throughout the Dominions" 119131, UJji, fols 175-79.

2 [Curtis,] "Memorandum" (Auckland, 1910), RT Papers c 776, fol 62.

3 Curtis to A J Glazebrook, 2 Sept 1921, RT Papers c 795, fols 134-40.

8

in 1918'; and In 1949 It was reported that many papers still rolled on the
Found Table both for Information and opinion.*

The Round Table was, for Its time, unique. It aspired, and wac
relied upon by many, to convey 3rltlsh views to the Dominions, Dominion
views to Britain, and an Imperial or Common wealth view to all. Its
authority In foreign countries was important, also. The Hoot was
especially keen to secure a large circulation for the magazine In the
United States. Curtis thought that Its influence was "probably greater in
Europe than In England", partly because (like The Tines) it was believed to
possess a peculiar insight into governnent thinking. 3 Some continental
Journals - such as Le Monde Francois - regularly reprinted whole articles
from each issue.

Soon after the appearance of the first Round Table, Rodolphe Lemieux,
the former Canadian minister, wrote to G M Vrong that "there is an inner
circle in that organisation - I know it, I feel It".** The anonymity of the
Found Table perhaps added to contemporaries' interest In that "inner
circle". Often, outside commentators saw more cohesion and homogeneity In
the group than did the Round Tablers themselves; but, as D C Vatt pointed

1 T H Laby, "Report of the Activities of the Round Table in Australia
during 1918", June 1919 (Melbourne file), RT (0) Papers.

2 D K Picken to Curtis, 18 Sov 1949, Ibid .

3 Curtis to Sir A Salter, 17 Apr 1930 (draft), Lothian Papers 251, fols
596-99.

4 Quoted by James Eayrs, ‘The Round Table Movement in Canada, 1909-20",
Can Hist Rev, Vol XIXTII1 (1957), pp 1-20.

9

out, "in a sense they had only themselves to thank".'

The word which most often cam: to contenporaries' minds when
describing the Round Table, and particularly its "Kindergarten" members,
was "idealist". This adjective was used not only in its philosophical
sense, of a world-view in which ideas were seen as nore poworful than
material things - which was, indeed, the Round Tablers' beliof - but also
in the vernacular sense, of a character or disposition which was high-
minded, disinterested, and determined to bring reality into conformity with
ideals. J G Lockhart described then in 1928 as "full of the noct excellent
intentions", possessed of "tidy minds", and therefore "ever at war with the
incorrigible intellectual sloppiness of the Briton". 2 Less charitablo
critics suggested that the Round Tablers were out of touch with reality,
even crankish. The dowager Lady Kilner, whose disapproval of her husband's
protegds amounted almost to hatred, described then in 1939 as "highbrow
noodles" . 3

"Idealism" was not always a guarantee of serious consideration, let
alone a fair hearing. nevertheless, it is striking how often the Round
Tablers' opponents paid tribute to their intellectual abilities, and to
their role in gingering up the Imperial debate. The Round Tablers were
clearly a force to be reckoned with, in a way that Philpott Williams and

1 Vatt, "The Ken of the Round Table", RT, July 1969, p 328.

2 Janitor CJ G Lockhart], Tie Feet of tie Young Men (London, 1928), pp
171 and 173. At the tine of his death, Lockhart was working on
Curtis's biography.

3 Lady Kilner to Grigg, 28 July 1939, Grigg Papers, MSS Microfilm 1005.

10

Ills Imperial Organization Society (which put forward proposals very sinilar
to Curtis's) were not. Richard Jebb thought that "Curtis has achieved a
wonderful success ... la organising discussion of the whole I Imperial)
question . . . and the Round Table Seeps up its level admirably".’ Henri
Bourassa was more effusive. In his view, the Round Table was "the most
active and Interesting" imperialist group, and Curtis's work “even marked
with a logical trend of reasoning . . . rarely to be found in Anglo-Saxon
productions ". 3 Similar appreciation of the Round Table's efforts to open
up discussion was expressed by writers such as H Duncan Hall and Sir Keith
Hancock, and by politicians such as Sir Robert Borden and Jan Smuts.

At the very least, then, contemporaries credited the Round Tablers
with an inportant role in the debate on Imperial relations, that of
providing (in Hancock's words) a "centre of reference, ever, when the
reference is critical ". 7 Vas it possible to go further, and suggest that
the Round Tablers, as a group, exercised real power? Sodk contemporaries
clearly thought so.

The idea that the Round Tablers not only sought but exercised power
behind the scenes existed even before many of the Round Tablers moved into
positions of power under Lloyd George. Richard Jebb gave currency to the
Idea in his Britannic Question of 1913. But It was under Lloyd George that
the myth really took hold. The Prime Minister himself remarked in 1921
that the Found Table

1 Jebb to Fabian Vare, 2 June 1912, Jebb Papers.

2 Bourassa, Independence or Imperial Partnership ? (Montreal, 1916), pp

5-6.

3 Hancock to Curtis, 23 Sept 1937, Curtis Papers 11, fol 146.

11

"is a very powerful combination - in its way porhapc the
most powerful in the country. Each member of the Group
brings to its deliberations certain definite and
important qualities, and behind the scenes they have
much power and influence".’

Lloyd George was perhaps not the most reliable witness, both because he wa3
himself responsible for elevating the Round Tablers and because he was
renowned for his volatility. Nevertheless, Sir Maurice (Lord) Hanley came
to a similar conclusion, counting the Round Table "among the most
influential" of contemporary "political congeries".* The Round Tablers*
purchase on Lloyd George's administration was by no means universally
welcomed. Sir Henry Vllson thought their influence "poisonous"®, while the
Morning Post (which was unsure "whether the Round Table swallowed Hr Lloyd
George or Mr Lloyd George swallowed the Round Table"* 1 ) described then as "a
. . . palace-guard of idealists, who could be trusted by a sort of
spiritual perversion to tale a line injurious to British interests on every
issue". s Joseph Calllaux tool the opposite view, that the Round Table was
a group of aristocratic nationalists, scheming "to restore simultaneously
the tottering power of their caste and Great Britain's world suprenacy" . 3 4 5 6

1 Lord Riddell's Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference and After
(London, 1933), p 330.

2 S Roskill, Haokey: Man of Secrets, Volume 1 (London, 1970),
pp 422-23.

3 R R James, Memoirs of a Conservative CJ C C Davidson! (London, 1969),
p 138.

4 Morning Post, 15 Sov 1922, cutting in RT Papers c 811, fol 29.

5 Morning Post, 12 June 1923, ibid , fol 30.

6 Caillaux, Vbitber France? Vhither Europe? <tr K K Armstrong.

London, 1923), p 5.

Once acquired, the Round Table's reputation as a "cabal" or
"canarilla" or "Junta" (the latter Sir Vllfrld Laurier's description) was
hard to shake olf. To some degree, It clung to the Round Tablers
throughout the 1920s and '30s. It was given a new lease of life by the
proninent support which Dawson and Lothian gave to the policy of
"appeasement". Most contemporaries failed to distinguish between
individual Round Tablers and the F:»uni Table is o wh'rte. I-ord Davies, for
instance, described tie Xour.d Table In 393b as an "influential group",
engaged in "deliberate sabotage" of the League of Nations and collective
security. 1

The notion that the Moot exercised a powerful "backstairs" Influence
was held by sympathisers as well as detractors. As late as the 1960s, the
members of the Sydney group were conparing unfavourably their own influence
with that of the London Moot 2 , while the New Zealand members apparently saw
themselves "as reporting . . . to a group of wise and powerful men in
London" . 3

This emphasis by others on the collective influence of the Moot
naturally begs the question: how did the Found Tablers themselves assess
their impact?

1 Davies, "'Round Table' or World Comnor. wealth?" , Nineteenth Century,
Vol CXVI I (1935), pp 47-55.

2 D JCacCallum, "The Round Table", 17 Mar 1965 (Sydney file), RT (0)
Papers.

3 L Beaton to Sir R Vade-Gery, 14 June 1965 (Eeaton file), RT (0)
Papers.

13

Thonas Jones noted In his diary In 1936 that "all the Round Tablers
are good at collecting any credit there Is going, like the Scotch".’ This
assertion is not easy to reconcile with the reticence of many of the
leading Round Tablers. (One American Journalist, sent to interview Curtis
in 1949, found hin "so overwhelmed with his own unimportance that there was
almost no interview". 1 2 3 ) Indeed, Round Tablers' claims of specifically
Round Table influence were, in fact, few and far between. A fund-raising
circular of 1920 Dade some core or less minor claims, ranging from the
decision to include foreign affairs within the purview of the Imperial
Conlerence in 1911 to the decision to call an Imperial Var Cabinet and
Conference in 1917. * A draft article by John Dove for the Journal
Overseas, written in 1924, nade the rather nore important claim that the
Round Table was the author of the 1919 reforms in India. 4 5 6 Curtis asserted
that his Found Table article of June 1921 "inspired the Irish Treaty . . .
and led to the creation of the Irish Free State' . * Curtis also claimed
that he had not only popularised but discovered the term "Commonwealth" as
a more fitting description for an Enpire whose "function In the world was
to promote the government of men by thensel ves" . e Other claims of Round

1 T Jones, A Diary with Letters , 1931-50 (Oxford, 1954), p 173.

2 Kathleen A Schiller, "Lionel Curtis - the Man", Freedom and Union

(Get 1949), pp 7-8.

3 Draft of fund-raising circular, (1920,3 Brand Papers, box 42.

4 John Dove, "The Round Table: A Xystery Probed", 18 Dec 1924. Ib1d r

box 70.

5 Curtis to Macadam, 8 July 1953 <ed ctee file), PT (0) Papers.

6 Hancock, Survey of Conmonwealtb Affairs, Vol Is Problems of
i rationality, 1918-36 (London, 1937), p 54.

14

Table influence are more difficult to find. Perhaps the Moot became
embarrassed by the rather extravagant reputation which Its members hod
acquired by the 1920s. Nevertheless, it is significant that the Round
Tablers returned again and again to the lessons of South African
unification, the one episode in which those who formed the core of the
later Round Table acted as a coherent group, and for which they were almost
universally given credit.

Historical Assessments

"Surely it Is a waste of time to write a long book on the Round
Table* , Curtis exclained In 1953, after reading John Conway's Harvard
thesis - a study of the Round Table's early coverage of Imperial
organisation, Ireland and India.' Vhat particularly galled him was
Conway's suggestion that the Round Table had performed " volte-faces " on
India and Ireland, and was therefore not to be reckoned an influence on
government policy. Curtis thought Conway's work 'positively misleading".

He changed his nind after meeting Conway, and even suggested that he might
make a useful Round Table correspondent . 2

Curtis's conment was, indeed, uncharacteristic. Of all the Round
Tablers, he was perhaps the most convinced of the historical value of their
work. In his private correspondence, references to "the future historian"

1 Conway, "The Round Table: A Study in Liberal Imperialism" (Harvard
PhD thesis, 1951).

2 Curtis to Macadam, 6 July 1953; Curtis to Morrah, 5 Aug 1953 <ed ctee
file), FT (0) Papers.

15

abound. In 1933, for iaotance, he criticised Lothian's decision not to
attend tho Toronto Commonwealth Relations conference: "Consider for a
nonent tho view which somo historian of our movement 50 years hence would
take". 1 The Round Tablers were generally conscientious In saving records
for posterity. Initially it was thought "that our history can be
satisfactorily written only by one of our own body, who knows the movement
from the inside*. 2 Unfortunately none of the Hoot had tho time to devote
to such a task, although in 1981 Hodson wrote an article for tho Round
Table, which remains the most authoritative introduction to tho subject. 3

Conway was the first of a number of North American scholars to
investigate different aspects of the Round Table's history. D C Ellinwood
followed hin in 1962 with a study of Xilner's "Kindergarten" and the
moveirent for imperial federation to 1919. Although generally sympathetic,
Ellinwood concluded that the strength of Dominion nationalism made the
group's "failure" inevitable. Like Conway, he emphasised the central role
of Milner. * G R Allison submitted a nore wide-ranging thesis in 1964,
again placing the Round Table firmly in the tradition of "new imperialism",
but emphasising its influence on the policy of "appeasement" (an influence
which he condemned vigorously).* Like Conway and Ellinwood, Allison relied

1 Curtis to Lothian, 15 Apr 1933, Lothian Papers 263, fols 245-50.

2 Korrafc to Aaery, 3 Dec 1951 <ed ctee file), RT (0) Papers.

3 Hodson, "The Sound Table, 1910-81", AT, Oct 1931, pp 308-33.

4 Ellinwood, "Milner's Kindergarten, the British Round Table group and
the Movement lor Imperial Reform” (Washington PhD thesis, 1962).

5 Allison, "Iaperialism and Appeasement: A Study in the Ideas of the
Round Table Group" (Harvard PhD thesis, 1964).

16

entirely on published sources. All three scholars were unsure ol the
composition of the grcup, and included many non-Pound Tablers.

By the early 1960s it was clear that no nenber of the Koot would be
able to undertake a history of the movement, and the Round Table archives
were opened to scholars. Ironically, one of the first to benefit was
Carroll Quigley. Quigley had already conceived an intense dislike of the
Round Table, which he saw as the "Inner core" of a Rhodesian-Milnerite
"secret society", with branches all over the English-speaking world. In
1949 he had written a book on the • Anglo-Anerican Establishment" (not
actually published until 1981) in which he put forward this view, and
asserted that the Round Tablers were "persons whose lives have been a
disaster to our way of life".' A brief rummage through the Round Table
files merely confirmed his views. Consequently, he published an article
(re-)af firming his belief that the Round Table was "founded by Milner . . .
to create an immense nexus of influence and patronage", and claiming that
it was "unquestionably the most influential grcup in British political life
for at least 30 years". 2 A second, unpublished article made the more
specific claim that the Round Table was "the most significant aberrant
influence on the foreign policy of Chamberlain and Halifax", and
that the group favoured a large measure of "colonial appeasement"
as a step towards "partnership" with Fazi Germany. 3 Macadam

1 Quigley, The Anglo-Asierlcan Establishment from Rhodes to Cliveden
(Few York, 1981), p xi.

2 Quigley, "The Round Table in Canada. 1908-38", Can Hist Rev,

Vol XLIII (1962), pp 204-24.

3 Quigley, "The African Issue in the Appeasement Program, 1037-39",
copy in Brand Papers, box 171.

17

thought hi a "crazy*. 1

In 1906 another American, Valter Nimccks, published a acre sober
study of Milner's "Kindergarten", Baking extensive use of the Milner and
Dawson papers, as well as core limited use of the Lothian and Round Table
collections. Slmocks was able tc paint a more vivid picture than
Ell inwood. But in basic interpretation he differed little: he saw the
Round Tahlers primarily as Milnerites, and again emphasised the "failure"
of the movement, "with only the quarterly nagazine to mark the fact that It
had ever existed". In contrast to Quigley, Nimocks believed that " as.. a.
group " the Round Table "had little influence on Edwardian affairs". 2
Himocks presumably believed that the Rcund Table had even less influence
thereafter, since his narrative stopped abruptly in 1914.

The Canadian historian John Kendle took the story further, with his
study of The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union, published in 1975.
Kendle had already thrown new light on the early history of the movement,
in two articles on Curtis's activities In New Zealand in 1910, another on
the Foot's espousal of UK devolution, and a chapter on the group's
preparations for the 1911 Imperial Conference. 3 In his longer study,

Kendle made extensive use of the available sources in Britain and Canada to

1 Facadan to Brand, 27 Aug 1962, Ibid .

2 Finocks, Milner's Young Ken: The Kindergarten in Edvardian Imperial
Affairs (London, 1968), pp 219 and viii.

3 Kendle, "The Rcund Table, New Zealand and the Imperial Conference of
1911", JCPS, Vol III no 2 (1955), pp 104-17; "The Round Table
Fovement, Lionel Curtis and the Formation of the Hew Zealand Groups",
SZ J of Hist, Vol 1 no 1 (1967), pp 33-50; "The Round Table Movement
and ‘Home Rule All Round 1 ", Hist Journal, Vol XI no 2 <1968). pp 332-
53; The Colonial and Inperial Conferences, 1887-1911 (London, 1967),
ch 7.

18

produce a well-balanced and still valuable account of the Round Tablo'c
early years. As his title suggests, Kendle' s main interest was in the fate
of the Round Table's original, federal, purpose, although he included
chapters on "Home Rule All Round" and on India, and a somewhat laconic
chapter on "the twilight years" after the First World War. In his view,
the Round Table "ceased to be a movement and The Round Table ceased to be a
quarterly devoted primarily to enplre-comnonwealth concerns" after this
point. 1

Although he conceded that Dominion nationalism "can be over-
emphasized", Kendle attributed the Round Table's "failure" primarily to the
fact that the members of the London group "never really understood dominion
feelings*. Had they done so, they would have realised that their "major
goals, especially imperial federation . . . were probably hopeless
aspirations from the beginning" . 'The same view has reter.tly been put
forward by John Eddy and Deryck Schreuder: the "ultimate failure of
'constructive imperialism' was as hopeless as the earlier British
mercantile imperial attempts to forge a north-west passage through winter
ice". 2 ) Perhaps the most valuable legacy of the Round Table was to have
"helped demolish the prejudice against granting self-government to India". 3

1 Kendle, The Round Table Koveoent and Iaperial Union (Toronto, 1975),
p 274.

2 Eddy and Schreuder, "The Edwardian Empire" in The Rise of Colonial
Kationalisa <Lcndon and Sydney, 1983), p 45.

3 Kendle, The Round Table Koveoent, pp 301-03.

19

In an earlier article, Kendle had suggested that the Round Table was,

during its early years, an "extremely powerful" group. 1 In his longer

work, however, he concluded that

"the influence of the movement . . . has often been
exaggerated .... On occasion, of course, especially
before 1914, the movement, particularly the London
group, did have some influence in governmental circles
In Great Britain and the dominions .... Even so it
oust be realised that very few of the Round Table
oenbers were really influential - in positions of power
or with long-time access to powerful men".

Kendle made this statenent "only in the context of imperial affairs", and

he allowed that a "somewhat different assessment might be required if

foreign affairs and the problen of appeasement were being examined". *

Since the appearance of Kendle* s study, no historian has attempted to

dispute the main lines of his argument or to provide yet another "long

book" on the Round Table movement as a whole. But the Australian Round

Table groups have been the subject of a fascinating study by Leonie Foster

which, as Kendle wrote in the foreword, provides "a model for similar work

in other parts of the Conmonwealth". Foster's work differs from previous

studies of the Round Table not only in tackling the history of the local

groups, but also in its historical scope - tracing the groups' history from

1910 as far as their demise in the 1970s - and in treating the Round Table

magazine rather than the "movement" as the primary focus of Round Table

activities. Foster emphasised that "Australian and British interests have

never been identical", and that in the last resort "the [Australian]

1 Kendle, "The Round Table Movement: Lionel Curtis and the Formation of
the Few Zealand Groups", p 33.

2 Kendle, The Round Table Movement, p 305.

20

articles reflected the primacy of the Australian national Interest".
Bevertheles6, as her study ably demonstrates, there was a broad middle
ground in which "native and Imperial loyalties mingled happily".’

Deborah Lavin' s essays on Lionel Curtis have brought vividly to life
the character, ideas and methods of the Round Table's leading founder. 2 In
Lavin' s view, Curtis "propagated the multinational Commonwealth and was . .

. the first to explore in any detail the ideal of multiracial Commonwealth"
- although the "modern Commonwealth of national entities has turned out to
be a far cry from his dream of a supra-national state". 3 Lavin' s work
casts doubt as well as light on some of the previously accepted nostrums of
Round Table historiography, by demonstrating the extent to which "Round
Table" work was often Curtis's alone, and the result of some very non-
Milnerite influences.

Andrea Bosco and the Lothian Foundation have stimulated
reconsideration of the federalist aspects of the Round Table's history by
sponsoring a wide range of publications asserting their continuing
relevance and (if applied to Europe rather than the Commonwealth)
practicability. Bosco' s own epistemological studies have credited Curtis

1 Foster, High Hopes: the Men and Motives of the Australian Round Table
(Melbourne, 1986), foreword, p 4 and passim .

2 Lavin, "History, Morals and the Politics of the Empire: Lionel Curtis
and the Round Table" in J 3ossy and P Jupp (eds) Essays Presented to
Michael Roberts (Belfast, 1976); "Lionel Curtis and the Idea of
Commonwealth* in F Madden and D K Fieldhouse (eds) Oxford and the
Idea of Commonwealth (London, 1982); "Lionel Curtis and Indian
dyarchy" in Andrea Bosco (ed) The Federal Idea, Volume 1 (London,
1991).

3 Lavin, "Lionel Curtis and the Idea of Commonwealth* , p 97.

21

and Lothian with a coherent federalist philosophy, and an effective
critique "of International anarchy and of the appearance of totalitarianism
within the nation state". In Bosco' s view, the Round Table was mainly
significant as "the link between inperlal and international federalism" .
Indeed, at times Bosco appears to argue that Lothian, at least, was a
federalist first and an Imperialist only second. 1

Curiously, one aspect of the Round Tablers' history which has
received little recent attention is "appeasement" . An exception is Kathryn
Tidrick's book on Empire and the English Character , In which she a lie
Allison and Quigley) counts all the Round Tablers as "appeasers".

Historians who are reluctant to endorse the conspiratorial view of the
■Cliveden Set" are, she suggests, perhaps guilty of "succunbing to the same
judiciousness which afflicted its supposed members". 2

Sqa£ Pi Qhl eas

Contemporary and historical assessments of the Round Table have
raised a number of important questions, not all of which have found
entirely satisfactory answers. Perhaps the most important is, still, the
question of the nature and extent cf Round Table influence. Allison,

Quigley and others have provided one answer; Himocks and Kendle another.

The latter certainly seems more plausible. Yet there remains southing

1 Eosco, " National Sovereignty and Peace" in J Turner <ed>, The Larger
Idea (London, 1988). pp 108, 121 and 122 (Lothian "regarded
federalism as a form to fill with a content"). For Bosco' c other
works and the Lothian Foundation's publications, see bibliography.

Tidrick, Expire and the English Character (London, 1990), p 311 note
15 (generally, pp 271 ff).

2

22

elusive about the Round Table's Influence even In Its "movement" stage, as

well as a wide field of unexplored endeavour thereafter. As Foster has

very pertinently suggested,

"The criteria for 'failure' Deed closer examination.

How can failure of a movement he measured? Ho results?
Unexpected results? Collapse? Length of existence?

The ultimate failure of the Round Table nenbers to
achieve closer union does not write them off. In the
midst of failure they had their successes". 1

Influence is, of course, very difficult to quantify even in the case of a

single individual. In the case of a movement, a group and a magazine it is

well-nigh impossible. The question needs to be broken down if there is any

hope of reaching even a tentative answer.

To take the "movement'' aspect of the Round Table enterprise first,
most historians believe that it was inevitable that the Round Table should
have failed. The Round Tablers themselves clearly thought it was not. On
what grounds did they base this view? And why did they think that the
component parts of the Empire had sufficient interests in common to justify
common policies and even common institutions? Again, contemporaries and
historians have generally assumed that the Round Table's claim to be a
"study" organisation was Just a tactical ruse: that, as J G Lockhart put
it, "the answers were already written out and reposing in Lionel Curtis's
pocket". 2 But was this really the case? Or was imperial federalism itself
a "moot" point? If so, in what ways and for what reasons did other Round
Tablers disagree with Curtis? And to what extent did the Round Tablers'
views develop after 1910?

1 Foster, op cit . p 162.

2 Janitor CJ G Lockhart!, Tbo Feet of tbe Young Hen (London, 1928).
p 177.

23

The answers to such questions might help to provide answers to other
ones, more Immediately germane to the "failure" of the Found Table
"noveirent". At what point, or points, did the Found Tablers thembelves
recognise imperial federation to be Impracticable: before the First Vorld
Var, during, or after? Did they attribute "failure" primarily to the views
of the Dominions, and of the Dominion Round Table groups in particular?

Vhat of British views? And what of changes in those circumstances which
had led them to embark on the Round Table enterprise in the first place?

If the Round Tablers did realise that their movement had "failed", we still
need to establish whether they saw "failure" as permanent or merely
temporary. This in turn will help to establish whether they re-assessed
their aims, or Just the means by which they hoped to achieve these aims.

Already it is clear that the dynamics of the Moot itself must be re-
examined. Contemporaries generally assumed that it was possible to speak
of a Round Table group identity. On the other hand, Hi mocks and Kendle
have both suggested that that identity faded after the First Vorld Var.

The problem deserves closer attention. Vhat were the sources of Round
Table cohesion before the First Vorld Var, and to what extent did they
change after? Vas agreement easier in some areas than in others, and, if
so, why? How important was Round Table membership to individual members of
the Moot? Conversely, what did individual members bring to the group?

Vere some members more dominant than others? And what light can the
history of the Moot throw on the careers and intellectual development of
individuals who were, in many cases, worthy of study in their own right?

Such questions concerning the internal dynamics of the Moot help to
clarify the larger questions concerning the Round Table's activities as a
pressure group. Vhoa did the Round Tablers seek to influence? Vere they

24

primarily concerned with changing political attitudes and policy in the
Dominions or did they hope to exert influence in Britain itself? On what
level did the Found Tablers seek to operate? Did they seek to bring about
a “revolution by dinner party", as John Turner so pithily put it?’ In
other words, were they primarily interested in using “backstairs" influence
to change the attitudes of politicians and officials? Or were they
primarily concerned to Influence "opinion", that amorphous and elusive, yet
all-important construct of modern democracy? In either case, how did they
seek to do so? And in what contexts and circumstances were they successful?

The Root's primary activity, certainly after 1916 or so, was running
the Found Table magazine. The views put forward will therefore help to
throw light on the Moot's role as a pressure group, and on the
circumstances in which it felt either compelled or able to act in such a
capacity. Where, then, did these who wrote for the Found Table diverge
from British policy, and where did they seek to modify it? Where, on the
ether hand, did they seek to explain and to justify British policy? To the
extent that the Round Table put forward a coherent view of the
Empire /Commonwealth, what light did it threw on the nature of British
imperialism in general? Was there, indeed, a distinctive "Round Table"
version of imperialism?

Questions of influence are, of course, important; but they are not
necessarily all-important. Intentions are often more interesting than
results; certainly they help to illuminate the thought-processes of
previous generations, to whom in some respects we are so close, yet who, in
other respects, inhabited a very different world.

1

Turner, "Lord Lothian and His World" in The Larger Idea (London,
1988) , p 5.

25

ms

The origins and early history of the Round Table have been covered In
some detail by Ellinwood, Hi mocks, Kendle and other historians,
levertheless, it is necessary to cover a certain amount of old ground in
order to emphasise, clarify or dispute points which have an inportant
bearing on the subsequent history of the Round Table.

Alfred. Lord Kllner

Lord Xilner w as sometimes; referred to as the "leader" of the Round
Table, more often as its "chairman". He was especially venerated by the
"Kindergarten" - who referred to him as "H.E.* or "his triple X" - but he
was also responsible for introducing nany of the non-" Kindergarten" members
of the Hoot, and he organised most of the finance. His role in the early
organisation was therefore pivotal. He also provided much of the
intellectual inspiration behind the Round Table movement. The extent to
which the Round Tablers later developed and even departed from Xilner's
idea3 is, of course, one of the questions raised by the history of the
movement.

Hllner was a iran of "very deep prej udices" 1 , whose opinions were
largely fixed. At their heart was a "British Race - Patriotism" which

1

Vincent Massey’s impression after meeting Milner In 1912: Claude
Bissell, The Young Vincent Kassey (Toronto, 1981), p 95.

claimed "that this is the law of human progress, that the competition

between nations, each seeking its maximum development, is the Divine Order

of the world, the law of Life and Progress". '

Towards non-Europeans Milner's attitude was one of paternalism, a

belief in "the inherent superiority of the European In certain qualities of

brain and character". This allowed him to embrace the "Rhodesian* ideal of

"equal rights for every civilised man", In the belief that few non-

Europeans would ever attain the level of "civilisation" of Europeans. 2

Towards non-British Europeans, Milner's attitude was one of greater fear.

He regarded international politics as a "racial" struggle, and imperial

politics as a contest between the "English" or "British" on one hand, and

the Irish, Quebe«;oIs and Afrikaners on the other. As he wrote to Curtis in

1908, after a visit to Canada,

"I am more than ever impressed ... by the fact that
the only real and permanent tie of Empire is race . . .

[thatl without a strong and enduring British leaven,
a large mass of the population to whom British
traditions, British history, and the British language
are dear, it is impossible permanently to retain any
great white community in political connection with the
mother country". *

Like his friend and Oxford contemporary Sir George Parkin - the "bagman of
Empire" for whose lecture- tours of the 1890s Milner arranged much of the
finance - Milner saw the consolidation of the white Empire as a

1 Milner, "The Key to My Position", printed In The Times,

27 July 1925 (often referred to as Milner's "Credo").

2 Milner's last speech in South Africa, 13 Feb 1925, published in Cape
Tines, 14 May 1925 (cutting in Grigg Papers, MSS Microfilm 1002).

3 Milner to Curtis, 1 Dec 1903, Curtis Papers 1, fol 231.

27

question of "National Onion". 1

It followed from Milner's national Darwinism that the nation, not the
individual or class, was the fundamental "organic" social unit. He
supported a limited programme of social reform, state intervention and
"Hational Efficiency" on the grounds that "there can be no enduring Empire
without healthy, thriving, manly people at the centre" . a But he also
believed that national power was a precondition of national prosperity, and
that "this country must remain a great Power or she will become a poor
country". Like Captain Mahon, another Important influence on the Round
Tablers, Milner likened national power to reserve cash in a bank, which,
although rarely necessary to use, determined the effectiveness and even
survival of a struggling business. 9 '

Given his experience as an unsuccessful parliamentary candidate <in
1665) , his belief In the existence and priority of a "national" view, and
the contemporary political ineffectiveness of the "new" imperialism, it was
perhaps inevitable that Milner should conceive what was at times a violent
dislike towards the British political system. He viewed party politics as
"a pure struggle of ins and outs without any inner meaning . . . whatever":
a system which gave "ultimate power" to "ignorant people", who would

1 Milner, "Mr Chamberlain and Imperial Policy", in The Life of Joseph
Chamberlain (Associated Newspapers Ltd, London, 1914), p 205. The
description of Parkin was Lord Rosebery's.

2 Milner, Constructive Imperialism: Five Speeches (London, 1908),
p 69.

3 Milner's speech to the Manchester Conservative Club, 14 Dec 1906,
Imperial Unity: Two Speeches (London, 1907), p 7; see also Milner's
speech to the Canadian Club, Vancouver, 9 Oct 1908, The Nation and
the Empire (London, 1913), p 307.

28

Inevitably be unreceptive to •trained knowledge and complete information". 1
His conception was fundamentally bureaucratic. "Organisation was his
watchword*, and he thought that misnanagenent "nay do much core harm than
murder".® In his view, " adni nistrati on" was "government in the truo sense
of the word" . * He believed in governwrnt by "experts*, and perhaps only
fellow-experts could recognise expertise. He held little faith in party
politicians being able to do so.

Milner's dislike of the British political systen was well formed even
before his appointment as High Conmissioner of South Africa in lfi-97.
nevertheless, his experience in that post gave a bitter personal twist to
his views. The Unionists were lacking in that quintessential Milnerlte
quality, "thorough"; and they were divided by Joe Chamber lai n' s campaign
for Tariff Reform. The Liberals, on the other hand, were revitalised by
opposition to the war - for the outbreak and prolongation of which Milner
was, perhaps rightly, held responsible'’ - and to Milner's subsequent use of
“Chinese slavery". Milr.er resigned while the Unionists were still in power
but his name remained anathema to Liberals.

1 Milner to Lady Edward Cecil, 16 May 1903, quoted In Cecil Headlam
(ed), The Milner Tapers: South Africa, Yol 11 (London, 1933),

pp 446-9.

2 Rt Hon H U Fisher, quoted in "At Few College", Rational Review,

Vcl 107 (Nov 1936), p 611; Milner, Bustle (Froebel Institute, Oxford.
1897), p 5.

3 Milner to Sir Lewis Michell, 13 May 1904, Milner Papers 188,
fols 53-54.

4 For a damning indictment, see Eric Stokes, "Milnerism" , Hist Journal,
Vol V (1962), pp 47-60.

Although he recognised that he was not cut out to be a "successful
politician In the ordinary sense"’, Milner was determined to remain a force
ID politics: "to work quietly In the background, in the formation of
opinion rather than la the exercise of power" . * The extent to which he
attempted to build up a caucus of his own is debatable. His main work lay
in propagandising for the "new" imperialism, in laying the groundwork for
future changes, nevertheless, this work Involved him in acting as an
unofficial "fixer* for the imperialist movement.

Milner’s personal generosity was legendary. After his death, his
widow was to conplaln that the number of his dependents was "legion".® But
the main source of funds for Milner's lnperlallst nexus was the Rhodes
Trust, of which he was the most active Trustee." Large amounts were found
for the South African Association and Progressive Party, and for Sir Percy
Fitzpatrick. Others who benefited included Halford Mackinder and Leo
Aoery.'' Amery had been the Times war correspondent in South Africa, and
was now editing the Times History of that war. He was also writing various
articles in favour of national service and Tariff Reform. 2 3 4 5 6 Defeated as a

1 Milner to Dawkins, 21 Apr 1904, quoted in Headlam, op c:t Vol II,
p 550.

2 Milner's speech at Johannesburg, 31 Mar 1905, The Nation and the
Empire (London, 1913), p 90.

3 Lady Milner to C-rigg, 8 June 1925, Grigg Papers, MSS Microfilm 1002.

4 Milner to Alfred Beit, 9 Sept 1914, Milner Papers 469, fols 138-9.

5 Details of payments in Milner Papers, boxes 468-477.

6 Reprinted as The Froblen of the Army (London, 1903) and The
Fundamental Fallacies of Free Trade (London. 1906).

30

Unionist candidate in 1906, Anery was funded by the Rhodes Trust to act o»
a one-man "imperial secretariat" for Kilner, and to continue his work
organising the Compatriots' Club.’ The latter was a sort of Kilner
Appreciation Society started by Amery in January 1904, with branches in
both England and South Africa. Its object was "to advance the ideal of a
United British Empire". It petered out sometime around 1911, when Amery
obtained the safe Unionist seat of Birmingham South. 2

The "Kladsrgartgn"

The most significant group of Hllner's proteges, who would form the
backbone of the South African Compatriots and later of the Round Table, was
his South African "Kindergarten". The origins of this group go back to
1900-01, when Milner, preparing for his role as Governor of the two
defeated republics, began recruiting staff. Deluged by an "enormous number
of applications" 51 , Kilner fell back on the criteria of personal, family and
college connections as the simplest way of building a cohesive, loyal team.

All graduates of Oxford, and all, save Duncan and Dawson, of New
College, the "Kindergarten" shared a contempt for the outlandish Boers and

1 Amery to Kilner, 30 Mar 1903, Kilner Papers 476, fols 6-8.

2 A copy of the "Rules of the Compatriots Club", including membership
lists for England and South Africa, is in Lothian Papers 4, item 279.
The Club was revived as a parliamentary group in June 1923 with Amery
as chairman; his diaries mention Compatriots' Club dinners as late as
October 1947, but in its second incarnation the Club was apparently
not an active pressure group. See Julian Barnes and David Nicholson
<eds) .The Leo Amery Diaries (London, 1980 and 1088) passim-

3 V Baillie Hamilton (Colonial Office) to Lord Ralph Kerr, 21 June
1903, Lothian Papers 453, fol 2.

31

uneducated Britons In whose country they landed.’ They stuck together,
sharing houses, holidaying and sporting together, and organising "Oxford
dinners". Above all, they were united by a common veneration for "H E",
Lord Rllner. John Buchan wrote that "loyalty to miner and his creed was a
strong cement which endured long after our South African service ended".*

A L Rowse has suggested that "homo-eroticism" was an element in miner's
relationship with the "Kindergarten". 3 ' This can be neither proved nor
disproved. Vhat is certain is that service with miner would be a useful
"apprenticeship" in public affairs"; and that a large part of miner's
attraction was his "unflinching devotion" to the Imperialist cause.®

After his retirement, Milner was pessimistic about the prospects for
British interests in southern Africa: his friend and one-time amour Margot
Asquith reported that "he has got it on the brain that we shall lose South
Africa". * The "Kinde" shared some of Milner's pessimism and they

1 See, eg, Perry to V P Ker, 23 Oct 1900, printed in E C Hodgkin, "The
Kindergarten", The Times, 13 July 1974.

2 John Buchan, Memory Hold the Door (London, 1940), p 99.

3 A l Rowse, "Lionel Curtis: the Prophet" in Glimoses of the Great
(London, 1935), p 342.

4 R S Rait to Lord Ralph Kerr, 26 June 1903, Lothian Papers 453, fol 3.

5 Hichens, quoted in "At Hew College", National Review, Vol 107 (Fov
1936), p 603.

6 Margot Asquith, Autobiography, Vol II (London, 1922), p 85.

32

recognised that self-government "will give the Dutch a majority".'

Fevertheless, the "Kindergarten" still expected a predominantly
British South Africa. One means by which this was to be achieved was
through British inmigration, and the other members of the "Kindergarten"
gave Dove much support in his work for the Land Settlement Board. At one
point there was even a " Ki ndergar ten" committee to supervise land
settlement schenes. A handbook for suitably wealthy settlers was later run
off as a preliminary issue of the Round Table. * The other means was the
unification of South Africa. A disunited South Africa was an economically
backward South Africa, rendering large-scale Immigration Impossible. As
Selborne put the argunent later, "there can be no expansion without
stability; and there can be no stability without Federation. 0 E D.

Thus, with Lord Selborne's approval and encouragement, the
"Kindergarten" set to work as a "deadly secret Ctee"'* to promote the cause
of federation. Milner was persuaded to arrange £1000 initial finance for
the project, from the Rhodes Trust.* Curtis combined the knowledge and
ideas of the group in a memorandum outlining the case for unification.

This memorandum, after amendment and approval by Selborne and the

1 Kerr to lord Ralph Kerr, 28 Jan 1906, Lothian Papers 454, fol 7.

2 The Pound Table: Preliminary Issue, 25 July 1910, copy in Rhodes House
Library. The conmittee consisted of Dove, Vyndham, Duncan, Feetham,
Perry and Dawson, but it appears to have been inactive: see the
letter from the last four to Curtis, 23 Aug 1909, in Lothian Papers
11, fols 42-5.

3 Selborne to Duncan, 30 Hov 19.07, quoted in L K Thompson, The
Unification of South Africa, 1902-10 (Oxford, 1960), p 80.

4 Dawson's diary, 1 Sept 1906, Dawson Papers 12.

5 Kilner to Robinson (Dawson), 21.9.06, Dawson Papers 61, fols 38-45.

33

"Kindergarten", was published in July 1907.'

The "Selborne Kemorandun" , as it becaoe known, was a forceful
document, calculated to stir white South Africans of both "races'. An
introductory chapter <which, as ex-Presldent Stejn of the Orange Free State
noted, was "full of . . . bad history"'') asserted the common "Teutonic"
origins of both British and Afrikaners. The Memorandum went on to describe
the deleterious effects of disunion, with particular emphasis on southern
Africa's railway ar.d fiscal development (for which Brand and Kerr provided
much useful material), and on "Native and Labour Questions'. Much was made
of the need to provide overwhelming force for the 'defence of civilisation"
against the "uncivilised masses", and of the trouble caused by "5 or 6"
different "native" and "Asiatic" policies. Finally, the Memorandum held
out to white South Africans the possibility of expansion northwards - the
development of "vast and vacant" lands, even as far as Lake Tanganyika, "in
whatever degree this great region is a country where white men can work and
thrive and multiply ". 9

The Memorandum had no great immediate effect. It was only with the
downfall of Jameson in the Cape elections of January 1908 that Afrikaner
politicians awoke to the possibilities inherent in pursuing the cause of

1 See Thompson, op cit . pp 67-70, for Curtis's Intrigues with Jameson
and F S Malan to get the memorandum published.

2 Ibid, p 77.

3 Basil Williams (ed> , 7 be Selborne Xeaorandun (Oxford, 1925): pp 109
and 112 ("defence of civilisation . . ."), 140 and 145 ("vast and
vacant ...">. The Memorandum was first published, with an appendix
by Kerr on "South African Railway Unification", as Cd 3564, 1907.

34

Onion. From then on events moved with astounding rapidity, with Botha,
Smuts, Herrlman and others arguing for full unification, not Just
federation. 1 2

The 'Kindergarten" expanded Its work In a variety ol directions.

Curtis and Feetbam, Sel borne's nominees in the Transvaal upper house,
maintained the pressure there. Dawson converted the Star and The Uses to
vehicles of propaganda for the movement, and Curtis wrote regular articles
for the Morning Fost. Vith funding from Abe Bailey and Lord Salisbury,
Curtis set about organising "Closer Onion Societies", of which there were
more than sixty by torch 1909. Kerr - who in May 1907 had turned down
Selborne's offer of "Federation work", on the grounds that it night
prejudice his chances of getting a gcod appointment with a colonial
government* - was persuaded to edit a new monthly magazine, The State,
devoted to the aim of unification and again funded by Bailey. In February
1909 a draft constitution was ready, and the "Kindergarten" threw its
efforts into ensuring a safe passage through the four colonial legislatures
(Southern Rhodesia having opted out by this stage). In Fatal, by now the
only British-dominated colony, these efforts were particularly crucial.

In later years, members of the "Kindergarten" received a great deal of
credit as "the men who conceived and carried through the Union of South
Africa". 3 At the time, Selborne congratulated Curtis in particular:

1 The "Kindergarten" acquiesced in the rejection of federalism. Indood,
Curtis later claimed that his research had shown a unitary
constitution to be preferable: Curtis to Kerr, 21 July 1910, Lothian
Papers 1, fol 64.

2 Kerr to Lady Ann© Kerr, 20 May 1907, Lothian Fapers 456, fol 25.

3 "Frederick Scott Oliver", The Times, 5 June 1934; cf John Dove, "The
Round Tabla : A Mystery Probed", 1924, Brand Papers, box 70.

35

"although you had many splendid helpers, the main cred.it for this work must
always be yours".’ In Leonard Thompson's view, this was clearly a case of
confusion between the midwife and the mother. nevertheless, the
"Kindergarten's" role in South Africa became a fundamental element in the
Bound Table's mystique, Important both in projecting the group as a
significant and effective political force, and in providing it with a model
for future action.

liie Imperial Problem

By the time of the foundation of the Round Table, the prospects for
Imperial integration seemed, In many ways, bleak. Chamberlain's campaign
for imperial preference had already run into the sands of domestic
opposition; and the various schemes for improved consultation and co-
operation associated with Sir Frederick Pollock's informal "committee" had
likewise failed to make significant headway. 2 The Colonial Conference of
1907 resulted in changes which were more symbolic than substantial, the
British Government this time leading the sceptics. 3 Indeed, the relations

1 Selborne to Curtis, 6 Feb 1909, RT Papers c 876, fol 62.

2 On the "Pollock Committee", see Y G Miller, 'The Continued Agitation
for Imperial Union, 1895-1910* <D Phil thesis, Oxford, 1981) chc 1
and 2; J E JCendle, The Colonial and Imperial Conferences (London,
1967), ch 4.

3

Kendle, op c i t . ch 5.

36

between Britain and tie Dominions (as they were now called) seened to be
increasingly intractable as a result of a growing awareness of distinct and
even divergent interests and priorities.’

"Colonial Sationalism" was the subject of a seminal work by Richard
Jebb, published in 1905, in which the distinctness of colonial identities
was forcefully asserted. 2 Historians John Fddy, Deryck Schreuder and
others have demonstrated the extent tc which Jebb "exposed an i Timetable
rock of emerging social reality", which was bound to make all subsequent
centralising efforts a "grand ballet of incomprehension". 3 Such an
eventuality was by no means clear at the tine, however.

In an essay published in the sane year as his Studies, Jebb denied
that there was any necessary opposition either between colonial nationalism
and imperial unity, or between co-oporaticn and federation . n Likewise, it
was possible to read Jebb's Studies as proof of the "new imperialist"
thesis that the colonies of settlement, having achieved autonomy in their

1 Michael Howard, Tie Continental Conml tment (Penguin edn,

London, 1974 > , pp 22-29; Paul Hayes, "British Foreign Policy and the
Influence of Empire, 1870-1920" in R F Holland and G Eizvi <eds>
Perspectives on Imperialism and Decolonization (London, 1984),
pp 105-113.

2 Jebb, Studies in Colonial Rationalism (London, 1905).

3 J J Eddy and D M Schreuder <eds>, The Rise of Colonial Rationalise
(London and Sydney, 1988), pp 88, 51; cf J D B Killer, Richard Jebb
and the Problem of Empire (London, 1950) and The Commonwealth In the
Vorld (London, 1958), pp 29-32.

4 Jebb, "Imperial Organization", pp 332-50 of C S Goldman <ed), The
Empire and the Century (London, 1905).

domestic affairs, were now ripe for sone share of the responsibilities and
burdens of Imperial affairs. This appears to have been the
"Kindergarten's" reading of Jebb's book: Kerr for one thought It
"extraordinarily good' and Jebb "absolutely right In his general thesis".'

The ultimate failure of proposals for Imperial federation Is apt to

lend their promoters an air of naivetfe, even irrelevance. Nevertheless, It

Is Important to bear In mind the "ambivalent" and "transitional' nature of

colonial nationalism, which Eddy and Schreuder have themselves emphasised. *

It was transitional from a state of colonial dependence, not of "organic"

unity. Therefore, as Kerr asserted, its

"vigour, self-confidence, even Its somewhat aggressive
Independence, Is immeasurably more valuable to the
Empire than the apathetic Irresponsibility of the
'colonial days'". ?

Vhat colonial nationalism was "transitional* was, of course, a "moot"
point.

People in the Dominions themselves rarely envisaged a future outside
the Empire. Curtis found the Colbertlan view - that colonies were like
fruit which, when ripe, would drop from the imperial tree - to be prevalent
amongst British politicians. But he contrasted this with the situation in
the Dominions.' 1 2 3 Historians have tended to confirm this aspect of

1 Kerr to Lord Ralph Kerr, 1 Apr 1906, Lothian Papers 454, fol 16; cf
Curtis to Jebb, 31 Dec 1906, Jebb Papers. Jebb's book was quoted in
the Sel borne Memorandum. B Villiams, op clt , pp 90-02. For the later
argument between Jebb and the Round Table, see below, pp 96 and
130-31.

2 Eddy and Schreduer, op cit . p 53 and pass! m .

3 IKerr.l "The Conference and the Empire", XT, Hov 1911, p 412.

Curtis to Sir Courtney Ilbert, 2 Sept 1916, RT Papers c 798
fols 251-53.

4

Curtis's Judgment. Sir Keith Sinclair and Carl Berger have Illustrated the
extent to which, In Bcw 2ealand and Canada, the growth of local national Isn
was bound up with a continuance of Imperial loyalty. Both have argued
that, in Sinclair's words, local imperialism "was itself an expression of
an emergent . . . nationalism". 1 Undoubtedly this was the case; but, for
it to be so, there must have been a strong presumption that the Empire
provided opportunities for national growth and the pursuit of national
Interests.

Imperial loyalty was, of course, often expressed in terms of ethnic
identity. Milner saw "race" as the glue which would hold Britain and the
Dominions together. This view was also expressed by members of the
"Kindergarten", such as Brand and Malcolm. On the whole, however, the
"Kindergarten" was far more ambivalent than Milner on the question of race.
The imperialism of Curtis and Kerr, in particular, was primarily cultural
rather than racial. This did not mean that it was any the less fervent.

Kerr asserted in 1920 "that the future of the world depends upon the
gradual recognition by the rest of the world of the fundamental principles
which lie at the heart of Anglo-Saxon civilisation". ? Vhat is important
is that Kerr saw "Anglo-Saxon" values as exportable and universal. Vhile
he could agree with Milner, therefore, that pan-Britannic nationalism would
assist Imperial unity, he was not convinced that the converse was true,
that the existence of other "races" would work in favour of disintegration.

The "Kindergarten's" experience in South Africa was in this respect
important. Initially, Milner's young men saw British-Afrikaner relations

1 Sinclair, Imperial Federation (London, 1955) , p 47; Berger, A Sense
of Power (Toronto, 1970).

2 Kerr to Curtis, 9 June 1920, Lothian Papers 208, fols 255-58.

39

la -racial- terms, like Milner himself. But the alliance which they
developed with Botha, Smuts and others Induced a more optimistic assessment
of the balance of forces In South Africa than was the case with Milner.

This optimism extended also to Quebe«,ois nationalists such as Bourassa. "I
don't believe that he would be opposed to the Imperialism of people like
Curtis and myself, Kerr wrote of Bourassa In 1910.’

Probably the most fundamental reason for the "Kindergarten's"
sanguine assessment of colonial nationalism was a belief in what was often
referred to as "the pressure of facts'. Like most Edwardian imperialists,
the "Kindergarten* saw International relations In terms of a constant,
uncompromising struggle for national existence. In a hostile, insecure and
Robbesian world, the Individual Dominions would find themselves "classed
with Chile and Peru". Per contra , by remaining within the Empire but
contributing towards Its costs In return for a share in Its direction, the
Dominions would have the power to secure fully their own Interests and
integrity. ?

Curtis's Scheia el

The idea of a new organisation to campaign for Imperial union was
first mooted in 1907. 3y March 1909 the 'Kindergarten" had evolved a
definite scheme, which Curtis elaborated in a letter to Amery. In its
essentials, it was clearly and consciously modelled on the "Kindergarten's"
previous activities. A memorandum was to be drafted, then thrashed into an
acceptable form by a small "editorial committee". Curtis was again to act

1 Kerr to E J Kylie, 16 Dec 1910 (Kylle file), RT <0> Papers.

2 fKarr.l "The Question of Policy", C 1910, J Lothian Papers 14, fol 275.

40

as draughtsman, travelling round the Dominions "as a sort of prospector".
Simultaneously, a chain of publications would be set up, with a London
office under Kerr "to feed them with pictures and stuff". Finally, a wider
circle would be organised in each of the Dominions, to "master the
Information placed at their disposal" and orchestrate propaganda for the
adoption of the necessary reforms . 1

Curtis and other members of the "Kindergarten" (Brand, Craik, Dawson,
Kerr and Karris) spent the summer of 1909 in England drumming up support
for their project, which Hilner generally referred to as "Curtis's scheme".
Others involved Included Amery, Jameson (who was temporarily in Britain),
Milner's secretary Arthur Steei-Mai tland, Robert Martin Holland (later
Hoi land- Mart in) , a banker and friend of Dove, and F S Oliver, author of a
biography of Alexander Hamilton, which, Milner wrote, "put me and many
others under a permanent obligation to you". 2

The meetings between Milner, the "Klnde" and their new contacts do
not appear to have been minuted, but their conclusions were summarised in a
printed document. This stated that Britain was suffering under an
increasingly heavy burden of defence expenditure. The Dominions were not
sharing it, ever, though they were beginning to Influence the conduct of
British foreign policy. The situation would eventually break down. The

1 Curtis to Amery, 29 Mar 1909, quoted in Valter Fimocks, Milner's
Young Men (London, 1963), pp 134-6.

2 Milner to Oliver, 5 Pov 1907, Oliver Papers 86, fol 2; Curtis quoted
fron Oliver's book in the "Selborne Memorandum": B Villlants, op cit,
pp 87-8.

41

scheme outlined by Curtis to Aiaery was therefore approved: the creation in
each Dominion of "a small group of carefully selected men"; a "central
group" in London, "to collect, to digest, and to disseminate information";
"special organc" in each Dominion, along the lines of The State; and an
itinerant agent to co-ordinate the campaign.

"t A3 11 these activities would have for their prinary
object the preparation by the central agency in
communication with the rest of a full and reasoned
statement of the Inperial problen, setting out the
alternatives involved, the real import of disruption,
the sacrifices necessary to ovoid it, and the
successive stages through which the ultioate goal is to
be sought .... so compiled that each of the groups
will be prepared to adopt and to issue it as its own
oanifestc. "

The movement should be "tacit" until a conwon policy was agreed. "CFJor
the present it would be inexpedient to seek or to allow identification with
any party." An expenditure of £25,000 was to be anticipated, excluding the
cost of producing magazines. '

The first Found Table meeting, described as such, took place at Plas
lewydd in North Vales over the weekend of 4 - 5 September 1909. The party
included four men, all peers, who were new to discussions of the project.
They were Lords Anglesey, the host and one of Miner's "diehard" allies;
Lovat, another ally and a prominent conscriptionist; Howick, heir to Earl
Grey; and Volmer, Selborne's heir. The printed conclusions arrived at
earlier in the summer were rubber-stamped, and it was agreed to employ
Curtis and Kerr at £1000 pa each, and to send them and Karris on a fact-
finding tour of Canada straightaway. Significantly, however, the meeting

[Karris, 3 "Kemorandum of Conversations which took place between a few
English and South African friends at intervals during the sunmor of
1909", Curtis Papers 156, item 1.

1

42

placed aore emphasis on the need of formulating "subsidiary objects", and
it was agreed that "for the present, and until the situation was ripe for
some constitutional measure every effort should be made to extend the
principle of co-operation"’.

Curtis. Kerr and Karris set sail for Canada on 17 September 1909.
Before they did so, Amery had passed on a letter from Keith Felling, an All
Souls colleague now teaching at Toronto, in which a degree of
circumspection was commended. "The average Canadian thinks of Canada
first, the old country next, and the Empire third", Felling wrote; "new"
imperialism was virtually non-existent, and consequently "the dangers of
a ay step leading to organic union are very great" . ? Kerr's notes show that
the emissaries found attitudes towards the Empire which could not have been
more striking as proof of Felling's warnings. Not only the likes of
Bourassa or Dafoe, but even G M Vrong, E J Kylle and A J Glazebrook thought
Imperial Union for the moment impracticable: Imperial federation was "a
long way off", the "present system works all right", the Empire "must
become looser before it really cohered", federalism was "academic" , "any
statement of [the! problem as a whole would have lal bad effect". 1 2 3

Curtis's experience merely confirmed his beliefs. Reporting back for
his colleagues, Curtis catalogued the dismal failure of Canadians to
understand the "new imperialism": their Inadequate perception of
International rivalries, their lack of "proper recognition of native
problems", their ignorance of the way Imperial Union could extend

1 Minutes of RT Meeting, Plas Sewydd, 4-6 Sept 1909. Lothian Papers 11,
fols 1-6.

2 Felling to Amery, 25 June 1909, Lothian Papers 11, fols 24-26.

3 Hfotes from tour of Canada, J Lothian Papers 5, fols 1-104.

43

Canada's voice. Curtis urged haste: with the lapse of tine, the
difficulties of bringing Canada into closer union "Hill increase". 1

Kerr's experience had the opposite effect: as he wrote to his father,
it led him "to modify some of icy views about the Empire" and to doubt the
viability of the "Plas Newydd plans". * In his report, Kerr also stressed
the paucity of "new imperialism" and the obstacles in its way. But he
emphasised that "the tide of opinion" flowed in favour of Enpire ond that
Canadians "will probably put their necks many an inch further into the
noose of Imperialism without realising it*. There was a real danger that
premature action would make Canadians " f Tightened" . ^ Kerr argued against
the publication of any memorandum. At most, there night be a need for a
"statement of broad ends and policy"; but the primary aim was rotber one of
"establishing loosely correlated centres of constructive imperialism, each
pursuing a course suited to the peculiar needs of its own Dominion ". A

Kerr's disagreement with Curtis wa3 not over the eventual need for
imperial federation, nor yet over its form; rather, it was over the
question of timing. Vhereas Curtis was all for immediate action and
forcing the issue, Kerr believed that "we have lots of time in front of

1 [Curtis, J "Confidential" C Memorandum on Canada, 19101, Lothian Papers
11, fols 59-78.

2 Kerr to Lord Ralph Kerr, 1 ffov 1909, Lothian Papers 459, fol 9.

3 [Kerr,] "The Situation in Canada", 11910,3 Lothian Papers 14, fols
351-74.

4 [Kerr,] "The Question of Policy", C 1910,1 Lothian Papers 14,
fols 272-88.

44

us"’. As te wrote to his uncle at the end of 1910, he expected a choice to
be rude "In the next half century or less"; but "1 don't believe that
anything we in England can do In the next year or so will do auch
benefit". 2

A neetlng of the available members of the "Kindergarten" tn January
1010 upheld Curtis's view on the importance of the memorandum. It was
also, for the first time, specific about the ain of the movement: "an
Imperial government constl tuti onal ly responsible to all the electors of the
Empire", with control of defence, foreign policy and the dependencies.
However, the Moot placed greater emphasis than before on "the encouragement
of internediate steps" and "the education of publ ic opinion". Moreover,
Curtis's idea of a network of journals was dropped, in favour of a single
magazine to be edited in London. '* A meeting a week later, at which the
"Kindergarten" members were Joined by Milner, Oliver, Lovat and Amery,
signified a further retreat from Curtis's original plans. The previous
meeting's definition of the principles of organic union was approved, but
"it was also agreed . . . that nobody was committed to the acceptance of
all of them".*'

1 Kerr to Curtis, 10 Aug 1910, Lothian Papers 2, fol 91.

2 Kerr to Duke of Morfolk, 22 Dec 191 C, Lothian Papers 2, fols 157-64.

3 Minutes of PT meeting, Ledbury, 15-18 Jan 191C, Lothian Papers 11,
fols 7-11.

4

Minutes of PT meeting, London, 23 Jan 1510, Lothian Papers 11, fols
12-13.

45

jlBIfl and Moans

•Closer union" was a vague tern, used at the time to describe any
proposal which aimed at increasing the internal cohesion of the Empire,
whether in the field of education, culture, economics or politics, and, if
Id the latter, whether supra-parl iamentary , extra-par 1 iamentary or inter-
governmental. For the "Kindergarten", however, with their South African
experience, "closer union of the Empire" had a more specific meaning: the
creation of a new body, with powers ever the whole Empire, a real Imperial
Parliament, and with it "a single defence force animated by a single
defence policy and controlled by a single executive".'

The reasons why the Round Ta biers sought a constitutional
reconstruction of the Empire are perhaps obvious. First and foremost was
what might be called the Seeley thesis: in Sel borne's words, the belief
"that, if this country is to maintain herself in the years to come in the
same rank with the US, Russia and Germany, the unit must be enlarged from
the UK to the Empire". 2 A second reason was to strengthen the resources at
the conmand of British rule in India and the dependencies. These were, as
Curtis put it, "volcanoes upon which Great Britain is obliged to sit". 3 '
Finally, a number of the Moot (Milner and Oliver in particular) saw in
Imperial union the means to insulate the Empire's against the violent
swings which they associated with Britain's party politics. Kerr

CCraik and Hichens,) "Draft letter to Steel-Maitland" . [June 1912,1
RT Papers, c 777 fols 85-8.

Sel borne to E Prettynan, 19 Sept 1903, Selborne Papers 73, fols 5-6.

I Curtis, J Xenorar.da on Canada and th e British Commonwealth (privately
printed, Letchwortb, 1910), p 26.

apparently shared this view, writing in 1910 that "a body whose business is
to control foreign relations, the army and navy, and frame a policy for the
Dependencies, must not be liable to he overborne by gusts of popular
opinion". '

The Round Table differed fron other Imperialist pressure groups such
as the Primrose League and the Overseas Club, and from the Ill-fated
Imperial Federation league, In thus having a reasonably clear idea of the
aims It existed to pursue. It also differed In having, in the strategy
outlined by Curtis, a fairly coherent Idea of the means by which to achieve
those alms.

Curtis's strategy was not without its critics In the early Koot. For
Kerr, the main need was to dlsseninate the Imperial ists' "belief in a
common Anglo-Saxon civilisation and Its influence on the world", and this,
as he now realised, would tale time, perhaps half a century.* Although
Curtis never came round to such a long-tern: perspective, by 1913 he agreed
that it would take "5 - 15 years of steady unsensational work" before the
conditions were ripe for federation. *

The meetings which followed Curtis's and Kerr's visit to Canada
brought nearer the surface other divergences and difficulties. It was not
found possible to reach a formula for the proposed federation with which
all members of the Koot could agree. "Federation", like "closer union",

1 [Kerr.l "The Constitution of the Empire" [19101, Lothian Papers 14,
fol 327.

2 [ Kerr, 1 "The Question of Policy", C 1910, 3 Lothian Papers 14, fols
279-88.

3

Curtis to Grlgg, 17 Oct 1913, FT Papers c 807, fol 36.

47

was: a vague tern, and in sone respects It was best kept that way. There
were also problems defining the group's attitude to co-operation. As Amery
wrote to Jebb in 1912, he for one was "convinced . . . that you cannot
carry out federal isn merely by letting the existing system break down";
federalism could only come about once there was "a practical federal spirit
ia the air, in other words men who have been accustomed to co-operate on
quasi-federal lines*.' Milner, Selborne, Brand and FCerr all expressed
similar reservations before 1914.

Another bone of contention was Curtis's insistence that the Round

Table should concentrate on moulding opinion in the Dominions rather than

Britain. In a Joint letter, Dawson, Duncan, Feethara and Perry argued that

"for the present at any rate there is more need in London for vigorous

organixat ion and propaganda on the lines you indicate than in the

colonies". * Similarly, Amery thought that

"the real difficulty when it cooes to the pinch is not
going to be the Dominions but this country, and this
country has got to be familiarised with the idea that
it must surrender its monopoly of power". 7

Again, Curtis was initially resistant, as was Kerr, on the grounds that it

was the Dominions who would be asked to make financial sacrif ices. *

nevertheless, by 1913-14 the Moot had effectively agreed the necessity for

domestic propaganda. The Found Table magazine was given out free In much

1 Minutes of Moots, 15-18 Jan 1910 and 23 Jan 1910, Lothian Papers 11,
fols 7-11 and 12-13; Amery to Jebb, 21 May 1912, Jebb Papers.

2 Duncan et al to Curtis, 23 Aug 1909, Lothian Papers 11, fols 42-45.

3 Amery to Kerr, 26 Jan 1911 (Amery file), RT <0> Papers.

4 Kerr to Amery, 27 Jan 1911, ibid .

43

larger quantities in Britain than in the Dominions; and a snail start was
■ade on "mass" opinion via the Workers' Educational Association.

Curtis's original plan was thus criticised in a number of respects by
his colleagues, and in some was substantially modified. Moreover, the Moot
reserved its opinion on a number of important issues. Nevertheless, in
essentials, it was Curtis's scheme which was adopted in the course of the
founding meetings of 1909-10.

ffimocks and Kendle have both emphasised the extent to which the Round
Table was comnitted to an element of deception, by which on the one hand it
portrayed itself as a disinterested network of "study-groups", and on the
other It prepared the framework for an eventual federationist movement.

There is sone truth in this criticism. A degree of disingenuousness was
thought necessary to allow "the gradual formation of right opinion".' The
need for secretiveness was constantly reiterated and Hichens for one
recorded his embarrassment when asked "'Do tell me what is Kr Curtis
doing'" over the next few years. 5 Nevertheless, the Round Table's
reticence also reflected the extent to which it was divided. As Oliver
emphasised, the Xcot was in no position to offer "pontifical
recommendations" until it was itself agreed on the necessary reforms. 3

1 Minutes of RT meeting, 18 July 1912, RT Papers c 777, fols 133-4.

2 Hichens, "Provisional Proposals for the Organisation of the RT
Office", Kay 1913, RT Papers c 778, fols 119-21; cf eg Minutes of RT
Meeting. London, 4 Apr 1911, RT Papers c 776, fol 146; Kerr,
"Memorandum", 24 Jan 1911, ibid, fols 38-41.

3 Oliver to G M Paterson, 21 June 1912, RT Papers c 777, fols 92-95.

49

The London group was dominated from the start by Unionists.
Jeverthelcss, the Round Table repeatedly professed itself to be a non-
party, or even an all-party, grouping. 1 Again the discrepancy is glaring,
but not entirely dishonest. In port the Hoot's stance wa3 an attempt to
ovoid the fate of the "tariff reform" campaign and to 'seep the door open to
on all-party federati onlst movement 0 ; In part, also, it was an expression
of intent. The Hoot did try to recruit Liberal members, although without
much success . * But the largest element in the Round Table's stance appears
to have been a hearty contempt for the role of parties and party
politicians. Like Hilner, Kerr condemned "the palaeological rigidity of
party creeds". The ordinary run of politicians, whether Liberal or
Unionist, were no more than "interpreters": "they never make a nove until
they are pretty certain that public opinion in the country, or at least in
their party, is ripe for it".-

Some effort was made to interest leading politicians in the Hoot's
work, sometimes with surprising results. Haud Selborne organised a dinner
for Sir Edward Grey, after which she was "most amused to find that tGreyl
considers the proposal for on Imperial Parliament to be a new and original

1 Eg l Kerr,] "Introductory", FT, Hov 1910, p 2; Curtis, The Found Table
Koveaent <1913), p 23.

2 [Harris,) "Kenorondum of Conversations . . . during the Sumner of
1909", Curtis Papers 156, item 1, p 7.

3 Harold Baker <HF for Accrington) was invited to join, but attended
only one meeting. The Hoot considered various other "suitable
Liberal recruits", but was not keen to attract Liberals merely as
■window dressing": Grigg to Curtis, 1 Sov 1913, RT Papers c 607, fols
70-74.

4

Kerr to Curtis, 10 Aug 1910, Lothian Papers 2, fols 64-91.

50

speculation of bis own".' After another dinner for Vinston

Churchill, Lady Selborne thought that he "means to steal the Xoot's clothes
while they are bathing, and come out as the one true original
Imperialist". 2 nevertheless, in the Round Table view, party politics were
secondary to the real political process. This was enphasised by Curtis,
for instance, when he proposed to write to Austen Chamberlain in 1915: the
latter, he believed, could be of great service, but as an influential voice
in the business community, rather than as a politician. 3 Even Dominion
politicians found themselves "a little out of it" when it came to their
place in the Round Table scheme. **

The key to the Round Table strategy was "public opinion", of which
the Pound Tablers (like most who appealed to this court) had a rather
limited view. "Personally I should say that the danger point in any great
question depending on a popular decision is generally passed when one per
cent of the voters have grasped the whole issues at stake", declared
Curtis. 5 Obviously It depended very much on whom that "one per cent"
comprised. Curtis and his associates were necessarily concerned that their
novoment should be conposed of "persons of light and loading",* "the men of
nost weight and influence in each of the self -govern! ng parts of the

1 Lady Selborne to Curtis, 34 Jan C 19133, Curtis Papers 2, fols 129-30.

: Lady Selborne to Curtis, Sept C1913J, Curtis Papers 2, fols 158-59.

Curtis to Grigg, 24 Apr 1915, RT Papers c 809, fols 25-26.

4 Ernest H Scott to Kerr, 28 Fov 1916, conveying Sir Joseph Vard's
complaint, RT Papers c 850, fol 81.

5 Curtis, Note s on the Progress of the Xovcacot Id Australia
(Bombay, 1916), p 5.

® "Round Table Statement", 1913, Round Table Papers c 778, fol 197.

51

Eapire" ' - businessmen, lawyers and academics who could claim to speak with
some authority, and Journalists who were in a position to mould, ac well as
to reflect, "opinion".

The Round Tablers' strategy was potently 61itist, as Hinockc and
Kendle have emphasised. On the ether hand, the Round Table's "target"
audience was not a handful of well -placed politicians (as has boon
generally assumed) , but the "opinion- makers" who could force politicians to
act. Sven so, it Is tempting to see the Round Tablers' limited conception
of this audience as one reason for the movement's failure. nevertheless,
their conception appears to have been neither unusual nor clearly wrong.
Gladstone's Idea of an "upper ten thousand" still carried weight, even in
an age of mass democracy. Indeed, one of the few scholarly attempts to
come to grips with foreign policy making in modern Britain has concluded
that the "Informed public" - which "not only exerts a direct Influence upon
the government" but "largely conductCsl the public debate" - consists at
most of "a few hundred active participants" . *

Ita. "Original foot"

The metropolitan Round Table was always small and (until the 1080s)
exclusively male.* Xenbershlp was conferred by invitation, and no attenpt

1 Kerr to G Craig-Sellar, fJuly 1910,1 Round Table Papers c 776,
fols 22-4.

2 V Vallace, The Foreign Fcl Icy Process In Britain (London, 1976),
pp 88, 100.

Xaud Sel borne and later Bancy Astor were invaluable as hostesses and
links with other political figures, but neither was counted a member
of the Xoot. There were proposals for a separate "Ladies' Xoot" in
1911, but no apparent action. In 1945 Xacadan suggested
(unsuccessfully) that his wife Caroline and Margaret Hodson should be
invited to join.

52

was made to publicise the group's composition.

lot all of those who attended the 1909 meetings remained active.
Anglesey and Jameson played no part in subsequent Round Table activities,
and Volner and Howick were dropped discreetly by the end of 1911. Lovat'S
interest appears to have waned. Marti n-Hol land was active only in the
finance committee. Steel-Kaitland dropped out after his election to the
Chairmanship of the Conservative Party in 1911; his application to rejoin
the Hoot was initially rejected’, although he again attended a number of
Hoots between 1915 and 1921.

Lord Milner was the fulcrum upon which the 1909 meetings had turned.
He maintained an active interest in the group throughout its early years,
and occupied a position of particular authority on contentious issues. He
was a sort of "father-figure" to the younger Pound Tablers and "the leader
to whom, above everyone else, they looked". 1 2 3 nevertheless, the Round Table
was only one of a nunber of projects in which Milner had an interest. As
Brand later recalled, "Xilner was always In our confidence but ... he
left all the active work to fthe younger Pound Tablers! . . . and
particularly to Curtis". ,

Lord and Lady Selborne corresponded frequently with members of the
Kindergarten, and showed great interest in their well-being and
advancement. The Moot often benefited from Selborne' s "horse-sense" at
meetings, but Selborne's position as an active Unionist grandee again

1 Minutes of RT meeting, 20 Feb 1913, RT (0) Papers.

2 [ Brand. 1 Lord Milner. FT. June 1925. p 427.

3 Brand to C Quigley, 18 Fov 1961, RT Papers c 867, fols 113-15.

53

precluded an especially vigorous role in the Round Table movement. He
appears not to have commanded the cane respect as Xilner. Kalcolm later
recalled that Selborne was "rather given to the kind of pious platitude
which appeals more to the mob than to a coterie of Intellectual young
men". 1

Wore directly involved In the day-to-day affairs of the Xoot was
F S Oliver, a hard-nosed Scotsman whose success In business had given bin
the financial security to delve pungontly into the politics of his age. As
"Pacificus*, Oliver was the author of a series of Tines articles advocating
a federal solution to the Irish problen. A fervent supporter of Tariff
Reform and National Service, Oliver, like Xilner, clained to be above party
politics; nevertheless, the younger Pound Tahlers were quick to discover
that "he is really a thoroughly party nan". 2 3

Leo Amery might likewise have been described as "thoroughly party",
ambitiously and pugnaciously so. Convinced of his own "high political
genius*, * Amery was temperamentally averse to compromise, a characteristic
which endeared him neither to the Unionist hierarchy nor to his fellow
Round fablers. nevertheless, Amery was a leading figure In British

1 Xalcoln, "Philip Kerr", 119461, (Lothian file.) RT (0) Papers. For
Selborne's political activities in these years, see George Boyce
fed), The Crisis of British Unionism: The Domestic Political Papers
of the Second Earl of Selborne, 1885-1922 (London, 1087).

2 Brand to Kerr, 23 July 1912, Brand Papers, box 182.

3 Oliver to Dawson 7 Nov 1931, Oliver Papers 85, fols 243-4. By thoc
Oliver himself was convinced that Amery was "nothing but a highly
intellectual chatterbox, of bad Judgement and quite extraordinarily
unimpressive to conmon men".

54

Conservatism for almost half a century, and was a useful contact for other
Sound Tablers even after he had left the Xcot.

Curtis and Kerr, the two original employees of the Round Table, were
the Castor and Pollux of the movement, Its spokesmen, Ideologues and
evangelisers. The relationship between the two was always close and
mutually enriching - as Curtis declared, ’I an only one blade in the
scissors, and cut nothing unless I am hinged with you” - but It was often
also uncomfortable. Curtis tended to patronise the younger Kerr; Kerr for
his part thought that Curtis had "a conplex ". 1 2

Kerr was not the only person to see in Curtis some such defect.

Arnold Toynbee characterised Curtis as a "monomaniac", absolutely convinced
by his own sense of mission, and incapable of seeing either the wider
context or the possibility that he night be wrong. 3 Xore charitably,

Austen Chamberlain observed that Curtis was filled "with a delightful
dogmatism and perhaps sometimes has not seen as far into a problen as he
thinks *. 4 The "Kindergarten" nicknamed Curtis "the prophet", a soubriquet
he found most congenial.

Curtis's self-assurance was all the more remarkable in that - unlike
most of his colleagues - he had been an academic failure. In conversation
deceptively self-effacing, Curtis was austere, abrasive and almost entirely
devoid of humour. Even his most fervent admirers were forced to admit that

1 Curtis to Kerr, 23 May 1927, Lothian Papers 227, fols 132-4.

2 Kerr to Lady Anne Kerr, 16 Sept 1914, Lothian Papers 464, fol 43.

3 Arnold J Toynbee, /equal rtances (Oxford, 1967), pp 130 ff.

Austen Chanbcrlain to Kerr, 24 Apr 1917, Lothian Papers 34, fol 13.

4

55

he nas a 'lover or nanklnd, not Individual men*.’ Nevertheless, especially

In the early years, Curtis exercised a remarkable hold over his Sound Table

colleagues, and also over a wider circle. Lord Salter later recalled that

■neither I nor others . . . often succeeded" in "resisting what Lionel

Curtis wished C us) to do". 2 Harry Hodson has described his tactics.

"First, the object - I almost wrote "victla" - was
flattered with the Insistence that he was uniquely able
and fitted for the task; the whole enterprise, If not
the future of the civilized world, turned upon him.

Then the hypothetical consent becane the assumed actual
.... Finally the required conduct would be
indicated with as much assurance that it would be
followed as a doctoi assumes when he writes a
prescription.

A larger than life character, Curtis had enormous energy, willpower and
persistence. He tended to see everything and everyone in black and white.
Similarly, other people tended to react violently either for or against him
and his message. His personality was thus both an immense asset and an
undoubted liability for the Round Table aovenent . **

Kerr's was a very different personality. By all accounts handsome,
charming, even debonair, he was also intellectually gifted and capable of
grasping subtleties and complexities which eluded Curtis. He bad none of
the latter's abrasiveness, although he did share Curtis's tendency to
appear excessively self-assured. According to Thomas Jones, ho

1 G X Gathorne-Hardy, Liooe 1 Curtis, CH, 1872-1955 (London, 1955), p 5.

2 Saltor, Memoirs of a Public Servant (London, 1961), p 239.

3 Hcdson, "Foreword" to Curtis, Vorld Var: Its Cause and Cure (London,
1992 odn) , p v.

4 A rather hagiographic life of Curtis was written for a Harvard honors
thesis by hie godson J V Shepardson In 1949; a fuller and more
balanced account is looked forward to from Deborah Lavin.

50

conveyed “a fallacious lucidity of one who bad done tlie thinking and solved
the difficulties for you".’ Nevertheless, the feature of Kerr's character
which struck most friends and observers was a fundaDental weakness for
caprice and aalleabl 11 ty . As Hodson recalled, he was "very
Impressionable". a

Kerr originally envisaged a political career after his return from
South Africa. 3 In this he was encouraged by Oliver, who thought that in
Parliament "you would be eveD more useful to our movement"." Nevertheless,
when a safe Unionist seat was offered him in April 1910, Kerr was persuaded
by Curtis and others to turn It down in favour of the Round Table
editorship.* 1 Kerr saw the first four issues of the magazine off the press
before enbarklng, In October 1911, on a year-long world tour. By the end
of this he was suffering from profound physical and nervous exhaustion,
which took the best part of the next two years to recover from. Although
Kerr's attendance at pre-war meetings was therefore erratic, his was an

1 Thomas Jones, A Diary VI tb Letters, 1931-50 <0xford, 1954), pp 514-
15. Sir Robert Vanslttart described Kerr/Lothian as "an incurably
superficial Johnny-know-all": V N Hedllcott, Britain and Germany: the
Search for Agreement, 1930-37 (London, 1969), p 12.

2 Hodson to Hevlll Butler, 27 Nov 194? (Lothian file), ET (0) Papers.

Cf (Brand,] "Philip Kerr: Some Personal Memories", FT, June 1900,
pp 234-43.

3 See, eg, Kerr to Lord Ralph Kerr, 4 Apr 1909, asking him to see
Balfour "and remind him of Uncle Schomberg (the 10th Xarquess of
Lothian], and the family connections": Lothian Papers 456, fol 16.

* Oliver to Kerr, 10 Aug 1909, Lothian Papers 11, fols 36-40.

Lord Ralph Kerr to Kerr, 7 and 10 April 1910, Lothian Papers 460,
fols 1-4. Kerr's attempts to have the offer of the seat passed on to
Cralk were unsuccessful.

5

57

inportant Influence In shaping the Round Table, and his openness to new
ideas profoundly affected the subsequent direction of the movement. 1

The careers of the other ex-nenbers of the "Kindergarten" confirmed
R S Rait's view that service with Kilner in South Africa would prove a
useful "apprenticeship" in public affairs.

As Chairnan of Camnell Laird from August 1910 (appointed on
Selborne's reconmer.dat ion) Lionel HIchens presided over one of Britain's
aajor shipbuilding, steel and armaments conglomerates, and was an important
figure in the contemporary debate on Industrial relations, until his death
in 1940. Re served on numerous government committees and Royal Comnissions
between the wars. His role in the Hoot was likened to "a steel rod of
exquisite temper, revolving firmly and quietly, as an axle fulfilling its
purpose should". 2 A close friend of Curtis's, HIchens was often called
upon to mediate between "the prophet" and the rest of the Hoot.

Robert Brand Joined Lazard Bros in 1909; he was its managing director
until 1944, and a director until 1960. A key figure in the City of London,
Brand also served on numerous government committees and was a frequent
delegate at international conferences. Brand possessed a keen analytical
aind. He was a "practical" man, and an eneny of "all sorts of metaphysics,
bad or good". 3 He was undoubtedly Curtis's most persistent and effective

1 J R M Butler's biography of Lord Lothian (London, 1960) has yet to be
superseded, but the collection of essays edited by John Turner, The
Larger Idea (London, 1988), provides useful anplification.

2 (Coupland, 1 "Lionel HIchens", AT, Dec 1940, p 14.

3 John Buchan, "Ordeal by ferriage" (13 page poem, privately printed,
1915), Lothian Papers 16, fols 483-91.

critic within the Hoot, and relations between then were sometimes strained.

On Xilner's recommendation, Dougal Malcolm was appointed a director
of the British South Africa Co in 1912. (He became President of the
Company in 1937). According to lord Malvern, he "played a very great part"
in the subsequent development of the two Rhodesias. ’ After his death,

Brand recalled Malcolm's gregariousness, wit and "profoundly Christian
character". 1 2 3 Intellectually, he appears to have been solid rather than
acute. Fundamentally conservative, especially on matters relating to the
dependent Empire, Kalcola was nevertheless one of Curtis's closest allies
on federation.

Milner's influence was again crucial in Geoffrey Dawson's appointment
as editor of The Times , a position he held (with the brief exception of the
years 1919-23) from 1912 until 1941. As such he was "one of the half-do2en
most influential men In Britain", In i L Rowse's view. 7 ' Dawson's
reputation (like Lothian's) has suffered enormously from his association
with the policy of "appeasement" ; at the tiro?, however, he was widely
respected as a model of conservative Journalism, even (as during the
abdication crisis) the keeper of the nation's conscience. His insider's
information on high politics and his contacts around the globe were
undoubtedly of enormous benefit to the Round Table. In turn, Eawson
appreciated the opportunities for discussion provided by the Moot.

1 i Brand, J "Dougal Orne Malcolm", RT, Dec 1955, p 5.

2 "B" I Brandi, The Times, 2 Sept 1955.

3 A L Rowse, All Souls and Appeasement (London, 1961), p 2.

59

fevertheless, his direct contribution to the Round Table was often limited
by the demands of his job. After his retirement he attended Xoots more
frequently "to make amends . . . for years in which I have done nothing
whatever to help’.’

George Craik was Chief Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police fron
1910 to 1914. After war service with the Lovat Scouts, he was appointed
Managing Director of the Commonwealth Trust. 3efore 1914 he was an active
member of the Moot, especially in the magazine committee. He appears to
have teen particularly close to Oliver, with whon he shared a deep
conservatism and an interest in Irish affairs.

John Dove was the exception among the "Kindergarten": ill-health
prevented him from leading an active public life until the last years of
the war, when he Joined the Var Office Intelligence Department. A brief
spell as travelling representative of the Commonwealth Trust was followed
in 1920 by his appointment as editor of The Round Table, a position he held
until his death in 1934. Of all the "Kindergarten" members. Dove's
contribution is hardest to gauge. Deeply religious, modest to the point of
obtuseness, "he came as near to real saintliness as is given to our frail
humanity". 7 Dove often appears to have been overawed by his more energetic
colleagues, particularly Curtis, and even as editor his personality seems
to have left little mark on the Round Table.

Other "Kindergarten" associates were included Jn lists of Xoot
members, and most attended meetings whenever they were in England. 1 2 3

1 Dawson to Curtis, 2 May 1941, PT Papers c 861, fol 11.

2 Malcolm to Grigg, 21 Apr 1934, Grlgg Papers, MSS Microfilm 1004.

3 "The Moot". 11914,] (Moot file,) RT (O) Papers.

60

Duncan, Feetham and Vyndham were closely Involved In the Sooth African leg
of the Round Table. Duncan pursued a successful career In politics, ending
hi6 life as Governor-General of South Africa. Feetham pursued an equally
successful career In law. Between the wars he chaired commissions and
inquiries in India, Ireland, Kenya and Shanghai. Vyndham returned to
England in 1030, but appears not to have re-established his membership of
the loot. The architect Sir Herbert Baker was also listed as a Round Table
member, but he attended meetings very Irregularly Perry moved to Canada
(as representative for Lazard Bros) In 1912. He contributed a number of
Pound Table articles from there, and briefly re-joined the Hoot In the
early 1930s. Karris and Heston attended meetings more frequently, thanks
to generous I.C. S. leave. Both were important influences on the Round
Table's Indian policy.

By the end of 1910 the Hoot was Joined by Lord Robert Cecil , brother
of Kaud Selborne, and a free-trade High Tory whom the "Kindergarten"
welcomed "to protect us from preferential propaganda".' Cecil was an
active participant in several early sub-committees, but dropped out after
taking office In 1915. A more assiduous contributor was recruited In mid-
1912, in the person of Edward Grigg, a Journalist who had worked on the
Chanberlainite Outlook before Joining The Times. From 1913 Grigg was
employed as Joint editor of the Round Table while continuing to provide
regular articles for The Tines. The arrangement was kept secret, in case
the Round Table was compromised by association with "so powerful and (as
liberals think) so partizan an organ as 'The Times'". 1 2

1 Kerr to Curtis, 7 Oct 1910, Lothian Papers 2, fols 124-6.

2 Grigg to S A Atkinson, 30 Hay 1913, RT Papers e 797, fols 109-11.

61

Although not Liberals, the last two Individuals to Join the prewar
loot, Reginald Coupland and Alfred Zlnmern, were recruited partly to
broaden the raDge of opinions within the group. Coupland's studies of
Greece had convinced him that the decline of Hellenic power had resulted
from "the fact that for all their Internal patriotism the city-states could
never combine".' Clearly already Influenced by the precepts of "new"
Imperialism, Coupland fell under Curtis’s spell during the latter's year as
Belt Lecturer In 1912-13. The Moot, which regarded the Lectureship with
something akin to proprietorial interest, agreed In May 1913 to support
Coupland's candidature for the post and to invite him to Join the group.*
Thenceforth Coupland was to devote all his energies to the study of the
history and contemporary politics of the Empire. Coupland counted himself
a disciple of Ruskln and the early VI Ilian Norris, and was al ways to be
found on the more "democratic* wing of the Found Table."*

Zimmer n was Coupland's senior by five years, and had been his tutor
at Hew College. He shared many of the senl -soclall st ideas of the "new"
liberals Graham Valias, Gilbert Murray and others, and was a leading figure
in the Workers' Educational Association. He was particularly keen to
ensure that the working class should ’realize that the questions within the

1 Coupland to Gilbert Murray, 14 Sept 1912, Coupland Papers 1/2/1; of.
Coupland, "The Growth of the City-State" (chapter 2 of a projected
history of Greece) , Coupland Papers 1/2/2.

2 Minutes of RT meeting, 29 May 1913, R7 Papers c 77 8, fol 127.

Earlier, the Moot had "approved the proposal for offering the Belt
Frof essorshl p Cslcl at Oxford to Feetban", but the latter had refused
it. (Minutes of meeting, 30 Dec 1912, c 777, fol 97.)

3

See eg Coupland's lectures 'The Spirit of Vllliam Morris" (ud>,
Coupland Papers, 1/2/5, and "Citizenship in the British Commonwealth'
<10 Oct 1917), Lothian Papers 16, fols 497-525.

62

purview of an Imperial Parlianent, Defence and Foreign Policy, are its
concern".' It was Zlnmern's links with the VEA, and the Moot's desire that
"the two movements should keep as closely in touch as possible", which led
to his Inclusion in the Round Table.*

It Is hardly necessary to emphasise that all the original Round
Tablers came from wealthy and privileged backgrounds. Nevertheless, they
were firmly convinced “that there were tetter goals In life than the making
of money". * They all attended public schools at a time when, as Grlgg
recoiled, these Inculcated r.ot only a "code", "how a man should behave and
what he should strive to be", but a "creed", a "sense of . . . obligation
to public service" and "a strong sense of the mission of the race" . ^

The Round Tablers' sense of "nisslon" was given further impetus by
the strong religious inclinations which many of them shared. Oliver, who
(with Brand) was unusually sceptical, went so far as to suggest that the
group reconstitute itself as "God's Troth Ltd", and Join in the noney-
making to be enjoyed from religious persuasion. ® The Round Tablers'
Christian convictions sometimes clouded their Judgment. Curtis's belief
that "the distinctions . . . between religion and politics . . . are
false** 1 2 3 4 5 engendered a moralistic and subjective mode of discourse in which

1 Zimmern to Crigg, (r.d, received 10 Aug 1914 >, RT Papers c 786, fols
143-4.

2 tCriggl to 2inmern, 14 Feb 1914, RT Papers c 817, fols 14-15.

3 "Arthur J Gla 2 ebrook", FT, March 1941, p 34 0.

4 Grlgg, The Faith of ar. Englishman (London, 1936) , pp 381-5.

5 Oliver to Dawson, 11 Juno 1923, Oliver Papers 84, fols 46-7.

Curtis, "Konorandum for Discussion at Bllckling", 19 Sept 1932,
Lothian Papers 268, fol 743.

6

great emphasis was placed on faith, revelation and good intentions. Kerr
doubted whether other religions "are capable of giving to their adherents
that energy, fidelity to the right, brotherhood, public spirit and devotion
to duty and the rule of law" which would enable then to enjoy the some
aeasure of freedom and self-government as Christians. '

Another important influence on the Round Tablers* political
psychology was the experience of "public service" which many of then had
acquired. Kerr contended that "the secret of the success of the Found
Table has been that it has been edited by people who have hod a long
experience of public affairs". 1 * Such experience, however, was, in the case
of the "Kindergarten" as of Kilner, that of the unelected official. The
younger Round Tablers therefore tended to share Kilner' s view that
•administration" was "government in the true sense of the word". Koreover,
the Round Table sought constantly to elaborate an ideal "Rational" policy
which might be Implemented without, and which might survive, the vagaries
of electoral politics. This lent a peculiarly authoritative tone to Found
Table pronouncements.

1 Kerr, "Vorld Problens of Today" in Approaches to Vorld Frobleas <Kew
Haven, 1924), p 93.

2

Lothian to Curtis, 27 Harcb 1930, Lothian Papers 252, fols 033-4.

64

The Round Table was founded, as Curtis enphasised in 1913, "with a
View to action". ' The strategy adopted in 1909-10 envisaged the creation
0 i a "'deque', or clique, or group, or whatever we nay call it in each
Dominion to shout 'harrooh 1 2 3 in a spontaneous manner when the egg is
hatched", leading to an Empire-wide movement for lnperial federation.*

John Kendle has rightly concluded that this strategy betrayed a somewhat
nhive assessment of opinion in the Dominions. Nevertheless, there were
other points where this strategy was clearly optimistic, and where the
plans of 1909-10 stood in danger of becoming unravelled. In particular,
Curtis's assumption that the Moot itself could agree on a new "Selborne
Memorandum" had yet to be proved. Moreover, as Curtis himself realised,
ouch cf the rationale behind the Round Table movement hinged on the
existence of an unstable and menacing International situation. It was
therefore possible that "tremendous and swiftly moving events" might "rush
upon us llSe a thief in the night and precipitate a crisis which public
opinion has not yet been prepared to face".®

1 Curtis, The Round Table Movement: Its Past aad its Future (privately
printed, London, 1913), p 9.

2 Kerr to Curtis, 31 Aug 1910, Lothian Papers 2, fols 92-95.

3 Curtis, The Round Table Movement . . . (London, 1913), pp 30-31.

CO

•M nance

Lord Lovat was later to recall that the Plas Hewydd meeting was
primarily concerned with fund-raising.’ In this, he was perhaps correct.
Lord Anglesey was persuaded to part with £1000 pa for three years. The
shrewder Lovat arranged that the Round Table’s London office perform all
the work of his Mushroom Valley Company <a South African land settlement
scheme) in return for £200 and another £200 in 1912. Oliver gave £105,
Kllner £100, and all the others present £25 each. 1 2 3

Milner spent the following nonths pressing other wealthy friends to
a ake donations. He succeeded in extracting £2000 from Lady Vantage, £500
each from Lord Elphlnstone and Geiard Cra ig-Sel lar, £300 from Lord
Leconfield, aad £100 each fron Jaoeson and the Duke of Sutherland.* Fund-
raising continued apace throughout the Found Table's early years, netting
one-off payments of £1000 fron the Duke of Westminster and "E.C. G.“, and
regular payments of £300 pa fron Lord Cowdray, £250 pa each from the
Marquess of Salisbury, Earl Grey, J F Mason KP and Sir S Scott, £200 pa
from Hugh Morrison, and £200 pa each from Viscount Iveagh, Lord Leven and
Melville, Ernest Debenhaa, V S Burns, F C Tiarks, G Ridpath and
R M Kindersley. Milner, Oliver, Brand and Hichens - the wealthier members

1 Sir Francis Llndley, Lord Lovat: A Biography (London, nd) , p 14.

2 (List of subscribers,] FT Papers c 782, folc 8-9.

3 Ibid ; "Subscriptions promised", RT Papers c 778, fol 134.

66

of the Hoot - also continued to support the Round Table on a regular
basis.’

In addition to these sources, the Round Table received *1400 residue
fron "Lord Selborne's fund", and *4300 promised by Sir Abe Bailey lor The
State, but not needed at the time.* Once some unspecilied "ruined
feelings" were soothed, Bailey gave a further *2000 lor Round Table
publications and *1500 for the general account. 51 He was thereafter the
most generous individual supporter of the Round Table, and oi other
projects associated with the group,

By far the most lucrative source of funds lor the Round Table in its
early years was the Rhodes Trust, which miner persuaded to natch private
donations on a "* for *" basis until the end of 1915, when the combination
of war, falling de Beers values, and a series of unwise investments forced
the Trustees to cut bacfc on their discretionary expenditure. Under the "*
for *" arrangement, the Round Table received *18,993 oi Rhodes Trust money
by the end of the First World Var. 4

Without the receipt of such funds from individual supporters and the
Rhodes Trust, it is unliieiy that the Round Table would ever have been able
to get off the ground, as the table on the following page shows.

1 l Lists of subscribers,) RT Papers, c 762, lols 19, 37, 46, 63 and
208.

2 Milner to Kerr, 16 Sept 1909, Lothian Papers 11, fcl 33.

3 Ifeid; "Funds available as at 22 Kay 1913", RT Papers c 778, fol 153;
Minutes of RT meeting, 12 Feb 1914, c 782, fol 139.

4 "Current State of Income', 9 Jan 1915, RT Papers c 783 fol 14;

"Income and Expenditure, 1913-19", 25 March 1920, c 783, fol 109.

The Round Table in fact received "* for X" donations for the years
1909-14 and 1916 (having received larger amounts of private donations
in the latter year than in 1915).

Donations

Rhodes Trust

Other income

Expen

1909-10

5210

1255

159

4439

1911

225

2000

1416

4283

1912

3715

2000

1731

6322

1913

4580

1206

2415

7018

1914

2501

4580

2279

7508

1915

2183

2190

3676

7243

1916

2762

4360

7849

1917

2138

4475

7992

1918

713

2762

4532

8269

1919

426

4447

8129

'Other Income = magazine, pamphlet and book sales, Interest on
investments

Expenditure = magazine and other printing, organiser's and editors'
salaries and expenses, London and Ledbury office
expenses)

The Round Table's expenditure was always greater than its income f ron
sources other than donations. Such was the initial scale of these
donations that the group managed to avoid financial difficulties, although
during the First Vorld Var It was forced to eat into the capital reserves
accumulated in the previous few years. Thereafter, financial constraints
became an important factor in determining the group's strategy.

1 -Finance". 3 Dec 1911, RT Papers, c 782. fols 3-6: "The Round

Table f Magazine accounts! ", c 782, fol 24; 11912 accounts, 1 c 778
fols 106-11; "Current State of Income", 9 Jan 1915, c 783 fol 14;
* Income and Expenditure, 1913-19*, 25 March 1920, c 783, fol 109.

66

The Round Table provided a livelihood for Curtis, except for a brief
period when he was employed by the Colonial Office, until 1931, when he
came into a substantial inheri tance. ’ The Found Table also paid what at
the time was a considerable salary of 41000 pa <rlsing to 41500 pa after
the war) to Kerr and his successors as editor of the Found Table. Further
suns had to be found foi the Found Table offices. A suite of seven rooms
at 175 Piccadilly was rented from early 1910, and by 1913 six employees
worked there for salaries ranging from 4500 pa <for the senior secretary Mr
Handcock) to 471.10.0 pa (for the office hand Mr Preece). In addition,
Curtis had his own office and secretary (from 1916 Pat Scott, whom he
married in 1920) at his home in Ledbury, Herefordshire. * Despite a
relatively high subscription rate <10s pa until 1920, 41 pa until 1948) the
Found Table magazine only briefly broke even, in the late 1920s and again
during the Second World War. Curtis's various studies were also
continually in the red, and therefore subsidised. * Rone of the funds
generated by Milner and his colleagues in London found their way to the
Dominion groups, which were expected to be entirely self-financing.

1 Curtis to Hichens et al, 6 Aug 1930, Lothian Papers 252, fol 32; the
Round Toble continued to pay Curtis's office expenses after 1931.

2 (Office expenses, 1 ET Papers c 782.

Curtis's Round Table Studies were paid for by Dominion groups at cost
price. Even so, a loss of 41658 was made between 1910 and 1914 CRT
Papers c 782, fcl 141), and a further loss of 4699 in 1915 and 1916
<RT Papers, c 783, fol 103).

3

yfm Round Table In the Dominions

It was crucial to Curtis’s plan that the demand for federation should
be launched from the Dominions; otherwise "such a movement would almost
inevitably be interpreted as ... an attempt to interlere with colonial
autonomy".' He and his colleagues therefore went to great lengths to
portray the Round Table as a real "co-operative" enterprise. 1 2 3 The South
African origins of the movement were emphasised, and Curtis himself was
encouraged to assume "the guise of a colonlallsed Britisher".®

Curtis's first port of call in 1910-11 was South Africa itself, where
he set to work on his argument for imperial federation. The latter he
finished by the end of Hay, and sent back to England to have printed under
the title Heaoraada on Canada and the British Cowaonweelth (referred to as
the "Green Hemorandun" or the "original egg" ) . "

In South Africa, Round Table affairs were left in the hands of the
remaining "Kindergarten" members Vyndbem, Duncan and Feetham. These three
enlisted the help of J Tyndall, a Johannesburg lawyer and associate of
reetham, to handle subscriptions, and at some later stage Howard Pirn, Percy
Horsfall and Professors F Clarke and E A Valker Joined them in a "nootlet"
to arrange Round Table articles. There was never any attempt to organise

1 Curtis to Kerr, 21 July 1910, Lothian Papers 1, fol 60.

2 RT, Hov 1910, frontispiece, and all subsequent issues to 1937.

3 Kerr to Curtis, 22 Dec 1910, Lothian Papers 12, fols 162-9.
Copies in Curtis Papers 156, items 4 and 6.

4

regular "study-groups" . Thic was core than Just tlic result of Curtis's
missed opportunity: as the editor of the Pound Tabic wrote in 1917, "it

would make it difficult for our people in South Africa" - all of whom were
politically ambitious - "if they were known out there to be the regular
'Round Tablo' contributors" . 1

In low Zoaland, by contrast, Curtis set about forning Round Table

■study-groups" with vigour and determination. He took great care not to

offend Dominion sensibilities by appearing as the emissary of a London-

based propagandist organisation.

"I come hero as a nan identified with South Africa, I
toll then how the South African group grow up in the
last ten years .... I go on to . . . suggest . . .
that they should forn little groups of students,
similar to our South African group, and that we should
pursue these studies together, with a view tc the
development of a policy of mutual relations which would
fit the circumstances of all. I represent tho
establishment of a similar group in England, rather as
the outcome of suggestion from South Africa,
subsequently endorsed by tho approval of friends we
havo mado in Canada." 2

Curtis's version of tho Round Table's origins was undoubtedly helpful to
him in his task of recruiting Dominion contacts, who in turn lent
credibility to the Round Table's projected image; but it also left him and
his colleagues open to the charge of insincerity, and presaged difficulties
should their views not meet with full agreement.

Curtis spent three nocths in Sew 2ealand, forming groups in
Vellington, Christchurch, Auckland, Vanganui and Dunedin, as well as a

1 Coupland to Oliver, 8 Sept 1917, Oliver Papers 90, fol 92.

2 Curtis to Kerr, 21 July 1910, Lothian Papers 1, fols 59-83.

71

aotwork of Round Table agents. Altogether cone 44 individuals wore
involved, including 11 academics, one KP and roughly equal proportionc of
lawyers, businessmen and landowners. 1 Curtic's principal contact wac
S Arnold Atkinson. His brother, A R Atkinson, was Hew Zealand
correspondent of the Morning Post until 1911 and of The Tioos thereafter.
Curtis was extremely pleased with his work, writing to Oliver that the
Vol 1 ington group had had to be restrained in their enthusiasm for
publishing his "original egg". 2

Curtis next sailed for Australia, where - with the help of John Dove,
sent to speed up Curtis’s work - groups were established at Sydney,
Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth. The composition of these groups
again reflected Curtis's concern to capture the "leading sen" of the
Doninion. Of some 63 individuals initially enlisted, 20 were or went on to
become academics; Q were public servants; 5 were churchmen, including an
archbishop and two bishops; and the reminder were in almost equal measure
lawyers, businessmen and landowners. 3 A Round Table office was set up at
Sydney, but Curtis's principal contacts were in Melbourne, where
F V Eggleston and Professor V Harrison Moore were among the founder members
of the longest-surviving Round Table branch.

1 Lists of Hew Zealand RT group members. RT Papers c 844, fols 2-6, 14-
18 and 23-24; cf J Kendle, "The Round Table Movement: Lionel Curtis
and the Formation of the Hew Zealand Groups in 1910" , HZ 3 of History,
vol 1, no 1 (April 1967), pp 33-50.

2 Curtis to Oliver, 15/16 Aug 1910, Lothian Papers 2, fols 135-51.

3 Lists of Australian Group Members, RT Papers, c 844, fols 2-6, 14-18
and 19-20; cf L Roster, High Hopes (Melbourne, 1986).

72

Canada, the oldest and most populous of the Dominions, was the crux of

Curtis'c scheme! ac he enphaslccd to the Wellington group,

"the one country which it is important to influence was
Caic.3 Canada, and . . . cur nain objective should be to
get a lot of men like themselves In Canada to adopt a
statement of this kind in some shape or form and to
issue it to Canadians on their own responsibility".

However, Curtis recognised that Canada was "the one Dominion to which I

cannot show the Egg in its present fora". He therefore requested the Hoot

to allow him to return heme "until I have got a doctrine I can preach".'

He felt that his task was made all the mere difficult by the Hoot's

decision to authorise the journalist »Sir> John Will icon and the financiers

Sir Ednund Walker, A J Clazebrook and (Sir) Edward Peacock to control the

Canadian end of the Found Table magazine. By so doing the Hoot was

"now putting the formation of the group into the hands
of men who are, I admit, second to none that we met in
Canada. The difficulty is that they differ with us on
the point which ... we came to the conclusion was
fundamental .... How if we succeed in getting this
organisation to agree to the main features of our
policy, well and good; but if not, we shall be put in
the position of a definite rupture with some of our
best friends, and we shall then have to set to work to
create a separate organization". 1 2 3

The Hoot was unsympathetic to Curtis's reasoning, and ordered him to
return via Canada, as planned.® Curtis spent only two months in Canada,
and cot up only two Round Table groups, at Toronto and Hontroal. Some 37
individuals were initially enlictod, including 12 academics and 2
churchmen. Financiers (6) were more prominent than in Australasia,

1 Curtis to Oliver, 15/16 Aug 1910, Lothian Papers, 2, fols 135-51.

2 CCurtis, 1 "Kemorandum" , 18 Hay 1910, RT Papers c 776, fols 64-72.

3 Kerr to Curtis, 14 Oct 1910, Lothian Papers 2, fols 127-34.

73

lawyers <3> less. Businessmen constituted the bulk of the remainder. 1
A J Glazebrook and S J Kylie were made convenor and secretary of the
Toronto group, which paid for an office. After Curtis's departure the
Canadian groups expanded rapidly. By 1012 there were 102 members of the
Toronto group, and there were new groups in Victoria. Vancouver. Calgary,
Sdnonton, Saskatoon, Regina, Vinnipeg and Halifax. A separate Newfoundland
group was set up in 1012. with (Sir) Brian Dunfiold as secretary. 2

Curtis later claimed that the Round Table groups comprised a
representative cross-section of opinion in the Dominions, including 'men
. . . found among the ranks of socialism, radicalism and labour* 1 . 3 This was
undoubtedly misleading. Of 37 original Canadian Round Tablers, only 2 were
Francophones (Talbot Papineau and Senator R Dandurand), and 3 others were
regarded as liberals (Vincent Massey, V H Blake and J S Villison). The 63
original Australian Round Tablers did include the Labour elder statesman
J C Vatson and a Trade Union official. William Somerville, as well as a few
others sympathetic to Labour, but they were clearly in a small minority.

In New Zealand, only one of the 44 original Round Tablers. Edward Tregear,
had strong Labour connections. One reason why the Round Table failed to
attract a more representative membership may be inferred from a later
episode involving a Labourite in New Zealand: his attendance at a Round

1 Lists of Canadian RT Group Members, RT Papers c 844. fols 2-6 and
14-18.

2 List of Toronto members, 31 Oct 1912. (Kylie file,), RT (0) Papers.
Similar lists for other Canadian groups appear not to have survived.
For Newfoundland, see Dunfield. "Notes on the RT Group". 16 Dec 1921,
(Newfoundland file. ) RT (0) Papers.

3

Curtis, The Pound Table Movement (1913). p 23.

Table noeting caused a flurry of excitement , and a general agreement that
it "would have done [him! ... a lot of good".'

Ac Leonie Foster has demonstrated in the case of Australia, the Round
Table groups comprised a very u^representat i vc section of Dominion
populations. They were, as they were intended to bo, composed of members
of the social, cultural and political Elites of the new nations. 2 Xany
Doninion Round Tablers - such as (Sir) Robert Garran, <Sir> John Latham and
F V Eggleston In Australia, or Vincent Xaccey and Loring Christie in Canada
- vent on to play important roles in policy-making in their own countries.
At the time of the Versailles conference, Curtis remarked on the number of
Round Tablers included in Dominion delegations. This was, ho thought,
■simply due to the fact that for ten years . . . the group system had given

the R.T. men a special training". 3 Vhether or not this was so, it is clear
that the Round Table was able to attract individuals of a very high calibre
in each of the Dominions.

The question which naturally arises is, what attracted such men to
the Pound Table? Some - such as H F von Haast in Hew Zealand, or Harrison
Koaro in Australia - appear to have joined out of old-fashioned Imperial
loyalism. nevertheless, such individuals were surprisingly rare. Most
appear to have Joined because they saw in the Imperial connection the means
to pursue their own agenda of national interests and nation-building. In
Kerr's view, there was no contradiction in the Round Table consisting of

1

2

3

H F van Haast to Grlgg, 10 Kay 1920, Lothian Papers. 17. fol 1.
Foster, High Hopos (Melbourne, 1986), chapters 2-4.

Curtis to A J Glazebrook, 2 Sept 1921, RT Papers c 796, fols 134-40.

75

■good nationalist Englishmen, good nationalist Canadians, good nationalist
Australians, etc".’

Both nationalists and imperialists agreed that there was an "Imperial
problem". They agreed that some new system of Anglo- Domini on relations
would have to be found if the Dominions were to become truly "self-
governing". They agreed, also, that conservatism, inertia and ignorance of
foreign affairs constituted tho main obstacles to change. Eggleston
complained that the average Australian's attitude towards defence and
foreign policy was at best "somewhat like the man who will sign cheques for
his wife's charities, but does not want to be worried by details of the
cases". 2 The Round Table was a useful neans of educating opinion in the
Dominions. But it was clearly more. Very few Dominion Round Tablers
thought that it was possible - let alone desirable - for their countries to
survive as independent nations. 31 The question, therefore, was how to make
British policy more responsive to the needs of the Dominions. And here the
interests of Dominion nationalism and of imperial unionism converged. As
Kerr emphasised, it was necessary for the Dominions to "barrack loudly" if
they were ever "to have a say".*

1 Kerr to V Massey, 4 Jan 1917. RT Papers c 822, fols 28-9.

2 Eggleston to Grigg. nd 119131, ET Papers c 798, fols 155-59.

3 E J Kylie, "Liberalism and Empire" (19101, (Kylie file.) RT CO)
Papers; cf Round Table Studies, [First Series, Vol 1, 19111 pp 638-
86 .

4

Kerr to V H Kelly, 28 Hov 1911, RT Papers c 797, fols 27-30.

76

Tfra Pound Table Magazine

Curtis's original plan had envisaged a network of journals In each of
the self-governing Dominions, edited locally, but also carrying a certain
amount of common material fed by an editorial clearing-house in London. It
is not clear whether Curtis intended these Journals to be circulated at all
beyond the membership of local Round Table groups.

This plan was substantially modified by the meetings of 1009-10. It
was agreed that there should be only one Journal, edited in London, "to
which all (Round Table! workers and all inportant statesmen in the
Doninions could be Induced to subscribe".' In Curtis's absence, he and the
Koct continued to work "in diametrically opposite directions". 2 The Moot
agreed to start producing The Found Table even before Curtis had finished
forming Dominion groups. Printed panphlets and flysheets advertising the
nagaalne made no mention of the Round Table groups. Moreover, these
promised a regular, comprehensive, well-balanced survey of Imperial
affairs: in other words, not a forun for discussion, but a medium of
information and enlightenment. 3 nevertheless, the London group still saw
the Pound Table magazine as "an offshcot of the movement".' 1 Kerr
identified three main purposes for the new Journal, all of them connected
to the eventual goal of the Round Table movement:

1 Minutes of RT meeting, Ledbury, 15-18 Jan 1010, Lothian Papers 11,
fols 7-11.

2 Curtis to Kerr, 21 July 1910, Lothian Papers 1. fols 59-83.

3 "The Found Table" (10101, RT Papers, c 844. fols 150-65; cf "The
Found Table f (10101, ibid , fols 25-6.

4 "Round Table Statement", 1013, RT Papers, c 778, fol 190.

77

a) it would serve as a "link between the students of the Inperial
problem within each group",

b) it would "help to recruit believers in Imperial Union who are
not known to the members of the groups", and

c) it would correct "false impressions and misunderstandings", and
disseminate "those facts, figures and ideas, which must become
the commonplaces of public opinion, before It is ready to
receive the true gospel". 1

The first Issue of The Round Table contained a number of references
to the inadequacy of the existing constitutional machinery of the Empire.
Subsequent issues carried articles on such topics as the confederacy of
Delos and the union of England with Scotland, which would have made little
sense except in the context of arguments about the respective merits of co-
operation and federation. 2 Kevertheless. the Hoot agreed "that until the
'egg' is published the Round Table should rot cone out flat-footed in
favour of a scheme of organic union of the Empire". 3 4 Oliver's call for "a
sore definite and propagandist" and "positive line upon the need of
Imperial Union" was decisively rejected . a

1 Kerr. "Memorandum" [Sov/Dec 1910), Lothian Papers 11, fols 46-58.

2 t Kerr, 1 "Introductory", FT, Ho v 1910, pp 3-4; [Perry,] "An Early
Karitine Confederacy", AT, March 1912, pp 312-17; [V P Johnston,!
"The Union of England and Scotland", AT, March 1913, pp 277-302.

3 Minutes of RT meeting, 21 Hov 1912, RT Papers, c 777, fols 168-9.

4 Oliver, "Minute", [June 1913,1 RT Papers, c 778, fol 50; Minutes of
PT meeting, 26 June 1913, RT <0> Papers.

Initially the Hoot's attitude can be explained in termc of the
■study-group" strategy. Vhilo it was believed that the Pound Table's
■influence mainly depends upon its leading articles being written from one
point of view, i.e. in knowledge of and sympathy with the doctrines of tho
'egg'" 2 , i* w « s also believed that the call for Union would have to be
carefully orchestrated. Increasingly, however, the Hoot's attitude
reflected conflicts over tho timing, forn and even need of Union, which
Curtis's attempts to produce a new "Selborne Hcmorandun" brought out. As a
result, the Hoot came to appreciate the magazine as a distinct and separate
mouthpieco, through which to influence opinion on a wide rango of issues,
sometimes unconnected to federation.

The Hoot's collective responsibility for what was published in the
Pound Table was an important element in maintaining tho consistency of tho
magazine. Ideally, "the line to be taken in the policy articles is
thrached out very earnestly, (and! tho article is then drafted by tho
writor selected, circulated and thrashed out again". 3 As Amery later
emphasised, the process "still left play for a good deal of individual
outlook on the part of the various authors ". A Nevertheless, "the viewc

1 Oliver, "Minute", [June 1013,1 RT Papers, c 778, fol 50; Minutes of
RT mooting, 26 Juno 1913, FT < 0 ) Papers.

2 [Kerr.l "Editorial Arrangements", I Jan 1012,1 FT Papers, c 781,
fols 162-3.

3 Curtis to Sir Arthur Salter, 17 Apr 1030, Lothian Papers 251,
fols 596-09.

1

Amery to J Conway, 21 Feb 1052, <ed cte© file,) RT <0> Papers.

70

expressed" were generally "taken as being those of a body of men with a
certain reputation". 1

The anonymity of Round Table articles reflected the fact that they
expressed the collective viewpoint of the Koot. It was also useful In
concealing the extent to which Round Table articles (which, according to
the printed circulars, would always be written by "qualified persons" 2 )
were the work of a relatively small number of individuals.

Kenbers of the London Moot wrote approximately two thirds of all
Identifiable "policy" articles in the years 1910-18. 3 Kerr, editor from
1910 to 1916, and Coupland, his successor from 1917 to 1919, were
particularly prolific, as were Oliver. Brand. Craik and Grigg (who acted as
caretakers of the nagazine during Kerr's illness). Hichens, Malcolm and
Ziamern also contributed a number of articles. Dawson appears to have
contributed only on British politics between 1920 and 1922. Curtis wrote a
aunber of articles after 1918, but none before. Coupland thought that
Curtis would only produce "some particular thesis of his own" which would
by nc neans be "practical politics". **

Others who contributed “policy" articles in the early years included
the "Kindergarten" associates Duncan. Feetham, Perry. Karris and Meston.
Roughly one-fifth of early "policy" articles were by members of the

1 Cove to Brand. 23 June 1933, Lothian Papers 276, fols 608-11.

2 "The Round Table", 11910,1 RT Papers, c 844, fols 25-26.

3 See Appendix D. -Round Table Articles, by Author".

Coupland to Kerr, 17 Jan 1919, Lothian Papers 17, fol 480.

4

80

Dominion groups (including tho "Kindergarten" members in South Africa). In
some cases they were dieavovod by the Meet.

An early circular for the Round Table stated that it was "not a
commercial undertaking", but that "there is no reason why the journal
should not bo read by every man . . . who is seriously concerned with
Imperial affairs". 1 By conteaporary standards the circulation of the
magazine was quite respectable. 2 A print-run of 3500 for the first iscuo
gradually increased to 6500 by June 1914; 13,000 of the "Special War Issue"
wore printed in September. The print-run then settled down to around
10,000 for the remainder cf the decade. * Most sales were through
bookshops. The number cf regular subscribers reached a plateau of just
over 3,000 at the end of 1912. Relative to population, subscribers were
more nuaerous in the Dominions (particularly Hew Zealand) than in the UK:
at the end of 1014, for example, there were 935 subscribers in the UK, 614
in Canada, 360 in Australia, 227 in South Africa and 709 in Hew Zealand. **

1 (Untitled, printed circular for distribution in Canada, 1911,1 RT
Papers, c 844, fols 20-33.

2 The weeklies New Age. New Statesman and Nation had circulations of
about 3,000. Even the nost successful weekly, The Spectator, fcad a
circulation of only 22.000 in 1903, falling to 13,500 in 1922:

K Robbins, Politicians, Diplomacy and V&r in Modern British History
(London, 1904), ch 9. Circulation figures for the major quarterlies
are likely to be similar or even smaller.

3 m Tbe Pound Table", 10 Kay 1920, Brand Papers, Box 41; cf papers on
the magazine's finance, RT Papers, c 752-3 and c 844-6.

4 (Subscription lists,! RT Papers, c 844, fols 210 ff and c 846.

fols 228 ff; "Round Table Humber 16". 27 Oct 1914, R? Papers, c 782,
fol 202 .

To make sure that the magazine reached its intended audience, the
Xoot seat out large numbers of each issue free: 665 in Septenber 1912, and
1,222 by September 1914.' In Britain the recipients included Buckingham
Palace, leading politicians, all national newspapers and high-class
reviews, the leading provincial papers, shipping lines, hotels and London
clubs. 2 Free and cost-price copies were also distributed through the VBA
and the Overseas Club (whose secretary wanted "every member ... to become
imbued with the Round Table doctrines" 3 * 5 ). Journalists were considered
particularly important targets. As Curtis stated, "the Round Table is not
intended so much for the average reader, as for those who write ior the
average reader".* 1 In order to make the Journalists' Job easier, a
subcommittee was established to write a precis of each issue, which was
then sent to all leading British and Dominion newspapers. *

For the first few years of its existence, the Round Table was unique.
Other quarterlies, such as the Vestntnster, Edinburgh and Rational Reviews,
the Pall Rail Gazette and Blackwoods, published occasional articles on
Empire relations and foreign policy. The Royal Colonial Institute's
Proceedings provided a wealth of information and analysis. Finally, The
Tines published occasional supplements on individual parts of the Empire as

1 "The Round Table" [19123, RT Papers, c 844, fol 131; "Pound Table
Humber 16", 27 Get 1914, c 782, fol 202.

2 [Free lists, 1910-14,3 RT Papers, c 844-5; [OK lists,] c 845,
fols 55-74; [Dominion lists, Xarch 1912,3 c 844, fols 123 ff.

3 Evelyn Vrench to Kerr, 11 Dec 1914, RT Papers, c 845, fol 9.

* Curtis, Dyarchy (London, 1920), p 74.

5 Xinutes of RT meeting, 9 Kay 1912, RT Papers, c 777, fols 12-15.

82

well as news items from local correspondents. Hone of these, however,
attempted to do what the Pound Table set out to do, which was to provide a
regular, comprehensive and consistent survey of the Imperial position, to
balance information with argument, and to pursue an agenda of considerable
controversial ity with subtlety and discrimination.

The "Green Memorandum"

The Round Table magazine was an increasingly important focus of Round
Table activities, both in London and in the Dominions. Severtheless, the
real purpose of the organisation was to campaign for "closer union" of the
Empire. Central to the strategy adapted in 1909-19 was the preparation of
a convincing case for federation. Indeed, the whole of Curtis's plans
hinged on his ability to produce a document acceptable both to the Moot and
to the Round Tablers in the Dominions.

The "Green Memorandum" was Curtis's first attempt at producing such a
document. Although his later writings differed in both form and substance,
many of the themes which he developed remained central to his critique.

Curtis prefaced his essay with an analysis of international relations
reiterating the imperialist belief that nations necessarily engaged in a
world-struggle for survival and predominance. Citing Captain Mahan, he
argued that Britain's naval hegemony was a necessary condition for the
evolution of Canada and even of the United States. He mocked Canadians'
assumption that they were already self-governing: lacking control of
defence and foreign policy, Canada could not claim to have "its own hand on
its own rudder".’ British institutions, meanwhile, were "breaking down

1

C Curtis, 1 Memoranda on Canada and the British Coaaonvealth (privately
printed, Letchworth, 1910), p 74.

83

bonoath the strain", resulting In tho congestion of parliament, the
retardation of social reform, even the physical aad montal deterioration of
the British race.’

If present relations were inadequate, so too would be any forn of
mere co-operation, which would leave unresolved the central Issue of
accountability: the Admiralty, Var and Foreign Offices could not operate if
responsible to "five or six" different governments. Moreover, co-operation
would actually be dangerous, as it would "encourage the delusion that we
are equipped with the strength which can only be derived from unity
Itself ". 2

Thus Curtis cane to his "Alternative", the "organic union" of Britain
and the Dominions. This, he admitted, was supported by "so few [Canadians!
that they scarcely count". 3 Bevertheless. In the long term, union was the
only alternative to dissolution. Curtis envisaged a peripatetic
Government on parliamentary lines, with a lower house elected in proportion
to population, and an upper house consisting of an equal number of members
from each represented part. It would control defence, foreign policy and
the dependencies, but not tariffs; it would derive its revenue in the first
instance from the existing national governments. 4

1 Ibid, pp 85-98. Curtis devoted many pages to the question of
degeneration, quoting CFG Masterman's Tie Heart of tie Eapire
extensively. Like Vinston Churchill, he supported the segregation of
the "feeble-minded".

2 Ibid. p 127; cf pp 70-84.

3 Ibid, p 58.

4 Ibid, pp 99-128.

84

Curtis's "Green Memorandum", together with his addenda The Australian
People and Sew Zealand Sotos, were Initially circulated to some 120 group
members and other friendc in Britain and the Dominions. 1 Their comments,
written on the blank pages interleaved for the purpose, were returned to
Curtis and iccuod ac Pound Table Studies, First Series in 1911 and 1914.
These volumes did not identify by name the authors of remarks included, for
the ostensible reason that "each student should feel the utmost freedom in
expressing his views". 2 Curtis was in possession of a list identifying the
authors <a fact concealed from the Dominion groups^), but no extant copy
can now be found.

Many individuals doubted that Britain's burden would be any less if
there were no Dominions to protect. Others suggested that as Britain
derived greater benefit from overseas trade she should continue to bear a
greater share of naval expend! ture . A Most thought Curtis's picture of the
weary Titan exaggerated. Degeneration was "stuff and nonsense", according
to one critic. *

A number of commentators thought that the main obstacle to federation
would com* from Britain itself. One suggested that a long period of
education wac needed in order to "teach the English voters that they must

1 Small "study groups" (mainly consisting of university teachers and
students) were subsequently set up at Oxford. Cambridge, Reading,
Birmingham. Edinburgh and Glasgow.

2 Curtis, Dyarchy (London, 1920). p 43.

3 Curtis to Hichens, Bov 1911, PT Papers, c 844, fols 77-84.

4 Pound Table Studies, l First Series. vcJ I. 1911,1 pp 33 (contribution
41) and 35 (contributions 43 and 63); pp 261 (contribution 4) and 263
(contribution 42) .

5 Ibid , p 223 (contribution 55).

Another doubted whether

regard themselves as 'partners in the Empire'".

■the ' Jfother o f Parliaments' (would] consent to play second fiddle - . 1 The
ClaGgow group feared that, if Curtis's scheme were implemented, "the whole
character of the British constitution would be upset". a

Curtis's hostility to "co-operation" was not shared by all his
■students": many thought it a necessary stage of imperial relations which
would grow (rather than collapse) into Union. 3 Similar views were put
forward more forcefully in private correspondence. Eggleston thought that
unity night be "dis-served by Imperial Federation" If it were implemented
too hastily. "It is clear to my mind that l unity] . . . will only be
achieved in the last resort by some fora of organic union"; nevertheless,
federation should be seen as "the final step", not "a first step".**

As for Curtis's "Alternative", nunerous contributors foresaw
difficulties over the role of local defence forces, powers of taxation and
(especially) control of the dependencies. Others argued that "organic
union" would not be complete without control of tariffs and migration. 5

1 Ibid, pp 245 (contribution 32> and 606 (contribution 1).

2 Pound Table Studies, First Series, Vol 7/ C 19141, p 498.

3 Pound Table Studies, (First Series, vol 1,1 p 179 (contribution 61);
pp 405-06 (contributions 80 and 81).

4 Eggleston to Grigg, 16 July and 14 October 1913, FT Papers c 798,
fols 102-04 and 125-32.

3 Pound Table Studies, (First Series, vol 1,1 pp 250-351. For the
dependencies, see below, pp 88-89. For tariffs, see pp 127-31.

Curtis himself reckoned that he could identify 35 supporters of his

scheme and 9 opponents from the Dominions other than South Africa,

including 13 supporters as against 6 opponents in Canada. ’ Severtheless,

even those who supported Curtis's argument emphasised that they felt out of

lice with general opinion. As one otherwise enthusiastic student put it,

"I . . .do not wish it to be understood that I think
that a scheme which is theoretically Just and promises
to be effective can at present be carried out in
politics. Personally I think it most unlikely that
Canada, for example, would agree to come under the
control of a Federal Government .... In ny
judgment nothing but the pressure of grave and
imminent danger from war would induce the Canadians
even to consider such a proposal". 2

The London group itself was far from ready to endorse Curtis's
memorandum. Xany members thought Curtis over-enthusiastic in his
denunciation of co-operation, but, paradoxically, also contended that any
scheme of federation would have to be more wide-ranging. Kerr believed
that "many concessions [that] have been made to Dominion prejudices" might
have to be abandoned. 3

Vhile Curtis was still touring the Empire, the Moot concentrated on
the passages in which he alluded to imperial federation as a panacea for
Britain's domestic problems. The majority soon decided that "it is
inadvisable to base an argument for Imperial Union on a detailed
examination of the domestic evils caused in the United Kingdom" by the
existing constitutional practices. 23

1

2

3

UiU, PP 794-5.

Ibid , p 778 (contribution 100).

IKerr,] "Xeoorandum" , [Bov 1910), RT Papers, c 776, fols 124-36.

Rather acre significant were disagreements over the forn the proposed
Imperial Government should take, Its constitution, functions and powers. A

subcommittee was set up In November 1910 consisting of Kerr, Brand and
Cecil, to thrash out with Curtis an acceptable Fora of an Organic Union of
the Baplre. In the course of discussions lasting four nonths, Curtis's
original scheme was considerably modified. The proposal of a peripatetic
assembly was dropped. The necessity of a right of direct taxation was
insisted upon. Whatever its powers in peacetime, the Imperial Government
■ought to have power to do anything" in time of war. Finally, rather than
a two-tiered Parliament which gave the Dominions a safeguard against
British preponderance, Curtis was made to accept a single assembly in which
the majority of seats would represent the British Isles. 2 Even this
outline did not satisfy all the members of the Foot: Amery and Selborne had
both submitted memoranda calling for a unitary constitution, which would
enable the Imperial Government to control tariffs. 3

Curtis was thus caught bGtwecn the Doninion groups, which were
reluctant to accept the whole of hie proposals, and the Moot, which thought
them not far-reaching enough, and had now saddled him with a schema for

1 Kerr to Curtis, 30 Sept 1910, Lothian Papers 2, fols 96-123; Minutes
of RT meeting, Blackmoor, 12-13 Nov 1910, R7 Papers, c 776. fols
79-81.

2 f Curtis, 1 7 be Fora of an Organic Union of the Bopire (privately
printed, revised 23 March 1911), copy in Curtis Papers 157, item 11.

3 Amery, "Memorandum", f Jan 19111, RT Papers c 776. fols 113-23;
Selborne, "Memorandum", 26 Jan 1911, c 776, fols 89-91.

which, SO he admitted, "public opinion today 1© nowhere ripe**.’ Clearly a
*jre persuasive argument would have to be found.

Curtis therefore embarked on a new three-part study of the problen.
Historical analysis would reveal the necessity of the British Bnplre;
analysis of contemporary conditions would illustrate the need for a
decisive step to prevent its dissolution; finally, the irreducible
components of such a step would be elaborated.

"Tha Principle of. the Cornnonwon 1 t.h"

The position of India and Britain's other dopondoncioc undor imporial
union wac a question which the Imporial Federation Loaguo had boon unablo
to resolve. 2 Initially, the Bound Table ignored this problem, assuming
that the Donlnione would be keen to share in the government of these vast
territories. Curtis even proposed to let them do so before Union (by
transferring the Vest Indies to Canadian adni nlstration, Fiji to
Australian, and so on). 3

In his "Green Memorandum" Curtis made several references to Britain's
role as a "constable" In the dependencies, which, foreshadowing Lugard, he
described as "her duty to them and her duty to the world at large". He
emphasised the dependencies' "incapacity" to secure "civilised rule" for

1 I Curtis,] The Fora of an Organic Union, p 7.

2 See S R Mehrotra, "Imperial Federation and India, 1868-1917", JCPS,
Vol I. no 1 (Fov 1961), pp 29-40.

3 Minutes of PT meetings. Plas Sewydd, 4-6 Sept 1909, Lothian Papers.

11, fols 1-6. Jebb also thought that control of the dependencies
might supply an "organic lick" between Britain and the self-governing
colonies: Studies in Colonial rationalism (London, 1905), p 278.

89

theacelvos, but warned that their increasing hostility to "alien rule"
meant that they were likely to be an increasing burden. It was therefore
cc6ent ial that they should cone under the control of a government able to
cosoand the resources of the whole Empire. This, Curtis now admitted, ran
directly counter to the view prevalent in Canada, "that these Possessions
are held merely for honour and glory and profit ... or that thoy might be
given sel f-governnent and placed on a colonial footing".'

Curtis's argunent failed to convince many of bis Dominion "students".
Indeed, as Kylie had predicted, reluctance to share in the control of India
and the dependencies was the "real crus" of Dominion opposition to Curtis's
schene. 2 "How far Is it a rather Pecksniff ian trusteeship and how far the
desire to have a regular stable government as a necessity for English
merchants?", asked one student. If Britain wanted to continue ruling the
dependencies, that was up to her, contended another; "it does net appear
that this is a natter which should be Included . . .fin anl arrangement
for the preservation of the Empire". 3

Curtis realised that the divergence of views could not simply be
ignored. "Ve must face the question as to who is to be responsible for the
great Dependencies . ** Curtis's case was reinforced by Karris, who argued
forcibly that, while the "egg" night be "solid" on the Dominions, it was
weak, and potentially fatally so, on the dependencies. There would

1 l Curtis. 1 Memoranda on Canada and the British Commonwealth (1910),
pp 26, 56 and passlfl-

2 Kylle to Kerr. 16 Oct (19101, (Kylie file,) RT (0) Papers.

3 Round Table Studies, l First Series, vol I, 19111, pp 13 (contribution
3) and 13-15 (contribution 27).

* Curtis to Oliver. 15 Aug 1910, Lothian Papers, 2, fols 135-51.

00

inevitably be opposition from India to any changoc which would put her
under the control of a body representing the Domlnloac, ocpocially if such
changes failed to take into account Indian aspirations to self-government . 1

Kerr visited India in 1912. There, under Harris's influence, he
conposed "a proposal for altering the fundamental propositions of the 'Egg'
eo far as they relate to India". 2 Kerr adduced three reasons for proposing
a llaited Indian representation in an Imperial Parliament: previous
British promises to associate Indians with the government controlling
India, the need for Informed discussion of Indian affairs, and the
expediency of satisfying "the entirely proper aspirations and self-respect
of the native Indians". Kerr suggested the inclusion of non-voting
nominees of the Government of India, to provide "expert" knowledge, and two
voting representatives of the Indian Legislative Council. He stopped short
of suggesting any significant Indian representation: "they could not be
given such representation ... as would enable them, like the Irish today,
in combination with large minorities, to turn out of office the Cabinet
which ultimately controls Indian affairs". 3

1 Karris to P C Kerri, 10 July 1911, Brand Papers, box 2.

2 Kerr to Paterson, 18 April 1912, RT Papers, c 826, fol 2. For
Karris's influence, see Karris to Curtis, 18 April 1912 (copy),
Lothian Papers, 462, fol 15: "the main proposal is what 1 suggested
to hin In the beginning".

3 Kerr, "Keoorandum on the Representation of India", [April 1912,1
RT Papers c 826, fols 4-14.

E©rr's argument was supported by memoranda fron four British
officials working in India, V H Buchan, H T Cullis, E D Xaclagan and
E Molony. ' All stressed the importance of making cone concoccion to Indian
opinion: as Cullis put it, "India is not governed by an autocratic
bureaucracy, which can do as it likes, but by a very limited bureaucracy,
vory sensitive and very deferential to public opinion ". 2 Further memoranda
from Karris and Heston also supported Kerr's proposal. Both argued that
Indian representation was, in Keston's words, necessary as a declaration of
faith that "self-government" was "one of the ideals at which our rule in
India is to aim". 31

This proposal horrified a number of members of the Moot. Cralk
asserted that Indian self-government "Is in the far distant future and may
never arrive". Moreover, "I have at least an open mind as to whether when
that day comes it would not be better for the Empire to get rid of India"."*
Malcolm deplored any attempt to transcend the racial barrier on which

1 V H Buchan, “Memorandum on the Representation of India", 11 June
1912, RT Papers, c 826, fols 45-56; H T Cullis, "Botes on the Indian
Memorandum - . fols 75-8, and "General Bote cn the Indian Memorandum"
(sent 12 June 1912), fols 79-85; E J Xaclagan, "Bote on the
Memorandum", 2 July 1912, fols 208-10; E Molony, "Memorandum on
India", 3 June 1912, fols 143-58.

2 Cullis, “General Bote", fol 79. Cullis, Xaclagan and Molony argued
for a larger measure of representation than that advocated by Kerr;
Buchan was more cautious.

3 Heston, "Memorandum on India and the Empire", Dec 1912, RT Papers,
c 826, fols 86-104 (quotation from fol 87); Karris, "Memorandum on
India and the Empire", Dec 1912, fols 160-66. Both argued for at
least three voting representatives.

4 Craik, "Bote on the Principle of Indian Representation", 16 July
1912. RT Papers c 826, fols 223-7.

92

Eipire rested; "Are we prepared to contemplate the ethnological collection
into which our Inperlal Parliament will develop?"’

Curtis also opposed the Karris/Kerr proposal: "until we are really

prepared to accord the Dependencies governing power we are only laying up

. . . a store of misunderstandings by pretending to do so". Hevertheless,

he was struck by the suggestion that "self-government" should be the

declared aim of British rule, although it was one whose realisation would

come “long after ["the present generation" 3 have been in their graves".

The adoption of this aim would re-emphasise the moral basis of British

rule, and avoid the necessity of enunciating a separate ideal of

citizenship for whites and non-whites. Therefore,

"the conception that Indians should be regarded as
fellow citizens of one super-coomonweal th with
ourselves, and that to prepare them first for the
control of their own sub-conmonweal th and finally for
an equal share in the control of the super-commonwealth
should be our guiding principle". 7

■Commonwealth" soon became the central concept in Curtis's propaganda
for imperial union. Although his "Commonwealth" principle was in many ways
"simply the old Liberal doctrine of the Victorian era", 7 it also reflected
a thoroughgoing, illiberal authoritarianism.

" Vhat is a State and in what respect does it differ
from any other combination of individuals? Are we
right in thinking that it is an organisation which
claims to exercise an unlimited authority over Its

1 Malcolm, ■ Memorandum" , nd f 19123, RT Papers c 826, fols 167-72.

2 [Curtis, 3 "Fote on Philip Kerr's Indian Memorandum", [1912,3 RT
Papers c 826, fols 233-40.

3 Zimmern to J A Hobson, 13 Sept 1916, RT Papers c 817, fol 139.

93

members? .... Conversely 16 not a citizon a poreon
whose legal obligation to oboy the formally declared
will of the state is unlimited?"’

[n Curtis's view, the state rested on a "bond" which wac "in the naturo of
dedication ... at root not contractual, but cacraaontal" j it demanded
from individuals "a sense of devotion" and of "sacrifice". Vhat
distinguished a "commonwealth" from other forms of government was that
citizens were "dedicated" to each other, and not to some ruler claiming
divine sanction, Citizens of a "commonwealth" owed unlimited obedience to
the "general will" as expressed in law: but, as not all citizens were
"responsible", not all could Join in the making of law. "Commonwealth" was
therefore not the same as "self-government", although it implied a tendency
towards it. A "commonwealth" was constantly engaged in the process of
widening its basis of active participation, but not in such a way as to
endanger the stability of the state itself. 1 2

Once again Curtis failed to convince his colleagues, who reacted to
his new line in Imperial propaganda with consternation. It was decidedly
"phi losophical" and for that reason alone "poison to the Anglo-Saxon
mind". 3 Craik complained that he could not understand Curtis's drift, and
doubted if others would. ** A second objection was that Curtis's thesis was

1 I Curtis, 1 "Memorandum" ( nd: 19121, Brand Papers, box 2.

2 [Curtis, 1 Round Table Studies. Second Series, Part A , (1912,1
"Introduction"; reprinted in The Project of a Commonwealth, Part One
(1915) and published in The Commonwealth of Rations, Part One
(London, 1916). Cf The Problem of the Commonwealth (London. 1916),
ch 19; "A Criterion of Values in International Affairs" in Kerr and
Curtis, The Prevention of Var (Sew Haven. 1923 > : Civitas Dei, Volume
One (London, 1034).

3 Brand to Kerr, 23 July 1912. Brand Papers, box 182.

* Craik, • Vote on the Principle of Indian Representation", 16 July
1912, RT Papers c 826, fols 223-7.

patently untrue: as Brand confessed, "I cannot get clear in my head that
. . . history can properly be moulded into its f ora- . ’ Thirdly. Curtis's
colleagues argued that Curtis's implicit assumption that other races were
•unfit'' for responsibility was. in the long term, unsustainable. Like
Craik and Malcolm, Brand was

". . . apprehensive of the logical application of these
sweeping principles .... I never intend that the
black man, however civilised, and however nunerous,
shall govern the Empire on an equality with the white
.... I am not sure that all this is consonant with
mutual citizenship in a Commonwealth. Vhy should a
minority of the citizens decide that a majority is not
fit for the full status of citizenship? Ve all of us
agree that it is our duty to train the dependencies up
to self-government and not treat their inhabitants as
chattels. But cannot this be said without recourse to
the theory of the Commonwealth?" 3

Finally, Curtis's new line of argument was rejected as simply irrelevant to
the problems which the Round Table existed to solve. As Craik argued, the
Pound Table's object was

"to make [the British Empire! still more powerful.

This was to be done by calling upon the Dominions . . .
to take a share in Imperial power .... A world-wide
federation may be ail very well - or it may not. At
any rate it is not what we are proposing" . ^

Milner was apparently more sympathetic to Curtis, but by no means whole-
heartedly so. *Vhy do you accuse me of being 'dedicated' to a
'commonwealth'?" he demanded of Oliver in 1914. "I am an out and out

1 Brand, "Memorandum on the First Part of the 'Round Table Report'",
Dec 1912, RT Papers c 777, fols 154-66.

2 Ibid : cf Malcolm, "Memorandum", nd [19123, RT Papers c 826,
fols 167-72.

3

Craik, "lote on the Principle of Indian Representation", 16 July
1912, RT Papers c 826, fols 223-7.

95

imperialist and a great admirer of our friend L.C. But it is his work I
admire not his philosophy. And I hate all kinds of flapdoodle more than
words can say."'

■The Pmblftn of the CQaaonyfialth'

As Brand defined it, the object of Curtis's "Round Table Studies" was
to provide answers to three separate questions:

■1. Vhy the Empire cannot go on as it is

2. Vhat changes are required for the Empire to be preserved? ....

3. Is the Empire worth preserving?" 2

Curtis's attempts to answer these questions in a way acceptable to both the
London and the Dominion groups had so far net with little success.

Clearly, federation was nore attractive in the abstract than as a specific
and detailed proposal.

The Dominion groups contained many individuals who agreed with Curtis
in theory. A few. in the words of the Hew Zealand secretary, "will follow
till all's blue". But the majority was convinced that a long period of
■education* vas needed before conditions were ripe for a federalist
movement. 3 The situation elsewhere was similar. In Australia the feeling
was rife "that federation can only come as a means of reconciliation of
divergent tendencies consciously felt and felt to be dangerous", which was
net the case yet.* 1 In Canada, the Round Table groups wore coning under
fire as a "Tory plot", ruling out any possibility of concerted action for

1 Milner to Oliver, 22 June 1914, Oliver Papers 86, fols 40-1.

2 Brand, " Xeaorandum" , 25 May 1914, RT Papers c 779, fols 85-89.

3 S A Atkinson to Curtis, 10 Kay 1912, RT Papers c 777, fols 67-69; cf
Atkinson to Curtis, 17 Jan 1913, RT Papers c 778, fols 66-67.

4

P V Eggleston Cto Curtis], 3 March 1913 (extracts), RT Paperc c 778,
fols 91-92.

96

some tins-

Curtis's response was now to urge caution and a protracted period of
■study" before pressing on with the original plan. 2 However, some of the
London group were anxious to enforce haste, an anxiety which was Increased
by the group's unplanned entry into the arena of controversy as the butt of
attacks by Richard Jebb.

Jebb had originally been counted as a potential supporter of the
Round Table project. His comments on the "original egg" here included in
the first "annotated" volume. 3 nevertheless, his espousal of co-operation
and Tariff Reform led to an increasing opposition between his views and
those of the Round Table. Under pressure fron Curtis, Jebb excised an
attack on the group from his Imperial Conference of 1911, * but by 1912-13
he was seriously concerned "that Imperial Federation is in the air". The
result was a series of letters to colonial statesnen, and in Kay 1913 The
Bri tannic Question, which contained a lengthy attack on the Round Table as
"the intellectual guide of regenerate Conservatism". 3

Curtis was pressed "to speed up", and was sent to Canada again to

1 E J Kylio to Curtis, 10 Feb 1913, RT Papers c 778, fols 62-3; cf
Perry to 3rand, 22 Feb 1913, RT Papers c 778, fols 38-42.

2 Curtis, "Memorandum", 25 Feb 1913, RT papers c 778, fols 60-61.

3 Jebb'c conuasnts were given the nunber 118; see his copy of Round
Tablo Studies in the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London.

4 Jebb to Curtis, 4 May 1911, Jebb Papers; cf Curtis to Feetham,

27 April 1911, Curtis Papers 2, fcls 68-71 ("he has given away tho
whole show" ) .

5 Jebb to Curtis, 15 April 1913, Jebb Papers; Jobb, The Britannic
Question (London, 1913), p 77. Jebb and Fabian Ware also produced a
chort- lived magazine, The Britannic Review, to counter the Round
Table’ & "centralist" argunents.

97

attempt to secure agreement to the fundamental propositions of the ■egg". 1
This he was unable to do. After discussion with the leading Toronto Round
Tablers, Curtis agreed that he would have to publish on his own
responsibility, leaving the "study-groups" uncommitted to his proposals.

Any propagandist movement in favour of federation would have to be created
afresh, albeit largely centred on former Round Table members. 2

However, any notion Curtis might have entertained that his new-found
independence extended also to his relations with the London group was soon
scotched by a letter from Brand. 3 Curtis was therefore urged to prepare a
summary of Part III before writing the full version. This he did, but his
draft 4 once more failed to win the group's agreement. Craik, Brand and
Malcolm again submitted memoranda savaging Curtis's "principle of the
Commonwealth" as obscure, Inconsistent, dangerous and irrelevant. 5

The outbreak of war naturally brought into question the need for
Curtis to continue working on his Round Table Studies. However, Curtis
argued strongly that some alteration of the constitutional relations of the
Empire was now inevitable. It was therefore the Round Table's duty to be
ready with an argument and scheme for the kind of rearrangement which it

1 Minutes of RT meetings, 17 July 1913 and 25 Sept 1913, RT <0) Papers.

2 Ho contemporary record of these neetings can be found, but their
outcome was summarised in Curtis to V Massey, 28 March 1916, RT
Papers c 780. fols 57-74.

3 Brand to Curtis. 12 Jan 1914, RT Papers c 779, fols 1-3.

4 l Curtis, 1 A Practical Enquiry into the Nature of Citizenship in the
British Empire* . . . (19141, Curtis Papers 157, item 6.

5 Craik, "Memorandum", 22 Kay 1914, RT Papers c 779. fols 90-101;

Brand, "Memorandum", 25 Kay 1914, Ibid, fols 85-9; Malcolm, "Hotes on
the Printed Draft of Report Part III", 27 May 1914, ibid.

fols 19-22.

96

had been founded to pronote.’ Others in the Moot agreed. Brand, for
instance, thought that "if those who recognise that the present
organisation of the Enpire is only temporary do not take every advantage
possible of the present favourable crisis, matters may be far more
difficult 10 years* hence".*

Curtis's plan was still for a three-part study of the Empire. In
addition, the Moot had decided there was a need lor a shorter volume,
designed for popular consumption.* By the outbreak of war, only four of
five instalments of Volume I were ready. Curtis now hurried off the final
Instalment of this volume, which was printed as a whole and without
alteration as The Project of a Comvonwealth, Part I in 1915, and published
as The Common wealth of Nations, Part I In early 1916. *

Curtis’s task of finding a formula acceptable to the Moot was made
all the more difficult by the circumstances of the war. The massive
injection of nar.power and resources by the Dominions clearly discredited
any belief that "co-operation" was an Ineffectual means of uniting the
Empire. Brand now wanted this reflected in Curtis's work, arguing that
‘half a loaf is better than no bread".' Curtis, on the other hand, saw in

1 Curtis, "Memorandum on the Conduct of RT Work during the Var" , 19 Oct
1914, RT Papers c 779, fols 102-113.

2 Brand to Sir R Borden, 8 Jan 1916, Brand Papers, box 182.

3 Minutes of RT meeting, 30 Kay to 2 June 1914, RT (O) Papers.

4 5,037 copies Of the two editions were printed, of which 666 were sent
out free, and only about 1800 sold by January 1917 <RT Papers c 783,
fol 103). According to G l Beer, the book's lack of success was
"mainly due to its length. It is neither history for the trained
scholar, nor is it adapted to the needs of the busy layman" (Beer to
Brand, 8 Oct 1917, RT Papers c 846, fols 134-35).

- Brand to Sir Edmund Valker, 22 Feb 1916, RT Papers c 780, fols 32-3.

IF' 1 .'-

\

99

the very fact of war evidence that "co-operation" had failed; had the
Empire been united, the German alliance would have shied from resorting to
force. ’

To nake mat tore worse, Brand and others took a stronger line on

imperial taxation than Curtis wished, arguing that the power of direct

taxation was an essential attribute of government.

"To pretend . . . that something that is not Organic
Union is really Organic Union is in my opinion perfectly
disastrous. It will raise all the hostility that
Organic Union would raise and in addition can be
absolutely riddled by anyone who cares to do so." a

Brand's line was supported by a majority of the Moot, who agreed a formula

by which the Dominions would deternine the distribution of taxation, while

its collection would be left to the Imperial Government. 3

The possible representation of India still divided the Hoot. Another
"Indian Xcot - was set up in the autumn of 1915, and agreed that some
declaration of British policy was a necessity. Cne of its acabers, Sir
Villiam Duke, again urged the Round Table to convince Indians: "India's
part in the coining contention lover federation! must be very subordinate,
but when forces may be rather nicely balanced it would be a pity if her
contributions were limited to wails of protest". 4 Curtis himself was now

1 Curtis to Kerr, 4 Sept 1915, RT Papers c 809, folc 78-81.

2 Brand to Kerr, 23 Feb 1916, Brand Paporc, box 182.

3 Xinutes of RT meeting, 2 Xarch 1916, RT Paporc c 780, folc 52-3.

Amcry wrote up the Xoot's proposals as Chapter 18 of the first
<unpubl ished, but privately circulatod) version of Tho Problem of the
CoaaoDwealth.

4 Duke to Curtis, 8 Feb 1916, RT Paporc c 780, folc 34-35.

co»l°8 roun< ^ v ^ ew that India should be given re procoat at ion in the

proposed Parliament, but many of his colleagues remained unconvinced. "Vo
arc divided among ourselves by the cleavage of opinion which divides the
world," Curtis eventually declared.’

A further rift opened up on the form of the proposed imperial
constitution. As the war prcgreecod, Milner, Oliver, Aacry and Grigg
appear to have become increasingly cynical towards the parliamentary system
on which Curtis sought to model his federation. As early as December 1914
Oliver declared that "if we win tthe warl it will be because the spirit of
the small Tennant who hate and despise democracy . . . will save the
country". 2 Milner claimed not to share Oliver's "aversion for democracy".

"I myself am perfectly indifferent. I regard it, like
any other form of Government, as a necessary evil. . . .
But I shy at the idea that you have only to reproduce in
the sphere of Imperial politics the sane systen, which
has begun to work so badly in domestic politics, in
order to find a panacea for all existing ills."

Milner urged Curtis to "give men of independence and character a chance" by

■producing something more like a Council of Statesmen" .

Curtis's draft of the shorter volume did include some concessions to
bis critics. His verbiage on the "commonwealth" was relatively restrained,
the proposal of Indian representation was omitted, and the necessity of
direct imperial taxation was asserted." However, Curtis still failed to

Curtis to Milner, 24 Feb 1916, RT Papers c 780, fols 38-41.

Oliver [to Brand?], 26 Dec 1914, Brand Papers, box 2B; Oliver to
Brand, 16 Feb 1916. Brand Papers, box 3. Cf Grigg <from the Western
front) to Kerr, 23 Dec 1915, 3rand Papers, box 3.

4

Xilner to Curtis, 27 Hov 1915, Curtis Papers 2, fols 186-98.

Curtis, Tie Prcblen of the CowmoD-«ealth (unpublished version, 1915).

101

w ln the endorse me nt of his col leagues. 1 It wac therefore agreed that
Curtis should issue the work with a preface dissociating the Moot, as well
as ihe other Round Table groups, fron his conclusions. It was also agreed
that Curtis was free not "to defer to other people's judgement- on matters
where he was not convinced. Curtis did in fact codify the passages on
Inperial taxation and cn India to reflect core faithfully his own points of
view . 2

Curtis's problems were not yet over, inasmuch as the Canadian Round
Tablers now launched vehement protests against the publication of his
volume. 3 The proposals for Imperial taxation and control of the
dependencies were particularly galling. Although they "nust some day be
faced by us all ... if pressed now [they! will doubtless inperil the
whole Mtter". 4 At nost, the Canadians were prepared to support the
publication of the first part of Curtis's work, in which it was argued that
there was a prcblem to be solved. No solution should yet be offered. s

The Canadian view received support fron sono members of the Moot.

Kerr questioned “whether it is scur.d strategy to begin your oanpaign by
propounding the solutions in detail ahead".* 6 Oliver, likewise, argued that
Curtis’s specific proposals could be published later "in response to a

Oliver’s diary, 2 March 1916, Oliver Papers 210.

Curtis to Milner, 24 Feb 1916, RT Papers c 760, fols 35-41, reporting
the agreement reached between binself and Hlchens, the latter acting
on behalf of the Moot.

Glazebrook to Curtis, 29 Jan 1916, ibid, fols 16-17
Valker to Brand, 1 Feb 1916, ibid , fols 31-32.

7 Xassey to Curtis. 2 March 1916, ibid., fols 54-56.

IKerrl to Oliver, 24 March 1916, Oliver Papers 90, fol 68.

3

102

widespread demand" . 1 2 nevertheless, when the issue was thrashed out at a
oeetlng early in April 1916, Curtis was able to command a majority of the
London group. Curtis himself was despatched on a further tour 'to explain
t he circuastances . . . and arrange for publication- in the several
Positions. *

In Hay 191b, therefore, more than six years after the inception of
the Bound Table project, Curtis's argument for imperial federation was
finally published, in the form of The Problem of the Commonwealth,

Although Curtis's thesis was considerably more refined than that of
his original "Green Memorandum", fundamentally it remained the same. The
great question, as he put it. was "whether the Dominions are to become
independent republics, or whether this world-wide Commonwealth is destined
to stand more closely united as the noblest of all political
achievements" . 3 The Eoninlons, heirs to Britain's long tradition of
progressive sel f-governnont , wore not cel f-governing in tho one area which
really mattered. Distinct nations, each with its own "national
cotcciousncss", they could yet preserve and extend their own identities by
agreeing to create a new Imperial Parliament. A price would have to be
paid, especially by Canadians. After making allowances for "taxable
capacity" (highest in Britain, lowest in South Africa), Curtis suggested
the following distribution cl the defence burden:

1

2

3

Oliver to Curtis, 3 April 1916, RT Papers c 780, fols 86-88.
Minutes of RT meeting, 6 April 1916, ET Papers c 78C, fol 90.
Curtis, The Problem of the Commonwealth (London, 1916), Preface.

103

Actual-expenditure. 1913-14 Sugg.as.ted. distribution 1

£n

per cap

por cap

Canada

2.704

0- 7-4.9

9.348

1-5-7. 3

Australia

4.082

0-18-1.7

5.553

1-4-8

Jew Zealand

0.765

0-13-10.8

1.383

1-5-1. 7

South Africa

1.345

0- 4-5.6

1.397

0-4-7. 9

UK

72.346

1-11-9.6

63.561

1-7-11.2

61.242

1- 5-2.7

81.242

1-5-2. 7

In return for such an increase in expenditure the Dominions would be
assured of a supreme authority responsive to their needs, and an Empire
Khich no other Power would dare to challenge.

Denlss or Hiatus?

Tie outbreak of war was a disaster for the novenent. On the one
hand, it exacerbated the divisions which Curtis's "Studies" had already
brought out; on the other, it ruled out the kind of long-term strategy
which most believed to be necessary. As G L Beer emphasised in 1914, peace
was bound to load to an enormous "centrifugal tendency". 2

Throughout 1915 Curtis urged his colleagues "to begin giving
practical people the impression that the novenent is leaving its academic
stage*, s He even proposed a new United Kingdom organisation, to press the
^Einions "to realise and assume their responsibilities".*’ His suggestion
* ac turned down, however, on the grounds that such an organisation would

UHd, pp 167-85.

G L Beer to Curtis, nd [late 19141, RT Papers c 779, lols 82-83.
Curtis to Grigg, 24 April 1915, RT Papers c 809, fols 25-26.

Curtis to Kerr, 4 Sept 1915, RT Papers c 809, fols 78-81.

4

104

gaack of the worst kind of centralism. 1

Curtis encountered similar difficulties when he urged the Moot to use
the nagazine to support federation. He had always "understood that when
the Egg was published the 'Round Table' magazine was to become definitely
propagandist". 2 However, both Kerr and Oliver now argued against such a
course. Sor did Oliver like Curtis's other suggestions, that the Round
Table should give way to a new magazine (which would give the impression
that the Pound Table had "broken up in disorder"), or that the magazine
should continue as a "bear-pit of controversy". The majority of the Moot
agreed with him. 3 As a result, the Round Table's ser.d-off for Curtis's
Ixock was United to a brief mention of it as one which "every responsible
citizen ought to read" . a

The reception accorded Curtis's Problem in the British press was also
far fron encouraging. Of the London papers, only Dawson'* Times was
fulsoae in its praise: the anonymous reviewer spoke of "the fundamental
truth of these principles" and "the contagion of this faith". * The
general Tory attitude was that Vestmi aster would not reduce Itself to a
*re 'provincial Assembly", and that the British constitution should
continue to change by custon and not fiat. e The Liberal papers, on the

Kerr to Curtis, 25 Sov 1915, RT Papers c 809, fols 92-94.

Curtis, "Memorandum on the Conduct of RT work during the Var", 19 Oct
1914, RT Papers c 779, lols 102-13.

Oliver to Kerr, 29 May 1916, Brand Papers, box 3: cf Kerr, "The Round
Table", 1 June 1916, RT Papers c 780, fols 124-25; Minutes of RT
meeting. 8 June 1916, RT Papers c 780, fols 127-28.

(Kerr,) -The Principle of Peace", RT, June 1916, p 427.

The Times Literary Supplement, 25 May 1916.

b 8 Ibo Athenaeum, 16 July 1916.

■"BWR

105

otier band, derided Curtis's philosophy as that of an expansionist,

Prussianist "Kultur". 1

It was not in Britain, however, but in the Dominions that Curtis
sought the constituency through which to force Union on the Empire.

Although the idea of using the Round Table groups as the media of a
propagandist campaign had been abandoned, they could still serve a purpose
in providing platforms for the discussion of Curtis's book, and forcing a
recognition of the fundamental "problem”. 2

Arriving in Canada at the end of April 1916, Curtis reconciled the
Canadian groups to the fait accompli of publication of his book, and
secured the issue of a Canadian edition. 3 He also persuaded the groups to
issue a "nanifosto” which stated that Canada, while determined to remain
vithin the British " Comoon wea 1 th" , was keen to assume responsibility for
defence and foreign affairs, and called on Canadian leaders to meet and
discuss the question.*’ Again at Curtis's instigation, G A Varburton was
hired to resuscitate the Vestern groups <ncw in disarray). Varburton
proved quite successful, although he found that "it was ... a very
decided advantage tc be able to state that the publication of this volume
hy Hr Curtis had been opposed by the leaders of the Found Table in

Eg J A Hobson, writing in The Manchester Guardian, 11 Sept 1916.
Hobson's review sparked off a heated correspondence with Zimmern (RT
Papers c 817, fols 139-60), with Hobson accusing Curtis of an
"impudent piece of mental jugglery", and Zimmern accusing Hobson of
being "remote from facts”.

Curtis, ” Memorandum on the Conduct of RT work during the Var* . 19 Oct
1914, RT Papers c 770, fol 105.

Curtis to Kilnor, 2 Hay 1916, RT Papers, c 780, fols 106-12.

4

"Kecorandum” [printed, Toronto, 1916,1 RT Papers, c 802, fol 276.

106

Canada" •' Curtie was successful in breathing new life into the Canadian
organisation, but a Canadian movement for Imperial federation was clearly
still a long way off. Curtis hinself left the Canadians "a bit critical

and disposed to tbini that he made a good many faux pas '*.*

In Hew Zealand and Australia, Curtis found a more encouraging
response to his Problem, and an Australasian edition was swiftly produced. 3
Curtis found himself "talking to the converted" In New Zealand, and the
Sound Table groups readily agreed to extend their operations, forming new
study-circles and special women's groups and agreeing to issue a
■saaifesto* on the same lines as the Canadian groups. Curtis made numerous
speeches, which were fully and sympathetically reported in the press. A In
Australia Curtis found the "disintegrationists" more numerous, a fact which
he put down to Australia's large Irish population. * Nevertheless, the
Pound Table groups were "in general agreement with the statement of the
case contained in 'Tho Problem'", and "desirous of assisting in every way
possible* . 6

From Australia, Curtis sailed to India, with the intention of forming
new Round Table groups froa amongst the British people stationed there. A

0 A Varburton and V F Bowles, ''Report Upon Their Visit to the
Vest ..." [April 19173, RT Fapers c 546, fols 231-46.

Vrong to Kerr, 20 July 1916, RT Fapers c 780, fols 139-41.

Curtis, Notes on the Progress of the Movement in Australia (Bombay,
1916, "for private circulation".)

Curtis to the Moot I Aug 19161, RT Papers c 780, fols 158-68.

Curtis to Milner, 16 Oct 1916, RT Papers c 780, fols 189-95.
c H Vickens to Curtis, 20 April 1916 (Australia file,) RT (0) Papers.

107

tel OD ICS employees taking part soon scotched his plans. Kevertheless,
Curtis ended up staying for IQ months, unable tc resist the temptation of
becoaing embroiled in Indian politics.’

Although the Moot was unwilling to endorse Curtis's Problem, nost
ceabers still supported the idea of federation, and many felt the need for
sone forward move while conditions were still favourable. In Curtis's
absence, the Moot therefore laid plans for a new network of “Coiraonwealth
Societies", with a definite commitment to the creation of an Imperial
Parliament. Curtis's Problem would not have to be accepted in its
entirety, "partly because it went into too great detail, and partly because
‘her® is a good deal of disagreement about some of its propositions even
a song those who accept its main conclusions". In particular, there would
be no commit me at against "intermediate'' steps. 2 Draft "proposals of
agreecent" were drawn up, listing the powers envisaged for an eventual
inperial government: defence, foreign relations, the dependencies,
taxation "f rom speci f ic sources only", citizenship <but not residence and
aigratica), and a veto on Dominion legislation.®

Curtis's reaction was, somewhat surprisingly, to protest at the
drawing up of "articles of faith". 4 Perhaps because of his protests,
lothlng more was done. The employment of various members of the Moot in

For Curtis's activities in India, see below, pp 192-97.

t Coupland?] to Glazebrooi, 22 !fov 1916, RT Papers c 802, fols 264-72;
cf Kerr, "Memorandum", 1 Dec 1916, RT Papers c 780, fols 178-81.

Kerr, "Rough Draft Proposals of Agreement", 29 Dec 1916, RT Papers
c 780. fols 105-08.

Curtis to Coupland, 15 March 1917, RT Papers c 810, fols 12-16.

Lloy*^ Geor 8 e * s new adninistratlon also limited its capacity to reconstruct
the Round Table organisation. Moreover, the decision to summon an Imperial
Conference in 1917 - long called for by the Round Table' - inevitably
preoccupied the movement.

The actual course of the summer's Imperial gatherings provided the
Romd Tablers with cause both for optimism and for dismay. Or. the one
hand, the innovation of an Imperial Var "Cabinet" appeared to be a big step
towards the kind of constitutional reconstruction which the Round Table
existed to promote. Moreover, Resolution IX of the Conference agreed the
need for a convention to consider Imperial relations after the war. On the
other hand. Borden and Smuts both ruled out "the federal solution". Smuts,
at a Parliamentary banquet in his honour, claimed that the Dominions' war
»ffort showed that the work of "union" was "very largely . . . already
done". Harcourt wrote to him with the gleeful verdict that "tonight was
the funeral of the Round Table". 2

At a Round Table dinner for Smuts on 4 May, Milner welcomed what he
saw as a step towards simplifying British foreign policy, ensuring its
continuity, and diminishing its control by the parties at Vestminster.

*err and Brand went further, endorsing the principle of "consultation", and
adding only that the new "Imperial Cabinet" should be accompanied by an

1 See, eg, [Grigg,] "The Dominions and the Settlement: a Plea for a
Conference", RT, March 1915, pp 325-44.

V K Hancock, Smuts, Vol I, The Sanguine Years (Cambridge, 1962) , pp
429-32. Vyndham and Duncan "thought that [Smuts] went as far as he
possibly could in advocating some form of imperial reconstruction":
Vyndham to Coupland, 8 July 1917 <SA file,) RT (0) Papers.

109

• Imperial Conference" reprcsentati ve of all parties in the various national

• e g:slatures. They were subsequently criticised for neglecting "the full

youad Table point of view", but asserted

" that full federation was at the present moment impracticable
and that they, personally, were highly satisfied that such a
step forward as that suggested could be taken at all".

For Kerr, the co-operation scheme provided "the nucleus both of a future

laperial executive and of a future Inperlal Parliament" , which was "better

that a shadowy scheme cf federation for which opinion was not 3 'et ripe".'

Brand now wanted the group to recognise "the necessity for an
intermediate stage of co-operation", while reiterating "our main principle
cf Organic Union for the ultimate future ". 5 Or. the other hand. Malcolm
insisted that "co-cperat ion in this or ar.y other form will fail ". 3 This
was an argument which the London group was unable easily to resolve,
alttough its members shared a "general belief that there is no immediate
prospect of organic union ". 4

Uncertainty over the effects of the Conference resolutions and a
p2rceived need "of defining more clearly the nature and purpose of the
found table movement" combined to recommend to the Moot a convention of
found Table groups. The proposal was made in a letter to group secretaries

Xinutes of discussion, 4 May 1917, Lothian Papers 474, fcls 4-8;
cf Kerr to Curtis, 24 April 1917, Lothian Papers 33, fols 12-14.

Srand, "Memorandum", 7 May 1917, Brand Papers, box 41.

Xalcolm, "Addendum to Mr Brand's Memorandum" , 25 May 1917, Brand
? apers, box 41.

Coupland to Curtis, 22 May 1917. RT Papers c 810, fols 66 - 68 .

4

110

in October 1917.’ Until such a convention could be held, there could be no
•enlargement In the scope of the Bound Table propaganda". 2

The proposal of a convention served only to delay the taking of
decisions. The Australian and Hew Zealand groups set about organising
preliainary national conventions, but these did not meet until the summer
of 1019. Vhen the Canadian reply eventually arrived, in February 1919. it
va s that individuals night attend ir. a personal capacity, but that there
*as no possibility of producing anything like a Canadian mandate. The
Caaadian Pound Tablers were "in favour of the continuance of the Found
Table groups but . . . shaky in regard to a specific doctrine". 3

If the Found Table movement "failed", it was thus partly for want of
trjing: the organisation never became propagandist, in the sense Curtis hod
originally envisaged. Dominion hesitation was obviously an important
factor, but so too were the divisions within the Hoot, and the rapidly
changing situation created by the war. The 1917 Conference threw the
covenant into disarray: if federation could be achieved gradually, there
*as no place for Curtis's "pistol policy". Finally, the end cf the war
brought a multitude of new problems, as well as removing the most pressing
reason for federation. Some new and longer-term strategy had clearly to be
devised, even if the ultimate aims of the movement still held good.

Ccupland to RT Group Secretaries, 18 Cct 1917, RT Papers c 802, fols
Hl-12; cf Coupland to Curtis. 9 July 1917, RT Papers c 810, fols
109-10.

Ccupland to 3 Dunfield, 17 June 1918, RT Papers c 802, fols 119-22.
Glazebrook to Coupland, 13 Fob 1919, RT Papers c 802, fols 179-81.

111

nF flEIEE ABD FOREIGN PCLICY. 1010-14

Tbe primary focus of Round Table activities In 1910-14 was
preparation for an eventual fedcrationist movement. The existence of this
overriding aim tended to determine Found Table coverage of practical
issues, as a matter of tactics as well as of Ideology.

It later became a maxim of the group that "our first duty Is not to
consider what interests people, but rather to interest their minds in what
really concerns them".' In the period 1910-14, the Hoot's appraisal of
such issues centred very largely on Angle-Dominion political relations, and
to a lesser extent matters relating to foreign policy. India received less
coverage than any of the Dominions. There was one article on Egypt, but
none directly on any of the other dependencies. 2

Ihe-Rounc. T able and Prewar Politics

The Pound Table was unusual amongst contemporary pressure groups in
having substantial financial resources at its conmand; a respected magazine
as Its mouthpiece; and a network of associated Dominion groups which might
act not only as the means of influencing policy in the Dominions, but also
as proof of the Round Table's claim to speak for the whole Empire.

Potentially, therefore, the Moot was well placed to exercise a unique and
considerable influence on policy and policymakers.

Nevertheless, the very nature of the Round Table enterprise, the aim
cf iB P«rlal federation and the strategy adopted for achieving it, severely
circumscribed both the London group's desire and its ability to act on the

Cuf tis to Rlchens et al, 6 Aug 1930, Lothian Papers 252, fols 627-32;

c * Curtis, Letters to tbe Feople of India (London, 1918), p xii.

^ Appendix C. " Found Table Coverage, by Subject".

i

112

; e vel of d 0 y-tc-day, ■ practical" politics. Imperial federation was clearly
a IoDg" terJa 8 oal ‘ EvCE its “ OGt GDt busiastic supporters admitted that an
extended process of "education" would be necessary before it could
realistically be sought. By 1913 Curtis was convinced that a "revolution
Id though" was needed, of the same magnitude as that which lollowed Adam
Saith's Yealtb of flatlcns . ’ The bulls of the Round Table's efforts was,
cecessarlly, concentrated on the level of "public opinion", not of existing
party politics. Indeed, party politics and politicians could themselves be
seen as both cause and consequence of the defects of the existing system,
and, as Curtis pointed out, "nobody likes to vote away his own
inportance". 2

The Sound Table strategy was built around the notion of "co-operative
study". Consequently there was sone nervousness about publicising the
activities of the central Moot, and a need not to alienate Dominion Sound
Tablers. The London group could ill afford to be tarred with the brush of
partisanship. The Dominion groups had the additional task of avoiding the
appearance of being directed from London. It was agreed early on that

"in cases . . . when questions of importance to the
whole Empire come up for discussion in the United
Kingdom or any of the dominions, the communication of
facts or suggestions to people in other parts of the
Empire should be effected by correspondence between
individuals and not through the medium of the Eomluion
Offices of the review". 3

* 3st correspondence between London and Dominion Round Tablers, even about
rev iew, was between individuals and not between groups, nevertheless,

Cu rtis, "Kemorandum", 25 Feb 1913, RT Papers c 778, fols 60-61.

*inutes of RT meeting, Plas Hewydd, 4-6 Sept 1909, Lothian Papers 11,
fol 5 .

1 Kerr , ] "Private Kemorandum" , f 1910,1 RT Papers c 776. fols 73-75.

113

tils decision reflected deep ambivalences within the Round Table
organisation, between study and propaganda, individual and collective
action, autonomy and centralism, which were never satisfactorily resolved.

Further constraints on the Round Table's activities as a pressure

group *ere placed by the limited extent of the Xoot's leverage within

British politics. Richard Jebb claimed in 1913 that,

"welcome to Conservatives as a splendid champion of
Authority, and to Liberal partisans as an imperialist
ally against Tariff Reform, the Round Table brilliantly
achieves that inter-party equilibrium which is a
stronger position for getting things done than
independence of political partie*•. ,

Jtbb vac right in identifying the aim of Pound Table strategy, but he was

ucdoubtedly wrong in attributing such a large measure of success to the

group. Aristocratic, Oxford, Cecil ian and Xilnerite connections gave the

ycunger Round Tablers privileged access to a number of key figures in both

leading parties, such as Sir John Simon, Vlnston Churchill, Austen

CLanberlaln and Sir Edward Carson. Sever thel ess, access by no means

giarantees influence, and here the Koot was handicapped both by its lack of

aE organised political following, and by its close attachment to Lord

miner. The latter was something of a political troublemaker, loathed by

Liberals, unwelcome to the Unionist leadership, influential mainly on the

ls perialist wing of the Tariff Reform movement. The younger Round Tablers

aJ lenated ever, that, presently powerless, constituency. 5 The London Xoot

fact occupied an extremely marginal position in British politics, from

1

2

Bichard Jebb, The Britannic Question (London, 1913), p 78.
Sae below, pp 127-31.

114

ifiicb It could hope to exercise Influence only In situations where its alms
consonant with those of more powerful interests and personal i tiesi or
wiere there was a policy vacuum needing to be filled, and no other groups
or individuals willing to fill It.

Finally, the Moot's ability to act as a pressure group was
constrained, to a surprising extent, by its inability to reach agreenent
within itself. Despite the relative horacgenei ty of the group, there
eiisted differences of view and emphasis, both on the question of closer
uiion itself and on the numerous questions thrown up by day-to-day
politics, which only became clear once those questions began to be tackled.

It is extremely difficult to evaluate the Round Table's influence on
tie level of "public opinion". Curtis certainly thought that the group was
acting successful ly, claiming in October 1914 that he could see a "change
. . . in the attitude of public men and of the press in the last four
years" which "has been largely due to the steady leavening effect of the
Round Table".’ nevertheless, when it came to the more easily quantifiable
Uvel of influence on "men and .measures", it is clear that the Round Table
w as altogether less successful. Only rarely did the London group attempt
to exert pressure, and when it did so, the constraints on its action became
a!l to ° apparent.

Curtis, "Memorandum on the Conduct of RT Vork during the Var",
19 Oct 1914, RT Papers c 779, fols 102-13.

L

115

us - gmajaiallfla

Two intersecting pressures conspired to create the "Imperial
problem". The Ilrst was the intensl li cat ion of Great Power rivalry which
forced all nation-states and Empires to seek a more effective mobilisation
and management of their resources. The second was "colonial nationalism".

The Pound Tablers were convinced that the Empire could not survive in
an increasingly hostile world by relying on the resources of Great Britain

alore. Britain's defence expenditure was already the highest in the world:

i67.8 million in 1910, compared to Russia's £62.8 million, Germany's £61.4
aillion and France's £52.4 million. 1 In per capita terms, Britain's
defence burden was, relatively, higher still. The Dominions, by contrast,
lagged far behind, as the following figures (published in the first issue
of the Round Table) illustrated:

Per capita defence expend it

ure,

1908-09 3,

United Kingdom

■

6 -

3

Canada

0 -

3 -

2*

Austral ia

o -

4 -

10*

New Zealand

0 -

5 -

0*

South Africa

0 -

6 -

8

The present-day demography of the former Dominions suggests that the
addition of their resources to those of Britain would, ultimately, have
tode little difference to the Empire's ability to maintain itself as a

J J Eddy and D K Schreuder (eds) , The Pise of Colonial Nationalism,
‘London and Sydney, 1988), p 36.

^Kerr, 1 "Anglo-German Rivalry", FT, Nov 1910, pp 32-33. The figure
Tor South Africa related to white population only (as in subsequent

rears) .

316

, vorld" statc " • nevertheless. It is important to remember the prevailing
aSSUB ptions of the period.

There was, at the tine, little recognition of ecological restraints
cn population growth, and great faith in deforestation, irrigation and
agricultural innovation. Dominion politicians were thenaelves great
■boosters": indeed, their role in organising loans and capital projects
M de then professionally so. Laurler famously spoke of the new century
■belonging to Canada". A conpatrlot, writing in the Round Table, agreed
■that the Twentieth Century Is hers by right". 1 The notion of vast "empty
spaces’ was hard to shake off. Cove, writing in 1921, reckoned that Canada
and Australia between them possessed the resources for a population of
200 million. 2 If Dominion resources could be mobilised to the same extent
as Great Britain's, then the future of the Empire would, at the very least,
look core secure.

By 1909-10 the Dominions already controlled their local defence
forces, and had won the right (despite initial obstruction by the
Admiralty) to construct their own navies; they were beginning to develop
treaty-making powers (as between Canada and the United States, and between
South Africa and Portugal); and, unchecked by the Empire's residual
authority, they were passing domestic legislation (notably on "Asiatic"
iraigration) which was bound to affect their relations with foreign states.
As Kerr consented In 1911, defence and foreign policy "have already ceased
to be " tie "sole and exclusive concern of the United Kingdom".

:v L Grant,] "Canada and Anglo-American Relations", RT, Dec 1913,

P 308. j v Dafoe believed that Britain would be dwarfed by Western
Canada alone within 20 years: Kerr, Rotes from Tour of Canada, 1909,
Lothian Papers 5, fol 35.

! Dcve, ] "The Migration of the Races", FT, March 1921, p 270.

2

117

j e 7 er tbelesc, It was "impossible for the Dominions to set up independent
foreign policies and independent defensive systems . . . without destroying
the Bupire " . 1

The "Imperial problem" was, therefore, one of finding some means
whereby Dominion resources could be mobilised in support of the Empire, yet
joainion aspirations to self-government and to control the disposal of
their resources could be accommodated. Curtis, of course, believed that he
already had the solution.

An alternative did exist, and was to cause considerable problems for
the Round Table project. Indeed, the Round Table's inability to develop an
agreed strategy for dealing with it must be considered one of the main
reasons for the group's "failure". The essence of this view was co-
operation between sovereign nations still owing allegiance to a single
Crown.

"The existing governments, whether in London. Ottawa,
Vellington, ITelbourne or Pretoria, were all to stand
on an equal footing, side by side, severally
administering and controlling the external, as well
as tho internal, affairs of their respective
countries, but maintaining the unity of the Empire by
co-operation and also by loyalty rendered to one
crown and one flag."

Curtis characterised this as the "Canadian view". It "failed to help" the
*ouad Table, except in proving that the "Imperial problem . . . had not
kon thought out."-

tKerr,] "The New Problem of Imperial Defence", RT, Nay 1911, pp 231

and 252.

Curtis, The Round Table Xoveaent . . . (privately printed, 1913),

PP 7-8.

[

118

Curtis's hostility to co-operation was frequently reiterated,
although rarely with the clarity and persuasiveness which the significance
0 f the matter demanded. He claimed that no form of co-operation had ever
teeo devised which was both effective and lasting. "Alliances can be made
and unmade": that was the lesson of history, from the Confederacy of Delos
to the recent experience of the Inter Colonial Council in southern Africa.

In Curtis's view, co-operation was fraught with constitutional
difficulties. The principle of responsibility would be severely inpaired,
idth members of the decision-making body or "executive' responsible to half
a dozen legislatures, mostly weeks away. The "executive" could hardly
refrain from taking important decisions until all the legislatures had been
consulted. The legislatures could only exercise their responsibility after
decisions had been made, by removing their executives and repudiating their
decisions. Decisions of the "executive" could therefore be reversed, i.e.
they ware not decisions but merely provisional agreements.

If co-operation implied a liberum veto , the whole of Imperial policy
fcould be at the mercy of each and every small Dominion; if it implied
lajority voting, both the constitutional difficulties and the danger of
political discord would be greatly increased. Britain would have to
reserve the right of unilateral action, and therefore would have to
continue bearing the whole cost of Imperial responsibilities. The
kninions would therefore see no reason to increase their commitments.
Nevertheless, they would continue to be Implicated in Britain's actions.

" The relationship of dependency remains unaltered, however studiously it
be veiled under courtesies and forms." '

See especially [Curtis, 1 Round Table Studies C First Series, Vol 1,

19 U1, Introduction, pp ix - xiii (quotation from p xiii).

Others in the Moot were less convinced, and certainly less dogmatic on

ibis None doubted that co-operation would eventually prove

inadequate. Nevertheless, Curtis's forcing of the Dominions' dilenma was
thought, in the short term, to be a ganble: after all, it was not
inconceivable that Canada and South Africa would prefer independence to
federation. 1 Moreover, co-operation had its positive aspects: It would
serve the process of education, and it would at least cake a start on the

probleB of inducing the Dominions to share Britain’s Inperlal commitments.
Finally, it was not clear that the breakdown of co-operation would be
either immediate or dramatic. Kerr believed "that the existing
arrangements - anomalous as they are - can be made to work for some tine to
come, provided the governments concerned mean to make them work". 2

The Round Table's unresolved disagreements over co-operation provided

an undercurrent of irresolution whenever the group attempted to confront
the practical and immediate issues of Anglo-Doninion relations. That the
Sourd Table should confront these issues was not doubted. As Dawson wrote

in 1909, "Some of us have to talk or write about these things in public
and it was obviously desirable "to help to keep then on lines which
f it in with . . . cur general scheme"."* Moreover, the pages of the Round
7ah ' e itself had to be filled and, as Curtis observed, the purposes of the
B»view as agreed by the Moot Included "from the outset . . . the
Propagation of views"."

The early meetings of the Found Table were able to do no more than

1 CKerr,] "The Question of Policy" 119101, Lothian Papers 14, fol 286.

2 c Kerr,l "Memorandum", nd 119111, <Kerr etc file,) RT (0) Papers.

*

G & Mobinson) to Curtis, 26 July [19091, Lothian Papers 13, fols 27-29
1 Curtis, 1 "Memorandum", 18 Kay 1910, RT Papers c 776, fols 64-72.

4

jloat a few ldeas on th#¥ "subsidiary" subject of Imperial co-operation.

The appro ach of thG 1911 ConfcrGncG provided the Round Table with the
Opportunity of producing more substantial and considered proposals. 1 A
cub-coanlttee was convened over the summer of 1910, and memoranda were
produced by Kerr, Amery and Malcolm. These were forwarded to Curtis in Hew
Zealand, who also wrote his own memorandum at the request of the Governor,
Lord Islington. Amery wrote a further memorandum at the end of the year,
which (after amendment by Kerr and Milner) was submitted to a dozen leading
British Cabinet politicians. 2

There was a substantial measure of agreement between the Round
Tablers' various memoranda. All suggested that the separation of the
Duminions department from the rest of the Colonial Office (agreed by the
1907 Conference) should be completed; that each Dominion should have its
ovn Ministry of Imperial Affairs, in regular communication with London;

that the Conference should be presided over by the Prime Minister and not
the Colonial Secretary; and that it should be provided with a confidential
resume of foreign, defence, Indian and Colonial policy by the appropriate
British ninisters. The latter point was also argued, forcefully, by Kerr
la the Pound Table. *

See John Kendle: "The Round Table Movement, Few Zealand, and the
Imperial Conference of 1911", JCFS, Vol III <1965), pp 104-17, and
Tie Colonial and Imperial Conferences, 1837-1911 <London, 1967),
chapters 7 and 9. The following interpretation differs in
emphasising the extent of divergence between members of the Moot, and
also of Curtis's responsibility for the subsequent debacle.

Serr to G Craig-Sellar, July 1910, RT Papers c 776, fois 22-24; [Copy
of Curtis's memorandum,! Lothian Papers 13, fols 181-217; l Kerr,!

[The Imperial Conference", RT Fapers c 776, fols 137-44; Amery,
’Memorandum' (circulated version), (Amery file,) R? (0) Papers.

1 Kerr , ] The Hew Problem of Imperial Defence", RT, May 1911, pp 231-

62< Selborne raised the matter of the PM presiding: Hansard (Lords),
series, Vol VII (5 April 1911), cols 1047-49.

121

In addition a number of proposals were put forward, especially by
^ r j an d Curtis, which were not supported by the others. Anery was
particularly keen to widen the Conference by including parliamentary
delegates, and to press for the establishment of an Imperial secretariat.
CurtiSi on the other hand, was more interested in improving conrauni cat ions
ty enhancing the role of Dominion High Commissioners in London. He also
proposed raising a £100 million loan to pay for new shipbuilding, its
bjrden to be distributed between the governments of Britain and the
Wain ions according to population.

Anery aimed to build an effective machinery for co-operative

decision-making, which In time would grow, almost imperceptibly, into an

"irparial union", with powers over tariffs and other natters as well as

defence. In the short term, he was little worried by confusion between

advisory and executive functions. Kerr described Amery's position as

reflecting "transparent" political ends and suggested instead

"that . . . our aim should be not to build up the
Imperial Conference as an organ of government, but a) to
alter its constitution so as to increase its value as a
means of educating the Governments and peoples of the
Dominions . . . and b> to put it as often as possible
to the test . . . so as to reveal the defective working
of the co-operative system".’

Ccrtls went further than Kerr. In his view, Imperial Conferences were mere
"iunbug" . The important thing was to bring home to the Dominions "the real
issues". Himself "soaked in colonial conditions", he was convinced that
Ul ioa would only cone about as a result of a deliberate step. If hie
P r °PDsal s exacerbated the Dominions' tendency to see themselves as separate

1

iKorr,] "The Imperial Conference", loc clt . Cf Kerr to Amery, 16 Dec
1910 > <Aoery file,) RT <0> Papers.

jjations, all well and good: he was himself "not afraid of that tendency
and in this P olnt 1 am a disciple of JebV s" . '

it a dinner for subscribers after the Conference, Milner claimed that
the Hound Tablers "had altered the whole course" of Imperial relations by
their lobbying for the Dominion premiers to be initiated into the arcana
jj pprlL . g In other respects, however, the Moot's early hopes of "stage
wnagiag the Conference" - * were severely disappointed.

The d6tAcle of Sir Joseph Yard's confused and misjudged advocacy of
aa "Imperial Council" is well known, as is the ostensible cause - his
reading of Curtis's "Green Memorandum", a copy of which found its way into
Yard's hands accidentally, as Curtis later enphasised. 4 It appears,
however, that Curtis's responsibility for the episode was larger than he
liked to admit. His "Islington nenorandum'' , without elaborating any
precise scheme of federation, pointed firmly in that direction. Its
relatively brief treatment of substantive proposals was prefaced by a long
section explaining that co-operation was historically and logically doomed,
aid that Hew Zealand's greatest contribution would be to put "the two
a.ternatives of increasing separation or closer union". *

Vhile in New Zealand Curtis clearly hoped that Yard would engage the
* r eal issues": he even envisaged the Conference as the ideal opportunity
to launch "a new sort of Sel borne memorandum" , with Vard giving it "a good

Curtis to Kerr, 10 Sept 1910, Lothian Papers 12, fols 99-108.

Curtis to Lady Anne Kerr, 20 Jan 1912, Lothian Papers 462, fol 2.

Kerr to Curtis, 29 July 1910, Lothian Papers 11, fols 87-98.

Curtis to Feetham, 27 April 1911, Curtis Papers 2, fols 68-7L.

[Copy of Curtis's memorandum,] Lothian Papers 13, fols 181-217.

5

secid off-' Tte Moot was nore cautious » thinking Ward "a lightweight" and
iis only likely supporter, Fisher, "a freak - a Labour P. X. ". 2
Ic vertheless, in his Round Table article preceding the Conference, Kerr
trg ed the assenbled premiers to face "the problen of the future relations"
tetveen Britain and the Doninions. 1 * It was the Banner in which the
preaiers did so, rather than the fact that they did, that constituted such
a setback.

After the Conference, sone members of the Xoot were reluctant to
engage ia any private lobbying before Curtis completed his Round Table
Studies and the Xoot agreed on a precise set of objectives. Vhen, in 1912,
Steel-Kaltlacd invited the Round Table to submit suggestions for him to
pass oa to Boner Lew, Brand i mined lately celled oa the Xoot to reject Steel-
Xaitlaad's proposal. After some reflection, Oliver Joined him, arguing
that "the Xoot has not yet arrived at that degree of certainty with regard
to central principles as to Justify Jt in tendering advice to practical
politicians on current affairs".' 1 On only one issue does the Moot appear

Kerr to Curtis, 14 Oct 1910, Lothian Papers 12, fols 153-56, quoting
a previous letter from Curtis.

•<err to Curtis, 31 Aug 1910, Lothian Papers 2, fols 92-95.

^Kerr.J "The Hew Problem of Imperial Defence", RT, Xay 1911, p 260.

Steel-Xaitland's suggestion reported in Hinutes of RT Meeting, 9 Xay
1912, RT Papers c 777, fols 12-15; Brand's opposition the subject of
Curtis to Brand, 9 June t 19121 , Brand Papers, box 2; Oliver's remarks
:n "Xenorandum of Object! odg ..." with Oliver to Paterson, 21 June
1912, RT Papers c 777, fols 92-95.

124

t0 tave attenpted to Influence the political debate before 1914 - the
question of local navies ggrsus contributions.

The Defence Conference of 1909 had endorsed the principle of local

navies. At first, the Moot also accepted the principle as, in a phrase

coined by Kilner, "creating fresh centres of strength" for the Empire.' An

early oenorandura by Korr argued that

"no Dominion Parliament will ever vote any substantial
sura to be handed over to be spent by a foreign C sic ]
department of state. Contribution is simply a method
of salving the conscience, and calming the fears of
the electorate, at a minimum cost to themselves".*

lelther South Africa nor Hew Zealand subsequently embarked upon an

ajtononois naval programme, but Australia did so with enthusiasm, and

Canada, under Laurier, promised to do the sane. It was Laurier's defeat in

1911, by an unholy alliance between Borden and Bourassa, both pledged to

repeal his Navy Act, which again raised the whole question.

The Koot had felt increasingly uneasy with the implications of the
local navy scheme, especially since the Australian and Canadian legislation
left the question of wartime control (implicit in the 1909 agreement)
unresolved. 3 In August 1911, the Round Table quoted Selborne that "the sea
Is all one, and the British Navy therefore must be all one". 4

1 Miner, Speeches Delivered in Canada during the Autuan of 1903
(Toronto, 1909), p 32.

Kerr, "Naval Defence and the Dominions" , 9 Dec 1911, Brand Papers,
2; cf [Kerr, J "The Defence Conference", 1 1909,1 Lothian Papers
12, fols 174-80.

lK «rr,J "The New Problem ol Imperial Defence', NT, May 1911,

PP 249 f f.

(CralkJ "Colonial Neutrality", RT, Aug 1911, p 435.

msm ,

125

Laurier's defeat was welcomed by the Hoot, whose nenbers now saw an
opportunity to link naval contributions to representation in the Conmittee
of I»perial Defence. Canadian Round Tablers were sent a detailed plan of
action with which to "take the lead in saving the Empire".’ A small
; ooitteo (Wrong, Kyi ie, Glazebrook, Villison and Walker) dutifully drew up
a seBorandum linking the issues of contribution and representation, and
Vrong despatched a letter to Borden urging an "impressive" programme,

Claiming all-party support. 2 The London section of a special article of
Septenber 1912 maintained the impetus, welcoming Borden's declared
intention of Introducing a new Navy Bill as opening "a new era in the
inplre's history". 5 ' A further article in March 1913 asserted that "unity
of control is all-important". * V H Kelly, one of the Australian Found
Table’s most prominent sympathisers, was Instructed by Kerr to "keep your
eye on Borden". Nevertheless, any hopes that Australia might abandon her
own policy were misplaced: as Jose, The Tines' correspondent in Australia,
pointed out, Australians "do think it unwise to dig up seedlings every week
to see how they are rooting". 9

Despite concerted activity, the Round Table's attempts to influence
the Canadian naval debate came to nothing. Borden's Bill was rejected by

Curtis to C X Vrong, 12 April 1912, RT Papers c 777, fols 22-26.

"Hemorandun" , t Kay 1912,) RT Papers c 777, fol 34; Vrong to Borden,

8 July 1912, ibid , fols 124-25.

f Grigg, Perry and Stevenson,) "Canada and the Navy", FT, Sept 1912
<pp 627-56), p 637.

’Policy and Sea Power", RT, March 1913 <pp 197-231), p 231.

Kerr to V H Kelly, 28 3Jov 1911, RT Papers c 797, fols 27-30; Extracts
from a Letter from A W Jose, 16 Oct 1912, Ihid, fols 43-51.

ti mm

126

ttie Senate, and no further attempts to secure a Canadian naval contribution
vere nade. Kylie blamed Canadians' "Ignorance of foreign affairs", but
also emphasised the "Hew Vorld's" fear of being caught up in the struggles
c f the Old. His own disappointment was plain: there had been too much
■flinging facts at a great conception .... Local self-government is an
excellent thing, but if carried so far as to destroy larger units of
society It may prove a misfortune" . 1

By the outbreak of the First Vorld Var, the advocates of imperial
unity cannot be said to have achieved any practical success. Imperial
federation was as far from realisation in 1914 as in 1910. Little had been
done to improve the nachinery for consultation, either. The disparity in
defence expenditure between Britain and the Dominions remained striking, as
Curtis's figures showed:

Per capita defence expenditure. 1913

- 14 7

United Kingdom

1-11

- 9.6

Canada

0-7

- 4.9

Austral la

0-18

- 1.7

Hew Zealand

0-13

- 10.8

South Africa

0-4

- 5.6

levertheless, as the figures also showed, all the Dominions except South
Africa had vastly increased their defence expenditure in the five years
Since 1908-09. In Australia's case, the increase was three-fold; or, from

(KjUej "The Sew Vorld and the Old: A Canadian View", RT, Sept 1913,
PP 037-47.

Curtis, The Problem of the Conuoonwealth (London, 1916), p 167.

mtm

127

j ess than a fifth to more than half of Britain's per capita expenditure.
^ s tralia was, of course, the only Dominion with its own navy. It might
reasonably have been asked, therefore, whether insistence on the
central isoticn of defence contributions was not, in the short term at
least, counter-productive.

flrfff Reform

Joe Chamberlain' s Tariff Reform canpalgn originated as an attempt "to
cement the union of states beyond the seas ... to consolidate the British
race".' Many of the key figures in the early Round Table were also keen
Tariff Reformers. Milner instituted a preference for British goods in
South Africa. On his return, he declared hinself a Tariff Reformer "of a
somewhat pronounced type" 2 , and set about supporting Chamberlain's campaign
with gusto. Anery was keener still, denouncing free trade as "the negation
of the whole meaning and essence of human society, the denial of law and
wrality*. 3 Others who supported Tariff Reform Included Selborne, Oliver,
Dawson and Grigg.

The majority of the Moot (and especially of the ■ JCi ndergar ten" > was
less convinced. There were a number of reasons for this. First, it was by
t) neaas clear that the Doninions (especially Dominion manufacturers)
really wanted a closed Imperial system. Malcolm's experience in Canada
convinced him that "with the exception of a few Journalists who have

c V Boyd, Mr Chanberlaln's Speeches, Vol 2 (London, 1914), p 143.

Milner, Imperial Unity: Two Speeches (London, 1907), p 19.

A “ery, The Fundamental Fallacies of Free Trade (London, 1906), p 5.

*nolj0B

128

affinities with the Unionist press at hone nobody in Canada cares a damn
tether Tariff Reform is brought about or not".’

Secondly, something that was clear was that a majority in Britain
Itbelf was opposed to Tariff Reform. The Liberals, after all, had won the
1905 election largely through opposition to "food taxes" . At a more
Sophisticated level it was recognised that Britain's interests as a
sjnufocturer, trader and banker could not be sufficiently catered for by
tie Empire alone. 2 Tariff Reform was clearly not a vote-winner. Cecil
{Slaself an unrepentant free trader) believed that the Unionists'

COBltnent to Tariff Reform "will permanently keep then out of power".®

The British context also provided a third reason for Round Table non-
coBfltneit. Tariff Reform had clearly become a party issue; whereas the
Round Table hoped that federal isn would secure the support of all parties,
aad therefore agreed, early on, the r.eed to avoid charges of partisanship.
Asery later recalled that this was the main reason why the Round Tablers
filled to support Tariff Reform: they "devoted themselves largely to
converting Liberal opinion, believing that they had the Conservatives
already behind them".' 1

finally, many of the younger Round Tablers thought that the Unionist
proposals went much further than Dominion policies, by calling for tariffs

* Xalcolm to C Onslow, 22 Jan 1910, Onslow Papers (Guildford), Private
Papers C 173/25/49. I am indebted to Chris Collins of JTuffield
College for this reference.

Alan Sykes, Tariff Ref ora in British Politics, 1903-13 (Oxford,

1979); cf "The Unionists and the Food Taxes", RT, Xarch 1913,

PP 232-76.

^cil to Kerr, 3 Oct 1911, (Cecil file,) R7 <0) Papers.

Aaery to J Conway, 21 Feb 1952, (ed ctee file,) FT (0) Papers.

129

for the benefit of the Dominions rather than of the UK itself. In Kerr's
fie*, such ca ^ ls for sacr ifi ce were profoundly dangerous. Instead, he
su gj es ted that British tariffs should be framed according to British needs,
and that onlj then should preferences be given, leading to customs

agreecents "frankly based on the self interest of each part".’ Similarly,
Brand argued that tariffs and preferences were an essential component of
jational social structures, and would therefore, even under a federal
system, be a matter for conference rather than centralised decision-
xaktng. 2 Sir Keith Hancock described "tariff personality" as an essential
ingredient in Dominion development. 3 This fact was brought home by tfce
lominion contributions to Curtis's Round Table Studies.' 1 "Is it heretical
to say that defence is at bottom the only reason for the union of the
Enpire?", Brand asked, rhetor ical ly, in rejecting the Tariff Reformers'
arguments. *

Vhile the Round Tablers fought shy of including tariffs in their
scheme for Imperial union, there* were some sign« of an attempt to mediate

tetween the two extremes of absolute free trade and complete Imperial
autarky. Thus Curtis, who was most emphatic on the need to leave the

Kerr, "British Folitics and the Empiie", [1911,1 <Kerr etc file,)
ST (0) Papers.

Brand to Kerr, 4 Jan 1913, Brand Papers, box 132.

v K Hancock, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, vol 2, part 1
<LondOE, 1942), p 85.

S^i eg, [ Wellington group,! "Rotes on the Question of Finance",

25 Xay 1911, pp 11-14 of (Round Table! Group Rotes , No 2 (1911).

Br «nd, "Kenorandum" , (1911,! RT Papers c 776, fols 107-12.

p oB j n i 0n s fiscal autonomy, was also reported to be "very anxious to find,
<t be possible, an alternative policy of Preference, which does not

'evolve the food tax".’ Even Cecil admitted the case for retaliatory
duties; and he was also prepared to support a measure of Imperial
preference, If food taxes could be avoided. 3 However, nothing concrete

appears to have been suggested.

Anery, in particular, tried hard to convince his colleagues that
their proposed Inperial Parlianent should have powers to introduce a

ivprein ? ; nevertheless, the majority realised that his ideas were as out
of touch with Doninion opinion as the Manchester School he so fervently
attacked. The Round Table's stance also brought criticism from a number of
other keen Tariff Reformers. Austen Chamberlain in 1913 begged the Round

Table *not to 'crab' any movement which led in the direction of Imperial
Cnion".' 1 The sane year, Jebb's Britannic Question explicitly pitted his

cvn vision of an Enpire basod on economic integration against the Round
Table rs' political movement.

In an interesting variation on the theme of the Round Table's
"failure*, John Turner has aigued that the movement's reluctance to support
“ariff Reform was both proof and cause of Its effective marginalisation.*

1 Salisbury to Brand, 11 June 1912, and Salisbury, "Memorandum on

Preference unconnected with the Taxation of Food", nd [19123, Brand
Papers, box 2.

Cecil to Kerr, 28 Kov 1911, enclosing correspondence with C Heaton-
5131s, (Cecil file,) RT (0) Papers.

See his "Memorandum" , Jan 1911, RT Papers c 776, fols 113-23.

Sir Austen Chamberlain, Politics fro.v Ioside (London, 1936), p 353.

'The Round Table and British Poll tics" . unpublished paper presented
to the Second Lothian Memorial Conference, Royal Holloway and Bedford
®ev College, London, 3 to 5 April 1989.

131

jever

theless, it Is clear that the arguments against commitment on this
were substantial. Coranitraent would have scuppered any hopes of

issue

Obtaining Liberal support. Moreover, if the views of Dominion Round
Tablers were any guide, it would have entailed a far more arduous task in
the Dominic 05 - Eggleston thought Johb's agenda "remarkably nebulous and
fantastic". 1 From Canada, J A Stevenson was even more enphatic: "I detest
the Jebb brand of imperialist and will fight then t slc l to the end".*

Migration

Perhaps the most enduring legacy ol the European empires has been the
extent to which they re-arranged the demographic map of the world.

Xlgratlon, both voluntary and involuntary, was central to the establishment
aad functioning of the early British Empire. British migration, at least,
«s also, in the view of the "new imperialists", crucial to its future.

Cecil Phcdes was not alone in contending that the British "are the finest
race in the world, and that the more of the world we inhabit the better it
is for the human race" . ?

The idea that people of European descent had a right to colonise
whichever lands they saw fit was virtually unquestioned in Rcund Table
c '-rcles. In 1917, Curtis proposed that a frontier belt of "Central Asia"
should be lopped off from India and handed over for European colonisation. 4

Eggleston to Grigg, Id June 1913, RT Papers c 798, fols 39-40.
Stevenson to Kerr, 25 Aug 1910, (Stevenson file,) RT <G) Papers.
^Rhodes's original Vi 1 1 , 3 Milner Papers 467, fcls 246-55.

E g Curtis to Coupland, 19 May 1917, Lothian Fapers 472, item 3.

^ late as 1926, Dove was assertIn S "that one of the still unsettled
questions of the world is how far the hot countries £ such os Guyana or
fijiJ can be Bade permanently inhabitable for Europeans".'

yjille the Found Tablers were thus interested la schemes to extend
Ejropean colonisation, it was primarily with the established colonies of
settlenent that they were concerned. Here, they emphasised two distinct
but coapleirentary priorities: to prevent non-European Immigration, and to
eacourage British, as opposed to other European, immigration. During the
eirl? years of the Round Table, It was the first of these which received
ust attention.

lot all the early Round Tablers were "racist" in the sense of
believing in Inherent or genetic differences between racial groups.
Xevertheless, their views on race relations generally included a belief in
tie inferiority of non-European cultural values, fear of economic
conpetition (based on the notion that non -Europea ns required lower living
standards than Europeans), and opposition to " mi sceg nation" and all other
forms of pluralistic development. 5

Such views were commonplace in contemporary Britain. Nevertheless,
‘.ley were given particular resonance by the "Kindergarten's" experience in
South Africa. There, the future Found Tablers accepted uncritically the
> v th that South Africa was a "white man's country". They saw the greatest

;

"The Colonial Problem of Europe", 23 July 1926, Lothian Papers
20 » fols 390-97.

133

tueat to this ideal arising not from the black African majority, but from
•Asiatic 5 "' who were making serious inroads Into white economic hegemony,
a -d who <mcre than Africans) resisted European cultural assimilation. As
Assistant Colonial Secretary for the Transvaal, Curtis tore a particular
j-gsponsitility for combatting the "Asiatic* menace. He it was who
jested that Indians in the Transvaal be nade to carry fingerprinted
pisses, and that further Indian immigration be halted, In order to save
South Africa from "the fate which has overtaken countries like Mauritius
aid Janaica" . '

It was not Just in South Africa that opposition to "Asiatic"
iafligration was in the ascendant. * Even in relatively liberal New Zealand,
where Kaoris and British were described as enjoying "excellent relations",
the Found Table reported widespread hostility towards Asians. 3 Fron
British Columbia, the immigration of "unassimilable material" fron Asia was
described as "a calamity": if unchecked, it would reduce the province to
the state of Hawaii, where "only millionaire employers and coolie labourers
rtsain-.*

In Australia, unsurprisingly, such views were held most trenchantly,
^ite Australia" was an article of faith amongst Australian Hound Tablers.

tte Times, 4 Xay 1907; see R A Huttenback, Gandhi in South Africa
(Ithaca, 1971), pD 158-61 and passim ; X K Gandhi, Satyagraha In South
Africa (Madras, 1928), ch X.

Avner Offner's essay on the "'Pacific rim' societies" in J J Eddy and
D X Schreuder, op ci t . demonstrates the extent to which such opinion
vas a component of contemporary "Colonial Jationalism" .

Xew Zealand: History and Folitics", XT, Feb 1911, pp 206-29.

Canada: Oriental Immigration: A British Columbian View", FT, March
pp 330-36.

134

Big lestoc was "absolutely convinced that the existence of British
cl7 lllsation in the Doninions is bound up with the exclusion of Asiatics".’
jj a frank exchange with the London group (prompted by the latter's
censorship of some particularly outspoken Australian comments) he warned
tfcat, if mis-handled, "a final difference of opinion on this point might be
a difference too deep to be bridged over by any form of organisation". On
tie other hand he also believed that, if handled sympathetically, the
Dominions' policies could provide a formidable arguisent for strengthening
ties with the "mother-country". As an example, he forwarded some doggerel
on the theme of a "union more profound' ensuring Australia's future as "an
Aryan land . . . for ever". 2

That the Dominions' immigration policies could be worked to the

advantage of the federationist cause was recognised early on by the Hoot.

An article by Kerr in the second issue of the Found Table warned that

"In the long run the project of a 'White Empire'
will only be accoopl Ished if the Enpire has the
strength to resist the terrific expansive pressure
of the teeming millions of Asia. And that strength
it will be able to exert only if all its parts are
absolutely at one on the policy they should
pursue" • 3

I* tic following issue Kerr examined the prospects for Japanese
coloaieation in mainland Asia, and concluded that it was not alarmist to

1 Eggleston to Grigg, 18 June 1913, KT Papers c 798, fols 39-48.

Eggleston to Grigg, 14 Oct 1913, RT Papers c 798, fols 125-32;
Eggleston to Curtis, 26 Feb 1913, RT Papers c 778, fols 68-71
(enclosing "A Welcome" by Bernard O' Dowd).

^Kerr, ] "The Anglo- Japanese Alliance", FT, Feb 1911, p 144.

135

believe that the Japanese saw far better prospects in Australasia and Forth

iaorlca. 1

The Foot was determined to dispel the impression that Britain was out
0 f sympathy with the Dominions on this issue. Grigg reassured Eggleston
tiat ■averybody here [in Britainl believes in the white Australia policy
aid is determined to do the utmost to support it".* Curtis devoted a whole
c&apter of his Problem of the Common wealth to the question, defending the
D 3 Binions‘ policies and urging critics to "think of London with six
Asiatics to every European". The Empire, while it night hove to deal with
tie consequences of Dominion immigration policies, should have no control
orer their fornulation.®

By the outbreak of the First Vorld Var, discriminatory immigration
policies were, of course, firmly in place in all of the Dominions.
Jevertheless, Doninicn opinion would not be completely satisfied until
Asian immigration was stopped at source.

Curtis was the prime mover behind a war tine attempt to reach an
agreement between the Governments of India and of the Dominions, based on
tie principle of "reciprocity". Following talks with Borden and his
*'-nister of the Interior, Dr Roche, Curtis produced a paper outlining his
proposals, which he then discussed with the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford.

A 2* 1q he argued that the "establishment of any Asiatic coaraunLty in the

C Kerr, 3 "The Emigration Question in Japan", RT , May 1911, pp 263-69.

Gr *gg to Eggleston, 12 Dec 1913, RT Papers c 798, fols 141-42.

Curtis, The Problem of the Common wealth (London, 3916), ch 5, esp
PP 60-62.

heart of a European community, however small", was "productive of social,
*aral and political evils". In order to avoid charges that restrictions on
Itdian migration were motivated by "racial* animosity, "reciprocal"
agree nents should be reached whereby Indians would be allowed tc visit the
Doninions only for the purposes of study and business, and similar
restrictions would apply to Dominion citizens wishing to travel to India. 1

Vhile Curtis was in India, Kerr pressed his proposals on a
syepathotic Secretary of State, Austen Chamberlain. The India Cffice
drafted a "Note oa Emigration" substantially embodying Curtis's proposals.
Tills was to be put forward at the 191? Conference by Heston and Sinha, but
tbs latter objected, sensing a betrayal of the wider interests of Indians. s
The question of Indian migration was again raised at the 1921 Conference,
when all the Dominions except South Africa agreed to end disabilities on
dOQiciled Indians in return for an end to nigration. The latter part of
the bargain held, but the former did not: further disabilities were
subsequently introduced. ?

From the Dominion point of view, the issue of Asian immigration was
dealt with satisfactorily, and subsided as a "live issue" between the wars.

Curtis to Lord Chelmsford, 2 Nov 1916, Lothian Papers 33, fcls 2-7;
Chelmsford to Austen Chamberlain (extracts), 2 Nov 1916, i b id. 34,
fols 14-17.

Kerr to Chanter lain, 26 Feb 1917 and 7 Harch 1917, Lothian Fapers 32,
fols 2-4 and 5-7; "Note on Emigration" and Chamberlain to Kerr, 24
April 1917, ibid 34, fols 10-13.

3

eg, "Canada", RT, Sept 1923, pp 368-405.

.'TVA--

137

Round Table ignored pleas from correspondents in India to criticise the
discrimination suffered by Asians.’ Nevertheless, the Moot was also
r elictant to publish any re-statenents of the Dominion case. An exception
wS gggleston' s "White Australia" article of 1921, which was only published
after pressure fron the Australian Round Tablers. 2 The reasons for the
Hoot's reticence are not hard to find. The initial expectation that the
Doalnions* policies could easily be worked to the advantage of "closer
union" was clearly misplaced. The Doalnions were suspicious of British
attitudes, while the British found the effect of the Dominions' policies to
te distinctly problematical . In the aftermath of the First Vorld Var, with
Japan's position in the Pacific enhanced and the Raj increasingly dependent
01 Indian goodwill, the dangers of a divergence of interests between
Britain and the Dominions was greater than ever. It was thus self-
evidently politic to allow the problem to be discreetly set to one side.

Ii d l a aric_th.e_Ile.per.d*iiLCles.

The Pound Table's coverage of events and policies, in Britain's
dependent Empire was by no means as thorough as its treatment of the self-
governing Dominions. Over the period November 1910 to June 1914, articles
01 Britain's dependencies accounted for only 7.5^ of total Round Table

See, eg, telegram from Rushbrook Williams, 5 July 1921, Grigg Papers,
*SS Microfilm 999.

•Eggleston,! " Vhite Australia", RT, March 1921, pp 312-39; l Fester,
Hopes (Melbourne, 1985), pp 90-91.

138

covera ge, and Just 0.6% if India is excluded. 1

jevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that the London Round
Tablere were Indifferent to British rule in the dependencies. On the
contrary, s one regarded it as "the biggest of all reasons for the existence
of this stupendous Commonweal th" . 2

Curtis's doctrine of the Commonwealth, of course, nade this argument
peculiarly his own, although both Kerr and Coupland anticipated him in this
respect. After his visit to India in 1912, Kerr reported himself "now a
convinced Inper ial ist" who believed "the British Empire to be the greatest
agency for assisting and promoting the development of the noa-self-
goveniag races that exists today". 3 In a talk given to the Ralegh Club
the sane year, Coupland adopted an almost apocalyptic tone in stressing the
"D0CEFS2" inportar.ee of the Empire's "supreme historical mission", that of
substituting order for conflict in the contact of races: without it, he
contended, the world would be condemned to "the authentic Armageddon".' 1

Xany commentators have seen the disintegration of British Imperial
pover as the result of collapse at the centre, or (more generously) of an
acknowledgement by Britain's Imperial rulers that "Enpire" was a thing best
rI 'i of. In such an interpretation the Round Table group, and in particular

See Appendix C, "Found Table Coverage, by Subject". Lady Lugard was
asked to write on Blgerla, and Hugh Clifford on the Straits
Settlements, but neither was able to do so.

Curtis, The Round Table Kovement <1913), pp 14-15.

K *rr, Vhat the British Empire Really Stands For (Toronto, 1917:
address delivered to Canadian groups, 30 July 3912), pp 3 and 7.

Coupland, "Ralegh Club", nd C1912I . Coupland Papers 1/2/3.

139

its promotion of a "principle of the Commonwealth", holds a special place.
Classical J y* S F Kehrotra stated in 1961 that the Conmonwealth doctrine

•^presented alnost a revolution in imperial thinking" which "repudiated
tk# concept of the 'two enpires' - the concept that there could be under
tha British flag one form of constitutional evolution for the west and
another for the east". Thereby the Round Table was to be found
•eaunciating the principle . . . land) laying the foundations of our
preseat nulti-racial Conmonwealth* . '

This idea, of a radical break with previous and prevailing
corceptions of Empire, was assiduously cultivated by members of the Round
Table themselves. Curtis <for the benefit of an Indian audience) described

1q re /e la tor y terms his own conversion to a new conception of the Ernpire-
Conaonwealth.

"I remember discussing the Indian anarchist troubles
with Xr Karris, as we walked through a forest on the
Pacific slopes f of Canada, in 19C9J , and his views so
startled and arrested n«y attention as to nake a lasting
impression on my mind. Self-government, he urged,
however far distant, was the only intelligible goal of
British policy in India. It needed a guiding principle
and no other was thinkable ....

"It was from that noment that I began to think of the
British Common wealth as the greatest instrunent ever
devised for enabling that principle to be realised, not
merely for the children of Europe but for all races and
all kindreds and peoples and tongues." 2

•rcn 1912 Curtis narked the juncture by substituting the term "British

Conotwealth*

for "British Empire",

a practice subeeupjently adopted by the

s R Kehrotra, "Imperial Federation and India, 1663-1917", JCFS,
7 °1 l, So 1 (1961), pp 29-4 C .

Curtis, Dyarchy (London, 1920), pp 41-2.

140

m d Table, originally in March 1914 and preponderantly after 1918.

Vhat might be described as the Curtis/Kehrotra version of events, in
wi ich Curtis and, after some hesitation, the Round Table as a whole
eibraced a radically new conception of Inperial relations, begs a number of
questions. Vas the "Commonwealth doctrine" in fact so "revolutionary"?

DJd jt effect a truly significant break with previous Imperialist
traditions, including the "two empire" concept? Were its purposes and
consequences entirely emancipatory?

By the time of the Round Table's foundation it was, indeed,
ccaiwnplace to write of the British Empire as consisting of "two empires".
Seeley urged his audience "to think much more of our Colonial than our
lidlan Empire' ' , and Froude contrasted "empire' with a "common wealth . . .
held together by common blood". 3 Similarly, Milner emphasised the
distinction, declaring in 1308 that the idea of "Colonial Self-Government"
fer India was "a hopeless absurdity".*

nevertheless, the blurring of the racial and cultural aspects of
British imperialism permitted the existence of a tradition, most eloquently
^pressed by Kacaulay, which looked to the ultimate export of "European
institutions", at least to India. 4 Sir Charles Dilke believed in "the
Possibility of planting free institutions among the dark-skinned races of

J R Seeley, The Expansion of England <Canbr idge, 1833), p 11.

J A Froude, Oceana, or England and Her Colonies (London, 1886), p 12.

Kllner, "The Two Empires", Proc EC I, Vol 39 <1903>, p 333.

Kacaulay' s speech on the East India Conpany Charter, 10 July 1833:
Hansard (Cosunons), 3rd Series, Vol 21, col 536.

♦ t, e world" • 1 Moreover, by 1909, the year of the Xorley-Xinto reforms,
possibility was, albeit slowly and hesitantly, in the process of becoming
a ;tualltj in India. Curtis's personalisation of his own exposure to the
Idea of self-S overnreent for non-Europeans, if not disingenuous, must
therefore be regarded as evidence of considerable naivety. Indeed, other

Sound Tablers were aware of the historical tradition behind the idea: the
principle that the Empire's "more civilised members are responsible for the
governoent and training in self-government of peoples not yet able to
govern themselves" Kerr described as "Empire in the old-fashioned sense ". 2

Early memoranda by Curtis dwelt via terms reminiscent of Froude) on
•self-government" as an "instinct" brought to the colonies by their
European settlers. He and the Moot considered it essential that the self-
gcvernlng colonies should share in the government of India and the

dependencies. It was only when travelling round the Empire that Curtis saw

the necessity of argument on this point. He met many colonials unwilling

tc neet the financial burdens involved.

Furthermore there were those who

took the view that there was something almost immoral about Empire . 9 As he
later wrote, In "these young democratic communities the principle of self-
8°vernnent is the breath of their nostrils. It is almost a religion. They
- # <el as if there were something inherently wrong in one people ruling
another" . 4 Curtis returned to England and set to work constructing his

c V Dilke, Greater Britain (London, 1868), vol 2, p 4C7.

tKerr, ] "A Programme for the British Commonwealth", R7 March 1922,

P 246.

Curtis to Oliver, 15 Aug 1910, Lothian Papers 2, fols 135-51 (copy in
FT Papers, c 870). See also the comments printed in Curtis's
'Annotated Memorandum" , quoted above, pp 83-89.

Cur tis, A Letter to Philip Kerr, 13 Kov 1916 (Bombay, 1916).

K

•priBCipl e of the Commonwealth", which was thus the direct result of a
^rceived need to propagandise the cause of empire.

Curtis contended that the Empire was worth preserving precisely as

haviag worldwide and peculiar "responsibilities". He contrasted “the
wakaess of the sense of mutual duty“ amongst "Orientals" with the strength
of it in Britain and her self-governing colonies . ' Commonwealth "does not
lean and can never mean universal suffrage"; rather, it was rule by "all
wio are fit", ie "Aristotle's 'aristocracy'". "It recognises that there
are cen unfit for the task of governnent, who Bust therefore be governed by
those who are fit."* Put simply, the Conmonwealth entrusted political
pcwer to as many 'as can be given the vote without endangering the state

tco such" . *

The whole thrust of Curtis's argument was designed to ensure the

streigthening of Imperial control over India and the dependencies, as he

**le clear to a Canadian correspondent in 1913:

"It would be different if I thought that the time was on
hand when India, Egypt, Ceylon, the Malay Straits or
Nigeria would govern themselves. Withdraw British
government and so far as I can judge they would
inevitably relapse into blood-stained chaos, and their
chance of learning how in time to govern themselves will
be thrown back for centuries".' 1

(Curtis, 1 Round Table Studies , Second Series, Fart A <1912), Curtis
Papers 156/9, p p 1-13.

I Curtis, 1 A Practical Enquiry into the Nature of Citizenship
• • . t the 'Strawberry Memorandum"! <101 4 > , Curtis Papers 157/6,

PP 1-23; cf The Capital Question of China (London, 1932) , p 300.

Curtis to Lady Selborne, 3 Dec 1935, Curtis Papers 2, fols 202-3.

Curtis to E J Kylie, 10 Jan 1913, ET Papers c 773, fols 21-4.

4

143

-be aa ln significance of Curtis's Comnonweal th paradigm was thus not in
$ta* ln S the " ultlmate S°al", in setting it within a context in which
the Inperial power retained full authority over the process. As Grigg
vrote, in a paraphrase of Curtis approved by the latter, "the salvation of
the aost backward races is not to be achieved by Europeans repudiating the
task of control, but only by exercising a control from first to last in the
interest of the lower races as well as the higher'. 1

■3nnp Rule All Sound"

Ireland was the oldest and, at the time of the foundation of the Round
Table, the most acute of Britain's Imperial problems. It was one which
subjected the Found Table's claim to a non-partisan status to its severest
test. Yet it was also one which the Hoot could hardly avoid tackling if
the group was to fulfil its other leading claim, to provide informed
coverage of the most important issues confronting the Empire. The way the
Xoot did so revealed much about the Round Tablers* views on the conflict
between Rational iso and Imperialism. Ever optimistic, they consistently
uader-esti mated the support for and demands of Bat i onal ism, and over-rated
He extent to which Imperialism could acccmnodate the Rationalist
clalieage.

Early Round Table articles dwelt at length on the troubled history of
I: *land, but rejected Rationalist "myths" of a separate and homogeneous

Grigg, "Substitute Introduction to the Vhitsuntide Egg", [July 19141,
ET Papers c 779, fol 58- For Curtis's approval, coo Curtis to Grigg,
29 duly 1914, R7 Papers c 779, fols 76-9.

144

Irish nationhood, and disputed claims of a consistent British malevolence. '
|jch eEph asls y ’ dS placed on the "tribalism" of early Irish society, which
constituted a menace to the development of a stable and ordered society in
Britain- was " from ttis difference in the levels of civilisation In the
tvo islands that subsequent disasters have largely sprung". 2 In Ireland
itself, "specific features of primitive society have outlived their age and
becoae ingrained in the character of fits! people". Such features included
■blindness to realities, aversion to compromise, a morbid concentration on
itself, a disregard for all interests but its own, fandl an ingrained
belief in the virtue of violence".' To ascribe all Ireland's woes to her

connection with Britain was itself a psychological deformity of the Irish
Catholic mind, an irrational ar.d irresponsible "paranoia" . *

The members of the Found Table found it hard to understand Irish
lationalism other than by reference to such pathological synptoras. It was
freqjently pointed out that the Irish already enjoyed the same treasure of
s«lf -government as did the other constituent parts of the United Kingdom;
iideed, with 103 KFs, rather more than was equitable. Other nationalities
within the United Kingdom - the Scots were always the favourite exanple -
w * re content with their constitutional rights. Vas there not something
^if-evidently retrogressive about the demands of Irish Nationalism?

See (especially fGrigg.l "The Irish Question", FT, Dec 1013 <pp 1-63) ,
PP 12-22; (Kerr,J "Ireland and the Empire", FT, Sept 1916 <pp 614-51),
PP 615 ff.

2 fKerr,) 'the Irish Crisis", FT, June 1918 (pp 490-525), p 497.

3 * Curtis, } "Ireland", FT. June 1921 (pp 405-534), pp 405, 500.

' c ”rtls to Xilner, 16 CCt 1916, ET Papers c 780, fols 189-95.

"If democracy . . . has made a great discovery since
the cult of little nations in the middle of the last
century, it is that local patriotism and self-
interest are not antagonistic, but complementary and
essential, to patriotism and self-interest of a
broader kind."'

While all the Round Tablers' instincts were thus with the Unionists in
rejecting Hone Rule of any kind for Ireland, it was nevertheless clear
that, as Xilner put it to Balfour early in 1910, "we are in for Home Rule
In com? form". 2 The Round Tablers realised - as, indeed, did other
thoughtful Unionists, such as J L Garvin - that a "purely negative"
attitude on the part of the opponents of Horae Rule would lead to "entire
failure". 9 The test that could be hoped for was "a compromise under which
Ireland cannot really becoae a nation, and the United Kingdom cannot really
resain united" . * The solution which seemed to offer the best hope of such
a coapronlse - and which, in various combinations and with varying degrees
of commitment, the Round Tablers were prominent in urging - was "Home Rule
All Rojnd" .

The idea of an all-round devolution was by no means original to the

1 IGrigg,] "The Irish Question". FT, Dec 1913, p 63.

2 Kilrer to Balfour, 17 April 1910, quoted in J E Kendle, Ireland and
the Federal Solution (Kingston, 1989), p 112. In this book and in his
article "The Pound Table Movement and 'Home Rule All Round'", Hist
Journal, vol II (1968), pp 332-53, Kendle has described in
considerable detail Round Tablers' advocacy of federalism for the UK.

I have therefore confined ray discussion to the salient points.

3 tGr Jgfiil "The Irish Crisis", FT, March 1914, p 215. For Garvin see
A X Gollin, J L Garvin and the Observer (London, I960), pp 168-234.

4 (Brand and Oral*, ] “Home Rule", FT, June 1912, p 428.

Sound Tablers ' ’ Nevertheless, the most persistent advocate of federalism
it this time was himself a Found Tabler: F S Oliver. The author of the
widely-read "Pad ficus" articles in The Times of 1910 and of many
subsequent articles and pamphlets, Oliver provided a trenchant yet cogent
jrgufient for compromise on the basis of all-round devolution.

•Home Rule All Round" offered many attractions to Unionists who
realised the impossibility of maintaining the st atus quo . It circumvented
• he unwelcome necessity of recognising the special character of Irish
tationallty, by placing Ireland on exactly the same footing as the other
parte of the United Kingdom. It necessitated a scaling down of the powers
the Liberals wore prepared to concede ("powers . . . wider than those
possessed by any state or provincial legislature in any Dominion" 2 ). It
set firm limits to Redmond's "march of a nation" by entrenching in law the
suprere authority of the United KI ngdom/ Inper lal Parliament. It obviated
all the difficulties of previous Hone Rule Bills which threatened to leave
the Irish with a voice in mainland dODestlc affairs. Finally, it was a
reasure which could be justified in itself, as a remedy for the
'congestion" of Parliament, and as a recognition of Adam Smith's maxim that
“thing should be centralised that could equally well be left to local

government.

Oliver's argument for all-round devolution encountered a mixed
taction in the early Koot. Hichens (himself an avowed "stick in the mud")

1 See Kendle, op clt . Chapters 1-4; also George Boyce, "Federalism and
the Irish Question" in A Bosco <ed>, The Federal Idea, Tol 1 (London,
19 91>, pp 119-3B.

2

r Brand and Craik.l "Hone Rule", AT, June 1912, p 440.

147

,e D tioned Brand and Xerr as particularly "keen devolutionists" . ’ Curtis
fouad the 'congest ioa" argument a useful one for the purposes of his "Green
jetfrandum* , although rather as making a case for relieving the United
Iiosdon parlianent of Its Imperial business than for relieving it of its
local business. 2 He subsequently put the argument for devolution to a
»* 3 otlet' in South Africa which included Amery and Cecil; the reaction was
generally hostile, particularly on the grounds that Ireland could not
afford a legislature of its own.* By Septenber Curtis was convinced (in
contrast to Lord Grey) that the Imperial federationists were best advised
to treat the units of the Empire "as we find them'. 4

Back in London, others were going through a similar difficulty in
deciding on the issue. A subcommittee on "congestion" was set up in
January 1910, consisting of Selborne, Cecil, Steel-Mai tlaad, Craik and
lerr. Considerable evidence of "congestion" was accumulated, providing the
hssis for a Joint study published anonymously by Macmillans, and for two
substantial articles in the Round Table.* Nevertheless, the committee was
wable to agree that devolution was the only solution to this problem:

1 Hi chens to Curtis. 19 Dec 1910, Curtis Papers 2, fols 41-44.

2 feooranda on Canada and the British Conmonweal th 119101, pp 85-98.

3 Hichens to Milner, 21 Karch 1910, Lothian Fapers 11, fols 79-83. A
connitte© of Hichens, Cecil and Oliver was set up to inquire into the
financial relations between Britain and Ireland, concluding (as the
Prinrcse Coamittee was to) that any Irish legislature would have to be
heavily subsidised by Britain.

4 Curtis to Kerr, 19 Sept 1910, Lothian Fapers 12, fols 109-22. Oddly,
Kendle, "The Round Table Movement and 'Home Rule All Round'", p 334,
treats this letter as proof of Grey's influence on Curtis.

5 4a Analysis of the System of Government Throughout the British Empire
London, 1912); [V P Johnston,! "The Congestion of Business in the
House of Commons", RT, Dec 1911, pp 58-95 and [Curtis,! 'The Better
Government of the United Kingdom", RT, Sept 1918, pp 750-77.

148

Cecili f° r instance, was convinced that charges In Parliamentary procedure
ould suffice. >

The constitutional crisis and tho inter-party Conference of 1910 gave
a teaporary boost to hopes of a compromise on devolu tionist lines. Milner
a ad Amery, reluctantly, became convinced that not all would be lost by such
a solution; on the other hand, Selborne, Cecil, Steel-Mai Hand and Hlchens
remained obdurate.* As a result of further discussion, It was finally
agreed that, as It dealt with the division between national and local
rdther than between imperial and national issues, federalism for the United
Ilngdon could not be regarded as in any way preliminary or essential to
Iiperlal federation. ^ Indeed, Kerr now suggested that "Imperialists must
. . . look with disfavour on the proposal . . . for it is likely to delay
tie accomplishment of Imperial union by removing one of the more pressing
argunents for it" . 4

•Home Rule All Round" again increased in attractiveness following the
ittroduction of the third Home Rule Bill in 1912. Among the Moot there was
still to unanimity on the question, although Selborne and even Hichens were
ocw reconciled to a federalist solution. For some, it offered a welcome
possibility of dishing the Liberals; for Oliver and possibly Craik, it was

1 Cecil to Paterson, 22 April 1913, RT Papers c 781, fol 129.

2 Kerr to Curtis, 29 July 1910, Lothian Papers 11, fols 37-98; 10 Aug
1910, Ibid 2. fols 84-91; 31 Aug 1910, IhJA 2, fols 92-95.

Mnutes of RT Meeting, Blackmoor, 12-13 ffov 1910, RT Papers c 776,
fols 79-81.

[Kerr, ] "Home Rule and tho Empire", 11911,1 (Kerr etc file,)

W <0> Papers.

^ (jgsii-otle objective In Itself. In either case it was clear that, as
Oliver put it, "Federalism is not going to be accepted, if at all, purely
03 its merits, but largely because it enables a number of solemn and
eitinetit gentlemen on both sides to save their faces".’

Oliver himself was indefatigable la pursuit of such a compromise,
persuading Austen Chamberlain and Carson to accept all-round devolution
should it be put forward by the Liberals; amongst the latter, however, he
was only able to muster the support of Lord Charnwood, Murray Macdonald and
Imro Ferguson. 3 Curtis and Grigg achieved a more notable success,
iifbencing Churchill towards a federal solution, first in September 1912,
aid then again (with Brand) in the spring of 1914. On the latter occasion
tie Sound Tablers drew up a scheoe for amending the Home Rule Bill which
was broadly accepted by Chamberlain, Carbon and Bonar Law as well as
Cburchill. nevertheless, as soon as Asquith was brought in, negotiations
broke down. Churchill then reverted to his previous, pugnacious
ittransigence. *

Vith the exception of Oliver, the Round Tablers' advocacy of "Home
Sule All Round." was sporadic and hali-hearted. To all intents and purposes

Oliver [to CraUJ, 24 Get 1913, Oliver Papers 95, fols 99-103.

For correspondence with Chamberlain and Carson, see Oliver Fapers 91
and 3?; cf correspondence with Grey and Craii, ibid 92 and 95.

J A Spender believed that Oliver was too identified with Unionism to
have any impact in Liberal circles: Spender to Oliver, 6 March 1914,
Gliver Papers 96, fols 11-12.

"Suggestions for a Settlement of the Irish Question", with subsequent
marginalia, RT Papers c 823, fols 154-57; Curtis to H Montgomery
Hyde, 24 July 1950, Curtis Papers 62, fol 27; Kendle, "The Round
Table Movement and 'Home Rule All Round' Oliver regarded Churchill
as "the enemy of your country": Oliver to Curtis, 10 April 1914,

c "rtis Papers 2, fols 161-62.

150

ttey ig nored wbat was in * act the lar 8 est element in the problem: the
as?ira ti°ns of Irish nationalists themselves. "Colonial Autonomy", the
desa cd of the const! tut ional nationalists, was ruled out entirely, on the
growls that it was a "transitional stage", which "must inevitably lead
either to closer union or to something which will not be distinguishable
froa separation". ' Unlike the peoples of the existing Dominions, the Irish

cojld not be trusted to make the choice wisely. Indeed, the Round Tablers
recognised that any solution to which they themselves could subscribe would

•have to te carried over the heads of the Irish Rationalist party". 1 2 *

The Round Tablers' true political colours were shown most clearly in
their attitudes to Ulster. Oliver condemned "all this Ulster shouting and
drua-beating and treasonable tomfoolery" in 1911; but that was mainly

because it was "prenature" and might alienate potential supporters on the

sa:nland. ? The Round Table refused to condemn Ulster's preparations for
rebellion. "It is enough that these men believe themselves to be arming to
defend their fundamental rights of citizenship in the United Kingdom. " 4
Xr.ner and Amery were leading figures in the organisation of an English
Covenant: Milner thought that "the crisis . . . calls for action, which is
different, not only in degree, but in kind, from what Is appropriate to

1 C Brand and Cralk.l "Home Rule”, RT, June 1912, pp 425-32.

2 <»rigg to J A Spender, 12 Dec 1913, RT Papers c 790, fols 114-18.

Oliver to Robinson, 27 Sept 1911, Oliver Papers 84, fols 6-7.

lGr igg, 1 "The Irish Crisis", RT, Xarch 1914, p 219. Grigg did worry,
however, about the example which might be set to "other discontented
dements of society, not only in the United Kingdon, but in our
dependencies beyond the seas": ibid , p 213.

or ditt« r y P° lltIcal controversies". 1 2 3 Curtis cane -to the conclusion that
apart fro 3 an / obligations I nay have to the Round Table, I ought to sign-;
GrlgS ♦ hou S 1,t and Curt,s should sign, whatever the propriety of

Sound Table employees doing so.*

In September 1914 the Round Table recorded that it was "only by the
aar-rovest margin that we are not now engaged in a civil as well as a
foreign war".* Had it cone to such a point, many of the Round Tablers
jlght well have been on the side of the rebels.

Tfi° Slvalrv oi Empires

■Great Empires are welded together by pressure from without", Brand
observed in 1509. * The connection between external pressure and internal
consolidation was fundamental to the Round Table's arguments in the period
1910-14, to the extent that it is difficult to disentangle the relative
weight attached to each. Vas Imperial federation urged primarily as a
response to international rivals, or was external pressure seized upon as a
convenient pretext? The motives behind the Round Table movement were
conplex, and a natter of some debate within the Moot. Nevertheless, it is

1 Milner to Selborne, 18 Feb 1914, Milner Papers 089, fols 10-18.

2 Curtis to Grigg, 16 March 1914, RT Papers c 779, fols 12-13; Grigg to
Curtis, 17 March 1914, Ibid , fol 14. Further correspondence in RT
Papers c 823, fols 118 ff.

3 IV Allison Phillips et al.J "United Kingdom", RT, Sept 1914, p 712.

' Brand, The Union of South Africa (Oxford, 1909), p 131.

cJear that the existence of external threats added enormously to the
persuasiveness and relevance of the Round Tablers' arguments, and to their
cohesion as a group.

The early Round Tablers were in no doubt as to the source of the nain
threat to Britain and her Empire. Anglo-German antagonism, Kerr declared
In tte first Pound Table, was "an all-pervading reality" and "the central
fact in the international situation to-day".’ Kerr interpreted this
an'.agonlsn primarily in Ideological terms, as a clash between the 3ritish
principles of " individual ism*’ and "liberty" and the Prussian principles of
•national efficiency" and "autocracy". The root of the problem was "the
unalterable conviction, deep in the hearts of the [German] people, that it
is their destiny to become the first power of the world". Only a change of
heart in Germany could avert the catastrophe of a full-scale war. 2 A
sinilar line was taken by Dawson’s Times, and was indeed accepted by the
Xoot as a whole.

The Round Tablers, as they later realised, ** are open to the charge
that they contributed to the outbreak of war by dwelling on the
irreconcilability of British and German aspirations. On the other hand,
tfcere is no evidence that the Round Tablers took an active role in lobbying
British politicians on this Issue. There was little need, and there were
plenty 0 f other groups to do so. In Britain, at least, the Round Table's
role U disseminating anti-Germanism was minor, consisting mainly of
Opting and therefore reinforcing attitudes already well-forced.

3

tKerr,] "Anglo-German Rivalry", FT, ffov 1910 <pp 7-40), p 7.
liid, pp 23, 37 and pass! n .

(Kerr,] -The Foundations of Peace", FT, June 1915, pp 597-8.

153

It was not with attitudes in Britain, but with attitudes in the
pcalaicns, that the Round Tablers were prinarily concerned. Their initial
5CUnd ugs in the Dominions, and the reactions to Curtis's Studies, revealed
tfcat there was by r.o means a universal acceptance of the idea that a threat
to Britain was a threat to the Dominions thenselves. Anglo-German
antagonism therefore entailed a possibility of divergence between Britain
and the Dominions. Describing the origins o f the Round Table, Curtis later
ejphasised that Its founders "feared that South Africans might abstain from
a future war with Germany on the grounds that they had not participated in
the decision to make war".’ "Colonial Neutrality" was thought to be a real
possibility, especially after Laurier's assertion of Dominion rights at the
1911 Conference. It was a possibility which the Round Tablers were
obviously keen to avert, and considerable space was therefore devoted to
deronstrating its impracticability through the pages of the Found Table
nagazine. Neutrality, in the Found Table's view, was equivalent to
secession, and, while Britain was unlikely to enforce unity by coercion,
the Bonin ions would soon find that independence would "save neither their
boaour nor their terr i tor les" . The advocates of neutrality were
transparently "hoping to be able to coabine the advantages of membership of
the British Empire, with avoidance of Its risks and obi igations" . 3

The Round Table's coverage of Anglo-Ger inan relations attempted to
deal with the problem from another angle, by emphasising the identity of

Curtis, Dyarchy (London, 1920), p 41; cf C Curtis, 1 "Abe Bailey", ST,
Sspt 1940. pp 743-46.

"Colonial Neutrality" , FT, Aug 1911, pp 435-42; cf f Kerr, 3 "The Few
Problem of Imperial Defence", FT, Kay 1911, pp 231-62.

HSU,

154

W

jritleh and Dominion Interests. Kerr's 1910 article stressed the global
ra tter than European range of Germany's ambitions, the existence of a
•surpl US " population In Germany, and the probability that the Dominions
(encompassing much of the land "fit for white settlement") would fall prey
to Germany should she prove successful in the struggle for naval supremacy.
j e rr also stressed that

"Of all things I Germany] . . . fears the effective union
of the British Empire for defence. In the long run It
is mathematical ly just as certain that she will defeat
England alone in a contest of wealth and numbers, as it
is that she will be beaten by the combined peoples of
the Empire" . ’

lerr's initial analysis of the German threat thus tied In neatly with
tie Sound Table's wider aim of Imperial integration. The picture he drew
of German ambitions was sharp and uncompromising - perhaps too much so to
be entirely convincing anongst Dominion readers. A visit to Berlin at the
height of the Koroocan crisis also helped to modify Kerr's views. As he
wrote to his mother, his conversations there convinced him "that the price
of war is &o terrific that only the most vital of national interests can
Justify it".- 5, Vriting in the Round Table after his- return, Kerr retracted
his earlier claim that Germany's interests compelled her to deprive Britain
of her Dominions and colonies, and suggested, on the contrary, that British
a rd German interests in the extra-European world generally coincided. In
Jer r's revised analysis, Germany's true interests were not those perceived
hj her government; her autocracy, aristocracy and bureaucracy needed an

1

2

CKerr,] "Anglo-Gernan Rivalry", loc oil, pp 21-25.

Kerr to Lady Anne Kerr, 20 Oct 1911, Lothian Papers 461, fol 10.

extern

heads* i
stronger

threat to cling to power; previous successes had "turned their
aD d "the more unpopular f the German government! grows at home the
is the bias in favour of recovering its prestige ... by glory

By standing firm, the British Enpire was defending not only its
interests, but international right, and the real interests of the

Geraa* f* 0 P le themseives. ’

Kerr thus vent some way towards accomnodatl ag the possibility of a

reconciliation between Britain and Germany, provided that the German ruling
class abandoned its irrational and illegitinate ambitions. A more active
policy of appeasement was urged by Eggleston, in a memorandum which was
published, with modifications and an editorial disclaimer, in the Found
Table of Septenber 1912. Eggleston emphasised that Germany's ambitions
on the whole "legitimate not predatory" and he suggested that Germany

eight make a useful partner in "the white man's mission of civilization".
Sritain's entente with France and Russia he described as both provocative
aad foolish; much better would be to work for a re-establishment of the old
Conceit of Powers. As an interim measure, Britain should withdraw from the
Satente, and strengthen her own position with a "healthy dose" of tariff
a -d land reforn, and of Imperial and military "Organization". (Curiously,
Heston's original memorandum envisaged this as a possible "Liberal
: P® f tyJ policy ".) 2

E S5leston's suggestions reflected an alternative view of the dangers

‘Kerr,] "Britain, France and Germany", FT, Dec 1911, pp 1-57.

Eggleston, "England and Germany: A Liberal Policy Towards Germany",

‘Sent 18 April 1912,1 RT Papers c 777, fols 73-83; I iifijn) "An

Australian Fote on Anglo-German Relations", PT Sept, 1912, pp 717-36.

156

0 of rooting the British Empire as well as a more sympathetic approach to
te'&o ambitions. In his view, a Germany "dispersed through the world with
interests in every land .... would be an ally of Great Britain in the
co>i c 8 druggie with Eastern nations". 1 Eggleston and a number of other
Australia 1 * Pound Tablers saw Japan as the greatest threat to the Empire.

At first, the Moot was inclined to play upon such fears, as a useful

arjusent lor Imperial consolidation. - * To the extent that Dominion
attitudes came into conflict with British strategy, however, the Moot chose
to support the calculations of 3rltish officialdom. This was shown most
clearly by an article for the June 1914 Round Table , in which Grigg
sutaarised two articles sent from Australia by Eggleston and V J Isbister,
only to discount the fears they voiced as "beyond all reasonable

reckoning". For Grigg, the "mutual value of t the British Empire's’ . .

friendship with the awahened people of Japan" was denonstrable , and he once
again (with an allusion to Xahan's doctrine of concentration) affirmed that
the front line of Australia's defence was in the tforth Sea. 3

The Koot's handling of Australian criticism of British foreign policy
Is significant. As In the parallel case of Anglo-German antagonism, the
Xoot strongly supportive of official British policy. Vhere Dominion
opinion was out of step with British policy, the Xcot saw its role, at this
&t «8 e » not as a conduit for Dominion influence, but as a means of
Queuing" the Dominions towards acceptance of British views.

Eggleston, "England and Germany*, lac. c l t, fol 79.

f Kerr,l "The Anglo- Japanese Alliance", R7, Feb 1911, pp 105-53,

lGr lgg, 1 "Saval Fol icy and the Pacific Question", PT, June 1914,

PP 391-463. The Hoot's attitude may have been confirmed, if not
influenced, by Chirol, who was a particularly strong supporter of the
Alliance: see his lecture to the Ralegh Club, "The For East"

(delivered 7 June 1914), RT Papers c 304, fols 38-65.

157

^^jSQBLSJSS. VAR ASD ADJUST MEHT. 1 914-??

7be outbreak of war inevitably wrought havoc on the Round Table
organisation, although it did not "gc bust", as Kerr initially predicted. 1
lie London group was depleted by the enlistment of Amery, Cralk and Grigg.
Ierr at first thought of enlisting, but was persuaded otherwise by Curtis
aid Selborne. He was, in fact, called up for service in March 1916, and
his first application for exemption was turned down - “apparently none of
tie tribunal had ever heard of the Round Table" - but the influence of his
friends eventually prevailed. 2 Equally important in circumscribing Round
Table operations was the drying-up of donations to the movement. The
result was the enforced redundancy of three office staff and calls for
econonies in the printing of Curtis’s studies. 3

Round Table operations in the Dominions were likewise severely
curtailed by the war. The London group lost two of its staunchest allies,
the Canadian E J Kylie and the Sew Zealander S A Atkinson, and ail the
Dcaition groups were greatly diminished by enlistment. Those who remained
ccnpiaiaed of the dificulties of recruiting new members, and of the

1 Kerr to Lady Anne Kerr, 29 July 1914, Lothian Papers 464, fol 26.

Kerr to Lady Anne Kerr, 31 March 1916, Lothian Papers 465, fol 27.

The appeal tribunal was chaired by Lord Salisbury.

Kerr to Curtis. 12 Aug 1914, RT Papers c 782, fols 187-88.

158

»neral lack °* i n * erest in the Round Table's "academic" programme . '

Hoveveri tbe war did not result in any change of tack by the Round

Table group, which decided in October 1914 to continue with its original
-lac- Indeed, the Round Table magazine was thought all the more useful as
a vehicle for the views on war policy espoused by the Moot, 2 which agreed
that it "must now concentrate practically its whole attention on the
business of winning the war". 3

y.r Politics and. the -Llovd. George Coalition

The most remarkable result of the First Vorld War for the Moot was
the wav in which, individually and collectively, Round Tablers moved from a
pjsition on the margins of British political life to one very much nearer
its centre.

Conscription, for which Kilner, Oliver, Amery and others had pressed
before the war, and which Curtis hinted at in his Round Table Studies , now
occupied a central place in the group's desiderata. An article on the
subject was prepared for the December 1914 Round Table, which included the
contention that military service was a Common Law duty; in the event, the

1 See, eg Glazebrook to Curtis, 27 Aug 1914, RT Papers c 782,
fols 195-6.

2 Curtis to Glazebrook, 3 Kov 1914, RT Papers c 779, fol 127.

IKerr! to Curtis, 4 June 1915, RT Papers c 809, fols 46-47.

159

^att oi Lord Roberts P rovided a different angle from which to tackle the
object. '

the following year, 1915, saw a large number of references to the
issue in the P a 8 GS of the “agazino, and the publication of Oliver's Ordeal
ft Battle, a trenchant statement of the case for compulsion. At one point
a 'National Covenant" was proposed, by which people would pledge themselves
to 'subordinate their whole lives during the war to carrying out the
declared purpose of the Government to bring this war to a successful
issue". 2 Although this project was ruled out on the appearance of
lortlcliffe's Rational Service Society, 3 the London group continued to
press for the "organising and disciplining of the whole population". 4 Once
conscription was enacted, London Round Tablers called for harsh penalties
against conscientious objectors. Kerr going so far as to suggest exile
(following a period of imprisonment with hard labour) as a suitable
puniehsant. 6 In the Dominions <which the Pound Table declared to be a
'second reservoir"®) Round Tablers were again prominent in the ultimately
ucsuccessful canpaigns for the local introduction of conscription.

Uerr.J "Draft Article on Compulsory Service", Nov 1914, RT Papers
C 779, fols 137-49; CAmery.J "Lord Roberts", RT, Dec 1914, pp 1-2.

Curtis to Lady Selborne, 10 Aug 1915, Curtis Papers 2, fols 180-84.

Kerr to Evelyn Vrench, 3 Sept 1915, RT Papers c 845, fol 18.

*Kerr.) "National Duty in War", RT, Sept 1915, p 709.

Kerr, "Memorandum on the 'Absolutist' Conscientious Objectors",

1 1917/18, ] Lothian Papers 219, fols 744-48.

tSerr.3 "The Burden of Victory",

RT, June 1915, pp 516-17.

160

the Moot's views on conscription and on the need for a more vigorous
policy pitted it against the dilatory "Squiff" (Acquith, with whoa the
jtXjt bad quarrelled before, ovor Anglo- Domini on relations, Ireland, and a
i&ole range of other issues). The latter's incompetence as a war leader
fl jd loosening grip on his own party enabled Milner and his colleagues to
a lly themselves with powerful political forces in both major parties and in
Var Office. Their "war gingerlte" credentials, patriotic rectitude and
erperience in administration ensured that the Round Tablers were well
placed to share in the spoils following Asquith's fall.

Kuch has been written about the "Monday night cabal" of Milner and
bis followers, and its role in Asquith's downfall. 1 A forerunner of this
group was the Round Table weekly subcommittee set up in June 1915 to
disejse war policy, consisting of Milner, Oliver, Aa»ry, Hichens, Brand,
forr, Zimmorn and Chirol. 2 In January 1916, Dawson recorded the first

«etlng of the "Monday night" group, consisting of himself, Milner, Oliver,
Aler 7 on d sir Edward Carson.® Others who joined included Kerr, Valdorf
ktor, General Sir Henry Wilson and (occasionally) Lloyd George. Although
tie 8 rcu P was separate from the Round Table, Round Tablers were numerically
preponderant, and contemporaries often confused membership of the two.*

A locus classicus of the conspiratorial ist view is Wrench, Geoffrey
and our Tines (London, 1955), chapter 12.

Uerrl to Curtis, 4 June 1915, RT Papers c 809, fols 46-47.

Dawson's diary. 17 Jan 1916, Dawson Papers 22.

eg, Stephen Roskill, Hartkey: Xan of Secrets, Vcl 1 (London,
1970), pp 422-23 (Hankey's diary for 15 Aug 1917).

iMiaL-

Th« purpose of the "Monday night* group was to discuss and co-

ordioa te

demands for a mere effective organisation of the war effort. It

^ proofed the talents of its ovm members, particularly Milner. In June
1316 0U ver su 83 eRted "various means . . . for forcing Milner on the
reluctant Government", including Conservative party pressure, press
•cla ■our"* flnd "private Tadpcling" <the method he preferred ). 1

A neeting of the "Monday night” group on 27 November 1916, including
Carson and Vi Ison, agreed to put pressure on Lloyd George and Bonar Law to
pall out of Asquith's cabinet. x This was confirmed by a Round Table
aeting the following weekend, during and after which Dawson composed his
fiaous editorial of 4 December, which scotched Asquith's hopes of
containing the cabinet revolt. 3 The following day the government
collapsed, to be replaced by a new Coalition under Lloyd George. The role
of the "Monday night" and Round Table groups was relatively minor, but it

was tii»ly, and helped to put a principled gloss on the intrigues of
politicians. a

Milner himself became a member of the new five-man War Cabinet. In
1918 he was briefly Secretary of State for Var, responsible for the unified

Oliver to Carson, 9 June 1916, Oliver Papers S7, fols 9-12.

Dawson's diary, 27 Hov 1916, Dawson Papers 22.

Ihe Times, 4 Dec 1916.

P A Lockwood, "Milner's Entry into the Var Cabinet", Hist
Journal, Vol VII (1964), pp 120-34. and Caneron Hazlehurst, "The
^hspiracy Myth* in M Gilbert (ed). Lloyd George (Hew Jersey, 1968).

162

^ cossa nd at Douellens which staved off the Allied collapse, and from

he served as Colonial Secretary, notable mainly for his advocacy of
^red retreat In Egypt.

Xaurice Hankey, the Cabinet Secretary, managed to forestall Milner' c
a'teapt to foist Steel-Mai tland on him as an assistant. He was forced to
accept Airery, however, "as Milner insists", even though he "would much
sooner see hin elsewhere".’ Amery found that Hankey's rule of minuting
definite conclusions was "not easy after some particularly woolly
discussion. But ny experience was that, if one invented the best decision
ote could think of, it was rarely queried by those concerned". 2

Kerr was appointed a member cf Lloyd George's "Garden Suburb" in
January 191V (and was replaced as Found Table editor by Coupland, although
he continued to contribute a large number of articles). By the end of the
war, Xerr was Lloyd George's only private secretary, in which position he
renalned until 1921, when he was replaced by Grigg. Milner predicted that
ferr wojld have "a great chance of making hinself hoard" from his position
ic Downing Street. 3 Kerr was indeed regarded in many quarters as the
'power behind the throne". - It was his job not only to brief the Prise
Kioister, controlling the flow of information and often conducting

Stephen Roskill, Hankey: Man of Secrets, Vol 1 <London, 1970),

P? 343-4.

2 Aaery, Ky Political Life, Vol 2 (London, 1953), p 94.

Winer to Sir Hugh Thornton. 3 Feb 1917, Milner Papers 19, fols 7-12.

Sev York Tines, 24 March 1921.

163

I terviews on his behalf, but also to liaise with government departments,
even occasionally to act as Lloyd George's representative at government
lutings- Kerr's influence was increased by Lloyd George's tendency to
•shuffl e everything on to" Kerr, and his reluctance "to use the
constitutional machinery".'

Others in the Moot moved into positions of less influence, but still

of inportance. Oliver served briefly as secretary to the Economic
Offensive committee of the cabinet. Brand and Hichens were enlisted to set
ap the Imperial Munitions Board in Canada, which was subsequently chaired
and staffed by members of the Canadian Round Table. Erand went on to
Vishington, where he was deputy chairman of the British Mission. Coupland

aid Z inner n both served in the Political Intelligence Department of the
Foreign Office, which acted as a "brainc trust" for the development of
British war aims.

John Turner has argued persuasively that the movement of Kilner's
proteges into positions cf office and influence was less the result of a
concerted "Fabian-llfce Milnerite penetration" than of "opportunist
lobbying". 2 Nevertheless, the prestige and power of the group as a whole
enhanced significantly by the changes which brought some of its members
50 close to the centre of power in Britain.

Kankey to Kerr, 11 Sept 1920, Lothian Papers 210. fols 407-11; cf
Alan Sharp, "The Foreign Office in Eclipse, 1919-22", History, Vol 61
<1976), p ? 193-218.

2

J A Turner, "The Formation of Lloyd George's 'Garden Suburb'", Hist
Waal, vol 20 <1977> , pp 165-84.

The position of Milner, Amery and particularly Kerr enabled those
gouol Tablers who were still independent of the government to enjoy a
privileged access to the corridors of power. Moreover, this was at a time
•v&ea". aG Curtis wrote, "everything is plastic and when by a touch you can
direct policy in one direction or the other".’ Curtis himself sought to
e iert an influence through Korr and then Grigg on at least three issues -
iiaiS ratlon P ollcle ®> India and Ireland.

nevertheless, the activities and influence of the Sound Table were

clearly constrained by the needs of the day-to-day running of the war and

its afternath, and also by the political priorities of the Coalition's

supporters. The Moot could not set the agenda; it could only hope to exert

icfluence on each issue as it arose. Furthermore, as Curtis realised, the

Round Table's intimacy with the Government was double-edged.

"To do our work we must like Tie Times be in close touch
with cen in office. But if cnce you allow the Round
Table to become an official organ its power for good will
die in your hands. Mow that so nany of our colleagues
are in official positions w© run some danger of our
fundamental principles suffering . . . eclipse." 2

:b? close connections between the Round Table and the Lloyd George

kalition necessarily entailed some loss of its claim to disinterestedness.

•3 Kerr' s case, the effect of his years in Downing Street was dramatic,

■ajsing him to transfer his allegiance wholeheartedly to Lloyd George.

^rtis to Kerr, 25 March 1917, Lothian Papers 33, fols 8-10.
Curtis to Ccupland, 15 Oct 1917, RT Papers c 810, fols 191-94.

|]iega tIons thflt the y° uri S er Round Tablers had become mere mouthpieces for
l\Oj& George were, indeed, both to damage relations with the Doninion Round
Table groups» and to give rise to acrimonious disputes within the London

Jbot.

in Wartime

The Dominions' response to the outbreak of war appeared, at first, to
canfoucd those who believed the Anglo- Dominion relationship to be in
process of slow disintegration. As Duncan commented, the war “brought to
tie test . . . theories of neutrality and partnership-at-will And the
Itoainions' answer was unequivocal. A million men from the Doninions
eilisted to fight for the Empire, in theatres ranging from the Western
Front through tho Dardanelles to the various German colonies in Africa and
the Pacific . 9 "Surely in all history there has been no such striking
dtxoastration of the unity of a far-flung Empire", asserted the Canadian
Round Table 3

The mobilisation of Dominion resources on such a scale, and on a
Purely voluntary basis, appeared to many commentators also to prove that
^-operation afforded a workable basis for the future of the Empire. This

tDuacan, 1 -South Africa-, FT. Dec 1914, p 229.

"The Xilitary Effort of the British Empire", FT. June 1919,

PP 495-509 for an early attenpt to quantify the Imperial war effort. .

"Canada", FT, Dec 1914 <pp 179-200), p 186.

166

view, which bad always been an element in the thinking of eoroo Round
fible rs * steadily gained ground ac the war progressed. By 1916 key figures
^ tie London Moot, including Brand and Milner, were prepared to subscribe
to Slid a View.' On the other hand, Curtis remained unconvinced. At
first, Kerr shared Curtis's doubts. 3 So, too, did Kylie, who emphasised
t j a t "xhat really counts is the intelligent and combined effort which if
w de in time of peace will prevent war”. 3

While the tensions between federation and co-operation thus remained
otresolved, the Moot was unaninous in believing that some constitutional
clang® was both necessary and inevitable either during or inroediately after
the var. Even If co-operation represented a viable future strategen for
Acglo-Itominion relatione, the ramshackle, chaotic and unstructured form in
which it existed before 1914 did not. On this point the Moot was

encouraged by some of the reports sent by Doninion Round Tablers. Few
Zealand's first Found Table contribution of the war included a plea for "a
tetter organized Imperial system". 41 The following year, the Australian
fevnd Table acknowledged "the defective system under which the Empire's
aiiairs are conducted" , as a result of which "the desire and the capacity

See Milner to Glazebrook, 8 March 1916, Xilner Papers 44, fols 61-64;
Brand to Sir Edmund Valker, 22 Feb 1916, RT Papers c 780, fols 32-3.
See also above, pp 98-99.

Kerr, "The Kcaning and Purpose of the British Commonwealth" [19161,
Lothian Papers 4, item 278; [Kerr,] "The Schism of Europe", FT, March
1915 ( pp 345-411), pp 409-10.

fylie to Curtis, 30 Sept 1914, RT Papers c 779, fols 80-81.

"Sew Zealand", FT, Dec 1914, p 257.

167

[lD t be Dominions) to serve are not availed of to the full".’

To the London Round Table, it was still clear that if the Dominions
<re to share in the permanent control of the Empire's foreign policy, "a
government nust be created to deal with it, constitutionally

of all the democracies under the Crown". Nevertheless, such
fl radical change in the Imperial constitution was unlikely to be brought
stout in the conditions of war. "It will be time enough to overhaul it
when the strain is relaxed and peace is attained." 2 The important point
for the moment was that the "absence of adequate representative machinery"
cojld be "no excuse" for not using "the machinery of consultation which
already exists" . 3

The Round Table therefore urged the British Government to convene a
vartice Inperial Conference. Cable and post were entirely inadequate as a
»ans of consultation. A whole range of questions - such as manpower,
fhacce, trade restrictions, shipping and prize law - needed to be hammered
out. Kore importantly still, it was essential for the Dominions "to know,
in advance, the mi ad of the British Government" regarding peace terms.
The latter would "commit the Dominions as conpletely as Great Britain". A
^rtiae Conference would therefore have a full agenda even without
discussing "any of the larger problems of Imperial partnership".'*

1 "Australia", RT, Sept 1915, p 855.

[Gri ggJ "The Dominions and the Settlenent: A Plea for Conference",

*r, torch 1915, pp 325-44.

(Kerr.) "National Duty in War", ST, Sept 1915 (pp 707-23), p 720.

fGri gg, J "The Dominions and the Settlement . - . " , 1.QC. cit-

represents

tive

168

Tho Dominion Round Table articles responded to the Koot's plea for a
(filler** oe, but not ln sucb a wa y as to S lv © great cheer. From Australia
I* t#as reportod that "responsible opinion appears cautious . . . and
a3 xiOUS to Halt awhile". There was even a possibility of "embarrassment"
a3 d "danger" if agreement on peace aims could not be reached. 1 In Few
Zealand, “scant consideration" had been given to the possibility of a
Conference. The war had brought about "a wider, more discriminating, and
*ire iEstructed loyalty to the great Commonwealth", but also a "feeling
tlat the war has altered for all time the position of the Dominions". 2

The London Round Tablers still believed that Dominion nationalism

ecu Id he accommodated and even cc-opted by a movement for closer Imperial

Integration. Nevertheless, the difficulties of doing so were brought home

forcefully, first by the disagreements (particularly between Curtis and the

Canadian Round Tablers) over publication of Tho Problom of tho

CcoxDhcal th, and secondly by the public and press response to Curtis's

tcok. Even if the Round Tablers thentsel%-es did not see Imperialism and

nationalism as necessarily antagonistic, many of their critics did. The

Toronto Globe, for instance, suggested that in

"appealing at this time to the perfervid loyalty of
ultra-imperialists, and in opposing Imperialism to
Rationality, [the Round TablersJ . . . are awakening
latent forces in this and every Dominion which
prudent statesmanship would refrain from
antagonizing at this critical juncture". 3

"Australia", ST, June 1915, pp 670-91.

"Rev Zealand" , RT, Sept 1915, pp 887-902.

Toronto Globe, 30 April 1917, copy in RT Papers c 822, fol 89.

1

2

3

169

ffcis * oS 4 caricature of the Round Table's position, but It was one which
illustrated clearly the suspicion with which many Dominion nationalists now
7 iettfd proposals for Imporial reform.

jlatters came to a head at the Imperial Var Conference of March to May

1917- At a private dinner with the Found Table, Borden emphasised that the
creation of an Imperial Parliament was for the moment "wholly impossible
and that it was dangerous to urge it"; on the other hand, he asserted that
the tew " Imperial Cabinet" set a valuable precedent, which "accorded with
the principle of responsible government because all its members were
responsible to their several parliaments and electorates for its
decisions" . (Curtis, who was in India, would have shuddered. ) Two days
later Scuts likened the new body to a board of directors who would meet

occasionally to decide the general lines of policy, leaving Groat Britain
to be "the managing director on the spot". On this occasion Brand and Kerr
broke ranks with their more dogmatic colleagues, "and the discussion broke

Kerr's article for the Round Table gave r.o hint of the disagreements

“ithln the Moot; indeed, it was a perfect example of his skill in skating

07er thin ice. Kerr welcomed the new Imperial Cabinet - which, by its awn

^solutions, promised to be annual - as a "valuable advance", providing

"a simple yet elastic machinery . . . which will
enable all the Governments of the Empire to keep in
constant, if not continuous, consultation on every
aspect of Imperial policy, and which will enable all
its peoples to understand far better their common
problcno" .

1

Xinutes of discussion, 2 Kar 1917 (Borden) and 4 Kay 1917 (Smuts),
Lothian Papers 474, items 3 and 4. See also above, pp 106-110.

170

OB

tie other hand, even if the "Cabinet" were complemented by a Conference
sentatlve of all the Parliaments of the Empire, there was "no use

repre

pretending" that the changes involved "will in themselves solvo the
f unda »e Qto1 I°P erial problem".

"The improved system for conducting Imperial affairs
. . . cannot give the Dominions more than a
consultative voice in Imperial and foreign policy
• • • • £ ItJ will greatly increase the influence of

the Overseas nations in foreign policy .... But
it will in the last resort still be the British
Parliament which will decide."

The tew system "might be made to work for many years", but eventually "it
will . ■ • fail".’

Kerr's re-iteration of the arguments against co-operation was
dictated as much by the need to hold the Moot together as by any real hopes
of inducing a charge of heart amongst the statesmen and peoples of Britain
and tho Dominions. Tco much uncertainty still attached to the outcome cf
tie war for questions of constitutional nicety to have more than a marginal
interest. Moreover, as Kerr himself realised, the mood of the Dominions
such that the proponents of Imperial integration had been thrown on the
defensive. The war had simultaneously increased "the sense of national
wlf-reliance" in the Dominions and "greatly diminished the prestige of the
Br ‘tlsh Government" , with the result that the Dominions were "tending more
ace oare to conceive cf the Empire as five nations deliberating on equal
teras round a table". In the longer term, this could only help the Round

tKerr.l "The Hew Developments in the Constitution of the Empire", J?T,
June 1917, pp 441-59. Butler does not include this in his list of
Kerr'c articles, but see eg Coupland to Curtis, 22 May 1917, RT
Papers c 810 , fols 66-67.

171

flble

cause; but in the short term, It would render any federalist campaign

poiDtle

ss or even counter-productive. 1

The Round Table had long insisted that the negotiation of peace would

test co-operation as severely as the conduct of war. Curtis, in The
frobles of the Comaonneal th, had gone as far as to assert that the
Doaiaions' "representatives will not be admitted to the conference at which
. peace is finally made".* Less categorically, Grigg suggested that
plenipotentiaries "cannot be responsible to several different governments",
bet allowed that the Dominions would at least be able to send advisers. 3

Wen peace finally came, the Dominions' uncertain constitutional position
was reflected in an ambiguous representation, partly independent and partly
within the British Empire delegation. Curiously, this was an aspect of the
Conference on which the Round Table chose not to comment.

Yar l Ins

A "Special Var Number" of the Round Table, published in September
1914, exanined the causes of the war. R V Seton-Vatson emphasised the role
ol tie Magyar ascendancy, alleging complicity in the assassination of Franz
Ferdinand. Nevertheless, the "dynamic cause" of the war was found to lie
la German militarism, aiming, desperately, at "world-domination or
downfall" , and seeing in Britain its "real enemy". Articles by Kerr and
0ri 8g set tie tone for future Round Table contributions by

Kerr to Curtis, 21 July 1917, Lothian Paporc 33, folc 10-21.

Curtis, The Problea of the Comnoowealth (London, 1916), p 113.

ISrl Sg.l "The Dominions and the Settlement", RT , March 1915,

P? 335-36.

3

172

<le6criW D S the utter irreconcilability of the British Empire (which "stands
for * * P 0300 ’ unlt y and freedom") with "Prussianism" ("a drilled and
disc1pl lned national nonomania" ) . ’ Thic was "a heroic conflict of ideals",
a tforld-hlstorical struggle between the forces of freedom and those of

despotism . 3

The logical inconsistencies of this view, especially given the
participati cn of Russia on the Allies' side, were blithely ignored. 3 The
propagandist effect was both conscious and deliberate. A special letter
acionpaaying the September 1914 issue told its recipients that any "notice
that you can give tc this statement of the British case will be warmly
appreciated". 4 Several Found Table articles were reprinted for sale at 3d
or 6d, and the Foreign Office produced further copies for distribution in
the United States ar.d other neutral countries. *

The Round Table's interpretation of the war's origins made clear the
Xoot's belief that Prussian militarism was the most fundamental cause of
the war. Accordingly, the utter defeat of Germany, and the dismemberment
of its ruling elite, occupied first place amongst the Moot’s suggested war
alas. The real danger was thought to be of "a truce- like peace and a new

1 ISeton-Vatson, 3 "The Austro-Servian Dispute", ST, Sept 1914,

pp 659-75; [Kerr,] "The Var in Europe", iMd, pp 591-615 (p 613 for
"peace, unity and freedom"); [Grigg.l "Germany and the Prussian
Spirit", Ibid, pp 616-58 (p 644 for "national monomania").

C Grigg, J "Germany and the Prussian Spirit", p 617.

D Vi Ison,] " Russia and Her Ideals", PT, Dec 1914, pp 103-35, made
out a rather weak case for Russia's "democratic spirit".

f Utter to FT subscribers, ) 17 Sept 1914, FT Papers c 845, fol 5.

"Bound Table Var Panphlets", RT Papers c 850, fol 217; Kerr,
"Xenorandum" , [1919,] Brand Papers, box 42.

173

^ r . i Lansdowne, the most prominent advocate of compromise, was described
y Coupled as "a typical product of the old r6gino". 2 nevertheless, the
joued Table was careful to dissociate itself from those who urged the
of a "vindictive" peace.

"A peace which gave any ground for the belief that
the aia of the Allies was the destruction of the
unity of the German people, or the restriction of
their legitimate liberty cr their opportunity to
develop on peaceful lines, would only . . . render
inevitable another war." 3

The Round Table's analysis of the Austro-Hungarian role in
precipitating war indicated a second element of the war aims advocated by
the group. This was that "the map of Europe must be redrawn" to
accoracdate the aspirations of subject nations.' 1 The principle of
•xational self-determi nation" was particularly keenly adhered to by
Ccuplatd and Zi minora; and also by R V Sotoa-Vatson, Arnold Toynbee and
Lewis Kamler, all of whom contributed articles to the Round Table , joined
Ziaaern in launching New Europe in 1916 and, again with Zinmern, staffed
tie Foreign Office's Political Intelligence Department from 1917. p

Vithin the wider Moot, the full application of the principle caused
scse nlsgivings. Grigg, in an article of December 1914, took issue with

; IKerr.J "The 3urden of Victory", RT, June 1915 <pp 511-20), p 518.

' Coupland to V Hassey, 27 Aug 1918, RT Papers c 822, fols 137-38.
Lansdowne's letter was rejected by Dawson's Times.

tKerr.l "The Foundations of Peace", RT, June 1915 <pp 589-625),

PP 613- 34.

4 Ibid.

For the PID, see Erik Goldstein, Winning the Peace: British
diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, and the Faris Peace Conference,
*916-20 <0xford, 1991), esp ch 2.

iip cslticu

174

the

liberal "sentiment in favour of snail States

Although Kerr

ed the principle of self-determination, he also argued that colf-

e&dors

^teraination could only be regarded as progressive if it were a first step
towards some wider federation. ? Coupland complained that Kerr was averse

t0 "true" nationalism, as expounded by Zlmmern and his allies.® It was not
tie argunents of the latter which finally resolved the question, but the
actual disintegration of the central Empires.

A third element of the Round Table's war aims was provided by the
global nature of the war: the disposition of Germany's colonies and of
Turkey's Arab territories. South Africa and the Pacific Dominions had a
clear interest in the retention of the colonies which they had overrun.
Equally, Britain stood to gain from a large increment in her Imperial
•responsibilities". Nevertheless, the problem of formulating an

appropriate justification for a policy of annexation was difficult. Lloyd
George's declaration that “the wishes, the desires and the interests of the
people" concerned should be the overriding factor was criticised by Feetham
as at test indeterminate and at worst contrary to British interests. a Yet,
as Kerr realised, the argument from British interests was even more

1 tGrigg, l "Nationalism and Liberty", RT, Dec 1914 (pp 18-69), p 55 and
casslm .

2 Stee, eg, tKerr.l "The Harvest of the Var" , FT, Dec 1915 <pp 1-32),

PP 14-15.

3 Coupland to Zimmcrn, 18 Nov 11916), RT Papers c 817, fols 214-19.

Feetham, "Memorandum" Con German East Africa), 2 Get 1917, Lothian
Papers 475, item 1. Feetham suggested "no abandonment of our friends
in the struggle" as a more pliable formula. Lloyd George's proposal
*as contained In his speech at Glasgow, 29 June 1917.

175

pgo t0 objection. 1 The question was therefore left only half-solved, to
^ taken up again in closer proximity to the peace conference.

7 be last element In the Round Table's war aims related to the future
fraiJWOrk of international relations. Kerr's wartime Round Table articles
lost few Opportunities of reminding; his readers that "world peace" was only
possible through "world governnent" . For the moment, however, conflicts
could only be contained by the deterni nation of the "nost liberal Powers"

to upheld "Justice and liberty

if need be by force of arms". Kerr

tlerefore urged the "development of the machinery of international co-
operation" by means of "regular meetings of an informal council of the
nations " . 2

Kerr's proposal bore superficial similarities to the "League of
lationc" idea currently being formulated by Lord Robert Cecil.® However,
Kerr's views were vaguer and more limited. Vhereas Cecil envisaged a
schene of universal disarmament and arbitration backed up by economic
sanctions, Kerr opposed automatic conmltnents and advocated a purely
consultative and political body: a revived "Concert of Nations", United to
‘the great powers" and (initially at least) to those which fought on the
side of the Entente. 4 Calls for a negotiated peace on the basis of a
hejgte of Nations he regarded as "the nost insidious form of pacifism". 6

Kerr to Snuts, 14 Dec 1917, Lothian Papers 219, fol 750.

(Kerr,] "The Foundations of Peace", PT, June 1915, pp 616-19;

Cf fUfia,] "The Harvest of the Var" , PT, Dec 1915, pp 16-21.

For Cecil's views, see H P Cecil, "The Development of Lord Robert
Cecil's Views on the Securing of a Lasting Peace, 1915-19" (Oxford
D Phil, 1971).

(Kerr,] "The Harvest of the Var",

pp 19-21

Ker r to Sir Esme Howard (British Legation, Stockholm), 22 April 1918,
Lothian Papers 210, fols 487-90.

gerr's interpretation of British war aims contained a fair dose of

nevertheless, the liberal tone of his pronouncements

^ orr ified" Oliver, whose drift away fron tho Moot can bo traced back to
disagreements over the presentation of British policy.’ Lloyd
on the other hand, recognised the value of a liberal-denocrat ic
slant to British propaganda, and John Turner has identified Kerr as an

,-jportant influence on his war alms speeches oi 1917-13, formulated partly
Id response to labour unrest in Britain, and partly in response to American

pressure . 2

The First Vorld Var marked a decisive turning-point by bringing to
the fore the hitherto ill-considered question of Anglo-American relations.
The desire for some form of rapprochement with the United States had, in
varying degrees, formed part of "new imperialist" thinking in the late

niaeteenth century. Hovrtholesc, before 1014 Xilnor and tho younger Found
Tablers appear not to have shown much interest in the question. Kerr's
notebooks from his 1909-10 tour reveal an alnost exclusive interest in
questioas of race relations rather than Anglo-American relations. From
Septeaber 1915, however, articles on America became a regular feature of
tte ■agazine. Most early ones were written by the historian G L Beer, who
la 1914 wrote to Curtis of his desire for "a closer understanding, and a
Possible alliance, between our two countries". 3

Oliver Cto Brand?], 26 Dec 1914, Brand Papers, box 2B; Oliver to
Kerr, 6 Dec 1915, RT Papers c 780, fols 2-4.

John Turner, Lloyd George's Secretariat (Cambridge, 1980), pp 150-51
ar| d pass! fl .

to Curtis, date 1914,] RT Papers c 779, fol 83; cf Beer's
ar ticle on "Kilner and British Imperialism", Political Science
Quarterly, vol xxx (June 1915), pp 301-08.

3

177

American belligerence added enormously to the hopes of those who
a liberal peace and a League of Sat ions. The Round Table, by now
broadly aligned with such hopes, worked hard to downplay any divergence
bet«ea British and American views. Even before America's declaration of
yar, Coupland professed to find in Wilson's interjections "a final and
ay thorltative confirmation of the unity in hopes and aims of the American

aid 3rltish peoples".’ A year later, Zimmern wrote of a direct line "from
Plato down to President Vi Ison" in the advocacy of "the principle of the
Coiconvealth" which also animated the 3ritish Empire. 2 Beer agreed that
there was a "perfect . . . identity of purpose" between Britain and
Africa. 3

American belligerence coincided with the first Russian revolution of
1917, an event which the Round Table welcomed as a patriotic revolt against
tie prc-Gernanism of the Tsar's entourage. 4 The collapse of the Russian
wsr effort and the rise of Bolshevism confounded such optimistic

assossaents. Kerr was thrown into a state of near-panic, writing to Curtis
it July 1917 that "the world is now rushing headlong towards the abyss of
anarchy", the responsibility for averting which "will fall largely upon the
shoulders of the people of the British Isles".* Nevertheless, writing In

ICoupland, 3 "The Last Phase", RT, March 1917 <pp 195-217), p 206.

IZisuaern,] "Three Etoctrines in Conflict", RT, March 1918 <pp 262-92),
p 286.

tBeer,] "America's Var Aims", RT, March 1918 <pp 238-61), p 255.

t Coupland, 1 "A Var of Liberation", RT, June 1917 (pp 409-41),

PP 423-28. Korr was more pessimistic, realising as early as May 1917
that the Russians were likely to pull out of the war: Kerr to Lloyd
t Kay 1917,3 Lothian Papers 867, item 1.

Kerr to Curtis, 21 July 1917, Lothian Papers 33, fols 19-21.

WBh

tW

Round Table after the second, Bolshevik revolution, Kerr had recovered
aninity: "it can only be a question of time before . . . Russia

bis equ

begins to emerge ... as one of the great liberal Powers of the world". 1
yjile the Round Tablers expressed a general sympathy with the aims of the
'fhite* counter-revolutionaries, none advocated a more active Western
i3 tervention. a Even Kerr, despite <or, rather, because of) his tendency to
alarnism, believed that

"to start in on a new war against Russia is the
surest way of producing Bolshevism at home. Perhaps
there will be a call for volunteers, and if so, I've
no doubt that there will be lots of officers to
volunteer. But let's try ana do in Bolshevism
peacefully first". 3

At Versailles Kerr played an important part in frustrating Vinston

Ciurchill's attempts to stampede the Conference into authorising a more

act i 70 intervention in Russia. 4

lilYflated and Backward Peoples"

Before the First World War, the Sound Tablers (and Curtis in
particular) had been made acutely aware of the need to propagandise the
cause of Empire as part of the groundwork for imperial union. During the

1 UCerr, 1 "The Gathering of the Nations" , RT, Dec 1917 (pp 1-17), p 3.
For attribution (not in Butler), see Coupland to Brand, 22 Hov 1917,

FT Papers c 846, fols 13-16.

tZiamern, ] "Some Principles and Problems of the Settlement", RT,

Eec 1918 (pp 88-113), p 91; ILeeper.l ''Russia's Revolt against
Bolshevism" , RT, June 1919, pp 509-31.

Kerr to Lady Anne Kerr, 18 Feb 1919, Lothian Papers 466, fol 17.

Hani e y | The Supreme Control at the Paris Fence Conference, 1919
(London, 1963), pp 06-73; Kartin Gilbert, Vinston S Churchill, Vol IV
(London, 1975), pp 243-55.

179

the new lnportance attached to an alignment with America and the need
to justify annexation of the enemy's former colonics resulted in an even
^ r€ fervent assertion of the 3ritish Imperial mission.

Far frcm believing Empire to be a thing of the past, Kerr was

convinced that such was the " backward ness" of non-Europeans that the
gjrcpean powers (including the Dominions and the United States) would find
themselves obliged to intervene more comprehensively in the twentieth than
is the nineteenth century.

"Great, indeed, as has been the extension of European
rule in the last century, the process does not appear
even yet to have ceased. One has only to look around
the world to realise that there are many states -
Mexico, for instance, Persia, China, Turkey, the
Central American republics - whose continued existence
as independent sovereign states is in doubt.'"

Vhilo members cf the Round Table admitted that individual "cultured

types" such as Gokhale or Booker Washington could claim a level of
civilization higher than that of the average Englishman®, they believed
tlat "colour prejudice", which "is exceptionally strong anong the Anglo-
Saxoa peoples", had a firm basis in facts. 3 Many emphasised climate as a
differentiating factor. In the temperate zones were to be found "a more
f igorous physique, a higher sense of the value of time, and a greater
capacity for sustained and methodical action"; whereas in tropical zones

Kerr, "Political Relations Between Advanced ar.d Backward Peoples",
PP 141-82 of A J Grant et al, An Introduction to the Study of
international Relations (London, 1916), p 164. Kerr's choice of
title ochoed 3ryce's Romanes lectures at Oxford in 2902, which
provided a liberal Justification for segregat ionism.

Kerr, “Memorandum on the Representation of India" [April 19121, RT

Papers c 525, fols 4-14.

CDo/e,] "The Colour Question in Politics", Editor's Preface, RT,
1922, p 39.

180

•he cli®**® was " enerva ting" and nature's abundance was detrimental to the
teiel cpn* nt of ° ental capacity. ’

Although in Round Table eyes the most fundamental division was that
^tifeea Europeans and non-Europeans, it was an axiomatic Round Table belie!
that the peoples and cultures of the world formed a kind of hierarchy, "a

gradual scale varying infinitely from the zenith of civilisation to the
cadlr of barbarianisn" . 2

The Pound Table's views on international relations were coloured by a
distinction between the peoples of North- Vest European origin and those of

Latin and Slavic descent. Directly below then were deeined to be the
peoples cf the Middle East and Asia, "who are not uncivilised yet who, for
mo reason or another, have been unable to maintain a civilised government

for themselves, once close contact has been established with the modern

Further down the scale, Africans were viewed as a "child-race",
coapletely unaccustoned to organised government and "centuries" away from
self-rule. Their first contact with Europeans had resulted in enslavement,
•dicii was understandable because they were "so much below the standard
inanity of the invaders that it was difficult to treat them as members of

* Curtis, Civltss Del [Volume 11 (London, 1934), p 2; cf Grigg,

"Substitute Introduction to the Vhitsuntide Egg", [July 19143, RT
Papers c 779, fols 37-74., and [ Kerr, 1 "Draft Chapters on India"
119151, Lothian Papers 6, fols 6 ff.

2

Kerr, "Political Relations Between Advanced and Backward Peoples",
p 142.

lhil, fol 152.

m*

181

tie s* 00
ericas

sia« or

family". ’ Finally, there were the aboriginal races of the

and Australia. Their extinction -/as inevitable, and no cause for

regret . 2

It is possible to distinguish two separate, although clearly related,
operatives which, in Round Table eyes, made European rule of non-Europeans
O ot only essential but beneficent. The first may be described as the
regulatory imperative, arising from the contact between races.

Keobers of the Round Table believed that conflict was endemic in the
relations betveen races: this was certainly implied in their repeated
assurances that the Emplre/Comiionwealth had ruled out the possibility of
open war between Its various components. 3 Drawing heavily on contemporary
accounts such as that by Dr John Pa ton on the Pew Hebrides, it was argued
that only control by some “advanced" power could ensure the maintenance of
order and mitigate the disruptive aspects of Vestern intrusion. A The
purpose of Imperial control was thus to ensure the satisfaction of European
decands, while repressing the conflict ar.d violence which was their natural

corollary.

Ibe second reason for European rule of non-Europeans may be described

; Gri Sg. "Substitute Introduction to the Vhitsuntide Egg", lflc.clt,
fol 52.

2 Curtis, Vitb Miner in South Africa [early diaries! (Oxford, 1951),

F 226. Cf [Kerr, 3 "The New Problen cf Africa" . RT, June 1927,

PP 454-5.

3 h Kerr, Vhat the British Empire Really Stands For (Toronto, 1917),

PP 14-15; Coupland, "Citizenship in the British Commonwealth" (lecture
of 10 Oct 191?) , Lothian Papers 16, fols 507-8.

Kerr, "Political Relations Between Advanced and Backward Peoples",
pp 143-52.

182

tS

tie missionary imperative, by which is meant the transplantation of

gBr0 pea n <or specifically British) social, cultural, religious and,
eventually* political norms. A prerequisite for such activity was, of

course, the destruction or at least modification of indigenous systems and
cilues. It is therefore hardly surprising to find members of the Round

Table adopting a consistently dismissive attitude toward non-European

cultures, especially where those cultures appeared to differ svarkedly from
European norms. Hinduism was described as "a religion [which] has little
tc do with morality’', a mere analgam of "dismal obscurantism and
tlauaaturgic priestcraft". A rather more sympathetic approach was taken
toward Islam, with its insistence on monotheism, scripture and cow-eating,

as also toward the Arya SanAj, with its semi-Christian version of

Hinduism. '

In his wartime leading articles, Kerr repeatedly referred to the
necessity of "trusteeship" as the only alternative to "anarchy". He also
ecphasised the responsibility "to lay the material and moral foundations on
the structure of civilized self-government nay eventually be built".

A benevolent trusteeship had, he claimed, characterised British rule "for
are than a century*. 2 Equally, Kerr asserted that Germany's "selfish" and
c Ppressive" colonialism disqualified her from any right to control
•^pendencies. 3

(Karris, 1 "Hindus and Mohammedans" , RT, Kay 1911, p 302; IMarris,!
"Kcnorandum" l April 19143, RT Papers c 827, fols 6-73 <fol 16);
tR E Holland, revised by Harris,! "The Arya Samaj", RT, Sept 1913,

PP 614-36.

CXerrj "The Harvest of the Var" , RT, Dec 1915, pp 1-32 (quotations
iron pp 12-13 and 30).

tXerr,] "The Foundations of Peace", RT , June 1915, pp 589-625
Quotations from p 614).

183

|P

g er r and Curtis identified American anti-colonialism as the main
Stacie both to a closer understanding between Britain and the United
States and to a resolution of the wartime colonial question satisfactory to
British interests.

As Kerr wrote, In the closing stages of the war, Americans (like the
ichabitants of the Dominions) possessed a "childlike faith in the virtues
of democracy and lalsser faire" f slc l . Inasmuch as they recognised the
•wcecsity of some civilised control over politically backward peoples",
ttoy were likely to "force us into some kind of international system which
M y be a source of serious friction in the future". Kerr therefore urged
Curtis to visit America to "get it into Vilson's head", or at least "into
the heads of the editors of corns of the leading papers", that, while
international control might be desirable, inter national administration
would be disastrous. Koreover, Curtis should assert "that the assumption
of a share in the burden of world government is just as great and glorious
a responsibility as participation in the war".'

Vhile Curtis did not go to America as Kerr wished, he did write a
powerful article for the December 1918 Round Table arguing these very
?°lhts. The American States' failure to control the "vacant lands" tc
tieir w est in the period before Federation, and the derelict state of Egypt
before 3ritish intervention, were held to be sufficient proof of the
‘■possibility of co-operative control of dependencies. The only solution,
^‘tis argued, was for "some democratic Power" to "be made responsible for
Creatln S fl nd maintaining peace, order, and good government . . . subject to

Kerr to Curtis, 15 Oct 1918, RT Papers c 810, fols 229-37; cf Feetham
to Curtis, 2 Oct 1918, (SA file,) RT <0) Papers.

184

conditio** lald down ln treaties". Curtis further suggested that the
(jolted States should accept the "responsibility*' for 'some or all of the
regions of the Middle East* .

"Her very detachment renders her an ideal custodian of
the Dardanelles. For exactly similar reasons her task
In preserving the autonomy of Armenia, Arabia, and
Persia will be easier than if it were to rest in our
hands. Her vast Jewish population pre-eminently fits
her to protect Palestine."

•The future position of America in the world", Curtis summarised his
arguneat, "... is the great Issue which now hangs on the Peace
Conference". 1

flfi Peace Settlement

The Round Tablers transferred almost bodily to Paris for the Peace
Conference; even Curtis found an official pest, as part of Cecil's League
o' Sations section. Again It was Kerr who occupied the most Influential
position as Lloyd George's secretary, adviser, and representative ln
verious committees and ad hoc confabulations.* The question which
Mturally arises is whether, as a group, the Round Table exercised a
significant influence over the making of the peace. The answer is largely
Mgative. Other than Kerr, the Round Tablers (including Kilner) were
relatively marginal figures at the Conference. Kerr hinself exercised

1 ICurtis, 3 "Windows of Freedom" , PT, Dec 1918 <pp 1-48), pp 1 ("The
futuro position . . .") and 20-36. Curtis's plea for American
involvement was reiterated in "America and World Rooponsibi i ity:

First and Second Thoughts", RT , March 1919, pp 249-60.

See here John Turner and Michael Dockrill, "Philip Kerr at 10 Downing
Street, 1916-21", ln Turner (ed), The Larger Idea (London, 1938), esp
PP 42-62.

185

influence only as Lloyd George's "watchdog" 1 , Moreover, the Round Tablers*
of British war aims had been largely propagandist both in
intention and in effect, and did not constitute the kind of detailed

which could provide the basis for concerted political action.

On the central issue of the terms to be imposed on Germany, virtually
a ll the Round Tablers followed Milner in hoping - vainly, as it transpired
.fora moderate peace. 2 A recurrent motif was the conviction that,
whatever terms were imposed, Germany would remain a Great Power, and that a
viadictive peace would only serve to hasten another war or to drive the
Geraan people to Bolshevism. Only a peace of conciliation could ensure the
trluaph of democracy in Germany, and thereby provide real security for the
victorious Powers. *

Zlmcern condemned Lloyd George’s “odious" election campaign. Kerr

programme

, rt iculati°n

protested, but found himself in a minority of one: "the views expressed
*ere held very strongly by all the members of the Editorial Committee
except yourself", Kerr was informed. * Kerr also found himself isolated on
tie question of reparations. 5 As early as 1912, Brand had anticipated

Hankey, Tie Supreme Control at the Paris Peace Conference , 1919
(London, 1963), p 97.

For Milner's views, and the controversy over his Evening Standard
interview of October 1918, coo In particular Terence O'Brien, Kilner
(London, 1979), cb 13.

"?he End of the Var" , PT, Dec 1918 <pp 48-87), pp 78 ff.

(Zinmern, ] "United Kingdom The General Election", J?r, March 1919
( PP 355-59), p 359; Coupland to Kerr, 13 March 1919, Lothian Papers

«?, fol 2 .

■*y doubts about the wisdom of these clauses are not on the score of
either expediency or justice, but on the score that I am not sure
tl *t the Allies will have the clearsightedness and the resolution to
llv e up to them": Kerr to Coupland, 15 Aug 1919, Lothian Papers 489
<sl ngle item).

186

fcynes

of

8 argument by pointing out the disastrous effects on Germany itself
outflow from France following the 1370-71 war. ' Round Table comment

oi tie reparations clauses of the Treaty of Versailles followed the same
lice of argument: "A vast lndennlty . . . will . . . act as a forcing house
to Gernan exports to the detrlnent of British trade". 2 Moreover,

"if these clauses are taken to mean what a very
large section of public opinion in this country, and
a still larger section in France, believes and
wishes them to nean, they will forn a constant and
powerful incentive to Germany to repudiate her
undertakings in all parts of the peace". 3

The Round Table found other clauses in the Treaty pointing in the

s&x direction: the proposal to try the Kaiser, the clause forbidding union
between Germany and Austria, the fate of "other millions of German race",

the clauses relating to the Soar Valley and the Rhineland, "the
disproportion enforced by the League between Germany's armanents and those
of everybody else". Generally, the Treaty was full of "latent dangers",
basing security "on a balance of forces which cannot possibly endure".* 1

One aspect of the peace settlenent which the Round Table did not
criticise was that relating to the control of Germany's forner colonies and
Arab territories seised from Turkey. On the question of American
acceptance of "responsibility" for the Middle East, the Round Tablers were,
course, disappointed. On the question of national rather than
* a ternational administration they were not. Here they were helped

1 t Brand, 1 "Lombard Street and Var", RT, March 1912, pp 246-84.

t Brand, ] "Finance and Reparation", RT, June 1919 <pp 455-67),

PP 463-64.

"‘be Peace of Versailles", RT, June 1919 <pp 429-54), p 442.

^4. pp 440-51.

^ijgiderably by Beer, who had already made clear his own belief that
^ terQa tional adnini strati on of colonies would prove "disastrous" . 1 At

request, all the Bound Table groups collected cuttings, articles and
toofcs, and in so ire cases composed memoranda, as ammunition for him to use. 2
is yilson's colonial expert at the peace conference, Beer was instrumental

13 shaping the eventual Mandate system. 3 Britain and the Dominions were
rewarded by the lion's share of the territories thus disposed. The
Imitations on the exercise of Imperial control imposed by the terms of the
Mandates were considered, by the Round Tablers at least, as of little
iaportance. Indeed, it was generally agreed that the Mandates idea

•singles out and develops the best side of what has been done hitherto by
Vffitern administration", and "was, in fact, an application of the
'con=on wealth' idea".' 1

The Round Table group was less pleased with the eventual form taken
bj tic League of Rations. The Round Tablers* wartime articles envisaged an
iistitution considerably looser than that proposed by Cecil or Vi Ison,
krr thought that "the chief danger to [any League] ... is that it should
kcoae discredited through its inability to live up to the expectations

1 tBeer.J "America's Var Aims", RT, March 1918 (pp 238-61), p 249.

1 ^ e . eg, Coupland to Laby, 28 Dec 1917, and laby to Coupland, 25 Feb

1918, (Aus file,) RT (0) Papers.

See V R Louis, "The United States and the African Peace Settlement of
19iq ; Tho Pilgrimage of George Louis Beer", Journal of African
History, Vol IV, no 3 <1963) , pp 413-33; also Kerr to Charles P
Howlaad, 6 June 1929, Lothian Papers 235, fols 154-57.

"The Outlooh In the Kiddle East", RT, Dec 1919 <pp 55-97), p 56.

The Round Table's views were reiterated in

rticb Have been formed of it". '

g series of articles published during the peace negotiations, and in a
a^randum drawn up for Lloyd George by Kerr.* These had little effect.

Tie League of nations contained many of the features which the Round
T»blers bad warned against. Nevertheless, the Moot accepted It, as the
pr ice to be paid for American involvement in upholding the peace
settlenent. 3

Vilsoa's failure to push the Treaty/League schene through Congress -
foreseen by Beer in 1917* - substantially confirmed the Moot's Initial
nisglvingc. The Senate's reservations, in the opinion of the Round Table,
•lave rendered I the Leaguel the great service of pointing clearly to the
flaws which at present neutralise its worth": in particular, "that the
Peace of Versailles attempted too much, and that the Covenant, which
guarantees It, Implies a capacity for united action between the Allies
"Met the facts do not warrant". The Senate was in fact expressing
opinions which would also be held in the British Empire, were the true
outlines of the situation known: "none of the democracies of the British
-npire has grasped the extent of its obligations to the League ... or
wc °l<i hesitate to repudiate them at once, if put to the test". The

1 f Kerr, ) "Tho Victory that Will End Var" . RT, March 1918, pp 221-37.
For authorship (not in Butler), see Coupland to Brand, 23 Fob 1018,
^ Papers c 847, fols 4-7.

: l Curtis,) "Vindows of Freedom", FT, Dec 1918, pp 12-20; £ Kerr, 3 "The

Practical Organisation of Peace", RT, Karch 1919, pp 217-48; [Kerr,]
Ncmorandun on the League of Bations, CJan 1919,3 Lothian Papers 54,
f ols 31-33.

1 Curtis,] "The League of Nations and the British Commonwealth", RT,
June 1919 (pp 468-94), esp pp 482-87.

1 Beer, ] "The United States and the Future Peace", RT, March 1917
<PP 285-317), pp 308 ff.

flUtinuation of such an unrealistic situation could only bring harm, both
, 0 ‘he cause of international stability and to the British Enpire. It was
therefore imperative to work for a reconstruction of the League, such as
jight brinj conmitnents back into line with capacity to fulfil then, and

cpei

the doors to American involvement. ' This was a task which was to

preoccupy the Round Table for much of the following two decades.

turtle and Dvarchv

Curtis later credited Karris with converting him to the idea of
effectual self-governnent for India in 190G. 3 There is no evidence of
Cjrtis voicing his new-found belief at such an early stage; nevertheless,
Harris's influence did come to be felt, through Kerr rather than Curtis.

The Harris/Kcrr argument initially encountered a great deal of
resistance from within the Moot. Curtis acknowledged its propagandist
value, but hedged its practical corollaries. Malcolm deplored the
iaflueace of H cur Indian experts”. 3 For the moment, the Root preferred to

IKerr, 3 "The British Empire, the League of Nations and the United
States", RT, March 1920 (pp 221-53), pp 226-38.

See above, p 139.

Xalcoln, "Kenorandum" , nd 110121, RT Papers c 826, fols 167-72. See
above, pp QO-92.

190

f0 llo* the advice of another, more conservative, "Indian expert": Sir
falentine Chirol. In Chirol's view, Indian self-government was

• loiotcelvable . . . within ary reasonably measurable period of tine, be it
generations or centuries", and mention of it was "most inadvisable' . • It
*as Ctirol, rather than any of the other "experts", who was ashed to write
the Indian chapter for Curtis's "egg M .=

it would seem fair to assune that, had the second volume of The
CosDOEwealth of Rations been published as planned, it would not have
contained proposals as radical as those urged by Karris and Kerr in 1912.
Such speculation receives support from the references to India in Curtis's
Problem of the Commonweal th . Although publication under his own name gave
Curtis a free hand - and he did modify soase passages on India "to prevent a
rationalist outburst"* - Curtis made no mention either of Indian demands
for self-government or of Indian representation in the Imperial
Parliament.'' On the contrary, he claimed that "Indian leaders" would admit
that authority in India had to lie where it did, and that India was
patently "unequal to the task of self-government".*

Despite Curtis's caution, It would not be true to say that Sound Table
policy on India remained locked in its pre-1912 mould. The war forced

1 Chirol, "Memorandum on India", June 1912, RT papers c 826,

fols 214-21.

2 Copy of Chirol's draft in FT Papers c 327, fols 167-234

3 Curtis to Milner, 24 Feb 1916, RT Papers c 730, fols 38-41.

* Here, Curtis was criticised even by Chirol. See Curtis to Milner, 29
Hov 1915, Curtis Papers 2, fols 199-201.

5 Curtis, The Froblen of the Commonweal th (London, 1916), ch 19, "The
dependencies", esp pp 199-20.

84S&

191

a clwD5 e

India was denuded of British troops; war propaganda invited

^ est j on ing of autocracy and alien rule; shortages and inflation ravaged
tie economy. The essential vulnerability - or, put another way, the
consensual basis - of British rule becane starkly apparent, while its
critics swelled in number. As the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, realised in
1915, ' India after the war will be a very complex question .... The old
regime pust be changed, and the people nust have more to say to their own

adalnlstration". 1

Once again it was Karris who urged the Round Table to take a lead.

■The situation which will shortly be upon us in India is a critical one",
h? named, towards the end of 1915. Karris Identified the demand which the
Mtionalists were bound to maker Dominion self-government. It was, he
declared, "inpcssible for the demand to be conceded". At the same time, it

was Impossible to proceed by an extension of the Korley-Ki nto principle.
Tie latter would put Indians

"In the position of a powerful Opposition which can
seriously influence and all but thwart the Government, but
can yet never turn the Government out or replace it.
Elsewhere in the history of British Dominions this has been
the feature of a highly explosive and short-lived
transitional period".

krris therefore suggested pressing for Indian representation at the
•sperlal Conference to "buy time", and then for an Imperial Convention
vi lch vould throw the whole weight of the self-governing Empire behind a

Hardinge to Sir Valter Lawrence, 29 July 1915, quoted in J Brown,
Gandhi 's Rise to Fower 'Cambridge, 1972), p 124. On the political
effects of the war in India, see ibid , esp pp 123-6, and Sir Algernon
" u nbold, Vater&hed in India, 1914-22 (London, 1979).

elution necessarily unsatisfying for the Indian nationalists.'

Harris's prognosis was discussed by a revived "Indian Moot", which
c0Cfi isted of Kerr , Curtis, Coupland, Xeston, K C C Seton and four new
m &eTG, Sir Vi 11 lam Cuke, Sir Lionel Abrahams, (Sir) Cecil Kisch and
(Sir) J B Shuckburgh. Members of this group shared Karris's concern lest
the Itdian demand for Dominion self-government be granted by default. They
jlso agreed that an extension of the Xorley-Klnto reforms would "involve
progress towards paralysis of government rather than responsible
joverniwnf. Curtis

"therefore suggested . . . the possibility ol proceeding on
another principle, that of calling into existence provincial
authorities responsible to Indian electorates, and
delegating thereto specific functions and revenues, adding
others from tine to tine as experience warranted".

Curtis's idea was accepted; and Duke (a member of the Bengal Executive

Council before being appointed to the Council of India) was given the task

cf outlining the principle as it would apply in Bengal.- Copies of Duke's

xemrandum were sent to Lord Hardinge's successor as Viceroy, Lord

Chelmsford, and to the Hone Department of India. *

In October Curtis arrived in India. His first impressions confirmed

the belief that India was heading for a "cosmic smash". The Indian

1 Harris, "The Coming Crisis in India”, 5 Oct 1915, RT Papers c 827,
fols 79-97. Indian representation at the Imperial Conference had
already been urged by a Found Table delegation to Austen Chamberlain
and was urged again in "India and the Imperial Conference", RT, Dec
1915, pp 86-119.

^ Duke's memorandum was printed as a pamphlet, Suggestions for Consti-
tutional Progress in the Indian Folity (London, 1916), and in Curtis,
tyarchy (London, 1920), pp 1-37.

3 Curtis to Lord Chelmsford, 8 Sept 1917, RT papers c 810, fols 146-52.

193

People were "as you see then In tie Book of Genesis". To prepare them for
sslf-government "needs generations of real education and patient work
. .yet the few thousands of articulates are demanding it within 25
.cars".’ Nevertheless, Curtis realised that 'our only safety lies in

$ u

iding opinion instead of sitting on it".*
Curtis stayed in India until March 1918,

reeling off a series of

letters and Studies on the question of Indian sel f-government j organising a
joist Address from a group of Europeans and Indians in 3engal; and

generally attempting to Influence both Indian opinion and the lines of
Erltlsh policy, especially after the "Montagu Declaration'* of August 1917

and the Secretary of State’s decision to tour India. T

In one important respect, Curtis's opinions changed: he now definitely
accepted tie Karris/Kerr line on Indian representation in an Imperial
Farliaaent. Britain's "war debt will to avoid bankruptcy have to be spread
to the wlole Commonwealth", including India. India's representation was
necessary, because her money was needed. 4

Curtis remained wholeheartedly opposed to the Congress/League demand
for lamed late "Dominion self-government". He similarly rejected any
further noves on Morley-Kinto lines, which he character ised as the
'principle of strangling the responsible Executive by successive twists of

1 Curtis to zimuern, 29 Nov 1910, RT Papers c S17, fols 169-71.

2 Curtis to Coupiand, 15 March 1917, RT papers c 810, fols 12-16.

3 See Deborah Lavin, "Lionel Curtis and Indian Dyarchy", in A Bosco
<ed), The Federal Idea , Vol 1 (London, 1991). For the politics behind
the Montagu Declaration, see Peter Robb, The Government of India and
Reform, 1916-21 (Oxford, 1976).

4 Curtis I to Coupland], 27 July 119173, RT Papers c 810, fols 122-b.

tfce D oose placed In the hands of Irresponsible electorates*'. 1 Curtis's
efforts were therefore directed towards elaborating the schene of "dyarchy"
fetched out In Duke's memorandum.

•Dyarchy" was a term borrowed from the Roman Emperor Augustus, who

{evolved responsibility for a range of minor matters to a "parallel
government* controlled by the Senate. As applied to India, "dyarchy"
entailed the creation of parallel political structures at provincial level:
one in which an Indian executive would be responsible to an elected
legislature, the other in which elected Indians would merely advise an
autocratic Governor.

As Chlrol observed, the schene was "avowedly experimental". 2 The
'cperial Parliament would control the pace of change, and the committee

charged by it with examining Indians' progress would be empowered to

Tecojmend that previously "transferred" subjects bo "reserved", as well as
?ice versa. Provincial Governors would retain a power of veto even on
'transferred* subjects. The central Government would remain untouched
until the last phase. Even at the end point of India's political
•volution, Indians would have no choice whether or not "to remain an
Jategral part of the British Commonwealth. Her foreign affairs are those
cr the whole Commonwealth. She can never therefore control them apart". 3
*evertheiess, the very fact that Curtis was advocating reform put him in
inflict with powerful forces both at home and in India.

3 Curtis, Letters to the People of India on Responsible Government,
(London edn, 1918), p 24.

2 Chlrol to Coupland, 16 Feb 1918, RT Papers c 880, fols 7-8.

Curti 5| Letters to the People of India on Responsible Government
(London edn, 1918), p 61 .

195

Curtis's perspective owed much to the Influence of Karris, Keston and
other Gove rnnent of India reforn»rs whose recognition of the need to
conciliate Indian opinion brought them Into conflict with the inertia
^rticularly to fee found in the Government's Home Department.’ Curtis
iitself was increasingly critical of what he saw as the constitutional
conservatism of the majority of the ICS. In turn, his abrasive manner won
few friends; and his Insistence on a "guiding policy" seemed to many naive.
As (Sir) Olaf Caroe later recalled, many Civilians feared "that the would-
t* reformers were intent on foisting on an unready India a top storey
without a foundation".- The average District Officer was concerned to
protect the peasantry, not to appease the intellectual elite. Xoreover, in
the context of war, the ICS looked at problems mainly fron the point of
view of maintaining law and order.” By the autumn of 1917, Curtis thought
that even Karris was "travelling towards what to ne seems reaction".' 1
Karris, for his part, now thought that "the best service the R.T. can do to
Irdian politics till the crisis Is over is to let them alone" . *

In some respects, the Moot was also critical of Curtis's role in
Itdia. Curtis was an employee of the Round Table and was originally in

1 See D A Low, "The Government of India and the First Hon-Co-Operation
Xcvement, 1920-22" In R Kumar <ed> Essays oi> Gandhlsn Politics
(Oxford, 1971), pp 298 ff.

7 Caroe, "Lionel and O.C. " l Aug 19623, RT Fapers c 868, fols 101-05.

Caroe himself composed a memorandum arguing for a much slower progress
to self-government, starting at village and municipal level.

3 l Hailey, J "Lionel Curtis" [I960], RT Papers c 864, fols 199-209.

4 Curtis to CMrol, 24 Sept 1917, KT Papers c 804, fols 119-24; cf
Curtis to Coupland, 15 Oct 1917, RT Papers c 810, fols 191-94.

5 Karris to Coupland, 1 Oct 1917, RT Papers c 827, fols 136-41.

196

j*jia t0 further Round Table business. The Hoot did not share his
enthusiasm for becoming eabrolled in the quagmire of Indian politics,
otters came to a head in the summer of 1917. "After some discussion",

[err *as deputed

•to write to you and say that they thought it was
essential that you should make it clear . . . that in
expressing views about the future of self-governnent in
India, you were expressing your own views only and not
those of the Found Table Dovement".’

jerr himself now doubted whether Indians in fact wanted "the Vestern

paraphernalia of suffrage and ballot-fcox" rather than the enhancement of

existing "centres of Indian authority". 1 2 3 Any hopes Curtis may have had of

using Xerr as a channel for his own views were to be disappointed; indeed,

a Denorandura written by JCerr for the Prime Xinister specifically discounted

the idea of a "'formula* or general declaration of policy" <six weeks

before the "Xontagu Declaration" ) , and made no mention of "dyarchy". *

Curtis's hand was considerably strengthened following the "Montagu

teclaration" of 20 August 1917, which pronised "the progressive realisation

of responsible government in India as an integral part of the Empire". The

foot now agreed to act as agents for the distribution of Curtis's Indian

tracts, and in March 1913 organised a London edition of Curtis's Letters to

toe People of India on Responsible Govemnent.* Nevertheless, tensions

s -ill arose. Curtis's attempts to have the Round Table publish articles

1 Korr to Curtis, 9 July 1917, RT Papers c 810, fols 106-7, responding
^ Curtis to Coupland, 19 Nay 1917, ifcid., fols 54-65..

2 Kerr to Curtis, 21 July 1917, Lothian Papers 33, fols 19-21.

3 K «rr, "Indian Reforms", 7 July 1917, Lothian Papers 32, fols 1-9.

* See rt Papers c 830, passim .

197

on India xhich reflected a viewpoint similar to his own set with
c ot sizable resistance. One such article, apparently by L F Rushbrook
Lilians, was rejected after Harris's criticism of the author's expertise:
■He has not been long in India, and like Curtis has seen only one side of
Indian life"- ’

Curtis's attempt to find a middle path between the unrealistic
expectations of Indian nationalists and the unwarranted fears of the bulk
of Indian Civilians was shared by Edwin Montagu. Indeed, Kontagu was
vritlng In his diary early in 1918 that "I find that I see eye to eye with
l Curtis! on every question". 3 Undoubtedly Kontagu was influenced not
solely by the persuasiveness of Curtis's arguments, but also by Curtis's
inpeccable Imperialist credentials and his connections through the Round
‘able. Kontagu himself was painfully aware of how precarious was his own
political leverage to Vhiteliall, Vestninster and Downing Street.' 9

Montagu’s report (written, under instruction, by Harris) was completed
after Curtis had returned to England. It explicitly disavowed both the
Congress/ league and Curtis's Joint Address schemes; nevertheless, it
Incorporated significant elements of the latter, in particular the proposal
of "specific devolution" at the provincial level. Vhere it differed was in
failing to recommend a complete geographical, administrative and fiduciary
separation between the two provincial governments, and in proposing an

1 Harris to Coupland, 1 Oct 1917, ST Papers c 827,fols 136-41.

t Kontagu ' s Indian diary, unpublished version,) Lothian Papers 35 and
36 (quotation from 36, fol 113). The published version has Curtis
agreeing with Montagu: Venetia Kontagu (ed> , Edwin Kontagu: An Indian
K*ry (London, 1930), p 233.

3 See eg Montagu to Kerr, 12 May 1919, Lothian Papers 729, item 1.

-r

196

jxtensl- 00 of the representative principle at the Government of India level.
Curtis accepted the report as a workable outline, hoping that "if subjected
to careful enquiry fit! can be nade a thoroughly sound one in the course of
its passage through Parliament" . '

Curtis's activity during the period of Parliamentary and public debate
c n the Report was directed two ways: first, towards securing the necessity
of sone such reform against the reactionary opposition of the Horning
fost/Spectator wing of the Conservatives, and secondly, towards
edification of the Report's proposals to bring them to resemble more
clocely his own.

In pursuit of the first objective, Curtis urged a reaffirmation of the
original "Kontdgu Declaration": "to a great extent the attacks which are
teing directed against the Report are really directed against the
Pronouncement of the 20th August". 2 Curtis enphaslsed the dangers of
delay, claiming, somewhat fancifully, that Indians saw the Report "as the
sun obscuring the stars, but bathing the whole world in light". Curtis
also emphasised the necessity of going to Paris "with a clear conscience" . 51

The London group as a whole now threw its weight behind Indian reform,

e, en claiming it as the fruit of Round Table activity. ** tfeston was

1 Curtis to N Chamberlain, 18 July 1918 , Lothian Papers 33, fols 42-46.

2 Ihii: cf Curtis to Lord Sinha, 15 July 1918, Lothian Papers 33,
fols 47-8.

3 Letter to The Times, 22 July 1918.

H tCcuplandl to B Dunfield, 17 June 1918, R? Papers c 802,
fols 119-22. Cf Dove, "The Round Table: A Mystery Probed", 1924,

Brand Papers, box 70 .

4

w

199

iiduced to write a Round Table article welcoming Montagu's proposals (but
ejpbasising their inadequacy where they strayed from Curtis's lines);* a
•little Cl omul 1 1 tee" was set up with the object of "placing" articles on
India in various papers and journals;" and money was provided to "such
propagandist associations as the VEA and YWCA’ to pay for lectures bringing
•the whole Indian problem before the public". 3

In pursuit of his second objective, Curtis pressed for a Select
Coaaittee to examine the report, suggesting Selborne as Chairman, 4 and then
present log it with a lengthy re-statenent of his case. 5 Here Curtis was
less successful . The Government of India Act differed in some rocpocts
iron Xontagu's original proposals, but not in those which Curtis considered
loportant. But if Curtis was not entirely satisfied with the end result,
lls share in its making was without doubt an Important one. The original
lapetus, and most of the ideas, came irom Harris and other ref or tiers in the
Government of India. Nevertheless, when they (and the Moot) hesitated,

Curtis himself persisted. Moreover, Curtis's distinctive contribution was
to present reform as the logical outcome of British rule, rather than as a
panic reaction to crisis. Thereby he helped not only to make reform

1 f Heston,) "The Xontagu-Chelmsford Report", RT, Sept 1918, pp 778-802.

2 f Curtis?) to H E Sgerton, 19 July 1918, RT Papers c 831, fol 109.

3 l Coupland?) to E 3e»rker, 15 July 1918, PT Papers c 831, fols 105-6.
Details of money spent In fols 112 and 135.

4 Curtis to Montagu, 3 Aug 1918, Lothian Papers 33, fols 54-7.

5 fexorandum of Evidence to the Joint Select Comalttee . . . (London,
19l9> , reprinted In Dyarchy (London, 1920), pp 482-552.

200

table In England, but to strengthen the hand of "noderates" in India,
j, Bailey* s Judgment, this was the real value of Curtis's work: "the
ejCOjra g e ment ha gave to the . . . 'Liberal' section of advanced thought at
CfltlC al period in Indian history".'

ar>d the Anglo-Irish Treaty

Ireland was another area where the Round Tablers (and particularly
Cirtls) were able to exert an influence on British policy. Again the Round
Tablers' Intervention was reactive - responding to a situation created by
tie Irish themselves - and primarily motivated by a desire for
oensolidation. Some shift in British policy became inevitable. Once the
Bound Tablers grasped this, their peculiar contribution was again to
ictcrpret that shift In terms of the continuities of British political
tradition, thereby portraying concession as the product not of weakness but
of tie continuing strength and adaptabi 1 i ty of British ideals.

The Easter Rising of 1916, as licholas Kansergh later wrote, effected
psychological transformation so considerable as to constitute a near
unbridgeable gulf in outlook and understanding" . 2 At the time, of course,
ttIs was by no means clear.

The Moot remained resolutely opposed to Dominion status for Ireland
u atl] the summer of 1921. One reason was its belief that the relationship
ktveen Britain and the Dominions was dependent on a spirit of goodwill and
Ccc promlse which was entirely lacking in Anglo-Irish relations. Vriting
* 0r the June 1913 Found Table, Kerr adduced several more reasons why "a

1 Hailey , ] "Lionel Curtis" C1S60J, PT Papers c 864, fols 199-209.

5 Xansergh, The Unsolved Question (London, 1991), p 81.

201

jolotiOQ whloh has worked elsewhere" would not be appropriate for Ireland:
her geographical proximity to Britain, which prevented Britain from

allowing her Independent control of armed forces, munitions, naval bases,

harbours and wireless; the position of Ulster, which would never submit

without safeguards to "a Roman Catholic majority which has now shown that

Its political life is mainly controlled by its clergy and bishops"; the

chaos which would result from separate tariffs and income taxes. Moreover,

there was a "larger aspect" to the question.

"Ve are to-day fighting two forces which stand
across the path to a true Commonwealth - one is the
tendency to autocracy, the other the tendency to
anarchy .... Ve have all begun to see the
dangers of autocracy. Ve are not so familiar with
the subtle anarchlsn latent in the gospel of self-
determi nation. " '

Dominion status was therefore at best a pis al le: . as far as the
Sound Tablers were concerned. For nost, the preferred solution renamed
’Hcrae Rule All Round", which once again grew in attractiveness as the
necessity of re-casting the 1914 compromise became more obvious.

The first move in re-opening the campaign for "Home Rule All Round"
vas ojde by Selborne, who wrote two articles for the Morning Fost in August
•916. 2 Selborne hinself was a reluctant convert to devolution: on the
''bole, he thought the Irish "quite unsuited" to parliamentary self-
Sovernment. 3 Nevertheless, he and Oliver worked closely for the next two

1 f Korr , ] "7he Irish Crisis", ST, June 1918, pp 496-525.

2 Morning Post, 8 Aug 1916 and 18 Aug 1916. Selborne' s and Oliver's
activities have again been well covered by John Kendle in Ireland and
the Federal Solution (Kingston, 1989), pp 179 ff. See also Kendle,
"Federalism and the Irish Problem in 1918", History, Vol LVI <1971),
PP 207-30, and D G Boyce and J 0 Stubbs, "F S Oliver, Lord Selborne
and Federalism" , JICH, Vol V (1976), pp 53-81.

3 Selborne to Oliver, 14 March 1917, Oliver Papers 95, fols 134-38.

it

202

years, pushing the federal scheme in various pamphlets, memoranda and
letters, and in meetings vith leading policy-makers. The federalists were
particularly active during the early months of the Irish Convention, which
ii Dublin from July 1917. A further bout of activity accompanied the
s*ttiig-up of the Cabinet’s Irish committee under Valter Long in April

1918.

The attitude of the Moot as a whole remained somewhat ambiguous
throughout this period. As late as May 1918, Curtis was pressing the Moot
to stop being "Asquithian" and come down firmly in favour of "Home Rule All
Jound*; Hichens was as "always . . . opposed", but agreed to "concede the
point If tho rest of us agree". 1 Only In September 1918 did the Round
Table print an article such as Curtis and the majority desired. By then,
the deterioration of the Ir ish situation was reflected in the suggestion
that there was "no reason to Insist on contractual equality in a measure of
devolution’*. 2 Subsequent references to federalism were less than
optimistic. In June 1919 it was suggested that federalism "has never been
considered in Ireland upon its merits"; six months later, the Round Table
*as forced to admit that "in the Ireland of to-day it will be difficult
to get it a hearing".’

The latter remark exposed the weakness of the federalist case. For
southern Ireland, federal isn would have meant accepting powers less
extensive than those contained in the original Home Pule Act; and this in a

I Couplandl to Brand, 14 May 1918, RT Papers c 803, fol 127.

1 Curtis,] "The Better Government of the United Kingdom", RT,

Sept 1918 <pp 750-77), p 768.

"United Kingdom: Public Opinion in Ireland" [from Dublin], RT, June

1919 <pp 580-87) , p 583; "United Kingdom: Ireland: The Hew Interest
•In England" C from London] , FT, De c 1919 (pp 124-27), p 126.

m.

context in w&ich the constitutional nationalists were steadily losing
round to the Sinn FMners.

o'

Initially, the Round Table, and particularly the nvagazine's Irish
correspondent 1 , cast doubt on the extent of Sinn Fain's real support.
Sepublicanlsn represented "a mood rather than a policy". 2 Southern Ireland

*js "not so united as it seems", and "a majority would work any scheme
which really settled the question". Cnly the Insurgents* terrorism
prevented the free expression of "common sense".' 3 ' The Round Table
therefore exhorted the Government to redouble its efforts to suppress the

■iroed conspiracy" , "and so make it possible for reasonable men of good
will once sore to play their part".*

Vhlle thus uncompromising in their attitude to Sinn Fein Insurgency,
tie Round Tablers felt a growing sense of unease with the lack of success
of British methods of coercion and with the resilience of Nationalist

sentiment. They were also apprehensive of the damage being done to
Britain's Imperial and international prestige by the Irish imbroglio. In
Australia, Irish sentiment was believed to have been largely responsible

Pocsibly Allison Phillips (a follower of Sir Horace Plunkett); but
possibly J J Morgan, then Crown Solicitor in Cork, and later a
regular Found Table contributor. The Moot was especially secretive
about the identity of its Irish correspondent before 1924, for
obvious reasons.

"United Kingdom: Public Opinion in Ireland" C from Dublin! , RT, June
*919 <pp 580-87), pp 581-82.

"United Kingdom: The Irish Problem Once More" [London], RT, March
*920 <pp 368-80), pp 377-79.

"United Kingdom: The Situation in Ireland" [Dublin), RT, June 1920
'PP 635-39), pp 638-39.

204

ior the failure of the conscription referenda during wartime.’ After the

the crisis in Ireland was "inown to obstruct a really thorough-going

uaderstanding with the United States". 2 "Irishman everywhere" , the Hound

jsbJe observed in March 1920,

"are using their unique gift* of intelligence and
oratory and political organisation and propaganda to
create suspicion and to separate and estrange. . Vhat a
difference it would make if those gifts were turned the
otbex way - to softening and adapting and brightening
the free civilisation of the Anglo-Saxon world, and
explaining it to the backward millions of the earth!" 3

Tie political advantages of a settlecent were thus clear to the Round.

Tiblers. Vhat was less clear was the basis upon which such a settlement

cculd te agreed. The magazine's Irish correspondent was not convinced that

Dcainicn status would lead inexorably to independence, taking issue with

Dicey's "remarkable statement" that the Dominions enjoyed a "right to

secede". * The London Moot, on the oth«» hand, believed that "Dominion

Sflf-governawnt" would reduce "tie over-riding authority of Westminster

. . <as in Canada and Australia) to a shadow". 5

Sinn rain's rejection of the 1920 Act indicated the final exhaustion
of attempts to appease Irish Nationalism on a basis of provincial

Curtis to Milner, 16 Oct 1916, NT Papers c 760, fols 169-95; T K Laby
to Coupiand, 3 Jan 1S17, Lothian Papers 476, foi 3.

"United Kingdom: Fublic Opinion in Ireland" [Lublin], AT, June 1919
<pp 530-37) , p 560. Cf Brand to Charles Altschui, 16 June 1919,

Brand Papers, box 12: the settlement of the Irish question being "the
one thing" which would remove American "suspicion of all our

natives" .

"United Kingdom: The Irish Problem Once More" [London], AT, March
1920 Cpp 368-30), p 380.

"United Kingdom: Public Opinion in Ireland" [Dublin!, AT, June 1919,

P 582.

"United Kingdom: Ireland: the Jew Interest in England" [London!, RT,
Dac 1919 <pp 124-27), p 126.

5

205

itro

lution- The British Government was now faced with a clear choice, in

VlQSto D

•peace

Churchill's words, between "war with the utmost violence" and
with the utmost patience". The former course of action apparently

C 0BK nded itself to Lloyd George and the bull of his Unionist colleagues,
although even they shrank from the measures which the army believed
accessary- 1 The option of compromise, with Dominion status as the most

frequently suggested basis, was supported by Labour, Asquithian Liberals,
large numbers of Southern Unionists and Dublin officials, significant
sections of the British press (including fforthclif fe's Times), and broad
swthes of Dominion and Anei lean opinion.*

The London Xoot was torn between loyalty to the Union and desire for

aa end to Britain's costly and embarrassing embroilment. It was therefore
agreed to send Curtis and Dove to Dublin, to assess the relative merits of

the options before the Government, and to report on the situation for the
ugazine.'* The result was a remarkable article in the Round Table of June
‘*21, which registered a decisive shift, in the magazine's attitude, In
iarour of compromise and settlement on a basis little short of Dominion
status. This was, Curtis asserted, "a conflict in which no sense of
S«uiae triumph can be felt". Even if the British army nanaged to pacify
country, it would do so by methods which were "a negation of the
Principle for which f the British Emplre/Comraonwealthl has stood".

*°eo/er, there would be no "finality" in such an outcome.

See U Xansergh, The Unsolved Question (London, 1991), pp 161 ff.

pp 145-46 and passim ; D G Boyce, Bngllsbaen and Irish Troubles :
British Fubllc Opinion and the Making of Irish Policy, 1913-22
(London, 1972).

Hiautes of RT meeting, 10 March 1921, KT <G> Papers. The Round
Tablers stayed with Plunkett, but it is not clear who else they met.

3

206

"Vant of experience In handling facts has left the
Irish mind out of touch with actualities. No cure will
now reach the root of this malady which does not give
Ireland the strongest dose of responsibility which she
herself is able to take".

ftlle it was " impossible" to allow Ireland control of her own navy and
bises Of to secede from the Empire, in all other respects (including
tariffs) southern Ireland should be given powers commensurate with
•colonial autonomy*’. The six counties of Ulster should be excluded.

•fruthern Ireland must be free to choose its rulers, and Ulster must have
tice to see how she I uses that freedon before a new prospect of unity
fcr Ireland can dawn. ■ ’

It was only relatively late in the day that the Round Table added its
vcice to those calling for a Dominion- type settlement in Ireland, and only
when the possibility of reach! rig a settlement by smaller concessions had
clearly been exhausted. Nevertheless, at the tine of Its publication,
Curtis's article was considerably in advance of actual Government policy.

It was amended to make clear "that the present situation . . . was not
exclusively the fault of Great Britain"; but the Koot as a whole accepted
Ms argument. 2 However, the Round Table lost a number of its Unionist
Miles over the issue, including at least one member, Lord Sel borne, who
‘look to heart very deeply" the role played by Curtis. 3

Curtis's article preceded a sinilar shift in Government policy only

t Curtis, 1 "Ireland", FT, June 1921 <pp 465-534). pp 492, 505. 511-12,

515, 52C.

Xinutes of J»T meeting, 3 Hay 1921, RT CO) Papers.

Curtis to Lord Baden Powell, 30 July 1932, Curtis Papers 91,

fols 23-24.

207

W'

wa feK Brou 8 ht to Lloyd George's attention by Grigg, his article

ittei { played some part in bringing about that shift.’ Over the next few
„ 0 tlS, Curtis continued to provide Grigg with a stream of advice on
q.estions of tactics and presentation. The basic principle of settlement
*in$ accepted, that advice tended to be of a conservative nature.

Iiltially. Curtis hoped that the Governnent would "use the agency of
Sister' to Obtain moderation from Sinn Fein.* Gnce it becane clear that
^ ra ig was not willing to let Ulster be used in such a way, Curtis fell back
o: the Empire, urging ‘that no proposals can be entertained which would
v a ve the effect of depriving Irishmen of the citizenship which Australians,
Canadians and South Africans enjoy (as well as ourselves)". 3 On the whole,
Curtis believed that the concessions contained in Lloyd George's
preliminary correspondence with de Valera "nay . . . have gone beyond the
Halts of the possible*. 4

Curtis's interest in the Irish settlement - and, no dcubt, his
insistence on setting limits to concession - was rewarded by his
appointment as Second Secretary to the British delegation which met with
Sian Frio's represent* ti ves from October to December 1921 . Oliver thought
Uat the "best hope" for the failure of the Conference lay in the
possibility of collision between Curtis and Ersktr.e Childers, Curtis's

‘ to J1U I lott, 11 June 1923, Brand Fapers, box 70; Curtis to

Macadam, G July 1953, Curtis Papers 89, fol 111.

Curtis to Grigg, 24 June 1921, Grigg Papers, KSS Microfilm 999.

Curtis' s article had originally envisaged Dominion status for the
"hole of Ireland, but had been amended by the Moot to advocate
^elusion: Minutes of RT meeting, 3 May 1921, RT <0) Papers.

Dove (conveying Curtis's views) to Grigg, 22 Sept 1921, Grigg Papers,
Microfilm 999. .

* Curtis to 3 C Valler, 23 Aug 1921, Curtis Papers 89, fols 54-55.

208

w

gclioo 1 'feUow from Haileybury who was now his opposite number on the Irish
Side.' Ia fact ’ Curt1 *'* in P acfc on the Conference was less dramatic,
although Thomas ' ones thought he made a significant contribution to beeping
tJe negotiations within the parameters set by Dominion Status "with
safeguards ". 3

The eventual Treaty Curtis welcomed, without irony, as "one of the
greatest achievements in the history of the Eaipire". 7 Nevertheless, the
Sound Table's original fear that Ireland would prove a loose cannon amongst
tie Eominions was to receive ample confirmation in subsequent decades.

miner and Eftypl

Although not technically a part of the British Empire, Egypt was an
liportant field for British economic interests, and a crucial lynchpin in
her worldwide military and conmuni cat Ions network. Moreover, since
Britain's occupation of the country in 1882 British control over the
rtsdivo's administration had coioe to aeeuoe an Increasingly colonial
character. As Milner wrote in the Found Table in 1921), rather than "an
*atanglement from which we were anxious to escape, Egypt came to be
regarded by us with pride, as one of the brightest spots in the whole field

Oliver to Grigg, 14 Get 1921, Grigg Fapers, MSS Microfilm 999. The
contrast in temperament between Curtis and Childers is the subject of
an illuminating passage in Frani Paienham [Lord LongfordJ's Peace by
Ordeal (London, 1935), pp 340-41.

See Keith Middlemas <ed), Tbosoas Jones’ Vhtteball Diary: Vol III:
Irelaid, 1918-25 (London, 1971), passim-

Curtis to Churchill, 17 July 1923, Curtis Fapers 90 (fols 30-54),
fols 30-31.

209

w

c f British Inperial rule".’ The latter Interpretation Milner himself had
4 ,ne ouch to foster, with the publication in 1892 of his widely-read
fagjaod in Egypt.

That the early Round Table conceived of Egypt as an integral part of
the Empire io illustrated by the Moot's initial plans to set up a
subsidiary group there, and to include a chapter on the country in the
projected Round Table “egg". 3 Abdication of Britain’s role was similarly
autiena to the writer of the first (and only prewar) Round Table article
oi Egypt f who emphasised that "the plant of sel f-governroent is a slow-
growing tree", and that in any case Egypt 'cannot be independent". 31 As
Ute as December 1913, Curtis pointed to Egypt as "an example of the
countries of the ffear East for which there is at present no hope except in
tie guardianship of some civilized State", nevertheless, he also declared
tiat Egypt was at least "gradually contracting the habits of order from
which progress towards self-governnent can begin". *

It was not Egypt's "habits of order" but her habits of disorder which
tirust the question of her sel f-gover noent to the foreground of Imperial
politics. Videspread disaffection broke into violent unrest in March 1919.
Various temporary causes were at work, but the underlying cause, as Arnold
Toynbee recognised, was a "new and genuine nationalism" encompassing "not
only the ex-governing class and the students, but doctors of religion,
krristers, officials, town workers and peasantry".

1 t Milner, 3 "The Situation in Egypt", RT, June 1920, p 520.

Curtis to Kerr, 21 July 1910, Lothian Fapers 1, fols 59-83; [Kerr,]
"Memorandum" C 19103, Lothian Papers 11, fols 46-58. Neither of these
plans came to fruition.

fHon S Peel.l "Egypt", RT, Aug 1911, pp 443-58.

* I Curtis, 1 "Windows of Freedon" , RT, Dec 1918, pp 23-24.

210

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"The struggle for self-government Is shifting Its
arena to the Middle East, and here, though we may be
a Commonwealth In spirit and intention, we are in
fact an Empire with the innate weaknesses of that
polity. "

a, c ti « s tbe strength of feeling in Egypt, Toynbee warned, that the
•goodwill" upon which British rule had previously been able to count had
D3 wall but disappeared. Unless some new accommodation could be reached on
tie basis of Common wealth rather than Empire, Britain would inevitably face
a stark choice between "abdication or tyranny".'

The shift in the Round Table's appraisal of Britain's Egyptian policy
«s thus drama tic and swiftly accomplished. It was essentially a pragmatic
response to realities which could no longer be ignored. The British
Governnent's response was not, and could not be expected to have been, as
clear-cut. Repressive measures were employed, with little success, and
Illner was despatched to report on the situation before any other steps
sight be taken.

Xilner was already convinced of the need for conciliation before he
l*ft England. That this was so Is clear from an <anonynous> article which
wrote for the Round Table of June 1920. Milner emphasised the extent of
%ptien disaffection, which was so widespread and so deeply-felt that on
present lines Britain would be forced not only "to keep a considerable army
in Egypt" but also "to take the administration of the country entirely into
Br *tish hands". This was "a prospect so formidable . . . that it is
impossible to contemplate it without extreme aversion". Vas it necessary?
Altaic certainly had "vital interests" in Egypt and the wider region - the

1

£ Toynbee , 1 "The Outlook in the Middle East", FT, Dec 1919, pp 55-97
(quotations from pp 79 and 86).

211

w

^ Canal, the garrisoning of troops, the exclusion of foreign powers, the
gltteoance of stability in the Sudan - as well os important economic

Interests in Egypt itself.

"But these are not interests, the defence of which
necessarily involves our taking charge of the whole
government of Egypt. A peaceful and progressive
Egypt, in friendly alliance with Great Britain, and
screened by that alliance from international
interference, would completely serve our purpose.*"

That Xliner should have found himself in the forefront of those

urging a conciliatory policy in Egypt Is at first sight more renarkable

even than the volte-face performed by the Round Table as a whole, miner

sever had any qualms about urging a policy of coercion in Ireland or South

Africa. Fever theless, in Xilner's eyes Egypt was an altogether different

case. There the Empire certainly had 'vital interests", but these were

mlnly of a strategic or dlplonatic kind. Above all, there was no

coHparable "loyalist" conmunity whose interests needed protecting, and who

could provide the basis for a continuation of the old, more or less

colonial, regime. On the other hand, Kilr.er believed, there was a good

oUnce that Britain could pacify the " model ates" , neutralise the

■^xtreniists" , limit her liabilities, and still secure her most essential

interests In the region. A conciliatory policy, as he put it to his

Cabinet colleagues in 1921, was not only "just" but "politic . . . and

calculated to strengthen and not to weaken our Imperial position". 1 2

Miner's negotiating stance unsettled many Imperialists. Sir George

Ll oyd was mindful of the Indian situation in denouncing Milner's policy as

1 fKilner, J "The Situation In Egypt", FT, June 1920, pp 520-35.

Quoted in John Darwin, Britain, Egypt and the Kiddle East: Imperial
Policy in the Aftermath of Var, 7918-22 (London, 1981), p 106. For
Miner's mission to Egypt and Its outcome, see ibid , pp 84-109.

212

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tie first step in "withdrawing the legions".’ Grigg had the Irish parallel
*jre In nlnd In opposing "the moral claim of smaller communities to Insist
on rights and powers in conflict with the interest and even safety of
larger communities* . * Nevertheless, the Pound Table as a whole welcomed
tie negotiations. Fears that "our action will be quoted to Justify demands
>y other dependencies" were thought to be overblown: Egypt supplied "no
valid precedent", because she was unusually homogeneous in race, language
and religion, economically and politically advanced, and never technically
a British dependency.®

The dramatic effect of a "generous" British gesture was an important
elenent in miner's and the Round Table's support for such a policy. Such
lopes were scuttled, however, by Zaghlul's unwillingness to agree to
British ’reservations", and the Cabinet's unwillingness to concede Egyptian
autonomy. It was not until February 1922 that Egypt received
■Independence". By then the moment was lost. Dove was in Egypt at the
tiw of the "Allenby Declaration", and in a series of letters to Brand
(subsequently published In the Round Table), he described the "scepticism"
and "suspicion" with which it was greeted. Nationalism was now "a
landslide which carries everyone with it". It was in Britain's own
interests to have a stable government in Egypt, and it was "part of our
“ission in the world" to encourage "responsibility". Dove could therefore

1 John Charmley, Lord Lloyd and the Decline of the British Empire
(London, 1987), p 95.

2 Grigg to Sir V Chirol , 28 Dec 1921, Grigg Papers, MSS Microfilm 999;
cf Grigg to Sir Godfrey Thorns, 26 Jan 1922, MSS Microfilm 1000.

3 IDG Hogarth, 1 "Egypt a Nation", PT, Dec 1920, pp 32-49.

213

^ "no alternatl ve" to further concessions. 1

As in the parallel cases of India and Ireland, the Round Table's
aialjs* 5 Anglo-Egyptian relations was marked by a sudden but calculated
slift- Although the Round Tablers were at pains to deny it at the time,
t »ts was a Pattern which would later be repeated throughout the dependent
g^j re . The crucial ingredient was not netropolltan liberalism but
indigenous revolt, nevertheless, once galvanised, progressive ideology of
the "Commonwealth" kind had an Important role to play, in Interpreting,
ttdlating and attempting to reconcile the conflicting claims of Imperialism
and Sationalism.

{ Dove, 1 "Letters from Egypt”, FT, June 1922, pp 555-38.

214

TABLE BETVEFK TKKJgAES

It was tae war which really put paid to the Round Tablers* original

strategy- Vartine conditions were hardly conducive to the organisation of
a ,ov€»ent for fundamental constitutional change: the outcome was too
jBcert* 10 ' too much else was in a state of fl ux. Curtis's argument
that co-operation would break down seemed at best "academic", and at worst
perverse, when set against the nassive Imperial war effort and the new
developnents in the constitution of the Enpire.

Peace brought further complications: uncertainty over the position of
tie United States, now a major military and naval as well as economic
jower; a new context of international relations through the League of
lations, which effectively recognised the Dominions as sovereign states; a
vhole host of challenges to Britain's colonial rule; and, of course, the
absence of any clear external threat which night be used to galvanise the
EoDininns into Union.

The need for a new strategy was clear. As Glazebrook emphasised
esrly in 1919, "if the Round Table is t.o fulfil its destiny as a leader of

thought in Imperial natters it roust make a fresh start ". 1

Allered Strat.Q&lftg.

In the immediate aftermath of the war, the Koot remained committed to
tie eventual realisation of some form of imperial federation. This was the
oise even with those members who had been the fiercest critics of Curtis's
Particular solution. At the tine of the Versailles conference, Brand wrote
l iat he still believed an "organic union" of the Empire to be a possibility

1

Glazebrook to Coupland, 13 Feb 1919, RT Papers c 602, fols 179-81.

215

If0 t f* r distant". 1 Early in 1919 Coupland let it be known that

"most if not all of the numbers of the Moot are convinced
that the case for organic union has been strengthened by
the war and its sequeL, and that steps should be taken as
soon as may be possible or convenient to restate the case
to the public" . 2

Vhile there were lingering hopes of a constitutional convention until
1921*1 the majority of the Moot soon realised that imperial federation was
an "impracticable" proposition. Vith the disappearance of the German
tlreat "the old motives and the old arguments for closer union of the
Eiplre have entirely lost their force".- Both in Britain and in the
foiinions it was clear that public opinion expected more of the League of
Iitions than did the Round Tablers thecselves. Above all, the war and the
p*ace negotiations had given an enormous boost to Dominion nationalism. By
tie spring of 1920, the stalwarts of the Melbourne group were forced to
adait that "people are shying off Imperial Federation", and that any
atteipt to orchestrate a federatlonist movement from Britain "will be
disastrous" . * Curtis's arguments were now agreed to be outdated, and "a
aev catechism" was demanded before even the Pew Zealand groups could play
aiy useful part in federatlonist propaganda.'

Brand to Sir Charles Addis, 16 Dec 1916, Brand Papers, box 12.

Coupland to the Australian groups, 22 March 1919, RT Papers c 8C2,
fols 183-64.

See eg Curtis to Grigg, 2 June 1921, Grlgg Fapers, MSS Microfilm
999. Cf Loring Christie to Kerr, 12 Jan 1920, Lothian Papers 2C7,
fols 182-87.

Grigg, "Memorandum", 26 Cot 1920, Lothian Papers 17, fols 7-12.

Sir J V Barrett to Curtis, 23 Feb 1920, Lothian Papers 495 (single
item).

H F von Haast to Curtis, 8 March 1920, Brand Papers, box 42.

216

Curtis and Kalcolm continued to fight a rearguard action in favour of
ue Round Table sticking to its guns: -the more unacceptable the doctrine,
•le greater ... Is the need for tho preacher-.* Nevertheless, the
ferity of the Hoot believed that the Round Table would only destroy Its
credibility by continuing to insist on an ideal solution.

Federation was not a matter of "practical" politics. Such an
aialssion was made by Kerr, speaking personally, in Canada in November
1922' - a course which he defended as necessary to explode "the old
coiplex" about the Round Table being "an intrigue against Canada's liberty,
eagiaeered from London"-' - and in the Round Table magazine, on behalf of
tie London group, six months later.* 1

The Hoot's decision to renounce its belief in the need for imnediate
federation was the result less of a change of heart than of careful
consideration of tactics. Criticised by Coupland for supporting a policy
wlici would leave the group xserely "narking tine"*, Dove justified the
found Table's announcement in terms which leave no doubt where the Moot's
sjapathies continued to lie.

"Ve have . . . been less 'prophetic' since the war, rot
from 'incuria' but because the majority of us, who still
believe that some form of constitutional union must cone
some day if the Empire is to remain one, felt that in the
new post-war mood of the Dominions more harm than good
would be done by continually asseverating this ....

□ur present policy, good or bad, has been to let co-
operation be tried, indeed to assist it in every possible

Malcolm to Coupland, 22 Feb 1919, RT Fapers c 314, fols 155-56.

Toronto Dally Star, 7 Bov 1922, copy la Lothian Papers 19,
fols 223-31.

1

2

3

4

5

Kerr to Curtis, 22 Nov 1922, Lothian Papers 19, fols 221-22.
[Kerr,] "The New Inperial Problem", RT, June 1923, pp 464-5.
Coupland to Dove, 28 Feb C 19231 , RT Papers c 804, fol 197.

217

vray. Both Its failures and Its successes are milestones
on our road, and In any case the King's Government has got
to be carried on."

Ulie the Round Table's "present principle is rather 'one step enough for
Dove concluded, "it has not altogether lost sight of the distant
sceae". '

Coupland was right in describing the Moot's attitude to imperial
federation as one of "marking time". Even Curtis now admitted that "there
;s not the least chance of any public agreeing with my views". He realised
that federation would take "the next few generations".- He evren conceded
that it was an open question whether federation would come about as a
restl t of a breakdown of co-operation or of a gradual developitent of co-
operative neasures. 3 !Tever theless, it is inpcrtant to emphasise that he,
and Indeed other Round Tablers, still saw imperial union as a viable long-
tern goal. Imperial unity was a thing of the future, not of the past.

■Marking time" was not the only Round Table strategy for reaching
this goal. As Dove indicated, the Moot admitted the ' impract icabl 1 i ty" of
federation partly in order to be better placed to advocate intermediary,
co-cperative measures. The Found Table was, indeed, at the forefront of
those pressing for a development of machinery for co-operative decision-
“ Un 8 in the lnterwar years."

The Round Table's task of providing inferred coverage of the "real"
issues facing the Commonweal tli lost none of its urgency now that federation

1 Dove to Coupland, 2 March 1923, Brand Papers, box 70.

2 Curtis to Xurray Wrong, 3 Hov 1920, RT Papers c 811, fols 10-11.

3 l Curtis,] 'Prel ini nary JTote on the Questions Raised ... ", Jan
1921, Brand Papers, box 41.

4

See below, pp 307 ff.

218

*6 conceived as a longer-term goal . Tho most striking difference between
{W prewar Pound Table and its interwar incarnation was the Increased
coverage given to international affairs: 17.8% of total coverage before
1914, and 31.5% between 1913 and 1939.' As Dove commented in 1928, "we are
jov to a large extent a foreign affairs review". * This was not because the
jound Ta biers had "gone off" the Empire. As Dove, again, wrote, "the
education of Dominion readers In foreign problems Is essential for our naln
purpose. How otherwise can the Dominions advance on the road which we
vc-uld bave them tread?" 3

Another way in which the Round Tablers hoped to contribute towards

the long-term goal was by encouraging the Dominions to work out their own

•rational' policies with regard to the central questions of international

and Imperial affairs. Vi th hindsight, this appears contradictory; to the

Pcund Tablers it certainly did not seen so.

A circular was sent out to the Dominion group® at the end of 1920,

calling for "a fresh appt oach to the central problems of the Empire by the

groups of each Dominion on their own initiative I and from their own

distinctive national standpoint". The "central problems of the Empire"

were spelled out: defence, emigration, trade and commerce, mandates, the

position of the Dominions in the League, diplomatic relations with Japan

aad other powers, the "tide of anarchy*’ flowing from Russia, and the

possible breakdown of British rule in Egypt and India.

•In all these questions we believe that the study of
national policy will lead of necessity to the Imperial
problem, and that this process will throw an increasing

1 See Appendix C. "Pound Table Coverage, by Subject".

2 Dove to Hlchens, 5 Dec 1923, Lothian Papers 243, fols 590-94.

3

in

Dsve to Coupland, 2 March 1923, Brand Papers, box 70.

219

light upon the central issue In that problem - whether,
to wit, Imperial unity is incompatible with the full
national development of the Dominions or, on the
contrary, essential to it.'

rte Doninion groups were reminded cf the importance of their reaching the
litter conclusion. The alternative to Imperial union was not national
impendence side by side with a British Empire "curtailed in extent but
yielding its old influence and power. The alternative is national
independence in a world in which the British Empire has ceased to exist". 1

Finally, it should be emphasised that the Xoot saw its original
strategy as interrupted rather than altogether abandoned. The idea of
reviving the Pound Table's programroa of "group study" was raised frequently
after the war, usually in connection with Curtis. In November 1919, Brand
Krote to Kerr, urging him to impress on Curtis the necessity of his
returning to his unfinished work, which was “vital to the success of the
Rojnd Table as 1 conceive it", "like a University in a State or like a
vital nucleus in a cell". 2 In a similar vein, Dawson described Curtis's
*ork as "the very foundation of the whole Found Table movement". 3 The
problem was Curtis himself, and his tendency to serial obsessions. In 1922
it would seem as if his colleagues' arguments temporarily won him over,

“ben he wrote to a friend that "it is up to me to carry on the Round Table
cnmplete the Commonwealth of Nation s".* 1

Circular to the Dominion groups, 22 Dec 1920, Lothian Papers, 17,
fols 16-29. A draft version, dated 21 Dec 1920, is in Brand Papers,
box 41.

Brand to Kerr, 17 Nov 1919, Brand Papers, box 42.

Dawson, “Organization and Personnel of the Round Table Off Lee",

July 1920, Brand Papers, box 42.

c «rtis to "Mary*, 4 March 1922, Curtis Papers 3, fols 1-4.

4

220

The camo year, 1922, a more ambitious project presented itself after

I 'vigorous" discussion of the Round Table's future. The Hoot found itself

"... very strongly in favour of an attempt to get
Anericaa support for a study of world politics upon the
basis of our previous work on the Commonwealth nations
.... Vhat we want to get fron sympathetic people in
America is,

1 ) the formation of groups who will take our
Memorandums l sioJ , tear them to pieces from the
American point of view, send us the criticisms which
result & supply us with American Memorandums for
treatment in the same way.

2) money to keep our work going".'

Terr (who was already in the US at the time of the Moot discussion) set
about floating the idea in Hew York with various contacts including Vhitney
Shepardson (one of Colonel House's advisers at Versailles) and John V Davis
(chief counsel to J P Morgan and Co, and Wilson's ambassador to London).

The idea of a French leg was added, "largely to sidetrack the idea that it
was oa Anglo-Saxon plot". The Moot's American contacts were adaaant
against any formal Round Table connection, although they were willing "to
get a sort of central Moot together' and have Curtis "teach them your
aethod". The Council on Foreign Relations which the Round Table thus
helped to galvanise in fact enjoyed more equivalent relations with the
Institute of International Affairs than with the Round Table. The latter,
Kerr realised, had to content itself with being "a purely British
«ncuiry\2

Curtis was once mere employed as a "researcher" from 1924.

,e *ertheless. it was not until early in 1929 that the first section of his
BGw fouad Table Studies was issued (with a preface stating that "the world

Gr *SS to Kerr, 6 April 1922, Grigs Papers, MSS Microfilm 1000.

Herr to Curtis, 22 April 1922 and 28 Kay 1922, Lothian Papers 18,

foie 186-83 and 189-91.

221

^ ff) changed, and also “y ovm vlew of ifc > that 1 could net piece a second
on to the first", ie, The Commonwealth of Notions) . 1 Other
preoccupations once more intervened, however, and it was not until 1934
t fct Curtis's work was actually published, as the first volune of Ci vitas

A?.'.

fltjhnt <n the 19205

Towards the end of 1915 Curtis had written to Milner that, as he saw
It. the real value of the Moot was in its "mixed character". An
•organisation which consisted exclusively of Olivers . . . would be lost in
the Doninions and among the working classes from the outset". One "which
cocsisted of Zimroerns . . . would probably lose touch with hard realities".
•Sich a combination" Curtis thought "worth holding together". 2 By the
early 'twenties, the Moot had lest r.ot only Oliver and Zimoern, but others
who had been key figures in the early years, and (some would later claim)
it was perhaps in danger of losing Milner himself.

A large part of the problem was the Moot's association with Lloyd
k«ge, which proved to be something of a poisoned chalice for the younger
found Tablers. Von Haast urged the New Zealand group to sever its
connection with the London Round Table, on the grounds that it had become a
tere ’mouthpiece* for Lloyd George. 3 Vhile his motion was rejected,
sus Picion that the London group was no longer "disinterested" remained.

Zimmern's disagreements with the Moot sprang from his attachment to

tCurtis, 1 Pound Table Studies, Third Series, Instalment A, Curtis

Papers 157, Item 4, Preface (dated dan 1929).

Curtis to Milner, 29 Nov 1915, Curtis Papers 2, fols 199-201.

J * A Ilott to Dove, 1 May 1923, Brand Papers, box 70.

of liberal Internationalism and concern for the effects of

tke i* e * ls

gritisb policy in Europe. He resigned in 1922. In December of that year
fce described his former colleagues as "subservient to Lloyd George", a
charge which Brand found "insulting" and "quite uncalled for".' The mutual
toibfis eventually died down. In 1926 Dove reported Zinmern as "now quite
frietdly again". 2 Thereafter Zimmern was a useful contact in Geneva and
Oxford, and one whose work meshed closely with that of the Round Tablers.
jevertheless, he was not to play any further significant role in the Moot.
The Round Table lost more friends on the right wing of British

politics. Lord Selborne viewed Lloyd George with intense suspicion
following the political crises of 1910-11. As Curtis later wrote, he was
•a nan whose conservative instincts run very deep", and he found it hard to
forgive the younger Round Tablers for their part in what he saw as a
tetrayai of British interests in India and Ireland. ■ s ' Oliver was another
who was never enamoured of Lloyd George. The final straw for Oliver, as
for selborne, was the role played by Individual Found Tablers in India and
Ireland. By 1923 he had decided to resign even as a Trustee, In order not
to have "any official connection with an organisation with whose views on
s^eral fundanental matters I have the misfortune to disagree".* 1

The departure of others from the Moot was less dramatic. Amery's was
Perhaps long overdue, considering his failure to make an inpact on the

Brand to Dove, 11 Dec 1922, Brand Fapers, box 70. Zimmern contested
Carnarvon as a Labour candidate in 1924, on a platform consisting
almost entirely of opposition to Lloyd George's foreign policy views.
(See his Election Address, 1924, copy in Bcdleian Library.)

D°ve to Kerr, 10 Oct 1926, Lothian Papers 224, fols 340-41.

Curtis to Baden-Powel 1 , 30 July 1932, Curtis Papers 91, fols 23-24.

°Uver to Dove, 20 Feb 1923, Brand Papers, box 70.

jound Table' s views on tariffs and Imperial co-operation. As Colonial
Secretary from 1924 to 1929, and as Secretary of State for India from 1940
tc 1945, Aoery sought the advice and collaboration of his former
c C jieagues, but he was by no means a mere conduit for Round Table
influence- 1

Lord Robert Cecil was another ex-Round Tabler who held office in both

Lloyd George's government and its Conservative successors. As President of
tbe League of Rations Union, and one of the foronoct advocates of
disarmament and collective security, Cecil found little support amongst
Rojnd Tablcrs. Dawson believed that Cecil had allied himself with an
'lapctent set of cranks", and Grigg thought that Cecil himself had become
decidedly and unforgl veably "anti- Imperial" . 2

Lord Milner agreed with Zlmmern that Lloyd George's conduct at the
end of the war was neither statesmanlike nor prescient. Moreover, Milner
feired for the Empire, haunted, as he told Oliver, by the example of the
■glorious* years 1757-63 being followed by the " nelancholy* 1763-83, in
which the hero of the former was not entirely blameless. 31

After his death, Milner's political inheritance was appropriated by
Ms foraidable widow Cwhom he had married in 1921). Lady Milner was a
pronounced "diehard", and editor of the Nations! Review from 1932 to 1948.
^ er views clashed with those of the Round Table on many issues. In 1936

Anory's views and political career are the subject of illuminating
analysis by Va Roger Louis, "In tbe None of Cod, Go!" (Hew York,
1992).

Dawson to Oliver, 28 June 1925, Oliver Papers 85, fol 16; Grigg to
Downle Stewart, 14 Oct 1933, Grigg Papers, MSS Microfilm 1003. For
Cell's attempts to implement his views, see Dick Richardson, The
Evolution of British Disarmament Pclicy in tbe 1920s (London, 1989).

*Uner to Oliver, 23 Dec 1918, Oliver Papers 86, fols 67-68.

^ py^isbed a short article which established the myth that Milner and
^ younger Found Tablers had disagreed profoundly over the League of
Ijt'ons* ' Her political differences with the Moot were accompanied by
^rsonal aninosity, particularly towards Kerr whom, she claimed, Milner
ji*elf tad cone to mistrust, as he did other "unmanly men". 2

Milner's authority was also posthumously employed within the Moot,
it one point Grigg claimed that in his last years Milner was "deeply
concerned about the extent to which the Round Table was drifting away from
Iapcrial interests". 3 Grigg's claim was made in the context of a
jartlcularly heated argument, in which Grigg found himself on the losing
side. There appears to be no contemporary evidence of such misgivings on

Ulnar' s part. On the contrary, Milner continued to act as the patron of
•.he group and to attend meetings - he had intended to join a Moot
discussion on the day of his death' 1 - and it was in this postwar period
’.hat he contributed his only two articles to the Round Table magazine.

3otl were on Egypt, where Milner himself was responsible for initiating
agotiatlons with the Vafdist leaders. It is by no means clear, therefore,
•iat Milner's views and those of his Round Table colleagues were as
dscordant as "diehards" (particularly Lady Milner) later claimed.

Although the Moot was smaller in the 1920s than in its prewar days,
■^question which might reasonably be asked is whether it lost in cohesion

Viscountess Milner, "Vhat Lord Milner Said", National Revietr, vol 107
(October 1936), pp 445-49; cf V Halp^rin. Lord Milner and the Eapire
(London, 1952), pp 200-01, quoting Lady Milner's letter to him of 2
far 1946. Milnor and the younger Found Tablers in fact made similar
Assessments of the League.

faty Milner to Grigg, 23 June 1925, Grigg Papers, MSS Microfilm 1002.
Gri 88 to Hichens, 15 Dec 1931, Grigg Papers, MSS Microfilm 1003.
(Brand,] "Lord Milner", FT, June 1925, p 427.

225

^ coa^tneat what it lost in sl2e. The withdrawal or resignation of
Oliver, Zi“ uoerQ and others ln “any ways emphasised the political and
Ideologic® 1 homogeneity of the remaining Round Tablers. It certainly
#f phasi£ed their social homogeneity.

The 'Kindergarten" now constituted a majority of the group, with
Curtis, Kerr, Dawson, Brand, Hichens, Malcolm and Dove all remaining
clcsely involved in Round Table affairs.' As Sir Olaf Caroe later wrote,
there was 'something in that association which gooc boyond the
Individual' . 2 Of the prewar Moot's non-" Kindergarten" members, only Grigg
acd Ccuplaad persevered with membership. It is clear that when matters of
fuoianental importance to the group were discussed, these two carried less
weight than their "Kindergarten" colleagues.®

Some attempts at widening the membership were made during the 1920s.
lae oi Curtis's Oxford pupils (and an early member of the South African
group), Percy Horsfall, was recruited in 2921. An employee first of the
inglish Electric Company (a subdivision of Canmell Laird) and then of
-azird Brothers (of which he was Managing Director from 1937), Horsfall was
1 mq whose "prejudices were few [but! very determined''.' 1 He remained a
«*ber of the Moot until his death in 1965, and wrote many Round Table
lr ticles on finance and economics, and on British and European politics.

Valdorf (Lord) Astor frequently hosted weekend nestings of the Moot

Craik attended meetings very infrequently after the war.

1 G Lockhart had him wondering in 1928 "what a good Tory like himself

wao doing ln such wild company"; Janitor, The Feet of the Young Ken

(London, 1928), p 177.

Caroe to Morrah, 14 Dec 1949, (Lothian file,) RT (0) Papers.

3 See, eg, Curtis to the "aboriginal" members, 6 Aug 1930, Lothian

Papers 252, fols 627-32.

[ Lord Hampden,! 'Percy Horsfall-, RT, June 1965, pp 207-03.

,t cmedea,

and was an important benefactor.

Severtheless, be rarely

,tt«iuled meet logs (even when they were held at Cliveden) and was apparently
asked to Join the Moot. Loring Christie (a member of Borden's tean
fersailles, and an important figure in the early Department of External
iffairs) Joined the Moot between 1923 and 1926. He fell out with the Moot
o70 r Locarno, but rejoined the Canadian Round Table in the late 1920s.’
pother of Curtis's proteges, Keith Hancock, attended Round Table meetings
fros 1924 to 1925 and again (after a spell in Adelaide) from 1934 to 1935.
Hancock recalled leaving the Moot abruptly, in protest at the foreign

policy views held by soma of the senior members of tbo Xoot.^

Vith the oxcoptioa of Dove (who served as editor from 1920 until his
death in 1934), none of the Moot was in o position to devote the bulk of
his energies and time to Round Table business. Brand, Malcolm and Hicbens
«re established and prominent, but therefore busy, figures in the worlds
ui finance, conmerce and industry. Dawson was again editor of The Tines
froa 1923 to 1941. Grigg entered Parliament in 1922; from 1925 to 1930 he
«r7ed as Governor of Kenya. Coupland resigned as editor in 1919, in order
to secure the Eeit Professorship, which he held until 1948.

Even Curtis and Kerr were unable or unwilling to make the Round Table
t-e primary object of their labours. From 1921 to 1924 Curtis was employed
tke Colonial Office as an adviser on Irish affairs; thereafter, although
•UMed by the Moot, he devoted the greater part of his attention to the

For the disagreement, see below, pp 321-22.

Hancock, Country and Calling (London, 1954), p 181. Hancock recalled
incident as taking place in 1936, but the Round Table minutes show
fiat the last meeting he attended was over the weekend of 19 to 20 Oct
1935 » at the height of the Abyssinian crisis. This sheds a rather
Afferent light on his claim that "a majority of our meeting accepted
tie argument that Great Britain had an interest in seeing Hitler
Q otat>ii s hed on the Brenner Pass" .

. —n Institute of International Affairs, and to his - what seemed to his

m * 1

leagues almost Irrational - obsession with China <to which might be
skywriting, ribbon development, the preservation of Oxford, and
..irarsity politics).

It bad been hoped that Kerr would resume the editorship of the Round
fable on ce he left Lloyd George's employment’, but Kerr soon decided that
jls comaitnent to Christian Scieace "will preclude ny taking a whole time

2 in fact, Kerr remained an active contributor to both the Moot and
the magazine until his death in 1940. Nevertheless Kerr, like Curtis, went
off on something of a tangent, entranced by the "ouch larger idea, the
integration of the English-speaking world, tie, including Anerica,] also on
id organic basis", which he believed was now "within the realm of practical
possibilities". 3 As Secretary to the Rhodes Trustees fron 1925 to 1939,

«Bd inbassador to Vashington from August 1939 to December 1940, Kerr (who
inherited the title and estates of Lord Lothian in March 1930) was in a
jood position to pursue his vision.

Vhile the professional and other preoccupations of the Round Tablers
ire unarguable, their effect on the group is less clear-cut. Maturity,
experience and "the enhanced prestige that achievement brings"* 1 ensured

the contribution which individual Round Tablers could make was, if
c .' J actitatively diminished, qualitatively more valuable. Vi thin the Moot
^uld be found experts and powor-brokers from a wide variety of fields,

See, eg , Curtis to Hichens, Brand, Kerr and Dawson, 3 Oct 1919,

Lothian Papers 491, fol 2.

Kerr to Curtis, 26 May 1922, Lothian Papers 13, fols 169-91.

K «rr to Curtis, 26 May 1927, Lothian Papers 227, fols 155-58.

John Dove, - rhe Round Table: A Mystery Probed", 18 Dec 1924, Brand

Pfi Pers, box 70.

uch with acces& to wideala 8 circles of potential collaborators. The Bound
fable undoubtedly benefited.

jtoreover, the diversification of Round Tablers' interests did not In
itself Indicate the disintegration of the group, or disenchantment with its
gjtive ideals. Indeed, it is remarkable how often Found Tablers
rationalised their individual interests in terms of the common Round Table
jood. This was, of course, most often the case with the "Kindergarten"
liters, and especially Curtis, but it was also true of others in the Moot.
Couplaad saw his move to the Beit Professorship as being "both in my own
iateroste and those of the Round Table'” while Grigg entered Parliament as
i ■lonely pioneer of the unborn Round Table Group" . 2 Individual Round
Tablers certainly acted idiosyncratical ly and without the backing of the
tlder Xoot. Nevertheless, Round Table membership continued to be a vital
j:d invigorating element In Its menbers' contributions to public life:
'southing larger than friendship and nobler than day-tc-day politics or
tosiness" . 3

and Rd.tlsh. -Politics

Lloyd George's premiership was a turning-point for many of the younger
found Tablers. The Conservative backlash in 1922 launched the political
Career of Grigg, the only Round Tabler to become an HP during the interwar
f* r Iod. The anti-Coal itionists* ascendancy at the Carlton Club prompted
*** to write to Nancy Astor:

Couple a d to Kerr, 13 March 1919, Lothian Papers 437, fol 2.

2 Gri gg to Sir Abe Bailey, 26 Oct 1922, Grigg Papers, MSS Microfiln 999.

3 Hcdson, "The Round Table's Early Life", RT, Oct 1976, p 420.

229

"After all that has passed there is for so a
profound aoral division between such people and
any leaders that I can serve. I an going down to
Bob! Brandi's today to suggest to the Round Table
that they should definitely . . . throw in their
lot as independent men behind Lloyd George".'

‘•riSg 8 ot the su PP ort want ed. Brand, Kerr and Hichens spoke on his

fchalf in Oldham, the Round Table office provided useful "facts and

figvres* . and Abe Bailey was persuaded by Curtis to provide £1000 for

firing's "fighting fund". 2 Once in Parliament, Grigg realised "the Justice

of the instinct which made me feel that it was r.ow or never if we were to

tackle Parliament"; he was "only sorry that there are nc other Pound

Tablers in with me at the nonent". 3

At the tine of Grigg' s election, Kerr wrote to his mother that "I

don't feel that he is much of a Liberal" . n Grigg' s later career proved the

truth of this remark. He was on the point of breaking up the Liberal

Party's new-found unity in 1925 when Ancry despatched him to Kenya as

Covcrnor. 3ack in England in 1930 he was active in trying to form a group

cf "Liberal Unionists" tc assist in a realignment of the Right. Pre-empted

l 7 the formation of the National Government, he again spent much of the

1330s Intriguing against the lacklustre and Imperially illiterate party

leaderships. Grigg' s parliamentary career appears marginal and almost

bizarre; it derived a certain consistency, however, from his fervent

s, perialism. As he explained to Bailey, what he was really after was a

1 Grigg to Nancy Astor, 21 Sept 1922, Grigg Papers, MSS Microfiln 999.

2 Kiss Handley to Grigg, 28 Oct 1922, Grigg Papers. MSS Microfiln 1000;
Grigg to Bailey, 28 Oct 1922, MSS Microfilm 999. Bailey again funded
Grigg' s election in 1923.

3 Grigg to Bailey, 23 Nov 1922, Grigg Papers, MSS Microfilm 999.

* Kerr to Lady Anne Kerr, 19 Nov 1922, Lothian Papers 467, fol 30.

alig QOcnt of force©:

"Empire" mobilised against ■Socialism".'

be wrote to Milner that if "we fail to make the whole Liberal
pjrty understand the Empire, it will end by adding an enormous strength to
(ie go^iallsts on their international and unBritish way of thought". 2

gnarly.

Kerr was offered a Unionist candidacy in 1922, but turned it down

jacause "I don't think the old associations would approve of my views at
,H'; he again resisted pressure from Lloyd George and Herbert Samuel in
192S, this time on the grounds that he would not wish to drop his Rhodes
fruit work. 3 He was probably wise: Dawson thought hin "one of the worst
politicians in the world" . * Kerr's i nvol venent in Liberal politics was
•evsrtholess close, and more consistent than that of Grigg. He was one of

tie leading Liberal spokesmen on Imperial and international affaire

throughout the interwar years, and, after inheriting a seat in the Lords in

1930, briefly served the Hatioaal Government as Ur.der-Secretary of State

.'or India. He resigned as a result of the Ottawa agreements.

As editor of The Times, Dawson maintained a certain impartiality,

‘ltlough he himself was both temperamentally and by conviction a
Conservative. Perhaps his proudest moment came when he managed to keep The
going through the General Strike of 1926. Nevertheless, Dawson, like
■liver (with whom he maintained a close friendship), was an exponent and
w »lrer of realpol itik . Consequently he was less moved by "anti-socialism"

1 Grigg to Bailey, 24 Feb 1024, Grigg Papers. MSS Microfilm 1001.

2 Grigg to Milner, 20 Fov 1023, Grigg Papers, MSS Microfilm 1001.

Kerr to Lady Anne Kerr, 3 Oct 1022, Lothian Papers 467, fol 26; Kerr
to Lloyd George, 7 Kay 1928, Lothian Papers 229, fol 352.

* D*veon to Oliver, 29 Sept 1931, Oliver Papers 85, fol 230.

^ Grigg or even Kerr « believing In 1923, for Instance, that it was much
w tter to let Labour in and make a "botch* than to polarise politics by
creating an artificial alliance to keep Labour out.'

Dawson's contacts were wide-ranging, and he was the only Round Tabler
,ith continuous access to the leading politicians of the day (including
Baldwin, Halifax, HacDonald and Neville Chanberlain) . It is tempting to
picture Dawson exercising "power without responsibility* by means of his
backstairs influence. 2 Nevertheless, it is important not to ovor-esti mate
tte extent to which ho was able, or indeed willing, to pursue his own
agenda. After Dawson's retirement, Valter Honckton paid tribute to bin
precisely because of his "disinterested advice - without what we ex- lawyers
call any 'indirect motive’".*

Other Round Tablers had more specialised interests in politics, and

consequently fewer contacts at the higher levels of British statecraft.
3raad, like Grigg and Kerr, was predominantly aligned to the Liberals,
joining Keynes in a series of Liberal think-tanks which produced Lloyd
forge's policy books. (Unlike Keynes, Brand was an old-fashioned free-
zer, and a firm supporter of Kontagu Nornan and the gold standard.)
band's owr expertise was recognised by politicians in other parties: he
*as a nenber of the Xacmillan Committee appointed by Snowden in 1929, and
^ vas an influence on the early financial policy of the National

1 Dawson to 01 i ver , 23 Dec 1923, Oliver Papers 84, fols 113—14.

^ J E Vrench, Geoffrey Dawson and Our Tines (London, 1955) lists a
dumber of occasions when The Times advocated a policy subsequently
adopted by the government.

J Xonckton to Dawson, 21 July 1941, Dawson Papers 82, fol 22.

^ra^ent. 1 Hichens* main concern was with "Industrial Fellowship" and

6 l*ilar Christian initiatives in the field of industrial relations, a

potcern which did not easily translate into politics at the conventional

lcTe l. Curtis's range of contacts largely centred on academics and

officials.* All Souls and a number of his more pol it leal ly- minded pupils

(notably Malcolm MacDonald) provided his main contacts in party politics.

'he younger Round Tablers appreciated less clearly than Kilner the

need to build working-class support for the Enpire 3 : their contacts in the

labour Party (excluding the Rational Labourites in the 1930s> and in the

Trade Unions were almost non- ex is tent, and there appears to have been no

significant attempt to rectify this situation. Instead, many Round Tablers

clung to a naive belief in the extent of Imperial patriotism amongst their

fellow countrymen. It was left to more experienced and astute politicians

to point out the truth, as when Neville Chamberlain deflated Grigg's hopes

nf a Liberal/Conservative alliance based on Enpire:

"The people of this country have a deep sentiment
about the Empire, but it is remote from their
ordinary thoughts. Vhat they are really concerned
about is their bread and butter; and though, when
it is explained to then, they are quite ready to
appreciate that their bread and butter is largely
provided by Imperial trade . . . their eyes are
fixed on the factories at hone, and overseas is
out of the world to them". 3

lT 'lS hiosclf caw more clearly than other Round Tablorc the domestic uses
■0 which Enpire could be put - as when he believed that "only very serious

1 See Robert V D Boyce, British Capitalism at the Crossroads (Cambridge,
198?), pp 2 b and passim .

1 Seej 0 Stubbs, "lord Milner and Patriotic Labour, 1914-1918" , EHF,

*>1 87 (1982), pp 717-54.

* fcviUe Chamberlain to Grigg, 30 Sept 1931, Grlgg Papers, HSS
Klcrofilm 1003.

trouble in India" might discredit the Labour Government in 1930, or when he
grjed that only the ' ,,ix P loi tation' of the Empire's resources could provide
jaeff ectIve counter to the assaults on "economic privilege" by the
•o&derprlvlleged" • 1 Others la the Moot were mere concerned with Empire as
international duty than as national asset.

One concern which united all Round Tablers was the need for stability
aod continuity in Imperial policy. The Round Table's attitude to specific
problems was thoroughly conditioned by this need, whether it was a case of
establishing a policy in India or East Africa to which Labour as well as
Coiservatives could subscribe, or of facilitating an Imperial foreign
policy which would keep the Dominions In line with Britain. This concern
was net less by direct pressure on politicians (which the Pound Tablers
vere ill-equipped to attempt) than by a concerted and steady pressure at
the level which Round Tablers thought more decisive: that of public
opinion, determined above oil by information and expertise.

Intonatio n and expertise

“he Round Table magazine was only one of a number of interlocking
«<ia through which Round Tablers, individually and in combination, sought
Influence public opinion. Indeed, It would not be an exaggeration to
su Sgest that the range of the Moot's influence was greater during the
1 iter war period than the prewar.

As editor of The Tiroes, Dawson was the premier newspaperman in
Britain. Reinstated by a sympathetic consortium orchestrated by Brand,

1 Gr igg to Seville Chamberlain, 26 Kay 1030, Grigg Papers, XSS Microfilm
10G2 ; Grigg, "The British Empire, the League of Rations and the Rhodes
ideal" , (sent to Lothian 28 Sept 1932), Lothian Papers 268,
fols 753-89.

*a & free to P ursue what to was evidently not a contradictory
policy of -reflecting and guiding public opinion".' His surviving
correspond 01106 Indicates the importance he attached to obtaining Dominion
arfEnpire correspondents suitably Imbued with his own Imperial Ideas - the
Catadian Round Tabler J A Stevenson was one who benefited. Regular Empire
pay stpple 33611415 were issued, often taking the opportunity to reaffirm
lilner' s vision of the Empire as "the most powerful bulwark . . . against
tie spread of international discord". -

Although by no means a mere tool in the hands of others in the Xoot,

Pawsot saw that his colleagues enjoyed a privileged access to the letter
pages of his paper, and Kerr wrote a number of articles under the pseudonym
•Tcyageur". They in turn kept Daws.cn on hl& feet, complaining vociferously
whenever they thought a Times article or leader failed to show the "true
inwrdness" of q point.

Found Tablers, particularly Kerr and Grigg, were prolific journalists,
and their contributions became a feature of many publications other than
fie floes. Kerr wrote a regular column for the Christian Science Konitor,
as well as numerous articles for The Spectator , the Nation and Athenaeum
«dtte Contemporary Review. Grigg often wrote for the more right-wing
htional and Fortnightly Reviews, as well as for J \. Garvin's Observer,
international Conciliation, a awgazioe financed and published by J P Horgan

1 A L Kennedy, -Geoffrey Dawson" , Quarterly Review, vol 294 (April
1956), pp 155-68.

2 The Tines Supplement, 24 Kay 1G34. For Dawson and The Times, see The
History of the Times, Vol IV (2 parts, London, 1952) and Wrench,
Geoffrey Dawson and our Times (London, 1955).

3 See > eg, Kerr to Dawson, 13 Kov 1925, Lothian Papers 222, fol 120 (on

Australian elections); on this occasion Dawson agreed.

235

^Co, reprinted whole articles from the Pound Table, as well as Tines

^torlals and fresh articles by Individual Pound Tablers (particularly

g faD d and Kerr). Also In America, a connection through Shepardson with the

yilllaBstovm Institute of Politics - " a re al thinking nachlne on foreign

affairs" 1 - resulted in the delivery and subsequent publication of lectures

Kerr and Curtis in 1922, Kerr in 1923 and Grigg in 1924. (Further

lectures were given by the Round Table's allies Lord Eustace Percy in 1929

and Lord Keston In 1930.) These added to the nunerous books and pamphlets

published by Round Tablers between the wars. Mention should also be made

of Reuters news agency of which Halcolm and Grigg, alongside John Buchan

and Sir Roderick Jones, were directors; Buchan made clear the need for

soaeone with "your point of view" when inviting Grigg to take up the post. 2

As Beit Frofessor at Oxfoid, Coupland saw himself, somewhat bizarrely,

as "not so much ... a person as a vehicle of Imperial work". * His

Inaugural lecture could almost have been written by Curtis. "Politics is a

science as rruch as an art", he declared;

■and we cannot with impunity omit to look afield
and ahead, to detect the crucial problem . . .
before the crisis is upon us, and to prepare
ourselves betimes to solve it by scientific
study" .

Is examples of successful "scientific" pre-emption, Coupland chose
ilexaader Hamilton's federalism and the union of South Africa. - In his
historical writings, Coupland was particularly concerned to emphasise the

1 Curtis to Tom Jones, Aug 1922 (copy), Grigg Papers, XSS Hicrofilm 999.

2 Buchan to Grigg, 9 Feb 1923, Grigg Papers, KSS Xlcrofiln 1000.

3 Coupland to Kerr, 15 Dec 1923, Lothian Papers 239, fois 153-53.

( Coupland, The Empire in These Days (London, 1935), p 10 and ff.

jitflonary and humanitarian aspects of Empire. His American Revolution and
# British Empire of 1930 claioed that tie British Empire had been
fer0 lBtlonised in 1775-93 by "colonial assini 1 at ion" , anti-roercant il ism,
al ti-slavery and trusteeship. He hoped that this volume would help
Orleans in particular to "begin to look at l the Erapirel from a new
angle', which was Indeed "why I wrote the book".’ Despite protests from
Curtis that he was already "one of the most fortunate people in the
diversity of Oxford", Coupland's work was speeded by a Round Table grant
of MOO pa. 2

Oxford connections had always been important as a basis for Round
Table activities; between the wars, they became even more so. Indeed, the
•London" Moot came increasingly to resemble an "Oxford" one, with Oxford
providing not only a spiritual and In many cases geographical hone, but
eiployoent, ready sources of information and expertise, and a likely <if
largely infertile) ground for the exercise of Imperial imagination.

Dawson's Times was once dubbed " Ihe All Souls Parish Magazine". ’ The
iescription could perhaps more aptly be attached to the Round Table.

Brand, Nalcolm and Dawson were already fellows of Ail Souls, "and
constantly there"." In 1920 they were Joined ex officio by Coupland. The
foil OKing year, despite the fact that even his friends recognised that his

1 Coupland to Kerr, [1930,1 Lothian Papers 247, fol 110.

2 Curtis to Kerr, 25 Sov 1928, Lothian Papers 239, fols 147-50; Minutes
of RT meetings, 16 July, 31 July and 17 Oct 1929, RT (0) Fapers.

3 C Hobhouse, Oxford As It Was and As It Is Today (London, 1939), p 18.
"The duty of purveying honest news is elevated in their eyes into the
prerogat i ve of dictating opinion’, Hobhouse claimed.

( Curtis to Sir Arthur Salter, 17 April 1930, Lothian Papers 251,
fol 599.

237

¥

.fervour was stronger than his scholarship-’, Curtis was elected to a
fellowship* Kerr, Hichens and Dove were also often there. » For Curtis, at
least, AU Souls provided academic credibility which otherwise he would
lave found hard to acquire. The All Souls "mystique", as a "conuni ttee for
roonlng or helping to run the British Empire", was no doubt important also
In adding stature to his colleagues. ?

The All Souls connection had other, more definite, uses. It provided
tie Round Table with a number of helpers and new members. It also provided
a tui&er of experts who were willing to loo* at Found Table articles, as
wien Professors Brier iy and Holdsworth vetted Cyril Asquith's "The
Prerogative of Dissolution" for the December 1929 issue.* Finally, it
provided an ideal setting in which to buttonhole both visitors and the
College's more prominent fellows, who included Amery, Sir John Simon, Lords
CielEsford, Curzon and Irwin/Kali fax, and Archbishop Lang.

Another Oxford vehicle for the Round Table's influence was the Rhodes
Trust. At one point Curtis was considered as a possible Trustee, but, as
the tester of Balliol observed, "perhaps, great man as he is, he may be too
prophetic". 5 Dawson was in fact the only "Kindergarten" member to bo nade
* Trustee; but with other Trustee* including Amery, K A L Fisher (former
tutor to many Round Tablers) and Sir Edward Peacock <a former Canadian

1 Kalcolra, "Lionel Curtis", RT, Xarch 195C, p 105. Curtis's fellowship
'as "an early dream" and "his greatest joy"; Canon DUX Bartlett to
Xorrah, 5 June 1952, RT Papers c SOS, fol 6.

2 Bowse, G1 lapses of the Great (2nd edn, London, I960), p 350.

3 1C V Brodribb, 3 Governnent by K. allardry (London, 1932), Dawson Papers,
box 80; cf Louis, Jji the Name of God, Go! (Hew York, 1992), pp 35-39.

( Kerr to Asquith, 18 Oct 1929, and Malcolm to Kerr, 26 Oct 1929,

Lothian Papers 237, fols 300-05 and 312-14.

13 Aug 1918, Milner Papers 471, fols 224-5.

5

A L Smith to Milner,

238

|0O*d

Tabler), tie Rhodos Trustees could be counted on to be broadly
tbetic to Round Table influence. More inportantly, the Sound Table

provided three successive General Secretaries, Dawson (1921-2), Grigg

.1922-5) and Kerr (1925-40). The latter's appointment was not universally
rt lcoied, causing Kipling's resignation and protests from Lady Milner. 1

One of Kerr's more fruitful innovations was the introduction of
Travelling Fellowships. The future Round Tabler John Maud was one who
*nefited; Margery Perham was another. Her case revealed the limits of
Influence by enablement, however. Shocked by the attitudes of white
tattlers in East Africa, she wrote a series of T/oes articles pleading the

caw for African interests. Grigg was enraged, and tried to get the Trust
lo withdraw her Fellowship. Kerr/lothian was unhelpful. 2 3 On this

occasion, Grigg decided against attempting to rebut Perham* s views
publicly : "it could only weaken such authority as I have ... if I am
instantly appearing in public controversy with people of little or no
importance like her". 2 Grigg’ s decision was perhaps wise: Curtis's
<ontro/ersy with Perhara four years later was one from which, it was
jenerally agreed, Ferhara eoerged the victor.' 1

Curtis once wrote to Kerr that "there is a dangerous impression
{fo-.ing that if people want to learn, they had better go to Cambridge

p or the Rhodes Trust generally, see R Symonds, Oxford and Empire
(Oxford edn, 1991 >. pp 161 ff.

2 Gr igg to Lothian, 14 Sept 1931; Lothian to Grigg, 30 Sept 1931, Grigg
Papers, MSS Microfilm 1003.

3 Gr> igg to M Ridley, 14 Sept 1931, Grigg Papers, MSS Microfilm 1003.

‘ See below, pp 285-86.

239

fitter than Oxford".’ To reverse this unfortunate trend, Curtis, Kerr,
upland, Brand and Hichens formed themselves, In various combinations,
j, to numerous ccmni ttees and ginger groups, enlisting the help of such
friends as HAL Fisher, V G S Adams, A D Lindsay and Professor Brierly.
itfogst their proposals was a new nugazlne for Oxford graduates, aimed at
raising funds for the Bodleian and other University facilities. 1 2 3 4 5 tore
significant, perhaps, were their plans for some new institute to signify
aB d eabody Oxford's connection with the Empire.

The earliest version of such a proposal envisaged a new research
institute based at All Souls, whose fellows would study such subjects as
the international economy, migration and "the colour problem". The work
would be entirely postgraduate, and kept deliberately snail, but
"scientific study" would be undertaken in order to facilitate "political
action". ® As the proposal evolved, Kerr conceived the idea of basing the
preposed institute at Rhodes House, where its purposes could be widened to
include the i nstruotion of FLodeo Scholars, ICS and Colonial Service
probationers. Dawson was enlisted to support Kerr's scheme. " Brand and
Coupland both warned of the danger that the All Souls and Rhodes House
scleras might kill each other off.° Kerr was therefore persuaded to limit
latter to problems of "colour"; Smuts, who was brought over to deliver
l le 1929 Rhodes lectures and to "fall in with" Kerr's scheme, persuaded him

1 Curtis to Kerr, 31 July 1926. Lothian Papers 221, fols 42-44.

2 Curtis, Memorandum for Hebdomadal Council, 5ov 1930, Lothian Papers
244, fols 134-39.

3 Kerr to Abraham Flexner, 13 May 1926, Lothian Papers 222, fols 160-69.

4 Kerr to Dawson, 11 June 1923, Lothian Papers 223, fol 203.

5

Brand to Kerr, 6 Oct 1929, Lothian Papers 236, fol 273; Coupland to
*®n*. 11 Hov 1929, Lothian Papers 234, fol 75.

240

f

w limit it further to Africa. In this form, Smuts gave a hearty
e idoi& eI>c:it to tbe both in his Lectures and at a special conference

to bring together "African experts" and "people in Oxford whom it is
j^jortant to interest in African problems". He also promised to find
il 3 ,COO to launch the new institute. 1

Discussions of both the "All Souls Project" and the "Smuts House"
scie*e rumbled on, but got little further. The problem was money. Smuts
failed to nvake good his promise, while the Rockefeller Foundation decided
to direct its largesse elsewhere. A similar fate befell plans for a new
•Irwin House", with which Curtis and Kerr/Lothian hoped to galvanise Indian
studies in Oxford. In this case the intended beneficiaries were not
British pol icy-raakers but Indians themselves. Again, however, the problem
vas money. Lothian appears finally to have given up in 1936, when he
persuaded the Rhodes Trustees to support the new Social Studies faculty, on
condition that it include within its remit the study of government in the
Ftpira. 2

ChathflB House

Ho survey of the Round Tablers* role in the dissemination of
information and expertise would be complete without mention of the (Royal)
Institute of International Affairs. The Institute had its origins in a
series of meetings at the Hotels Majestic and Crllion in Paris in the
earner of 1919. There, members of the British delegation and press at

1 Kerr to Coupland, 5 Hov 1929, Lothian Papers 234, fol 73; Coupland to
Kerr, 29 Jan 193D, Lothian Papers 239, fol 176.

2 R Synonds, Oxford and Enpire (Oxford edn, 1991), p 170. For "Smuts
House" , see thfd . pp 173-78. and for "Irwin House", ibil, PP Ho- 16.

Ttfgiin* 6 Eluding Curtis, Kg rr, Dawson, Cecil, Lord Eustace Percy,
g I Gathorne-Hardy, J V Headlan-Xorley , Clement Jones and Harold Temperley)
with their American counterparts (Including Shepardson, Beer, James T
Slotwell • Archibald Cary Coolidge, and Thomas V Lanont) and agreed to work
f cr the creation of Institutes in each country, "which would act as a
telephone exchange between the few hundred men In each country who
a dii lister foreign affairs and create public opinion on the subject".’

Back In England, It was Curtis who was the real "father" of the new
Icstitute, as Gathorne-Hardy later enphasised. * Joint Honorary Secretary
with the latter between 1920 and 1930 (resigning to prevent the Institute
being seen as a "one-man show"^), Councillor fron 1934, and President from
19(4, Curtis it was who organised the preliminary meetings (which took
place at the Round Table office), drew up lists of possible members,
soured fron Bailey the initial finance, and drafted the constitution.

Contenporary accounts link the Institute with the creation of the
Uague of Pations.' 1 2 3 4 5 Curtis, however, saw it in Imperial terms. Like other
»sbers of the Round Table, Curtis was never more than lukewarm towards the
league. Indeed, he regarded it as "a scaffolding . . . plastered with
Phases', all the more dangerous because by its existence it deluded
opinion in Britain and the Dominions as to the true nature of international
affairs. 9 Chatham House Was in fact the outcome partly of Curtis's

1 "George Louis Beer", RT, Sept 1920, p 935.

2 G X Gathorne-Hardy, Lionel Curtis, CH, 1272-1955 (London, 1955), p 1.

3 Curtis to Jerome D Greene, 20 Sept 1930, Curtis Papers 3,
fols 212-15.

4 See, eg, Harold Hicolson, Peacemaking 1919 (London, 1933), pp 352-53.

5 t Curtis, ) "Vindows of Fre^don" , RT, Dec 1918 <pp 1-47), p 25.

242

Jjgtllity to the league, his recognition of the need to inform and educate
pjt>U c opinion, and what Elie Kedourie has pertinently described as a
ik3 peful theory about the relation between Knowledge and action". 1

Curtis envisaged a "postgraduate" Institute for "definite study and
research", with a library and other facilities, publishing books and

papers, and generally contributing to the formation of "sound" opinion.
Squally importantly, the Institute would play host to closed meetings,
where "men of theory" could meet with "men of practice", so that academics
aai specialists could trade Insights with officials and politicians in an
atiosphere of mutual enrichment. As well as a free-standing Institute in
iwrica - which, as has been seen, was finally jolted into existence by
fo«nd Tablers in 1922 - Curtis was concerned

"to get Branches of the Institute in the Dominions
because such branches will at once find themselves
directly depending for a supply of material and
information on the London Branch, and a new and
most important Imperial link will thus be created.
In so far as we can get leading publicists in each
of the Dominions to study foreign affairs in the
true sense of the word, they will come to realise
the vital necessity of Imperial Union".*

Curtis's creation enjoyed a remarkable and swift success. Its

ieaugural meeting in July 1920, at which Hankey delivered a paper on

'Diplomacy by Conference" (published in the September issue of the Round

ra Me), was attended by some 300 people. By 1922 the membership was 714,

swelling to 1707 in 1929 and 2414 in 1536.-

Funding for the Institute came from a variety of sources, including

Kedourie, The Chatham House Version (London, 1970), p 352.

Curtis to Brand, 1 Dec 1910, Brand Papers, box 39.

Stephen King-Hall, Chatham House: A Brief Account (London, 1937),
P 24.

^irtl 6 ' 6 * rion< * s Lor< * Astor, Sir John Power and Sir Henry Price. The two
generous benefactors were Abe Bailey and Col P V Leonard. As well as
tfce initial finance, Bailey provided £5000 pa from 1928, emphasising in his
letter offering the gift that the Institute's work was "vital to the
resent needs ci the British Commonwealth", because "to preserve Its unity
OT jer the Crown, Its peoples as well as its governments must learn how to
M0 dle their foreign relations together".’ Leonard gave Chatham House to
lke Institute. In his speech inaugurating the building, he declared that
■ tons the British Empire is the greatest of human aohievements. To serve
it rightly Is to serve mankind". =

Curtis had hoped that the overseas Round Table groups might be
persuaded to form themselves into local branches of the Institute. Here,
Lwevar, the other London Round Tablets disagreed. In their view, the
lno.1 groups performed a useful function, while the Institute’s value was
nnyet untested. ’ Hover theless, the links between Dominion groups and the
local branches of the Institute were close. Kearly all of the original
Dominion members of the Institute were also Round Tablers, and the latter
often took the initiative in founding local Institutes. In Australia, the
creation of the local Institute -as largely the work of Eggleston, Sir
Ihoaas Bavin and H 8 Nicholas; in New Zealand, of Downie Stewart and
IRAtkiQson; in South Africa, of E A Valkc-r.' 1

Bailey to Prince of Vales 119281, Lothian Papers 244, fol 665.

Quoted by S C Leslie, "British Attitudes to the Commonwealth", FT,

July 1973, p 369.

Curtis to Brand, 1 Dec 1919, and Brand to Curtis, 5 Deo 1919, Brand
Papers, box 39.

, L v atp invited to become Original members

"List of Hames of those who KinK”Hall» op cl t , pp 67 ff

Eee ail; ^:?°^^^e? 9 i9^ pp

A

Curtis's belief that the local Institutes would be led to grasp the
ie; essity oi Imperial union wos, of course, over-optimistic; but his view
0 f the Institutes as an "Important Imperial link" was perhaps not. Kenbers
0 f the various Institutes enjoyed reciprocal membership rights in other
parts of the Empire and meetings were often organised at Chatham House to
ba addressed by visiting Eoninion nationals.

Alongside Toynbee's annual Surveys of International Affairs, the
Institute fostered many works of Imperial relevance. Funds from the
Carnegie Trust <of which Hi chens was UK representative) enabled Hancock to
publish the first Surveys of Conmonvealth Affairs. Hugh Vyndhara published
three volumes in the lesser-known "Problei&s of Imperial Trusteeship"
scries. Hailey's magisterial African Survey was also published under FIIA
auspices. The RIIA was precluded by Its Charter from expressing corporate
opinions; nevertheless, Curtis himself was able to publish his Capital
Question of China as the "comnon result" of an RITA study group.’ Of nine
such groups in existence in 1936, four (on Empire relations, the Colonial
Question, Imperial Trusteeship and Empire Trade) were directly Imperial in
tiene. 2

Finally, mention should be nade of the series of Commonwealth
Nations Conferences organised by Chathan House and its sister Institutes,
‘^purpose of these was, in the words of a Chatham House official, "to
brIl >g into the open those . . . problems of the Commonwealth which do not
** r ge (at any rate In public) at full-dress Imperial Conferences". 3 If
problems into the open was one purpose, another was to discuss

3

Curtis, The Capital Question of China (London, 1932), Preface.
King-Hall , op clt . pp 114 ff.

245

elutions and provide reassurance. The 1933 Conference, for Instance,
5 ,ggested a number of improvements la the machinery for Imperial co-
nation, and ended in the "unaninous belief . . . that the British
CoUijnweal th ought to endure, and that it would in fact continue to hold
its place among the Fowers of the World". 1

In 1930 Curtis wrote that Ms aim in founding the Institute had been
■to embody as much of our Round Table novenent as possible in a permanent
institution". In the same breath, however, he complained that this had not
teen dene "as I could have wished by the Koot as the Moot". 2 There was
some truth in his complaint. All the Found Tablers were founding members
of tie Institute, attended meetings frequently, and spoke perhaps more than
their fair share. Nevertheless, none was as enthusiastic as Curtis. Brand
agreed to act as first Treasurer of the Institute, but only reluctantly, as
•It would not be possible to let anything got in the way of" the Round
Table. 3 Another worry was the Institute's journal. It w<*& thought that
few people would take both nvsga/t ines, and that there would inevitably be
competition for qualified writers.'’ Finally, there was Curtis himself, who
"as funded (with difficulty) by the Found Table, but appeared to spend all
Ms tine furthering the work of the Institute. As Dove remarked, "this
latter thing is all right. But Lionel's first love has still to be won,
and unless he returns to it, we shall all be the losers". 3

1 CHodson, 1 "British Coranonweal th Relations", RT, Dec 1933 <pp 42-61),
p 43.

2 Curtis to Hichens, Dawson, Brand and Lothian, 6 Aug 1930, Lothian
Papers 252, fols 627-32.

3 Brand to Curtis, 5 Dec 1919, Brand Papers, box 39.

4 Dove to Hichens, 5 Dec 1923, Lothian Papers 243, fols 590-94.

® Brand fed) , The Letters of Joha Dove (London, 1938), p 321.

h

246

Curtis was 58 in 1930 and, with the exception of Kerr, Coupland and
gcrsfal 1 * all the other Round Tablers weie la their 50s. Without the
production of "young blood" there was a real prospect of "the petering
ou t of the magazine" , which was "the thing we most wish to avoid".'

Other considerations, too, recommended a broadening of the Moot. The
Dominion groups were now languishing under the weight of a good deal of
seglect. The task set by the Moot, to study a range of questions which
vcold confront the Dominions were they "outside" the Empire, was criticised
by tie Kev Zealand members as distinctly "nebulous".* In 1932 Eggleston
suggested that the Dominion conraittees be allowed to revive themselves by
providing an expanded quota of the Round Table, including more opinionated
articles. There was now "no mutuality, no exchange" , he complained, and
tha Pound Table had become merely a "British Review with appendices".
Xeanwhilc, "the Enpire is disintegrating In the same mood of absence of
aiad as that in which it was built up". The Koot's response was again to
suggest "that we cannot do better than return to our old method of group
study". * Nevertheless, as Dove emphasised, it was. necessary to be sure
'that, if the work is taken up, it should be carried to completion".' 4

A decade of "marking time" had also resulted in a weakening of the
& ease of purpose of the London Moot, hardening divergent interests into

1 Curtis to Sir Arthur Salter, 17 April 1930, Lothian Papers 251,
fols 596-99.

2 J H A Ilott to Dove, 10 May 1927, Lothian Papers 20, fols 413-14.

3 F V Eggleston to T H Laby (copy), 1 April 1932, Lothian Papers 267,
fols 677-84; Dove to Laby, 16 June 1932, Lothian Papers 267, fols
718-21.

{ Dovo, "Decision with regard to Imperial problem" (sent 19 June 1932),
Lothian Papers 267, fols 722-24.

Ik.

^tblng approaching irreconcilable obsessions. Curtis now believed that
^loa was the storm-centre of world politics, both as the greatest
chillenge to international stability and as the Deans by which the
pinions would be brought to realise the necessity of imperial federation.
Lothian, on the other hand, had "frankly abandoned this! belief in the
possibility at any time of constitutional union" for the Enpire alone, and
*as now convinced that only if the United States were included in the
elation could the security of the Empire be maintained. 1 Xeanwhile, Grigg
was obsessed with the problems of the settlers in Kenya, and was
particularly bitter about the lack of support he found anongst the Moot.

In August 1931 Dove's drastic emendations to an article by Grigg
sparked off a furious series of letters to other members of the Yoot. To
Brand he declared that "if we do not bring the Round Table back to its
Imperial nission it will soon be nothing but a subsidiary and washy branch
of the Institute of International Affairs." 5 A similar letter to Hichens
at the end of the year elicited the confession "that your criticisms ate

JwtV

"But I don't think we ought to give It up ... .

{ Tiber e Is nothing at present to take the place of the
Found Table and do the work that it set out to do. As
a magazine I think It is first class and it has a
great reputation .... Vhat we want is, if
possible, to steer it back on to the old lines. And
there we get back to our root difficulty. How can the
Round Table committee be so reconstituted as to carry
out this work?" -3 '

Grl 88's feelings were eventually assuaged, and an answer found to Hichens'
question: that "a group of younger men" should be collected, "so that we

1 Dove to Coupland, 2 March 1923, Brand Fapers, box 70.

2 Gr *gg to Brand, 6 Aug 1931, Grigg Papers. YSS Ylcrofiln 1003.

3 Hichens to Grigg, 22 Dec 1931, Grigg Papers, MSS Microfilm 1003.

^Id campaign again on the old lines".’ It Is clear, then, that great
>cpes « re t& veste< * ia the recruitment of younger members.

Three new recruits were added to the Moot in 1930-31: (Sir) Harold
Sutler, <Sir> Ivison Macadam and H V Hodson. 2 Butler was a fellow of All
Sculs and deputy director (from 1932 director) of the International Labour
Office. He provided a number of Round Table articles between 1926 and
1932, and was an undoubted influence on the Found Table's European and
eosnomic coverage, nevertheless, his coorai tnents in Geneva prevented him
froa attending meetings on a regular basis, and he dropped out of the Moot
after 1934.

Macadam was one of the few Round Tablers educated at Cambridge.

After wartine service with the Royal Engineers and a spell organising the
Jaticnal Union of Students he Joined Chatham House, serving as secretary
aai later director general, from 1929 to 1955. Hodson recalled him as a
•strong practical man*, "reliable" but "enthusiastic" , "passionately loyal
to his country, his causes and his friends". He joined the Moot in 1931,
aod was an active member until his death in 1974.

Hodson was another long-term contributor, Joining the Moot in 1930
and remaining actively involved ever since. The youngest of the new
recruits (just 24 in 1930), Hodson was another fellow of Ail Souls, elected
1928. After a brief stint with the Economic Advisory Council (and
Irving as secretary of the Oxford Enquiry Society), Hodson was appointed

1 Grigg to Dovnie Stewart, 14 Oct 1933, Grigg Papers, MSS Microfilm
1003.

2 Sir Arthur (later Lord) Salter, then an official with the League of
Sations, was Invited to Join, but various coruni tments (including a
series of missions to China) prevented him from doing so.

Hodson, "Sir Ivlson Macadam", FT, April 1975, pp 221-22.

^istaot editor of the Round Table in 1931, and was funded to undertake an
eX tensi ve tour of the Empire. In 1934 he succeeded Dove as editor, a
position which he held until 1939. Alter the war he became assistant
editor then editor of The Sunday Tines, and In 1961 the first Provost of
Oltcbley <the Anglo-American "think-tank").

In 1934 Macadam and Hodson were Joined by three further recruits,
lalcoln Macdonald, John (Lord Redcliffe-) Maud and J H Penson. Macdonald,
the son of the Prime Minister, was himself a Junior minister at the
Doiinions Office. He resigned from the Moot following his appointment as
Dominions Secretary in 1935, but he renal ned in close contact with Curtis,
lacadan and other Round Tablers. Pinson (a member of th*» Cabinet
Secretariat) was also only briefly a Found Tabler: he was appointed one of
tie Sewfound land Commissioners early in 1937.

Xoud was a young fellow of University College, Oxford, whose interest
!o local government and the Empire was stimulated by the award of a Rhodes
Travelling Fellowship in 1932, which enabled hin to study Curtis's legacy
in Johannesburg. 1 Maud went on to becone Tutor to the Colonial
Uslnistrative Services course in 1937-39, followed by a long period in
jovernment service which included four years in South Africa as the last
British High Commissioner and the first British Ambassador. He was
; e*rarded with a life peerage in 1957. He remained a nember of the Moot
•“til 1979, just three years before his death.

In 1934, Hodson, Macadam and the otter new recruits formed a "Junior

to suggest ways for the Round Table to "sharpen the edge of its

r

Serial policy". The result was a remarkable re-af f irmation of the Round

fc*ud'& pooi on Local Government in Xodern England (London, 1932) was
followed by City Government: the Johannesburg Experiment (Oxford,
1938) which praised Curtis's foresight.

•e original alms. Co-oporatlon was described as "a shan" . Great

table

Jritaln was still responsible for the defence of the whole Empire: only the
existence of the League had prevented this from being nore widely seen,
yitb the re-emergence of 'power states", the true situation was becoming
clear. " ln these circumstances, is the Commonweal th not faced with the
sa* choice as the Found Table pointed out nearly a quarter of a century
ago, between the path to separation and the path to organic union?" 1

Severtheless, the younger Round Tablers believed that the tine was
no t yet ripe for painting the moral. Co-operation was still "capable of
grcwth" , and "probably the path to organic union no longer starts in quite
the same direction". The Round Table would have to work with the grain of
opinion. To press too far ahead would be to forego the possibility of
influence. 2

Some thought was given to reviving the "study group" aspect of the
Doainlon Round Tablers* work. In Australia the idea was welcomed: the
secretary of the Melbourne group thought that the Empire was fast returning
"to conditions similar to those which existed when the Round Table groups
** 1 ® founded".- In Canada, on the other hand, there was "no possibility'
of such moves: opinion in tlie Toronto group, like public opinion generally,
Mas ty r.o means convinced of the need. *

The proposal was, therefore, again put to one side. The Round Table
averted to its policy of "narking time". Nevertheless, it is clear that

1 Xacadam to Curtis, 17 April 1934, and Hodson, "Prolegomena on Round
Table Policy", f Apr 11 1934,1 RT Papers c 360, fols 43 and 45-49.

^ Hcdson, op cit .

Taby to Dove, 27 Sept 1933, (Melbourne file,) RT <0> Papers.

G P de T Glazebrook to Curtis, 15 Aug 1934, Lothian Fapers 285, fol
598.

I

251

, rt D flJ» D 5 thQ y^nger members the original alms of the movement still held
good: -organic union", although as yet inpractl cable (and, of course,
utdefined) " as sti11 the long-term goal.

Two more members were added to the Xoot later in the 1930s: Lord
Hailey in 1936 and Vincent Harlow in 193d. Bailey was an eminent Indian
Civil Servant, and in Curtis's view "the reverse of a reactionary". 1 He
returned to England in 1933 (although he was retained by the India Office
to help push through the 1935 Act). Curtis then persuaded him to direct
the ifrlcan Survey, which was published in 1938. Hailey's attendance at
Sound Table meetings was therefore irregular before the war, but he was an
active and respected figure in the Xoot thereafter. -

Harlow was an historian in the mould of Coupland, although "much less
ths public man and much more the devoted scholar": his historical writings
presented a far more sophist looted version of Coupla fid's Anglican and
anjlccentr ic thesis.' 1 ' He joined the Hoot at the time of his appointment as
Jhodes Professor In London; he left aflei succeeding Coupland as Beit
Professor in 1950.

The recruitment of Hailey and the younger Round Tabiers failed to
galvanise the Round Table in the way that had originally been intended.
Nevertheless, they clearly widened the range of opinion and expertise to be
lotnd within the Xoot. The Round Table certainly benefited.

1 Curtis to J H Oldham, 29 Kay 1933, Curtis Papers 91, fols 42-43.

Curiously, John Cell's biography of Halley (Cambridge, 1992) makes no
mention of his membership of the Xoot. The lack of Round Table items
amongst Hailey's Rhodes House papers may be the reason.

F Xadden, "The Commonwealth, Commonweal th History and Oxford", in
Xadden and Fieldhouse (eds), Oxford and the Idea of Commonwealth
(London, 1982), p 18; cf Ronald Robinson's contribution to the sane
volume .

3

gi|ftflg a_ar,d Ue-goaad iai?i e-3aga zlas.

The scale of contributions which the Round Table enjoyed between 1909
tB <l 19H *as not to be repeated. A reduced level of operations was
tk»refore maintained, with only one full-time secretary betwen the wars,
dec Handley, and with Curtis paying his own secretarial expenses. Despite
Its inevitable impact on sales, the price of the Found Table was doubled to
5/- per copy in March 1920.

The Fhcdes Trust "£ for £" arrangement was never revived, although
miner was able to secure a ono-off donation of £2500 in 1021. Abe Bailey
»as by far the most generous and dependable contributor, giving £1000 in
1923, £500 pa from 1924 to 1929, and leaving the Moot £1000 pa after his
deeth in 1940. Sir Joseph Flavelle, the Canadian Round Tabler, gave £300
pa for nost of the interwar period. Other substantial contributors
Included Lords Iveagh, Cowdray and Harabledon, the Macmillan fanily and Col
l V Leonard. In addition, Brand, Hichens, Malcolm, Dawson and (after 1930)
Lothian all gave regular amounts of between £50 and £200 pa. 1
Contributions nevertheless dwindled steadily throughout the interwar
period. In 1925, for instance, they still amounted to £2028, in 1930 to
W20, and in 1935 only to £170. 2

The magazine just about broke even, if the editors' salaries are
deluded. Dove drew the remarkably modest salary of £225 pa until 1930,

*nd £300 pa thereafter. Nevertheless, the Round Table also had to pay
^rtiG's salary of £1500 pa after 1924, and Hodson's (initially £600 pa,

1 'Contributors", Feb 1923, Brand Papers, box 70; "Note on contributors
to Round Table", [1929,1 Lothian Papers 22, fol 536; "Contributors",
£1931, J Lothian Papers 267, fol 705; Lothian to Dove, 14 Dec 1933,
^thian Papers 277, fol 621.

)

1 Round Table accounts, ] Lothian Papers 267, fols 698-709; Annual
8e Ports, RT (0) Papers.

253

risi°S t0 • C100 ° P a> a * ter 193 °- It was therefore fortuitous, first, that
fttiis was enabled by an inheritance to stop drawing a salary after 1930
ttl, secondly, that the Round Table was able to enter the 1930s with a
•considerable nest egg" of at least £13000 in investments. 1 Income from
tb« latter, which was probably in the region of £500 pa at contemporary
interest rates, was helpful in making up the shortfall. Even so, the Round
Tall® was making a regular loss of between £600 and £1400 pa throughout the
1930s, which had to be found from selling off investments. By the outbreak
of war, the latter stood at Just over £6500. 2

The income from sales of the Round Table magazine dropped steadily
through the 1920s, from £5400 in 1920 to £3483 in 1930. Taking into
accouat Macmillan's ccxnnission, this would suggest sales of approximately
COCO copies in 1920 falling to 4000 in 1930. By 1939, sales had fallen
further to 3700. Id the latter year, some 750 copies were still given out
free. After Britain itself, flew Zealand remained by far the best national
custoaer. 3

"he Moot's aim of taking "a distinctive line of its own"* 1 was not
always easy. The Round Table contained many individuals with strong views
and sometimes differing interpretations of the Imperial mission. Some of
tie problems which confronted the Enpire between the wars brought out these
differences to a peculiar degree. In a few cases, the clash of opinions

1 Curtis to Sir A Salter, 17 April 1930, Lothian Papers 231,
fols 596-99.

^ Annual Reports, RT <0) Papers.

3 iXagazlne accounts, 1920,3 Brand Papers, box 42; [magazine sales,
1925-31, J Lothian Papers 267, fols 698-701; Minutes of ET meeting,

14 June 1945, RT (0) Papers.

1 Dawson to Brand, 31 May 1923, Brand Papers, box 70.

254

^bin the Hoot resulted merely la acrimony. On the whole, however, such
a6eS were rare. The group loyalty engendered by familiarity and shared
ideals usually ensured that group discussions were genuinely productive,

|B <i resulted in the emergence of some form of consensus.

the Root's practice cf giving instructions to writers extended even to
jreas where members of the Xoot thenselves had little or no special
competence. 1 Frequently, drastic revisions were demanded once an article
bad been written, even when the article in question was written by a member
of the Moot. Authors were not always happy with this arrangement:
g V JCassingham, who was commissioned to write an article on the British
•yellow" press in 1924, suggested "that tho reforms which the Found Tablo
dll eventually put forward for the future conduct of the Press should not
Include that of editorship by a Conuai ttee" . 9

Members of the Moot wrote some 58 % of identified ■'policy’' articles
between the wars. 3 Dove wrote few articles and, as he admitted, when he
iid he tended "to make bricks without straw or rather you nay say to steal
of other peoples' straw".'* By far the most prolific writer from
iiosgst the "aboriginal" members continued to be Kerr. Almost invariably
•is articles appeared as the first in each issue; Dove described them as
"voice" of the Round Table . 6 Brand, Curtis, Grigg and Malcolm also
provided a substantial number of articles; Coupland, Dawson and Hichens

See, eg, Kerr to A V A Leeper, 19 Jan 1920, Lothian Papers 214,
fol 144, for an article on the internal politics of Russia.

1 H V Xassi ngham to Dove, 13 Feb 1924, Brand Papers, box 70.

2 See Appendix D, " Round Table Articles, by Author".

1 Dove to Brand, 29 Oct 1923, Brand Papers, box 70.

5 Dove to Brand, 23 June 1933, Lothian Papers 276, fols 608-11.

255

fitter less. Horsfall wrote at least 39 articles between 1919 and 1939,

,id Hodson at least 29 between 1930 and 1939.

Id Canada, Australia, Hew Zealand and South Africa, the Dominion Round
Table groups continued to be responsible for the production of local
•chronicles" throughout the interwar period. A short-lived Indian "group"
taa instituted at the end of 1920 by L F Rushbrook Williams, director of
the Government of India's publicity department producing the annual "Blue
Book*. 1 He continued to provide Round Table articles until 1925;
thereafter articles were provided by John Coatnan (1926-32), Ian Stephens
<1931—34 ) , Xaurice Yeatts (1934-37) and A Inglis (1937-42). Whitney
Shepardson contributed articles from America from 1920 to 1934; he rejected
the idea of a committee, on the grounds that agreement would be difficult,
and that any good writer sought advice anyway.* Shepardson was succeeded
as US correspondent by Erwin Canham <ol the Christian Science Monitor'), who
continued to provide articles until 1955. John Horgan provided the bulk of
Irish articles between 1923 and 1967. A short-lived Shanghai group to
produce Far East articles was set up by Curtis in 1930, but was disbanded
after the Moot decided against giving regular coverage to what they
regarded as Curtis's latest obsession. 3

The renainder of the Round Table consisted of articles individually
cosaissioned, often, of course, following guidelines laid down by the Moot.
^''Son's nenbership was here of considerable use. R M Barrington-Ward and
kpt Colin Coote provided a number of articles on British politics, and The

1 B ff Lascelles to Kerr, 30 Dec 1920, Lothian Papers 214, fols 126-29.

2 Lothian to Shepardson, 16 Jan 1935, Lothian Papers 295, fol 660;

Shepardson to Lothian, 4 April 1935, Lothian Papers 296, fol 708.

3 Curtis to the Xoot, 24 Jan 1930, Lothian Papers 23, fol 636; Dove to

Br and, 28 July 1930, Lothian Papers 252, fol 623.

flies’ foreign correspondents (Including Borman Ebbutt, Ernest de Caux and
tie Conte d'Ormesson) contributed several articles on their respective
countries. The Moot sometimes obtained articles from local journalists
(such as A Stanley Parker of the Egyptian Gazette or Herr Kirchen of the
frankfurter Zeitung) or from freelance writers (such as )(aurice Hindus, who
m-ote on Russia). On the whole, however, the Moot preferred not to employ
•tie hack writer type". 1

Academics provided a number of articles: Sir Arthur Bowley wrote on
the birth-rate. Prof H A Smith on the Imperial Conference, and Dr David
Xitraay on the Balkans. All Souls was a particularly important source of
authors (such as G C Faber, G F Hudson and Reginald Harris). Probably the
largest group of outside writers, however, consisted of government
officials, either serving or retired. Sir Villiam Peters wrote on Russia
froa the British Embassy at Moscow, Sir William KcClure on Italy from the
Efllassy at Rome. Sir Frederick Whyte provided a number of articles on
India and the far east. Sir Arthur Villert wrote on Europe, Sir Reginald
Paterson on Egypt and Sir Selv/yn Grier on Vest Africa. Sot all such
witers merely reiterated government policy; indeed, many used the freedom
"Mch anonymity provided to venture expert and authoritative criticism.

1 Brand to Dove, 19 Dec 1922, Brand Papers, box 70.

257

^p fl ftl.EMS QF EMPIRE ASP COMXOBVEALTH. 1Q1Q-3Q

Eggleston's complaint of 1932, that the Round Table had become a
•British Review with appendices", was to a large extent justified. Only
5 OB 0 62 of Identified "policy" articles published between the wars were by
poalnion Round Tablers, compared to 202 before 1914. 1 It was true, also,
that international affairs accounted for a greatly increased proportion of
the Pound Table's coverage. Nevertheless, Imperial and Commonwealth
affairs, and especially the politics and relations of Britain and the self-
governing Dominions, still provided the Round Table's primary focus. India
no* received roughly the same attention as each of the Dominions, but the
other dependencies continued to be poorly represented.*

sipire and Common wealth

Ironically, Curtis's favoured term "Commonwealth" came increasingly
to rival "Enpire" as the accepted description of the territories united
under the British crown . 3 Equally ironically, Curtis's “principle of the
Coconwealth" , which had caused such misgivings when first it made its
appearance, now came to be "generally accepted" within the Moot, as he
could claim in 1930. * Curtis attributed the delay in accepting his thesis

Seo Appendix D, " Round Table Articles, by Author".

See Appendix C, "Round Table Coverage, by Subject".

SR Xehrotra, "On the Use of the Term 'Commonweal th' " , JCPS, vol II,
do 1 <Hov 1963), pp 10 ff; cf Hancock, Survey of British Commonwealth
Affairs, Vol 1 (London, 1937), pp 32, 54 and 58.

Curtis to Hichens, Dawson, Brand and Lothian, 6 Aug 1930, Lothian

Papers 252, fol 627.

Scarcely less Important were the

w t&e process of “mental digestion". 1

rasignations or departures of some of Curtis's fiercest critics within the
group, a Qd the wa ^time and postwar disrepute into which the idea of
*efpi re " Nevertheless, it would not seen unreasonable to speculate

that Curtis's colleagues discovered what night be described as the
propaganda value of his doctrine.

The Round Table's characteristic philosophy was elaborated not for
*>rely acadenic purposes, but in the heat of controversy and with specific
iitentions. In the 1920s and 30s, Found Tablers were concerned to contrast
their own progressive vision of Empire with the "old" imperialism of
•diehards" such as Lady Milner, Winston Churchill and Lord Lloyd - whoso
iasistence on outdated and unnecessary forms of control they believed would
lead to a colossal increment in the forces of indigenous nationalism and
anti-imperial ism . 9

Primarily, however, the Round Tablers were concerned to disarm the
eieales cf Enpire, amongst whom they numbered Dominion, Irish, Egyptian and
Iidian nationalists; American anti-imperialists; internationalists of the
league of Nations Union type; and assorted radicals such as Norman Leys
<*hoa Round Tablers regarded as "a fanatic", and who in turn described
Curtis as "one of the three wholly evil people I have ever met" 4 ). To

1 Ibid.

2 Xilner recognised that the word "empire" conjured up a vista of
■conquest, of domination, of the oppression of the weak by the
strong": Questions of the Hour (London, 1923), p 112.

3 Soe, eg, Grigg to Lady Milner, 30 May 1933, Grigg Papers, MSS
Xicrofiln 1005, accusing her and Churchill of " chort-sightodnoss" .

* Grigg to Lovat Fraser, 7 Aug 1925, Grigg Papers, MSS Microfilm 1002;
Paul B Rich, Race and Empire ia British Politics (Cambridge, 1986),

P 63, quoting Leonard Barnes' unpublished autobiography.

tk

tkls H st tbe lnterwar years added another, perhaps more dangerous, threat:
golelievism. As early as July 1917, Kerr saw this creed as the nain enemy
0 i -the people of the British Isles, who almost alone clearly comprehend
. the dominant idea of the Commonwealth - loyalty to principle and
loyally to the whole". ’ Likewise, Curtis described the “principles" for
»hicl the British Commonwealth stood as being locked in mortal combat "with
those of Karx, which are their negation". 2

Two aspects of the Commonwealth "principle" might be distinguished,
although it was their combination in the historical and contemporary Empire
by which Round Tablers set most store: "unity" and "freedom". Frank
patecham was right in describing Curtis as being "on the side of the big
significant forces". 3 The essence of the Round Table argument was that, as
law was the only substitute ior war, it was the citizen's duty to recognise
the overriding claim of the highest authority to which he was subject,
which in the British case was the "enbryo" and "model" of the future world-
stste.' 1 Internationalism was harnessed to the cause of Empire, which was
projected as a brave experiment in "fusing nationalism and racialism . . .
into a higher unity" . 6

The second component of the "Commonweal th" argument was that the

1 Kerr to Curtis, 21 July 1917, Lothian Papers 33, fols 19-21.

^ Curtis to Hichens, Dawson, Brand and Lothian, 6 Aug 1930, Lothian
Papers 252, fol 629; cf "Memorandum for discussion at Blickling",

19 Sept 1932, Lothian Papers 268, fols 742-51.

Frank Pakenham (Lord Longford), Peace by Ordeal (London, 1935),

P 141.

1 See, eg, Kerr's Villiamstown Lectures of 1923, in Kerr and Curtis,

The Prevention of Var (New Haven, 1923).

Grigg to Jeffrey Williams, 9 May 1933, Grigg Papers, MSS Microfilm
1004.

260

r

British Empire existed in order to assist Its peoples towards freedom -
tk4 t it was, Indeed, the world's "great nursery of national states,
floured as well as white". 1 In Curtis's hands, the argument was often
poreued ad absur.dan, as when he clained that the first British invaders of
India were "all unconsciously laying f the] foundations" for "a structure of
government based on the principle of the commonweal th" . 2 In the writings
0 f other Round Tablorc tho argument wac put forward in a more sophisticated
fora. Coupland, in particular, deserves recognition as one of the ablest
exponents of the "constitutional procession" interpretation of Imperial
history, in which Britain's various dependencies were held to be moving at
different stages along a well-worn path "of assinilation or equalization",
from direct rule through innumerable levels of representation towards full
responsible government. 3

The Round Tablers' conception of the "constitutional procession" left
great scope for the continued exercise of Imperial power, In the first
place, the "habits of mind upon which self-government is based cannot begin
to develop unless they are policed, advised, and to a great extent
adainlstered by some stable power from without".' 1 Imperial supervision was
necessary right up to tho point of full internal self-government. Gandhi
"as wrong in thinking that suffering was itself an education in self-
government: "the breakdown of government . . . precludes any training

1 Curtis, Cl vitas Del, Volume Two (London, 1937), p 336.

2 Ifcld, p 119.

See Ccupland, The Expire Id These Days (London, 1935), p 179 and

Dassi m . The term "constitutional procession" was coined by Zimmern:

The Third British Expire (London, 1926), p 8.

I Kerr,] "The Price of Liberty", XT, Dec 1919, p 18.

m self- government".' Setbacks were indeed inevitable. The Found Table
pointed to the interwar experience in Cyprus and Ceylon as evidence of "the
tfnd of difficulties that are likely to arise when representative
institutions are granted to a people whose capacity to govern is still open
to question" . 2

The Round Table's attachment to the principle of sel f-governnent was
further constrained by the belief, held by moot Round Tablers throughout
the period 1919-1939, that the dependencies could never be given
Independence outside the Commonwealth. Internal sel f-government was one
thing; control of defence and foreign policy quite another. The point was
eipfcasised whenever the question of Indian constitutional advance was
addressed. 11 Hodson argued in 1931 and again in 1939 that Indian sell-
government would have to include control of external affairs."

Isvertheless, as late as 1943, Coupland found it impossible to conceive of
aa “independent Indian foreign policy and defence'. 5

It should be noted, finally, that it was by no means clear to all
Round Tablers that the Westminster nodel was always an appropriate one.
Coupland emphasised that "Dominion self-government" did not necessarily

1 Curtis, “Memorandum for Discussion at Blickling", 19 Sept 1932,

Lothian ? apors 268, fol 744.

2 (Isaac Foot,] “A Legislature for Palestine?" FT, June 1936,
pp 513-15.

^ See, eg, Curtis, Letters to the People of India on Responsible

Government (London edn, 1918), p 61; (Lothian, 1 "India: Constitution
or Chaos-, FT, March 1931, pp 269 ff.

4 Hofison to Dove, 27 Feb 1931, Lothian Papers 253, fols 718-25; Hodson,
'The Round Table" [circulated 6 Jan 19393, Brand Papers, box 153.

5

Coupland, The Future cf India (Oxlord, 1943), p 174.

«ptail adoption of a parliamentary model.’ More emphatically, Grigg
^rted that the latter was "entirely devoid of flexibility and quite
incapable of engendering the essential spirit of compronise in countries
„ber« racial and ccmnunal divisions present the principal political
difficulty". 2 Grigg himself outlined an alternative, corporatist model for
gast Africa in 1934, and although he achiovod no success in "trying . . .
to aoke Lionel [Curtis! take on cone thing of this kind", he received warm
support from Duncan, Malcolm and Richard Jebb. (Malcolm and Jebb both
suggested that corporatism should also be applied to Britain. )*

It is clear, then, that the Round Table's commitment to self-
government in the dependencies was by no means straightforward. Their
development of the language of "Commonwealth" was undoubtedly important,
but it was affirmative rather than critical. The reasons why the group was
soaetines prominent amongst those who urged an accelerated advance towards
self-government are to be found less in any a priori attachment to the
democratic principle than in a pragmatic response to the fragility of
British power.

Instead

The "principle of the Commonwealth" was In many ways simply an
application of "trusteeship" to the constitutional sphoro. Although the
Corner principle was the Round Table's characteristic contribution to the

Coupland, The Empire in These hays (London, 1935), p 115; cf his
letter to The Times, 20 Feb 1935.

Grigg, The British Ccnmonwealth (London, 1943), p 52.

Grl Sg. The Constitutional Probien in Kenya (Nottingham, 1934); Grigg
bo Duncan, 21 March 1934, Grigg Papers, MSS Microfilm 1004; Duncan to
Gr *gg, 25 Feb 1934, Malcolm to Grigg, 21 April 1934, Jebb to Grigg, 4
F *b 1934. Ibid .

263

r

on Enpire, the latter continued to inform much Round Table writing
0B tha dependencies. Coupland in particular preferred "trusteeship" to
■frja^meealth" , but other Round Tablers (including Curtis) also tended to
use the terms interchangeably. 1 In bis wartime Round Table articles, Korr
anticipated Lugard's more famous statement of the case by a number of years
when he asserted that dependencies were held in trust not only on behalf of
their inhabitants, but also "on behalf of civilization". 2

The Round Table was, of course, not unusual in suggesting that
British rule either was or should be characterised by "trusteeship". The
principle was common currency amongst all shades of opinion on the Empire.
Fevertheless, different shades clearly attached different weight to the
idea, and injected into it different contents. Here, again, the Round
Table was to be found playing a mediating role: seeking on the one hand to
disara the critics of Empire, and on the other to linit the influence of
less progressive exponents of the Imperial ethic.

Round Tablers were acutely sensitive to the charge that "all the talk
atcut ' trusteeship' " wac "merely camouflage or cant", and that British rule
bad been imposed for no "other purpose than to smooth the profitable path
British trade".* The locus classlcus of such an interpretation was J A
3obsoa's Imperial iso of 1902. After one bruising encounter with its
author, Curtis was driven to exclaim: "One's heart bleeds for Hobson! It

See, eg, lCurtis.3 Xaterial for Indian Chapter C 19163, RT Papers
c 828, fols 338 and passim .

" l Kerr, J "The Harvest of Var" , RT, Dec 1915, p 13. For Lugard, see

The Dual Xandate Id British Tropical Africa (London, 1922), p 18 and

Pa ssim .

Coupland, The Enpire In These Days (London, 1935), pp 163-64.

264

^ hurt I should imagine to thini so ill of men in general!" 1
j c *ortheless, Hobson's critique found increasing favour. It was clearly
insufficient simply to impute a nalignant intention to those who adopted
g^ch a critique. Indeed, it was "imperative ... to counteract the
increasing vogue" of their "dangerous half-truths". 2 This the Round
lablers sought to do partly by emphasising that Britain derived no
particular economic advantage from the control of her colonies, nor should
see* to do so.

Vith the exception of Grlgg, the Moot was firmly opposed to the
Chasten ai nit e tradition of Imperialism, still upheld by the lifces of
issry, which regarded the colonies as "undeveloped estates" to be exploited
for the sole benefit of the metropolitan economy. 3 The majority of Round
fablers remained firmly committed both to free trade orthodoxy and to an
interpretation of "trusteeship" in which the maintenance of an "open door"
sale moral and political, as well as economic, sense. In 1926 the Found
fable argued that the abandonment of Britain's "open door" policy would
excite the hostility of other powers, especially the United States; in 1930
Harold Butler invoked tho example of the Thirteen Colonies to warn against

arousing the resentment of the inhabitants of the dependencies themselves. n
Both arguments were deployed in 1932, in anticipation of the Ottawa

Curtis to Coupland, 29 Nov 1916, RT Papers c 817, fols 169-70.

Coupland, "The Study of the British Conmonwealth" (inaugural lecture
as Beit Professor, Oxford, 19 Nov 1921), reprinted in The Enpire In
These Days (London, 1935), p 22.

Nor Grigg, see "The British Empire, the League of Nations and the
Rhodes Ideal", (circulated 28 Sept 1932, J Lothian Papers 268, fols
753-89.

"Post-Var Tendencies in Empire Trade", RT, Sept 1926, pp 690-703;

1 8 Butler, 1 "Imperial Economic Unity", RT, Sept 1930, pp 745-65.

Conference . 1

When the British Government did impose tariff preferences in the non-
tf ndated colonies, followed by anti-Japanese quotas and duties, Coupland
replied with a forceful denunciation of a policy which "goes far to justify
what is said abroad of our national hypocrisy". 2 Hodson again pressed in
1937 for an urgent reconsideration of a policy which threw into question
the whole moral basis of British rule. "Is a trustee . . . entitled to
eate a commercial arrangement with himself on behalf of his ward which is
to his own profit, even though it also be to his ward's?" The Round
Table's answer was a clear and unequivocal "no". 3

While the Moot was thus fervently opposed to an ocor.onic policy in

the dependencies which favoured 3ritain at the expense of other developed

cojntries, there was no hostility to the idea of Western economic

penetration as such. Indeed, the argument that "the white man who seeks to

develop the resources" of a colony was "a natural enemy of the native" was

thought to be the reverse of the truth. A As Coupland argued,

"Livingstone linked commerce with Christianity as a
means of fulfilling our duty to 'civilise* Africa.
And it is becoming more and more obvious in these
days that the execution of a 'trust' for the welfare
of the natives . . . depends for its efficiency on
an adequate local revenue, which in turn depends on
economic development" . *

tHodson, 1 "Imperial Preference", RT, March 1932, pp 246-65.

f Coup] and, 1 "The Future of Colonial Trusteeship", RT, Sept 1934,
pp 732-45.

fHodson, 3 "Colonial Tariffs and Quotas", RT, Dec 1937, pp 92-109.

f Kerr, J "The Next Imperial Conference", RT, March 1926, pp 227-55 .

tCoupiand, J "The Future of Colonial Trusteeship”, RT, Sept 1934,

P 734.

5

266

.philanthropy and five per cent" here, thus, far from incompatible.

£r«overi it was part of the Empire's "trusteeship" to ensure that the
j 5 t«ral resources of the colonies were made available to the developed
jeoaoaies of the Vest.’

Only slowly did It dawn on the Sound Tablers that relatively few of
the benefits of economic development reached the Inhabitants of the
colonies themselves. At the time of Labour's 1929 Colonial Development
let, Kerr wrote to Garvin that Britain's record in her dependent Empire -
coapared to France's or America's - had been an "economic failure", and
that "we never really tackled the problem of raising the standard of living
if the people". 2 nevertheless, it was only after the outbreak of riots in
the Vest Indies that the Round Table began to tackle the problem. Even
then, the solution proferred was. not an adjustment of the economic
ldvantages within the colonies or between the colonioc and metropolis, but
'the provision of some outlet . . . for the surplus population". 3 The
principle of financial self-sufficiency was still being upheld by
»ir Selwyn Grier in March 1939, although he broke new ground by championing
the interests of the producer against those of the nonopol istic trading
; 0 B?anies. “

Lord Hailey's African Survey has often teen credited with leading the

towards state-assisted colonial developnent which took place at the
ginning of the Second Vorld Var. J V Cell has shown that Hailey himself

-Hodson.J "Colonial Raw Materials", RT, March 1936, pp 306-14.

Serr to Garvin, 23 Sept 1929, Lothian Papers 236, fols 244-46.

"Inperlal Eesponsibi 1 i ties in the Vest Indies", RT, Sept 1938,

Pp 692-707.
i

J Grler,) "Problcns of British Vost Africa", RT, March 1939,
PP 291-308.

^ m fact "just in time to catch the tide" initiated primarily by Malcolm
gjcDonaid and the Fabians. 1 There is no evidence to suggest that other
sabers of the Round Table were of importance in this shift. On the other
they rapidly adjusted themselves to the new way of thinking. By 1942,
galley was calling in the Round Table for "a new conception" of
*>tropclitan-colonial relations which would include a "far nore effective
Intervention on our part to promote their development than the traditions
of a previous generation had contemplated". 2

jtvHar "Constitution or Chaos"

The Round Table's dealings with India between 1010 and 1010
illustrated the importance of personal contacts and individual interest in
the evolution of Moot policy. Both were more limited in scope for the
first decade after 1919. Curtis appears to have lost interest in India,
and Dove was the only member of the Moot to visit the country in the early
1920s. Meston left India early in 1920. Harris remained until 1928, but
he was by no means willing to initiate any new directions in Round Table
policy. The Round Tablers' main contacts in India were their regular
correspondents. Rushbrook Williams and Coatnan were successive directors
°f Public Information, and Stephens worked for the same department; Yeatts
an official in the Home Department. Curtis and Kerr both attempted to
e uiiven the magazine with contributions from native Indians, but the
^.'ority of the Moot was unwilling to undertake any such "experiment". 3

J V Cell , Hailey (Cambridge, 1992), p 240.

t Hailey, ] "The Future of the Colonies", RT, Dec 1942, pp 8-16.

Minutes of RT meeting, 31 July 1929, RT (0) Papers; Miss Handley to
Kerr, 11 Feb 1930, Lothian Papers 244, fol 613.

3

Grigg complained in 1931 that the Round Table's Indian chronicles
fisted largely of “wandering consents on the fluctuations of Indian
opinion".* There was much truth in his criticism. Coatman admitted that
Indian politics left him "pu22led and irritated". 2 It was generally
believed that the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms went far towards meeting the
desands of the nationalist movement. (Similarly, the missionary official
j i Oldham thought that the reforms gave Indians "the power ... of
wasting, within a measurable period of tine, complete swaraJ". 3 ) The
nationalist attitude was therefore proof that Indians were not yet "fit for
wlf-governnent" . 4

The question of some further constitutional advance was raised as
early as Fovenber 1920 by E ff Lascelles, a former Hew Zealand Round Tabler
nov eaployed as a lecturer by the Indian Army. Lascelles was highly
critical of the ICS's lack of "political sense", and suggested various
secsures to accustom the Service to working under responsible government.®
<Fone, Incidentally, was advocated by the Pound Table. ) Turning to the

cocst i tut Iona 1 sphere,

"There is one thing of which I feel certain: it is
that it will not be possible to wait for the statutory
period of ten years before the next advance is made. I
think that it is essential that forward thinking should
be done from the outset and that we should make
concessions before they are demanded .... Round

Grigg to Hichens, 15 Dec 1931, Grigg Papers, MSS Microfilm 1003.

ICoatnan,] "The Inwardness of the Indian Problem", RT, June 1926,
p 302.

Oldham Ito Dovo?] , 31 Dec 1921, Lothian Papers 19, fols 232-39.

tR Vi 11 ions, J "India: A Survey of the Situation", RT, Dec 1924,
p 149.

Lascelles to Kerr, 16 Dec 1919, Lothian Papers 213, fols 77-81.

Table thinking is very necessary just now. My
Impression is that India wants Curtis again". 1

kittle came of this letter. Kerr wrote back that, in the opinion of the

foot, Her Majesty's Government had, if anything, been over-generous with

its reforms. It was now up to Indians to work them. 2

3y 1923, there was considerable discussion within Government of India

circles of the causes of the political impasse. (This led to the

appointment of the Muddiman Committee in 1924, whose majority reported the

following year that the main cause of deadlock was the irresponsible

attitude of Indian politicians. 3 ) In April 1923 a memorandum, apparently

by Curtis, discussed the desirability or otherwise of some further British

dsclaration of aims. The memorandum failed to cone to a decision one way

or the other, but posited something short of Dominion self-government, with

no responsibility for defence or foreign policy, as the "ultimate limit"

wlich India would reach in "three or four generations, perhaps longer ". A

The extent of Indian unrest could not forever be obscured by a cloud

oi condemnation and wishful thinking. The early appointment of the Simon

Commission in 1927 acknowledged this fact; its reception in India confirmed

It. Once again, the question of Indian constitutional reform forced itself

onto the British agenda.

In June 1928 the Round Table re-instituted its "Indian Moot", now
consisting of Curtis, Dove, Feetham, Kerr and Harris. Curtis was deputed

1 Lascelles to Kerr, 24 Hov 1920, Lothian Papers 214, fols 113-5.

2 Kerr to Lascelles, 24 Dec 1920, Lothian Papers 214, fols 121-23.

2 Report of the Reforms Enquiry Committee . . . appointed by tbe

Government of India <Cmd 2360), 1925.

* t Curtis?, I "India" t circulated to Moot 6 April 1923], Brand Papers,
box 70.

to write lor the Round Table on the "broad questions of principle".’
probably because of a divergence of views within the "Indian Moot",

Curtis's article was somewhat anodyne: welcoming the opportunity for
review, but impressing a good deal of caution. 2 Meanwhile, Dawson was
striking out somewhat further than his colleagues. Between Decenber 1928
aad March 1929 he visited India, and on his return he wrote a large nunber
of leaders and articles on India "with the idea of educating the public at
home" on the necessity of some forward move. (The Times' Indian coverage
ns subsequently printed as a pamphlet to show that the English press was
•not unconstructi ve" . > 3

The divergence of views within the "Indian Moot" finally came to a
head towards the end of 1929. The occasion was provided by Harris's
article commemorating the tenth anniversary of the Reforms. Harris cane
close to acknowledging the failure of the 1919 Act, which "nobody for
cioice would wish to see . . . indefinitely prolonged". Nevertheless, he
saw a "difficulty ... in extracting from its record any sure guidance for
tie future", and offered a gloomy prognosis for the forthcoming Simon
Report, as bound to run into the saxae problems of Indian "irresponsibility"
and unrealistic expectations. *

Kerr wrote to Marris, trying to persuade him to change the tone of
b:s article. Britain was in India as an "indispensable adviser" not as of

* Minutes of RT meeting, 12 June 1928, RT <0> Papers.

2 l Curtis, 3 "The Task of the Simon Commission", RT, Sept 1928,
pp 685-713.

3 Dawson, Motes on Indian Tour and subsequent articles, Dawson
Papers 83, fols 141-45; cf F J Xoore, The Crisis of Indian Unity,
1917-40 (Oxford, 1974), pp 47-48.

4 I Marris, J "India aad 1930", RT, Dec 1929, pp 50-78.

•divine right". He identified a fundamental "defect" in Karris's article,

“that it assumes that Great Britain alone, with the
advice of the Simon Commission, has got to decide
about the future o£ the Indian Constitution. In the
strictly constitutional sense this is true. In the
political sense I believe it is quite untrue".'

Harris refused to make the changes Kerr requested: the idea "that Indian

seatioent must not merely be consulted, but a ppeased" . might be "the Round

Table's view but it is not my view and so I cannot write it ". 2

Kerr's controversy with Karris was really over a question of degree:

Karris did not deny that Indians should be consulted and, where possible,

tfoa over, while Kerr still saw a large role for the British in assessing

Indian claims. Nevertheless, Kerr and the Round Table were now more

Inclined to place more responsibility for finding a solution in Indian

hands. The substantive reason for this was a realisation that otherwise

British rule would lead "through Black and Tannery to inevitable defeat". 3

The "Irwin Declaration" of 31 October 1929 committed the Governaent

to the policy which Kerr had urged on Karris.- The concomitant pledge that

Doainion status was "the natural issue of India's constitutional progress"

subsequently aroused much opposition. Harris thought that it would merely

encourage Indians to press for a complete British withdrawal. 5 From South

1 Kerr to Karris, 23 Oct 1929, Lothian Papers 237, fols 327-32.

1 Karris to Kerr, 25 Oct 1929, Lothian Papers 237, fols 333-4.

Karris's emphasis. Harris's article was printed as it stood, owing

to the lack of time for finding a new writer: Kiss Handley to Karris,

23 Oct 1929, Lothian Papers 237. fol 338.

3 Kerr to Karris, 23 Oct 1920, Lothian Papers 237, fols 327-32.

* The Declaration was issued despite considerable opposition from

within the Cabinet and elsewhere: see R J Xoore, The Crisis of Indian
Unity, 1917-40 (Oxford, 1974) pp 41-94, and J Brown, Gandhi and Civil
Disobedience (Cambridge, 1977), pp 42 ff.

5

Karris to Lothian, 24 July 1930, Lothian Papers 252, fols 612-16.

ytlca, Duncan opposed the idea on different grounds:

■ India will never fit in as a Dominion in the
existing scheme of the British Commonwealth. Her
coming la will help to break such bonds as still are
left of unity. The alternatives are to hold her by
force or let her go and of these two I prefer the
latter .... Ve can't afiord it and she isn't
worth it " . '

leither Karris's nor Duncan's views found favour with the Moot. Dawson
gave Irwin's declaration a hearty endorsement in The Tines, 2 while in the
pcond Table Kerr welcomed it as "statesmanlike". Britain had now accepted
the case for self-government; "the question to be decided is the practical
one, a* to how far and at what pace responsibility can he safely
transferred" . 3

Given Kerr's acknowledgement of the need to conciliate, if not
appease, Indian opinion, what is surprising is how limited were the steps
be favoured. After seeing the Simon Commission's provisional scheme, he
suggested further reservations: that the Governors should possess more
powers than a "constitutional monarch"; and that the executives be opened
to non-elect ed individuals nominated by the Chief Minister or Governor. 3
At tie level of central government, Kerr saw "democracy" as "entirely out
of tie question". He suggested a consultative Assembly consisting of
delegations from provincial legislatures, and a Council - with undefined
Powers - entirely selected by the Viceroy. 5 Kerr's suggestions represented
4 considerable advance on the 1919 Reforms, but they fell far short both of

Duncan to Dove, 29 Dec 1931, RT Papers c 813, fcls 63-65.

The Tioes, 1 Nov 1929.

£ Kerr, 1 "Vbere are Ve Going?" RT, March 1930, p 231.

Kerr to Simon, 3 March 1930, Lothian Papers 253, fols 779-83.
Kerr to Simon, 1C Karch 1930, Lothian Papers 253, fols 784-92.

5

273

Dominion status (even as interpreted before the 1926 Conference) and of
Indian expectations.

The Simon Commission's proposals had already "been overtaken by
British initiatives" by the time they were published. 1 The Moot was still
intent on ■emphasising the importance of fixing a limit beyond which Great
Britain cannot go" 2 , but it soon became clear that a more positive response
Has needed. At a meeting at the end of July 1930, attendod by Coatman but
not Karris, the Moot agreed that after the Si non Report had advocated
responsible government in the provinces, "it was impossible not to go
further" and introduce "a measure of responsibility* at the centre.

Control of the ICS, the Army, the frontier province, relations with the
princes and the Consolidated Fund would, however, remain under the direct
control of the Viceroy. 3

Kerr/Lothian was deputed to appraise the Report for the Round Table.

He devoted a large part of his article to a plea for collaboration.

■The real task before India is not to get rid of the
British Raj ... . Indeed, the greatest danger to
India today is that Great Britain may become too
ready to throw off her responsibility and to leave
India to 'stew in her own juice' .... Indians
should assume the actual responsibility for a large
part of Indian government, and demonstrate their
capacity to maintain themselves in power and to carry
on a Just and efficient administration, before the
steadying hand of Britain is wholly removed."

Having acknowledged that the Simon Report "has no friends" in India,

Lothian proceeded to praise its generosity and even suggested that it went

'dangerously far". ffo mention was made of the further steps agreed by the

1 J Brown, Modern India: the Origins of an Asian Democracy (Oxford,

1985), p 256.

2 Dove to Lothian, 8 July 1930, Lothian Papers 251, fols 600-02.

3 Minutes of RT neeting, 31 July 1930, RT (0) Papers.

Criticised by Dove for

^ot, only of the idea of "fixing a Halt". 1

^tting the Koot's "positive suggestion", Lothian argued that to have
included proposals for constitutional noves at the centre would not have
helped the Hound Table Conference <to which he had been appointed one of
the Liberal delegates). Some concession by Britain was inevitable, but it
was iaportant for Indians to be seen to share responsibility for whatever
scleia night emerge. 2 3

The first Round Table Conference was remarkable mainly for the

princes' agreement to the idea of an all-India federation. Lothian, like

other British participants, saw this as a godsend. In an article for the

Rovnd Table - 2000 copies of which were printed as a pamphlet and

circulated to every XP as well as in India and the United States* - he

6teted enthusiastically that the Conference "has started India and Great

Britain on a new road from which there can be no turning back". 4 *

After a discussion of the Implications of the Princes' announcement,

Anery recorded Lothian's opinion that

"the control at the centre will be in the hands of the
Princes who will not only conmand a third of the
members in the Legislature but have no difficulty
whatever in buying up the others. His whole picture in
fact was one of a thoroughly corrupt but otherwise
peaceful and monarchical India". 6

tothian put the case nore circumspectly in the Round Table. There would be

1 t Lothian, 1 "The Crisis in India", RT, Sept 1930, pp 679-708.

3 Lothian to Dove, 27 Aug 1930, Lothian Papers 252, fol 642, replying to
Dove to Lothian, 20 Aug 1930, Ibid, fols 638-41.

3 Lothian to Dove, 13 Xarch 1931, Lothian Papers 253, fol 713.

i Lothian, 1 "India: Constitution or Chaos", FT, Xarch 1931, p 240.

J Barnes and D Nicholson <eds>, The Empire at Bay ; The Leo Amery

Maries, 1929-45 (London, 1968), p 296 (entry of 16 June 1933).

5

little place for Congress radicalism in an all-India federation. While
Britain should retain certain essential powers (such as nomination of the
Viceroy and, through him, control of the army, of foreign policy, and of
currency, debt and financial stability), federation provided the means
thereby the remaining functions of central government could pass from
British hands without fear of "revolutionary" consequences.’

Lothian was closely involved with the formulation of a constitutional
6chene for India, as a delegate to the two further Round Table Conferences
in 1531-2, as Under-Secretary at the India Office, and as chairman of the
Frunchise Committee which toured India early in 1032. During his visit to
India he was largely but unsuccessfully concerned with holding the Princes
to their commitment to federation. Lothian was also a member of the Joint
Select Committee which examined the Government of India Bill.' 3 ’ Ccupland
weighed the niceties of the status which the Bill would confer on India,
and Judged that it would leave her "In the penultimate stage" of her
•advance to Dominion Status": a position "slniiar in principle to that in
Canada, say, before 1871 or In South Africa before 1914".*

Hodson argued that further concessions night be needed (including
coitrol of defence and foreign policy), since Congress was clearly "the
only real political force". 4 Nevertheless, for the majority of the Moot
fl s for the Government, the position reached by early 1931 - provincial

1 l Lothian, 1 "India: Constitution or Chaos", RT. 3.31, pp 268 ff.

2 Lothian's role as Under-Secretary and chairman of the Franchise
Committee is examined in Gerard Douds, "Lothian and the Indian
Federation", pp 62-76 of John Turner, The Larger Idea (London, 1988).

3 Couplaad, “India and Doniuion Status" (dated Oct 1934), in The Empire
in These Days (London, 1935), pp 157 and 151.

1 Hodson to Dove, 27 Feb 1931, Lothian Papers 253, fols 718-25.

geli-g overnmont "with safeguards", and all- Indian federation with
limitations - represented the ne plus ultra, "the limit to which the scope
0 f Indian self-government can be extended at the present time".’ The Round
Table therefore acted ns a pressure group on Government policy only
tangentially, helping to keep it on the lines laid down in 1929-31; its
»in purpose was to defend and win support for that policy against its
critics in India and Britain.

Undoubtedly the most dangerous threat to the reforms was the "diehard"
opposition emanating from the right of the Tory party. 1 2 Dawson's Tines was
oice again prominent in support of Governnent policy, and in attacking
tiose who urged "that the ideal of Indian hopes is to be a new and inferior
grade of constitutional status". 3 Grlgg offered suggestions on how to
tacklo criticism of tho constitutional and financial aspects of the
Reforms. 4 * (In 1933 he returned to Parlianent as HP for Altrincham, after
defeating Randolph Churchill.) At one point, Lothian and Curtis were
involved with Irwin, Sir Stanley Reed and Patrick Young in planning a
'Round Table [Conference! Society" to rally "noderate Conservative" opinion
atd dispel "doubts" and "suspicions" in India. The society never
materialised, however, probably through failure to secure the support of
Zetland, whose leadership was thought essential. 6

1 Ccupland, loc clt . p 150.

^ See Carl Bridge, Holding Indin to the Empire (lew York, 1986).

The Times, 28 Nov 1931; Dawson's policy is well covered by Vrench,
Geoffrey Dawson and Our Hires (London, 1955), chapters 23—27.

See, eg, Grigg to Dove, 7 June 1932, Lotbian Papers 267, fols 711-14.

See "Note of Conclusions Reached", 5 July 1932, Lothian Papers 263,

fols 219-20; also Sir Stanley Reed's draft letter to potential
supporters (sent 25 July 19321, Lothian Papers 267, fols 642-44.

5

277

Such was the gravity of the issue that it was thought pocciblc that
Baldwin might have to split his party to uphold the "national" principle.'
The Bound Table's frustration with the "diehards" was increased by the
belief that at most they could delay reform until Labour returned to
office; then a more radical scheme would be bound to emerge. 2

To the Round Table's inmense relief, the Government managed to
override "diehard" opposition and place the Government of India Act on the
statute boo's. Vi thin months of its passage, the Round Table detected an
•increasingly realist attitude . . . developing in the political parties in
India". 3 Lothian helped pave the way for Congress moderates to participate
In provincial government, by assuring then that Governors would be unlilcely
to use their reserved powers against a ministry enjoying electoral
support. 1 * The Viceroy, Linlithgow, initially regarded Lothian's
interference as unhelpful. 5 nevertheless, he soon made similar assurances,
and Congress at last decided to enter the electoral fray. The Found Table
praised this decision as a "triumph for moderate forces". Indeed, it was
no* thought possible to assert with confidence that "underlying most Indian
opinion is a strong faith in the value of the British connection" .*

1 IHodson et al,3 "Great Britain: the Slippery Slope", RT, June 1934,
p 609.

2 [Stephens,] "India: Swaraj the Phoenix", RT, June 1934, p 570; cf
Grigg to Lady Milner, 30 May 1933, Grigg Papers, MSS Microfilm 1003.

3 CYeatts,] "Interregnum in India", RT, Dec 1935, p 124.

4 Letters to The Tiroes, 6 and 13 April 1937, 17 and 21 Feb 1938.
Linlithgow to Lothian, 4 April 1938, Lothian Papers 364, fols 513-14.
flnglis,] "An Indian Milestone", RT, Sopt 1937, pp 809 and 819.

pgjafldle Easi.

278

Britain's military successes against the Ottoman Bnplre Ironically

pie her a much enlarged role in the Middle East just at the time when she

seemed to be losing her grip on Egypt. Amery saw in this a strategic
windfall which would consolidate once and for all the -Southern British
for Id* which stretched in an arc "from Cape Town to Wellington-.’ His
forcer colleagues were far from convinced. "Every competent observer"
recognised that "the people of these regions" could not "maintain order for
•heaselves" . Nevertheless, it was "not in the world's interest for England
to add further to responsibilities already so greatly out of proportion to

her relative strength". 2

One solution to the problem, which Curtic advocated forcefully in

Jecenber 1918, was for the United States to "make herself answerable to a

league of Satlons for peace, order, and good government in some or all of
•.he regions of the Middle East".* Curtis's suggestion caused some
iisagreemeat within the Moot. Coupland reported that it was stirring up
considerable animosity from the Foreign Office. 4 Nevertheless, the
suggestion was again put forward a year later, with the complaint that
»Mle America vacillated things were steadily going "from bad to worse". B
Erica's decision not to undertake any such global responsibilities came
48 « disappointment to the Hoot, which spent much of the following two
Meades trying to reverse the decision.

1 See V 3 Louis, In the Nsme of God, Go! (New York, 1992), pp 68-70.

2 "Tho Price of Liberty", PT, Doc 1919, pp 18-19.

(Curtis,) "Windows of Freedom", PT, Doc 1918, pp 33-34.

Coupland to Kerr, 20 Jan 1919, Lothian Papers 482 <single item).
(Toynbee,! "The Outlook: in the Middle East", RT, Dec 1919, p 57.

5

Britain thus entered the 1920s with an extensive new role in the
region. The Round Table was determined that Britain should do so "with
0 p«n ayes" . Hone of the territories now brought under the aegis of the
gjpire /Commonwealth was easily defensible by sea. Largo sums would have to
t* found for the defence of frontiers, and if to thccc was added the burden
of naiataining order amongst peoples who were "highly strung" and "prone to
sudden spontaneous uprisings", it was "unlikely that the cost can be met".

It was essential , therefore, that the cost "be lessened".'

Vith the contemporary situation In Egypt firmly la mind, the solution

wllch the Round Table now proferred was to linlt Britain's liabilities to

tie bare essentials, and to seek the collaboration of indigenous groups.

TE Lawrence was enlisted to advocate just such a policy in the Round

Table. The earth, Lawrence contended, "is Just a track along which

countries and continents race with one another, and for all we know Asia

wy be gaining on us mentally". National iso was "too universal to be

extinguished, too widespread to be temporary". The only way to channel it

flDd to limit its "destructive" consequences was by "an active [policy! of

imposing responsibility on the local pooples" .

"They will not wish to take charge, but we can force
their hand by preparing to go. Ve do not risk losing
them to another power .... [If! assured of
eventual dominion status, and present internal
autonomy, [they! would be delighted to affiliate with
us ... . The alternative is to hold on to them
with ever- lessening force, till the anarchy is too
expensive, aad we let go. " a

Tbe policy thus urged by the Round Table was in fact adopted by the British
Government, at least in Iraq and Persia. The Round Table refrained from

1

2

Ibid, pp 55-97.

tT E Lawrence,! "The Changing East" , RT, Sept 1920, pp 756-72.

280

c0BBBQ t on the latter country, but Iraq was the subject of two coapiacent
aE d self-congratulatory articles, In 1923 and 1926. *

In Palestine, there was less scope for the kind of solution advocated
by the Hound Table and subsequently pursued in Egypt aDd Iraq, because of
the 3ritisb commitment to a Jewish "national hone" contained in the Balfour
Declaration of November 1917.

On Zionism the Round Table's stance was again much less clear-cut
than Anery's. The latter saw the establishment of a Jewish colony in
Palestine as an important instrument of British strategic and economic
penetration of the region. 2 Of the Round Tablers, only Zimnern
consistently held this view. In 1916 his attempts to ventilate the issue
through the Bound Table ran up against tho hostility of the rest of the
Foot.® The editors agreed to print a "contributed" article in 1918 by Leon
Sixon, who welcoaed the Balfour Declaration as the first step to a "self-
governing Jewish Commonweal th" . * Nevertheless, other Round Table articles
took a different view. In 1919 Toynbee asserted that Jewish settlement
"Quid only create a new problen by "causing unrest among the local
Christians and Moslems". 6 The following year, T E Lawrence was equally

1 [Gertrude Bell,) "Great Britain and the 'Iraq", RT, Dec 1923,
pp 64-83; "The Working of the 'Iraq Parliament", BT, Dec 1926,
pp 18-36.

2 Amery. My Political Life , Vol II (London, 1953), pp 115-117; cf
Louis, op clt . pp 70-74. 89-94.

3 Zimnern to J A Hobson. 29 Sept 1916. RT Papers c 817, fols 152-58;

Kerr to Zirunern, 29 Fov 1916, ibid, fol 163.

* (Loon Simon, J "Palestine and Jewish Nationalism" ("contributed"), RT,
March 1918, pp 3C8-36.

5 ttoynbee,! "The Outlook in the Middle East", RT, Dec 1919, pp 82-83.

k

281

jussive

of Zionist schemes. '

Some of the Round Tablers appear to have been won over by Zionism In

the course of the 1920s. Kerr lent his support to schemes to reward
ftizoant with a knighthood- 4 ; in 1928 he joined the Palestine Mandate
Society- The Round Table as a whole remained unable to take a clear line
on Palestine, convinced that "both Jew and Arab nay make a good case in his
defence*. 3 It was not until 1936 - when the antagonisms seened intractable
-that the Found Table resumed its coverage. Still, the Moot attempted to
be even-handed, balancing one article which rejected the proposal of a
legislative council (on the grounds that it would leave the Jews a

peraatent minority) with another which called for a limitation of Jewish

: migration (and suggested that it be diverted to British Guiana ). *

The Peel Commission of 1936-3?, of which Coupland was a member and

«hose Report he drafted, saw paitition as the only solution to the problem.
Toynbee welcomed his Feport. as a "great state paper", the product of "moral

courage" and "extreme intellectual ability". Nevertheless, he recognised
•hat a "surgical operation" would not please the Arabs, and would leave two
economically unviable units. He suggested, therefore, that partition
should be accompanied by federation of both units with the Lebanon, Syria
“id Iraq, with a continued Anglo-French presence in the region. 5 In

IT E Lawrence,] "The Changing East", RT , Sept 1920, p 769.

See, eg, Kerr to Sir Herbert Samuel, 4 Jan 1921, Lothian Papers 218,
fols 668-9.

(Isaac Foot,] "A Legislature for Palestine?", FT, June 1936, p 512.

Ibid , pp 503-17; i F Barbour,] "Palestine: the Commissi oner's Task",

FT, Dec 1936, pp 79-94. The suggestion concerning British Guiana was
repeated by Harlow in June 1939.

(Toynbee, ] "The Palestine Report and After", RT, Sept 1937,

PP 740-54.

joynbee's view, the whole region constituted "a natural and historic unity,
,£icb *a& artificially partitioned ... to meet . . . the respective
gjigeneles of British and French imperial ism" . 1

Ssuihprn Africa

Lack of criticism of South African policy was considered to be in the
natives' best interests, as Curtis explained in The Times in 1935: "South
Africans must and will find out for themselves what is right or wrong with
tteir own policy. Lectures from us merely delay the process". 2

Curtis's insistence on South African autonomy was no doubt sincere,
levertheless, it concealed the very real extent of the Xoot's sympathy with
the trend of "native* policy in the Union. Close study of the problem of
■poor whites", as well as a sense of foreboding, had led the "Kindergarten"
towards a liberal form of segregati onisn. Kerr's conviction on this matter
was strengthened as a result of his tour of the United States in 1909 . 9 On
his return to England, Kerr wrote a long article for The Hares In which he
argued that segregation was the only way to enable "the native ... to
rise steadily in the scale of civi 1 izat ion" . * Sinilar views were held by
other members of the Moot. Id 1924 Grigg suggested to Bailey that the only
solution to South Africa's Indian "problem" was that "you will have to end

1 [Toynbee . ) "A Federal Solution" ("Editorial"), pp 266-77 of
"Palestine: the Vider Hope", RT, March 1939, pp 252-77 (quotation
from p 275); cf (Harlow.) "Palestine: A Leaf Turned", RT, June 1939,
pp 457-75.

2 The Tinas, 15 May 1935; cf Curtis, "South Africa Since the Union",
Atlantic Monthly, vol 140 (Aug 1927), p 263.

Kerr's notes fron his American tour are preserved as Lothian Papers
5, fols 105-77.

4

i

The Tines, 5 Nov 1910.

up t>y making a regular enclave and settlement for them In soDe special part
of the Union- . ’

Snuts's defeat by Hertzog in 1924, and the latter's nore overtly

racialist policies, caused misgivings within the Xcot, including fear of "a

forn of racial strife . . . which will eventually ramify all over Africa,

and even Asia". 1 2 nevertheless, it was the overtness of Kert20g's policies

rather than their content which troubled Kerr:

"People will stand administrative discrinination
.... But as soon as you make legal discrimination
the rule, it stirs a totally different degree of
animosity .... The negro problem is manageable in
America largely because the Constitution makes no
discrimination between black and white, though, as
everybody knows, there is an immense anount of
discrimination in practice". 3

The advent of the Fusion Government in 1933, in which Duncan and Smuts were
again cabinet ministers, was greeted with relief by the Moot. The
introduction of new segregation laws and the disfranchisement of educated
Africans appear to have caused little concern. The Found Table's South
African committee quoted with approval Duncan's statement that, if such
action were not taken, the African vote "would increase fast as education
spread, and in fifty or a hundred years' time might tilt the balance
fatally against the white vote".*

One aspect of white South African aspirations of which the "Selborne
Memorandum" made good use was the possibility of the expansion of South

1 Grigg to Bailey, 10 April 1924, Grigg Papers, MSS Microfilm 1001.
[Kerr,] "The Hew Problem of Africa", FT. June 1927, p 457.

Kerr to Duncan, 13 April 1926, Lothian Papers 222, fols 130-31.

■Hative Policy in South Africa", FT, June 1936, pp 540-41.

4

African influence northwards, which Union was thought to facilitate. 1 Such

a possibility renamed a strong element In subsequent Round Table

speculation. In 1927 Kerr produced a report on the "African Highlands" for

the Rhodes Trust, in which he argued that

"except for the coastal belt along the Indian ocean
and certain lovlying valleys . . . the whole of [the
region from Cape to Sairobil . . . seems inevitably
destined to be colonised in greater or lesser degree
by the white man".

South African "experience" should guide British policy; South African
influence was "bound to increase". 2 Two years later, the Moot discussed
■the advisability of establishing an African Council, or some form of
regular consultation between the British and South African Governments on
East and Central African questions".* As late as 1946 the editor of the
Round Table was reporting that "our feeling here Is that the Union oust
soon assume the status of the predominant power of all Africa".'*

The Protectorates were the most obvious starting-point for such
scienes. The "Kindergarten" had expected those territories to be
transferred to South Africa as part of unification, but pressure from
Britain ensured that responsibility remained with the British High
Coaaissioner. Hertzog's government requested a reconsideration in 1925,
tot it was only after 1933 that the Round Tablers themselves believed the
Question to be amenable to a solution in South Africa's favour.

The first shot in the Round Table's campaign came in September 1934,

* B Williams, The Sclbornc Memorandum (Oxford, 1925), pp 140-45.

' Kerr, "The African Highlands", 25 Feb 1927, Lothian Papers 83,
fols 4-23.

3 Xlnutes of RT meeting, 16 Kay 1929, RT <0> Papers.

4 Xorrah to Kidd, 27 Feb 1946, (SA file,) RT <0> Papers.

285

p

the printing of a South African article which claimed virtually
support amongst white South Africans for the proposal . ' Six
*jntb3 later, Horsfall announced tho Moot's wholehearted agreement with the
proposal. Much was made of the "complete economic and cultural dependence
of the protectorates on the Union", and it was claimed that “South Africa
. . has not shown any lack of ability to find constructive solutions of
great problems". 2

Curtis was In South Africa for the Inperial Press Conference at the
tiae the Round Table was declaring its position. He reiterated the
latter's argunents in a widely-publicised speech in Cape Town. 3 He was
'genuinely surprised" by the reaction. * On the boat back to England, Sir
Roderick Jones reported to Smuts that he and Curtis were the only press
ielegates in favour of transfer. 0 Back in England, Curtis encountered
further "intensity of feeling" on the subject, ever, in All Souls. e
Undeterred, he composed a series of articles for The Tiroes setting out the
case for transfer, quoting Bishop Gore to the effect that “people tend to
livo up to the best opinion we are able to hold of then". Curtis played
lonn the natives' views on the subject, because they were “not yet able to
wke aajor decisions in their own interests".^

1 "The Protectorates and the Union", RT, Sept 1934, pp 765-801.

t Horsfall, 3 "The South African Protectorates", RT, March 1935,
pp 318-23.

3 Reported inter alia in the Cape Tines, 23 March 1935.

* Curtis to Feetham, 26 March 1935, Curtis Papers 91, fol 140. Sir
Villiam Clark and Sir Herbert Stanley were anongst Curtis's critics.

5 Jones to Smuts, 3 April 1935, 1M1, fols 161-62.

Curtis to Duncan, 16 April 1935, 1 bid , fols 178-79.

Tie Times, 13, 14 and 15 May 1935.

I

Curtis's three Tines articles were answered by a single one from

larger? Perban, who, unlike Curtis, had actually visited the Protectorates.

? 8 rha» disputed the whole basis of Curtis's thesis, arguing that there had

»on a "steady depreciation' in South African policy since the Union, that

•liberal" South Africans were opposed to transfer and that the "central

fact* was the clear and reasonable 'opposition of the tribes". In a

jelling comment on her adversary's magnanimity, she observed that Curtis

"advocates, as always, that teaching of political
responsibility by trust which will strengthen the
Empire with those very forces of nationalism
otherwise possibly destructive. Is this liberalism
to be applied only to white races?" '

in even more devastating critique of Curtis's views was put forward by

1 K Xscmlllan, who was refused space in The Times; eventually Curtis

irougfct the correspondence to a halt by declaring that he and Macmillan

*ere "simply wasting each other's time in trying to convince one another ". 2

it vas clear that Curtis had lost the argument, and he was reduced to

containing about "extremists . . . writing as though South Africans had

ions and tails". 3 An elaboration of his and Perham's articles was

published later in the year under the title The Protectorates of South

Africa; by then, however, much of the heat had gone out of the issue.

A similar lack of success awaited the Round Tablers' hopes for South
African incorporation of Southern Rhodesia. Here there were two
coaplicating factors: first that the territory was home to a small but

The Times, 15 Kay 1935. Cf Perham's previous articles on the

Protectorates, The Tines, 5 and 6 July 1934.

Curtis to Macmillan, 30 May 1935, Curtis Papers 91, fol 266; cf

Macmillan to Curtis, 16 and 19 Kay 1935, ibid , fols 251-52 and 253.

Curtis to Smuts, 5 June 1935, Curtis Papers 91, fols 287-90.

(jollflSive group of white settlers, most of whom were averse to any hint of
Afrikaner domination, and secondly that a strand in official British
thinkiag saw the existence of Southern Rhodesia as a useful lever on South
Africa itself, either as a bribe or as a counterweight. 1

The belief that "the ultinate destiny of [Southern Rhodesia] is to
forn part of the Union" 2 was asserted right up to the referendum of
lovenber 1922 and the assumption of power by the colony's own legislature
ia October 1923. (Ironically, Malcolm made the latter development possible
by negotiating away the Company's claims for compensation.) Thereafter,
tie strength of feeling against incorporation was admitted. 3 Nevertheless,
South African "experience" was still held to be applicable. In 1932, for
iistanco, the Round Table cuggoctod the need for sogrogationism and
■confining the native vote ... to the native institutions", the Cape
system being merely a relic fron a "time when public worship of the
franchise was at its height". 4 As late as 1935, Curtis was writing to
Sauts that his "dream" was still "the completion of the Union of South
Africa*, from the Cape to the Zambezi. * By then, however, such a
possibility was highly unlikely, not least because of the independent
aspirations of white Rhodesians.

1 See X Chanock, Unconsu moated Union: Britain, Rhodesia and South
Africa, 1900-45 (Manchester, 1977).

2 "South Africa: The Southern Rhodesia Commission", RT, March 1920,
p 464.

^ See, ©g, [Sir Drummond Chaplin, 1 "Southern Rhodesia under Responsible
Government", RT, Sept 1926, pp 757-70.

* "Southern Africa: The Situation in Southern Rhodesia", 1?7, Doc 1932,
pp 211-20.

5 Curtis to Smuts, 5 June 1935, Curtis Papers 91, fols 287-90.

288

f

forthern Rhodesia, Fyasaland aad Uganda aroused little interest
aB3 ngst Round Tablers before the Second Vorld Var. Tanganyika was briefly
a subject of concern in 1917-19, the Round Tablers being anxious first that
an area of such "great importance to the future of South Africa" should be
kept by the Empire, and secondly that large-scale Indian immigration should
not be allowed. 1 Thereafter the Round Table showed little further interest
In the territory, except (occasionally) to refer to it as evidence of the
hi jh moral purpose animating British rule in the tropics. 2

Kenya raised an altogether more complicated series of problems.

British opinion was vitally interested in the colony, stimulated on the one
hand by the romantic frontier ideology of the cottiers and their allies,
and on the other by the critical analyses of S oraan Leys and Vi Ilian
KcGregor Ross. During the 1920s Kenya became a testing-ground for rival
interpretations of Imperial trusteeship; the "Achilles' heel" of the
Eaplre, as Dove put it. 3

The issue which first Kindled the Round Table's Interest in Kenya was
Indian migration. The restrictions placed on Indians in the colony
generated intense criticism from India itself. One correspondent asserted
that such criticism was the work of "extremists, who, I believe (though it
Is difficult to prove), are affected by Bolshevism". 4 The impassioned
interventions of such respectable Round Table contacts as Srinivasa Sastri

I Feetbam's memorandum, 2 Oct 1917, Lothian Papers 475. fol 1; Kerr to
A Chamberlain, 28 Fob 1917 and 7 torch 1917, Lothian Papers 32,
fols 2-4 and 5-7.

^ See, eg, Couplaad's article in Tlo Times, 3 Oct 1928.

^ Dove to Grigg, 30 May 1925, Grigg Papers, XSS Microfilm 1002.

* U G Baber?,) from Sakuru, 6 Aug 1921, Lothian Papers 17, fols 30-39.

289

jad Sir Malcolm Hailey gave the lie to that particular idea. 1
Ie 7 ertheless, far from condemning the discrimination faced by Indians, the
jtoond Tablers threw their weight behind it. Ac early ac 1917, Kerr
gujgested that the best way of rationalising restrictions against Indians
*as as "the case of the Kaffir*.* A Round Table article of June 1923
anticiF« ted tbe "Devonshire Declaration" by calling for the ending of
Indian immigration "in the interests of the African". It also called for
■sanitary segregation" and a commitment against Indian enfranchisement. 51

The full implications of the "paramount duty of trusteeship"
enunciated in the 1923 White Paper were not commented on by the Round
Table, nor, apparently, immediately grasped by its editorial Moot.

Certainly Grigg, who was appointed Governor in Hay 1925, saw no reason why
■trusteeship" could not be exercised as well by the white settlers as by
officials subordinate to London.

One of the tasks which Anery entrusted to Grigg was the "closer
union" of Kenya with Uganda and Tanganyika. Almost immediately Grigg asked
for the Hoot's help in pushing the issue. At first the Hcot was
enthusiastic, although Dawson was deputed to warn against the danger of
seeming to lead from Britain. "Could you not get Sandford [editor of the
African Standard) to ventilate the subject and then have this local
opinion reported here, so as to give us something to work upon?"* 1 A
'secret* subcommittee of the Hoot was inaugurated in order to advise and

See Sastri to Grigg, 3 Sept 1921, Grigg Papers, HSS Microfilm 999;
extract from Hailey's letter, 18 July 1923, Brand Papers, box 70.

2 Kerr to A Chamberlain, 7 March 1917, Lothian Papers 32, fols 5-7.

( Dove and Rice,] "Kenya", PT, June 1923, pp 507-29. See generally
Robert G Gregory, India and East Africa (Oxford, 1971).

4 Dawcon to Grigg, 20 Oct 1925, Grigg Papers, HSS Microfilm 1002.

k

jgfiiet Grigg • and it was suggested that Amery appoint him High Commissioner

for all tireG territories. 1

Once Grlgg was in Kenya, the Round Tablers continued to correspond,
glthougl more fitfully than their initial arrangements suggested. The main
task of advising and supporting Grigg was taken over by J R Oldham, a good
friend and close ally of many of the Moot, Curtis in particular. Oldham
chared Grigg' s concern to prevent the emergence of a gulf between the white

settlers and opinion in Britain, and to establish the framework of "closer

union*. 2 As a first step, he suggested the creation of a Research
Department for East Africa, whose purpose would be to help control "the
forces that are threatening in the long run to make the tack of
civilization in Africa impossible". 3

Feetham was enlisted to head the prospective department, his

political masters Hertzog and Roos appreciating '‘the point that for the
government of a British territory in Eastern Africa to turn to South Africa
for advice . . . was . . . worthy of every encouragement". 4 At the Hoot's
suggestion, Oldham wrote two articles for The Tines in which he floated the
idea, incidentally claiming that Africans would benefit less from a
’transient" class of administrators than from "the continuous stimulus of
‘•be presence in their midst of a more advanced and progressive

1 Feetham to Grigg, 5 Fov 1925, Grigg Papers. MSS Microfilm 1002.

Oldham to Grigg, 8 Sept 1925 and further correspondence. Ibid .

Oldham, "Research in East Africa" (Sept 19251; Oldham to Grigg,

28 July 1926, ibid . "'Research' is apt to be misleading in its
suggestion and I personally always treat it merely as the most
convenient label", Oldham later wrote; to Kerr, 18 Feb 1927, Lothian
Papers 83, fol 58.

Feetham to Grigg, 24 Kay 1926, Grigg Papers, MSS Microfilm.

291

clv ilizati°n" . ’ The Round Tablers further arranged for Oldham to put the
dee for research to Amery, Tom Jones and others at an All Souls weekend. *
Grlgg f s hopes for an early Implementation of Oldham's scheme and of
•closer union" foundered on the opposition of the Governor of Tanganyika,
obstructionism from within the Colonial Office, and prevarication within
tbe Cabinet. Grigg' s sympathy for the aspirations of the white settlers
helped matters little, and strained his alignment with Oldham and some of
tte Xoot. His proposals for "Imperial Folicy on East Africa" alarmed
Oldham by their insistence on settler self-government without adequate
cafeguards for native interests. 3 Coupland believed that Grigg was trying
tc "stampede the Cabinet and get a pro-Delaooro policy adopted" . ** After "a
gcod many deliberations" 5 , Kerr wrote an article for the Pound Table which
insisted that any East African legislature "should be so constituted as to
represent from the start not only the white electorate, but also the other
races" (albeit by white appointees). Moreover, attention was drawn to the
■undoubted evils" which would result from the "undiluted transfer of
authority to a snail body of white settlers".®

Grigg suffered further setbacks, not the least of which was an
unexpected majority of the Hilton Young Commission (including Oldham

1 The Tines, 9 and 10 June 1925; for the Hoot, see Oldham to Grigg, 8
June 1926, Grigg Papers, MSS Microfilm 1002.

^ Oldham to Grigg, 15 June 1925, ibid.

3 Grigg, "Imperial Policy in East Africa" f Feb 19271; Oldhan to Grigg,

9 March and 10 April 1927, iMd-

4 K Middlenas <ed>, Thomas Jones 1 Vhitehall Diary, vol II (London,

1969), p 171.

^ Kerr to Sir John Chancellor, 2 June 1927, Lothian Papers 227,
fol 105.

tKerr, J "The New Problem of Africa", RT, June 1927, pp 447-72.

fc ijaelf) report leg its agreement with the 1923 "native paramountcy"
doctrine.’ The advent oi a Labour Government in 1929 spelt the end of
grlgg's hopes for a nove either on "closer union" or on settler self-
gofernnent. By now British opinion was firmly set against any concession
to the settlers. Dawson reported to Grigg that he was being inundated by
anti-settler "extremisn" . 2

Grigg felt betrayed by the Round Table's lack of support for his East
African policy, especially after an article of his was radically amended in
ordor to take into account the Moot's "differences of opinion". 3 In 1935
he persuaded the Moot to publish a Kenyan settler's attack on the colony's
■rigid, unsympathetic and out-dated" form of government . ** nevertheless,
the Xoot as a whole found itself unable to take any clear line on Kenya,
and therefore took none. The attraction of both imperial creeds struggling
lor supremacy in that colony was simply too great for one or the other to
be decisively abandoned.

British Migration

Early advertising for the Round Table assured prospective subscribers
that one of the objects of the Review would be "to encourage a sound system
of eoigration from the Mother Country to His Majesty's Doninions

Grigg thought the Conraission "very badly mis-handled" : Grigg to
Archbichop Davidcon, 18 Feb 1929, Grigg Papers, MSS Microfilm 1002.

Dawson to Grigg, 25 March 1930, l b l- d -

Dove to Grigg, 5 Aug 1931, Grigg Papers, MSS Microfilm 1003.

t Lord Francis Scott, 1 "Kenya: The Settlers' Case" ["contributed"!,

Dec 1935, pp 62-97.

4

oV9 rsea"-' Quite what constituted such a "sound system" was not made
explicit at the tine; nor, indeed, was it to be. The superficially
straightforward issue of British migration was, in fact, a minefield,
involving such delicate issues as Dominion autonomy, State intervention and
class relations, as well as more intractable problems of birth-rates and
living standards. The Moot frequently affirmed its commitment to
supporting increased British migration to the Dominions 2 , but was seldon
able to match its commit mer.t with constructive proposals.

One problem was the younger Round Tablers* reluctance <in contrast to

Kilner's and Amary's eagerness) to contemplate State intervention and
subsidies: they accepted the Empire Settlement Act of 1922, but believed
that it represented the utmost "linit . . . ( of! State action".*

An even thornier set of problem was raised by the question whether
British and Dominion Interests In the natter were Identical. The author of

a 1922 Hew Zealand article proposed as a general principle that "in matters
that are not vital to Imperial existence and honour ... it is the plain
duty of our rulers to study our own country first". It might be true that
Britain had a "surplus" population, but Hew Zealand's capacity to absorb
iwigraats was limited "to a few thousands a year".* An article from
Australia the same year emphasised that both farmers and industrial workers

The Pound Table, PrelioS sary Issue, 25 July 1910, copy in Rhodes
House Library.

See especially [Dove,) "The Migration of the Races", RT, March 1921
pp 241-74, and CHodson,) "Empire Migration", RT, Doc 1934,
pp 60-78.

Uerr.l "The Imperial Conference", RT, Sept 1923, p 701. For Milner
and Amery, see Stephen Constantine <ed) Emigrants and Empire
Otanchester, 1990). Judging by the results of the 1922 Act, the
Round Tablers' scepticism is understandable.

K

Sew Zealand", RT, Sept 1922, pp 912-30.

viewed schemes lor large-scale Immigration as designed to undermine their
cvn living standards. 1

The theme that the Dominions could not be expected to be dumping-
grounds for Britain's "malcontents" continued to predoninate throughout the
interwar years. The problems of commodity-based econonies reinforced the
Dominions' reluctance to accept large numbers of immigrants. An Australian
article of 1936 was fairly representative in concluding that the whole
assisted migration policy had been "costly and strewn with failures"; the
noral was that "the type of migrant who might fail in the United Kingdom
but succeed in the Dominions is now rare". 3

The deathblow to large-scale emigration schemes was dealt by a factor

over which neither Doninlon nor British statesmen had any control: the

declining British birth-rate. A special article in 1937 estimated that

Britain's population would be less than 20 million by the year 2037. "Will

the Dominions be ready to take a larger share in the burden cf Imperial

defence? Vill the United Kingdom still be able to bear the cost of

attaining the strength of an Imperial Power?" These were questions which

the Round Table could put. but not answer. 3 Severtheless, it was clear

that any hopes that Britain would be able to continue to provide a stream

aigrants to the Dominions were now entirely unrealistic. Indeed, the

found Table now expected the stream to go into reverse.

"Interchange of population is valuable in itself,
since it invigorates the individual migrant and

1 ■Australia", FT, March 1922, pp 405-22.

‘Empire Migration: an Australian View", RT, Sept 1936, pp 737-47.

For one of the "failures", see "Australia: the British Settlers In

Victoria", ST, Dec 1933, pp 203-08.

ID H KacLachlan, 1 "The Birth-Rate and the Empire", RT, March 1937,

pp 308-18.

brings in new blood where otherwise the stock night
stagnate and decline. This consideration applies
. . . equally to a novenent of people from the
newer countries back to Great Britain as to an
opposite flow".'

The language had changed little since 1910, but within a generation the
problems of Empire migration had changed beyond ail recognition.

j gpprlal Trade and Tariff s

Throughout the interwar period, the Round Table remained cautious on
tie question of tariffs and Imperial preferences. Milner and Dawson were
both convinced of the need for protection, and Grigg and Xichens were both
supporters of Imperial preference (although opponents of Amery's "mixing
up" the Empire in the arguments for domestic protect ion*) . Others in the
Xcot (especially Brand, Curtis and Kerr) continued to believe that 3ritish
interests were best served by free trade, and that trade itself was a very
utcertaln foundation for Imperial integration.

Sone attempt to mediate between Imperial preference and free trade

ws again made in 1923, in an article by Xerr.

"It is very uncertain whether a protected market in
Great Britain alone would be sufficient and whether
the disadvantages . . . would not outweigh the
advantages. But . . . would not the whole
Commonwealth as a home free trade market, with some
uniform measure of protection fron the huge
competitive agencies of the modern world, be very
different?"

*err thus outlined a prospect which was not on the agenda of any of the
Political parties: "free trade within the Coranonwcalth" (io, Britain and
th? Doninions), protected from the outside world, but with no Internal

1

2

tHodson, 3 "Enpire Migration", RT, Dec 1934, p 61.

Grigg to Bailey, 24 April 1924, Grigg Papers, MSS Microfilm 1001.

296

■

WV ^

tarif^ 5, ' rhe 1923 Conference agreed a series of preferential measures -
not the "Common wealth free trade" for which Kerr argued - but was
iaaediately followed by the general election. The Moot expressed the hope
that Labour might carry through the previous government's Conference
conaitmsnts "on grounds of Imperial policy'. 2

Grigg, who was at this time engaged in an attempt to build a
■Jational Liberal" caucus on a platforn of Imperial preference, declared
hisself dissatisfied with the extent of the Round Table's conversion. He
thought it would be "a splendid thing to got the Round Table concentrated
once again on a definite policy to be secured within a few years". Like
Chamberlain earlier, he identified Curtis, who was "always afraid of the
tariff question", as the root of obstruct! on. 3 Curtis was not the only
sceptic, however. The most that a majority of the Moot would commit itself
to was "a systen of inter -imperial trade which would at the same time
encourage primary production in the Dominions and industrial development in
Great Britain": again, "Commonwealth free trade". 4

The economic crisis which followed the Vail Street Crash produced a
surge of "huddling to the flag" protectionism, as Hodson observed. 5 The
foot was perturbed by Beaverbrook' s "garden wall" scheme (and especially by

1 (Kerr,! "The Imperial Conference", XT, Sept 1923 (pp 683-711),

pp TOO ff . Kerr here followed the lines agreed by the Moot: Minutos
of FT meeting, 7 June 1023, RT <0> Papers.

' Minutes of FT meeting, 19 Dec 1923, RT <C> Papers; (Kerr.l
"Afterthoughts on the Imperial Conference", PT, March 1924,

PP 225-41.

Gr *gg to Bailey, 19 Feb 1925, Grigg Papers, MSS Kicrofiln 1001.

Dove to Horsfall, 26 June 1925, Lothian Papers 19, fols 260-64.

Hodson to Dove, 25 Oct 1931, Lothian Papers 259, fols 507-11.

297

r

' it6 attenpt to bring in the colonies)'. Harold Butler, who wrote a Hound
Uble article on the subject, thought that "tariffs are a very two-edged
tool for an exporting country". 2 Moreover, "from a constitutional point of
view . • • the economic unity is a retrograde step", implying

colonial dependence and a new centralisation. 3

Vith the Ottawa Conference approaching, the Round Table warned
against the prospect of an "Empire still divided by high tariff walls, and
ringed about by an almost unsaleable barrier": such "would be an Empire
dooB»d to decay If not disruption* . Tariffs, "far from being in themselves
a national asset, are an unfortunate necessity"; any tariff arrangements
Huuld have to leave the way open for preferential agreements outside the
Enpire, and have as their aim "a net lowering of tariff haulers".

Kcreover, "the use of Imperial sentiment to manufacture commercial pacts
Kill destroy the sent i neat aad leave only the pacts". 0

Hodson believed that there would be "a great deal of disappointment"
Kith the results of the economic Conference. The agreecents which were
Mde (soixe of which were "very silly") would do little to secure a
wrldwide reduction of tariffs, which alone would secure a real return to
prosperity.* The Pound Table was marginally more optimistic, suggesting
that on balance there had been a net reduction of tariffs. Nevertheless,
there was a danger in subjecting the "mutual relations of the Commonwealth"

1 Cove to H Butler, 26 July 1930, Lothian Papers 252, fol 620.

2 Butler to Dove, 7 July 1030, Lothian Papers 252, fols 605-06.

3 t Butler, J "Imperial Economic Unity", FT, Sept 1930, pp 745-65.

1 tHodson, ) "Imperial Preference", FT, Karch 1932, pp 246-05.

Hodson to Dove, 5 Sept 1932, Lothian Papers 267, fols 735-39.

L

^expectations which could not be fulfilled.’

Hodson's caution was Justified. Writing in the Pound Table of June
l93 7 he exanined the figures for British trade after Ottawa, concluding
that what little diversion of trade to the Empire had taken place was
directly attributable to Britain's decreased purchasing power, and a
cocsequent concentration on food and raw materials. Inperlal preference
*as only worthwhile if it secured "the maximum freedom of trade within the
Eipire itself and “a substantial liberation of trade with foreign
countries". In neither respect had Ottawa been a notable success. *

|he Irish Free State

Curtis renained closely involved in Irish affairs until 1924, as the
Colonial Secretary's "particular Private Secretary . . . for Irish
ratters". 3 In this capacity, he played an important part in ensuring that
British constitutional procedure was observed in the enactment of a Free
State Constitution . A The latter contained many elements foreign to the
Dominion model, as Harrison Moore pointed out in a Pound Table article;
nevertheless, its franework was unmistakably that of a Dominion rather than
af a Republic. 6

Vith regard to the constitutional question, Curtis's attitude was

1 CKacdonald, based on Hodson's notes, 3 "Ottawa and the Trade
Agreements", FT, Dec 1932, pp 44-53.

I Hodson , J "Empire Trade and World Trade", FT, June 1937, pp 514-17.

3 Gr igg to L Christie, 30 April 1922, Grigg Papers, XSS Kicrofiln 999.

See John McColgan, " Inplementing the 1921 Treaty: Lionel Curtis and
Constitutional Procedure", Irish Historical Studies, vol 20 (1977),

PP 312-33.

t Moore, J "Ireland: an Australian Impression" . FT. Sept 1923,

PP 782-804.

299

r

largely unhelpful to the Free State Government. On other questions he
tended to be nore conciliatory, hoping that fair treatment by Britain would
lead to "sone new political synthesis".' Writing to Bailey in January
1922, he asserted that "ninety per cent" of Irishmen were "potentially
cane", and only ten per cent "incurably mad". 2

With the outbreak of civil war in Ireland the Hoot, unsurprisingly,
threw what weight it had solidly behind the pro-Treaty forces. The Round
Table poured scorn on the rebels as a small knot of "irresponsible zealots"
vho backed up their "new theory of divine right with th© rifle and
revolver". 3 From his position inside the Colonial Office, Curtis proceed
for financial and material support for Cosgrove's governnent . a

Many on the right wing of British politics - including erstwhile
allies of the Moot such as Lords Sel borne and Salisbury - professed to see
In the fact of civil war proof of the Irish people's unfitness for self-
government. 4 5 Curtis suspected ulterior designs for the reassertioa of
British control over southern Ireland, a prospect which he viewed with
dismay. 6 He urged the British Government to be scrupulous in carrying out
its own undertakings, especially as those who constituted the Free State

1 Curtis to Devonshire, 11 Dec 1922, quoted in Paul Canning, British
Policy Towards Ireland , 1921-41 (Oxford, 1985), p 73. See generally
pp 70-91.

2 Curtis to Bailey, 7 Jan 1922, Curtis Papers 89, fols 69-70.

3 IDovo and Curtis, 1 "Ireland at the Cross-Roads" , RT, June 1922,
p 507.

4 Keith Middlemns <ed), Thomas Jones' Whitehall Diary: Vol III:

Ireland , 1910-25 (London, 1971 >, pp 218-19.

5 J J Lee, Ireland, 1912-85 (Cambridge, 1989), pp 143-44.

6 Klddlemas, op clt . pp200-OL, 220; CCurtls.3 "The Irish Boundary
Question", FT, Dec 1924, pp 35-37.

300

W

g^ernnent had "risked their own lives- for the Treaty, and had "kept it in
the letter and In the spirit".' A breakdown of the Treaty, he asserted,
^Id mean "certain war", and one "which cannot be terminated by another
Treaty because no one In Ireland will ever trust us again". 2

The test of Britain's willingness to abide by the spirit of the
treaty came in 1924, when the Free State Government requested the
iapleoentation of Article XII, which provided for a three-man Boundary
Coaaission to modify the border between Borth and South. Initially Curtis
feared the revival of old antagonisms, and hoped that "the basis of a
settlement will be found in our securing a promise of inaction" in return
for British inaction on financial claims. 3 nevertheless, the Free State
Go/ernnant could hardly afford to give up its one major bargaining-counter
at such an early stage.

Curtis's influence was now sufficient to secure the appointment of
Feetham <"the ablest of Dominion judges" and "constitutionally of
conservative temperament") as Chairman, in Kay 1924. * Problems arose when
Craig refused to appoint a Forthern Ireland Commissioner. Horne, Cur 2 on
and others urged support for this latest example of Ulster intractability.
Eventually, with strong support from the Round Table - which claimed that
'tie honour of the [British! nation" was at stake® - the British

1 Curtis to Churchill, 19 Aug 1924, Curtis Papers 39, fols 76-83.

2 Curtis to Churchill, 31 Aug 1924, Ibid, fols 84-87.

3 Xlddlemas, op cit . p 228 <31 March 1924).

* Xlddlemas, op cit . p 232 <27 May 1924); Curtis to Churchill, 19 Aug

1924, Curtis Papers 89, fols 76-83.

tDove,J "The Irish Boundary Question", AT, Sept 1924, p 776. Dove's
article was based on Curtis's notes: see Curtis Papers 90, fols 10-23
[summer 1924!.

301

Qffje rnneot rushed through legislation enabling it to appoint J ¥ Fisher.
Further problems arose over the interpretation of the Boundary Commission's
teras of reference. On this issue, the Round Table steered a middle path,
insisting that the Boundary Commission should itself be the judge of its
ou> powers. 1

As Chairman of a Commission whose two other members were certain to
differ, Feet ham possessed an unusual freedom. Nevertheless, the
•conservative temperament" to which Curtis referred ensured that he took a
very limited view of the Commission's mandate, placing great emphasis on
•economic and geographic* constraints and on the wishes of (Protestant)
landlords as opposed to (Catholic) tenants. As a result, the Commission's
proposals amounted to little more than a rationalisation of the existing
boundary. 2 Leaks of the Commission's findings created outrage in the Free
State, stalled the Commission's work, and paved the way for a tripartite
agreement to drop all claims (except land annuities). The Round Table
reported these events with equanimity, confining its comments to the
hopeful observation that an agreement reached by all parties would prove
■ore lasting than one imposed by a Commission, however fair and impartial. 3

At the time of the wrangle over the appointment of the Commission,
Chirchill reported to Curtis a "growing belief* among Conservatives "that
Ulster strongly fortified and Southern Ireland a recognised

* t Curtis, 1 "The Irish Boundary Question", RT, Dec 1924, pp 27 ff.

' See Report of the Irish Boundary Commission, 1925 (Shannon, 1969),
especially pp 32-68 (Fcetham's Xcmo on Article XII) and vii - xxii
(lutroduct ion, by Geoffrey J Hand); also G J Hand, "MacHeill and the
Boundary Commission", in F X Martin and F J 3yrne (eds) , The Scholar
Revolutionary (Shannon, 1973).

CBourdlllon and Horgan,! "Ireland: the Boundary Settlement and
After", RT, March 1926, pp 344-67.

i

302

for«ig D aation ’ we should be In a stronger position than at present".’

Ait; was by no n*ans the view taken by the Hoot. Curtis had hoped to "use
,he agency of Ulster" to secure a moderate settlenent for the whole of
Ireland. In the June 1922 Found Table he again argued that the separation
# f Ulster exacerbated Britain's problems by increasing the relative
preponderance of "extremists" in the rest of Ireland, and by furnishing
•hen with new sources of grievance against the 'Imperial factor ". 2
jevertheless, Ulster's resistance to i ncorporat ion was clearly strengthened
&y the very fact which made it such an urgent desideratum for the Found
Table: the resurgence of Republicanism.

In the aftermath of civil war, the magazine allowed its roadorc to
{ssune the gradual extinction of Fcpubl icanicm in Ireland. "The real
‘.ruth, always disguised and never frankly admitted, is that the great
ssjority of the Irish people never wanted a republic.""* The rise of de
Talera' s Fianna Fail party was thus something for which Round Table readers
*«re not we 1 1 -prepared. The magazine's Irish correspondent J J Horgan lest
^opportunities to denigrate de Valera's character and political ability.
Ie also emphasised that, with the changes in Dominion status brought about
since 1921, Ireland enjoyed "all the advantages and none of the
disadvantages of a republic"." 1

Fianna Fill's electoral victory of 1932 naturally alarmed the Round

• a Me. The Hoot took the now unusual step of printing its own

Churchill to Curtis, 3 Sept 1024, Curtis Papers 89, fols 89-90.

fbove and Curtis,] "Ireland at the Cross-Roads" , RT, Juno 1922,

PP 524-25.

"The Irish Scene 1925", RT, Sept 1925, p 753.

t Horgan, 3 "Events in the Free State", RT, March 1930, p 368.

Qtcervatiocs on developments ia Ireland, stating categorically that de
Valera’s constitutional intentions were "legally Impossible", and that
Britain' s case on land annuities was "beyond dispute". 11 de Valera
carried out his promise to abolish the oath, Britain should retaliate, by
cancelling preferences for Irish goods, and refusing to negotiate further
agreements at the Ottawa conference. Meanwhile, Horgan enphasised the
iiportance of Britain taking a stand, in order to undermine de Valera's
popular support. 1

Horgan initially expected Fianna Fill's imminent demise, but the Free
State elections of early 1033 marked something of a turning-point. By the
end of the same year, he was describing the (short-li ved> coalescence of
opposition groups as having merely "saved C the ml . . . from individual
destruction". 2 Horgan now adopted a more conciliatory line towards de
7alera, drawing distinctions between his views and those of Hary XacSwiney
and the IRA, and welcoming his disavowal of the use of force to end
partition. * Horgan also moved closer to de Valera in his assessment of
lorth-South relations, calling on Ulster’s leadership to show "sufficient
lugination and courage to face and decide this momentous issue".' 5 In
De:ecber 1934 and March 1935 the Round Table tackled the Ulster question

1 (Dove and Horgan, 1 "Ireland and the Treaty" , RT, June 1932,

pp 489-518, including "Editorial Preface", pp 489-92, and Appendix,
"The Economic Position", pp 517-18 (showing Ireland's dependence on
British markets) .

2 C Horgan, ] "Mr de Valera's Objective", RT, Dec 1933, p 172.

3 (Morgan, 3 "The Irish Free State: Quo Vadis?", RT, March 1934,

P? 368 ff.

4 (Horgan.3 "The Victory of Xr de Valera", RT, March 1933, p 306.

304

^sd'On, with tte publication of articles from Horgan and Arthur 31ack <a

^aber of Stormont), putting the case for and against reunification.'

On the central issue of Anglo-Irish relations, Horgan urged the

British Government to underline the Dominions' equality by giving an

assurance that force would not be used to prevent secession. This

"would immediately clear the air and free Mr de
Valera's Government either to declare a republic
... or to confess that they did not intend to do
so ... . In either event . . . such a
pronouncement would remove once and for all the Irish
belief that Ireland is under external compulsion in
the natter". 2

the foot was divided over whether Britain should issue such an assurance.®
Jovertheles*, the Pound fable accepted de Valera's successive amendments to
the constitution, no doubt convinc&d <ac Horgan now repeatedly emphasised)
that the alternative to de Valera was an Irish government even more
"extrene". De Valera's seizure of the Abdication Crisis as the moment to
renove the last vestiges of 3rltlsb suzerainty Horgan described as a
gesture "of little importance": "a bit of comparatively harmless nake-
believe", after which ''everything remains much as it was before".'- That
the foot acquiesced in Horgan' s assessment may be inferred from Kenneth
Bailey's article of June 193V, which asserted that "nobody in the rest of
the Commonwealth would wish to insist on strict compliance with . . .
constitutional forms ... as the price of the Free State's membership of

* [Horgan, 1 "Ireland and the Commonwealth", RT, Dec 1934, pp 21-43, and
[Black,] "Ulster and the Irish Froblem", RT, March 1935, pp 249-65.

The Moot itself did not take a line one way or the other.

CHorgan, J "Ireland and the Commonwealth", RT, Dec 1934, pp 38-39.

3 Minutes of RT meeting, 11 April 1935, RT <0> Papers.

* [Horgan,] "The Irish Republican Kingdom", RT, March 1937, p 355;
tHorgan,] "Re-enter Ireland", RT, March 1938, pp 312-13.

Ik

this free association of equal nations ". 1

Despite sone hesitation, the Round Table, like the British
Ccvernnent, generally pursued a policy of "appeasement" towards Ireland
between the wars. 2 This reflected a pragmatic appraisal of the options
available. On the one hand, Britain lacked the physical and especially
•oral force to inpose its own terms on Ireland; on the other, Britain's
real interests were more likely to be secured by conpronise than by
confrontation. Feville Chamberlain's decision to pursue the path of
negotiation, despite virulent criticism from the right of his party, was
applauded by the Found Table. The .resulting Agreement of April 1938 was
welcomed a3 closing "a humiliating chapter in the history of Anglo-Irish
relations" . 3

fiffllnlca Stalu.s-aad. -laper U1 .Co-opaxatiQn

As has been seen, the Sound Tablers continued to believe that
Iaperial federation afforded the only permanent basis for the continuation
of tie Empire. They did not see their attempts at orchestrating a campaign
in 1910-17 as a last-ditch effort to keep the Empire united. On the
contrary, they continued to believe that federation was the ideal towards
*bicl the Empire was progressing. The Empire was like southern Africa in
1902-10, its component parts jealous of their own autonomy, and only slowly
Roping towards sone realisation of the need for institutionalised unity. 4

1 CK Bailey,! “The King and His Peoples", FT, June 1937, p 480.

Paul Canning, op cit . p lx and pas&la-

tHorgan, ) "The Anglo-Irish Agreenent", FT, June 1938, pp 526-27.

Kerr to Curtis, 21 July 1917, Lothian Papers 33, fols 19-21.

306

Co-operation was -unquestionably the proper line of advance for the

ti^sV " tbe onl y practicable policy'. 2 Nevertheless, it was still only

40 •intermediate" stage. The Round Ta biers

"have always believed, and they still believe, that
sooner or later, after the equality of status of the
Doninions had been fully recognised, necessity and not
propaganda would force a conscious reovenert towards
constitutional unity - other than that which the Crown
itself gives*. 2

The Round Table thus accepted, without enthusiasm, but with a keen sense of
realities, the -new orthodoxy- of co-operation. Nevertheless, they were
juick to point out "the essential inadequacy of our present system of
iaperial relations". Taken as a whole, the actual machinery for
consultation and co-operation between Britain and the Dominions was
inferior to that between any of then and a foreign nation, as provided by
•.lie League. There was an "enthusiasm for form", but little of substance. **
Until 1921, the Round Tablers still expected the calling of a special
constitutional convention, as envisaged by Resolution IX of 1917. 5 In its
absence, the main piece of co-operative machinery was still the Imperial
Conference. Again contrary to the resolutions of 1917, this bedy quickly

1 (Grigg.l "The British Comnor.weal th of Nations in 1921", PT, Dec 1920,
P 11.

- "Draft Circular to the Dominion Groups", 22 Dec 1920, Lothian Papers
17, fol 17.

^ lGrigg,J "The British Commonweal tb of Nations in 1921", p 11.

* (Kerr,) "Afterthoughts on the Inpcrial Conference", PT, March 1924,
pp 225-41.

t Malcolm, J "The Meeting of the Imperial Cabinet", PT, June 1S21,

PP 549 ff; cf Amery to Grlgg, 24 June 1921, urging Lloyd George to
set up a committee (with Kilner as chairman, and himself a member) to
Prepare for a convention: Grlgg Papers, MSS Microfilm 999.

^verted to being a biennial, trtonnial and finally quadrennial
institution. Its value, for the Round Tablers, consequently diminished,
jhe Conferences of 1021 and 1923 were "not far short of a failure",
unwilling to "deal with the real issues which confront the Bnplre" , and
Bjre concerned with mere "Junketing and speeches". 1

The Moot put forward various proposals for improving the machinery of
co-operation. Many of these were the same as the proposals put forward
before the war. In 1923, for instance, Kerr suggested annual Conferences,
tie creation of an Imperial Secretariat, joint Anglo-Dominion delegates at
all major conferences, and "quasi-diplomatic" communication between London
aid the Dominions by means of Agents-General and High Commissioners. 2 The
Moot also favoured extending Dominion representation in foreign capitals:
■the core direct the contact of all parts of the Commonwealth with the*
realities of the international world the better". 3

Despite such promptings, the machinery of Imperial co-operation
remained largely undeveloped. The reason, Grigg observed, was that the
Docinions appeared to be concerned "rather lest the/ should be committed to
too ouch unity than to too little of it*.' 1

The Round Table recognised that the Dominions' war efforts had
contributed to "a greatly and justly enhanced sense of national dignity". 5,

!Kerr,] "The Next Imperial Conference", RT, March 1925, pp 227-28.

!Kerr,] "The Kew Imperial Problem", RT, June 1923, pp 459-93; cf
'Voyageur" [ Kerr) in The Tines 12,11,24.

IKerr.l "The Imperial Conference", RT, Sept 1923, p 698.

I Grigg , 1 "The Imperial Conference", RT, Sept 1921, p 733.

[ Grigg, 1 "The British Commonwealth of Rations in 1921", RT, Dec 1920,

? 4 .

5

privately. Coupland described the Dominions in 1919 as "almost norbidly
gea&itive at present on the question of 'equal nationhood'", and he
acknowledged *° k® tl10 nain factor militating against the Round

fablers' hopes for closer Imperial integration. ’ Dove took a similar view.
Initially, he believed that the Dominions would "settle down after the
■first wild careless rapture* which followed upon victory". 2 By 192b,
however, he was writing of a deep-seated "inferiority complex" towards
Britain, which was frustrating any attempt to institutionalise Commonwealth
unity. 3

There were grounds for the existence of such a "complex". As one
Sojtb African commented after J H Thomas's tour of the Dominion, "if the
Englishman abroad will suppress the aaai festatlons of his assurance as a
superior person, he will do more pernanent good to the British Empire than
all the Primrose Leagues and Empire Leagues that ever wagged a flag".* 1
Ie/ertheless, the Round Tablers <who were themselves always scrupulously
coirteous in their dealings with Dominion nationals) believed the root of
the problem to lie in Dominion rather than British attitudes. Curtis wrote
in 1934 of a "pathological condition* 1 of "pique" in Dominion attitudes,

“hich rendered it difficult for British people even to give advice to their
cojnterparts in the Dominions. -

The London Round Tablers continued to believe that Dominion
wtlcnalism need not necessarily be antagonistic to Imperialism and to the

1 Coupland to Malcolm, 10 Feb 1919, RT Papers c 814, fols 148-49.

2 Dove to Coupland, 2 March 1923, Brand Papers, box 70.

Dove to Kerr, 16 Dsc 1926, Lothian Papers 224, fols 349-56.

F Clarke to Dove, 18 Sept 1924, Lothian Papers 19, fols 251-54.

5 Curtis to Hodson, 20 Aug 1934, Lothian Papers 286, fol 605.

309

gritish connection, but they were forced to recognise that it frequently
rtS. The P roble “ was exacerbated by the extent to which nationalism was
gapped up in the internal politics of the Dominions: "twisting the lion's
lair provided an easy form of electioneering, and a mark of respectability
for Dominion politicians anxious to convince their electorates that they
„ould put the interests of their own constituents first. Such politicians,
j e rr observed, nade a living from "the fallacy that there is a choice
between freedom and obligation".’

The problems of co-ordinating and strengthening Anglc-Doninion
relations were thus increased by changes in the politics of the Dominions
thecselves, and especially by the rise of a new generation of nationalist
politicians. Glazebrook in 1919 thought that "it would be a very serious
disaster" if Xacken-zie King "should really ever become Premier of Canada" 2 ;
yet King was the dominant figure in Canadian interwar politics, clocking up
» total of 22 years in office between 1921 and 1948. More worrying still
ws the rise of Hertzog in South Africa: the Found Table held him "morally
responsible" for the Afrikaner rebellion of 1914, and the Moot predicted in
1920 that if he should win an election South Africa would dissolve into
civil war. 3 Yet Hertzog was indeed elected, and held the position of Prime
Roister from 1924 to 1939. Finally, the Dominion solution to Britain's
lf lsh problem introduced a further element of instability. Harrison Moore
1,33 initially optimistic that the Free State would "participate nore fully
ia the conduct of affairs of the Commonwealth than other Dominions", and

£ Kerr, 1 "The Sew Imperial Problem", FT. June 1923, p 479.

A J Glazebrook to Kerr, 4 Sept 1919. Lothian Papers 493.

"South Africa", FT, March 1915, p 467; "Draft Circular to the

Dominion Groups", 22 Dec 1920, Lothian Papers 17, fols 20-21.

w

310

•lead tie way" towards closer Imperial integration.’ Experience proved the
opposite to bo tho caoo. First Cosgrove and then de Valera led the other
posinioiis in unravelling their ties with Britain, so that by 1937 Eire had
. a republican government in everything but name".=

Even in the case of Ireland, the Round Tablers remained optimistic
concerning the real (as opposed to the stated) objectives cf Dominion
aationalists. They believed that as soon as the Dominions saw the
hollowness of their "real power' as "small nations", the chimera of
independence would lose its appeal. 3 Nevertheless, there remained a deep
sabivalence, and some division within the Moot, over the question of
whether and iD what way Britain should accommodate the nationalists'
ierands.

As early as 1913, Fred Perry and 5 J Kyli© suggested pressure for
forsalicing tho autonomy of tho Dominions by a declaration "that the Crown,
and not the British Parliament as at present, is the bond which holds
iifferent parts of the Empiie together". This suggestion, anticipating the
Balfour Declaration of 192C, was not followed up, apparently because of the
problematic position in which it would leave the Crown should governments
offer differing advice. *• Nevertheless, some members of the Moot were not
‘fraid cf letting the nationalists pursue the logic of their arguments.

1 t Harrison Moore, J "Ireland: an Australian Impression", RT, Sept 1923,
p 800.

tHorgan.J "The Irish Republican Kingdom", RT, March 1937, p 357. See
here David Harkness, The Restless Dominion (London, 1969).

Coupland to Malcolm, 10 Feb 1919, RT Papers c 814, fols 148-49.

{ Perry to Kylio, 26 Fob 1913, RT Papers c 7 78, fols 74-76; further
correspondence ibid , fols 38-42, 72-73, 77-78, 80-85 and c 781,
fols 129-30.

311

Qjrtie went as far as suggesting, early in 1025, that the Dominions should

jg encouraged to declare their independence from Britain.

"First lot that position be accepted, and then let
each Dominion set about to settle in conference with
Great Britain and with the other Dominions what in
future their legal and constitutional relations are
to be, and let the conclusions arrived at be embodied
in documentary form .... Then, and not till then,
shall we begin to know where we are. But, in my
opinion, nothing which could issue from such a
process could be more pernicious than the present
situation, based as it is on no surer foundation than
a shifting sand of pretence." ’

lerr insisted that Curtis make clear he was writing in a purely individual
capacity, and not on behalf cf the Round Table. 2 In his own article
anticipating the 1926 Imperial Conference, however, Kerr called on the
prsaiers to appease the Dominions' " psychological feeling" by abolishing
the last vestiges of dependence, including Britain's veto on Dominion
legislation and the right cf appeal to the Privy Council. 3

The 1026 Conference, and the Balfour Report to which it gave rise,
are often described as a landmark in Inperial relations. This was not the
Round Table's view at the tine. The Moot believed that the Balfour Report
'defined a change that had already taken place".'' Commenting in the Found
Table, Sir Frederick Vhyte quoted The rimes to the effect that that the
Conference merely "provided an agreed and authoritative picture of the
E “?lre as it is". He added that there was a "comparative scarcity of
Poetical conclusions", mitigated only by the "psychological value of the

1 Curtis to Hume Wrong, 15 April 1926, Lothian Papers 224, fols 321-24.

2 Kerr to Dove, 29 April 1926, Lothian Papers 224, fols 327-28.

I Kerr , 1 "The Hex t Imperial Conference", FT, Xarch 1926, pp 227-55..

* Kinutes of RT mooting, 5 Jan 1Q27, RT (O) Papers.

312

¥

pcceedings". ’

Dove wo loomed the fact that the Report "leaves the Empire a unit for
the purpose of the play of Imperial sentiment in time of crisis" - " to my
^Ddi the reality behind the British Empire ... is the sentiment below
the surface". Kever theless, the Report left many questions unanswered. In
particular, the “difference la function" which accompanied "equality in
status" was an unsatisfactory gloss on the question of responsibility. 2
Sggleston went further: in his view, the Balfour Report was a "dismal
joke". 3 Similarly, Harrison Moore, himself a aereber of the Conference on
)oninion Legislation, was appalled by the difficulties of reconciling the
irreconcilable, such as the absolute equality of legislatures with the
legal unity of the Crown. The Report, he concluded, was "pure politics":
ieductive, doctrinaire and "hardly British". * Nevertheless, he hoped that
nith such business out cf the way, the Imperial Conference would no longer
be doninated by "the mere desire of each to take back conothing in the way
of sdvantage for which they can claim credit". 5

The Moot also hoped that, with Dominion Status settled, "Dominion
°P Itt icn may now begin to press in the opposite direction - for
strengthen! ng rather than loosening the Imperial structure".*

Nevertheless, the Imperial Conference of 1930 was again dominated by

IVhyte.J "The Imperial Conference", AT, March 1927, pp 225-41.

Dove to Kerr, 16 Dec 1926, Lothian Papers 224, fols 349-56.

Eggleston to Laby, 1 April 1932, Lothian Papers 267, fols 677-84.

Xoore, "Notes on the work of the Conference on Dominion Legislation",

Karch 1930, Lothian Papers 23, fols 629-34.

Xoore to Dove, 19 Feb 1931, Lothian Papers 25, fols 864-66.

tKerr,] -Where are Ve Going?", XT, March 1930, p 227.

questions of "freedom" rather than of * unity".

Smuts' s claim, on the c-vq of the Conference, that no member of the

• free association" could withdraw without the consent of the others created

an "outrage" amongst Hertzog's Nationalist supporters. Duncan urged that

the right should be conceded. If the najority in South Africa wished to

secede, "they could not be prevented from doing so". More importantly,

"1 dc not believe that more than a handful of the
Nationalist party really want to secede. But if we
trail the thing in front of them and dare them to say
'secession', of course they will all say it".’

Again, the majority of the Moot found the idea hard to stomach, and

therefore rejected Duncan's views. Dove thought that talk of the

Doainions' "right" to secession was like talking of Parliament's "right" to

cut off Charles I's head. 3 The Found Table reflected his views. There

was, Harrison Moore asserted, a "distinction between those things which may
bo changed as the result of discussion and those which cannot". The
Doainions' allegiance to the Crown "cannot be dissolved by the unilateral
act of the subject". *

There were thus limits to the Round Tablet's’ tolerance of the

constitutional disintegration of the Enpire. Nevertheless, the Moot

recained optimistic, believing that the changes of 1917-31 had cleared the

deadwood from Anglo-Dominion relations. Dove even asserted that the Moot

"recognised, after the war, that all this had to come
.... Ve have done our best ... to suggest
improvements it machinery and otherwise, so as to
render co-operation possible, but we have in no way
run counter to the dominant movement which ended in
the Statute of Vest minster. Nor have we any regrets,

Duncan to Lothian, 3 June 1930, FT Papers c 813, fols 61-62.

Dove to Lothian, 3 Sept 1930, Lothian Papers 252, fols 643-44.
tKoore,] "The Crown and the Doainions", FT, Doc 1930, pp 96-105.

for we believe that nothing permanent, in the new
conditions which arose after the war, could ever have
been built on the old foundations".

The Bap Ire was now "at a psychological moment",
ijad run its course. It was time to return to the
m igration of the British Commonwealth'.'

The "co-equality movement"
"constructive ideal - the

A series of Round Table meetings over the summer and autumn of 1932

iiscussed various options as to the best way forward. Grigg favoured the
creation of an "Empire secretariat" and of an "Empire Foreign Affairs
Coaaittee", the latter consisting of delegations from the various national

parliaments, based in Geneva. 2 Curtis, of course, argued that federation
offered the only solution to the problem, but he also suggested the

creation of a deliberative assembly, modelled on the Assembly of the

league, in order to foster an al 1 -Commonweal th outlook (and reveal the
limits of co-operation "Inexorably"!.'* This latter suggestion commended
Itseli to the Moot, and Curtis was therefore deputed to outline his
proposal in a memorandum circulated to all the Round Table groups. A
Further suggestions were put forward in the Round Table: a
Conaonwealth tribunal, co-ordination of Commonweal th representation at
'eneva, enhancement of the position of Dominion High Commissioners,
interchange of civil service and military personnel, and some system of

Dove to T H Laby, 5 July 1932, (Melbourne file,) RT <0> Papers.

Grigg, "The British Empire, the League of Nations and the Rhodes
Ideal", (circulated 28 Sept 19321, Lothian Papers 268, fols 753-89.

Curtis. "Memorandum for Discussion at Blickliag", 19 Sept 1932,
Lothian Papers 268, fols 742-51.

Minutes of RT meeting, 7 to 10 Oct 1932, RT (0) Papers; Curtis, Draft
Memorandum (circulated for 31 Oct 1932 meeting!, Lothian Papers 268,
fols 811-27.

joint (or shared) diplomatic representation.’ Kenneth Bailey suggested
rtr lous measures for enhancing the unifying role of the nonarch, including
£>re extensive Royal visits to the Dominions (when the monarch could assume
the dJ ties normally carried out by a Governor-General), and the appointment
0 f a Governor-General or equivalent for purely British matters. *

Throughout the 1930s, discussion of the machinery for Commonwealth
co-operation was overshadowed by the prolonged economic, and worsening
political, world crisis. Specific functional and regional co-operation
locked increasingly more realistic than an "undiscriminating pursuit of
uniformity". 3 The Round Table now began to suggest that a start might be
aide with Just some Dominions (especially Australia and Few Zealand) rather
than wait for the slow movers. * Above all, however, the development of
eornon aachinery was subordinated to the mere pressing need for common
policy. As Hodson put it, "because the independence of the Dominions has
teen fully established, It is ail the more necessary that on vital matters
of coaaon concern" the Empire "should secure the greatest possible measure
of coaoca pci icy" . *

1 See in particular [Sir Alexander Wood Fenton,) "A Commonwealth

Tribunal", FT, Sept 1933, pp 742-55; [Hodson,) "British Commonwealth
Relations", RT, Dec 1933, pp 42-61.

lEailey,] "The King and his Peoples", RT, June 1937, pp 467-84.

tBodson.3 "The Imperial Conference", RT, Sept 1937, p 701.

4 IHodson,] "British Commonwealth Relations", FT, Karch 1938,

PP 275 ff.

5

l Hodson,] "The Imperial Conference", RT, Sept 1937, p 696.

316

kjflflT.RWS OF FQR51GB POLICY. 19in-BQ

problems of Empire, and especially of Anglo-Donf nion relations, were
iiti*ately linked with problems of foreign policy. On the one hand,

Imperial relations were increasingly becoming a variant of international
relations, and were closely affected by changes in Britain's international
position. On the other, Britain's international position was itself
affected by changes in the Empire, and particularly by the extent to which
the Empire could be made to provide the resources to translate the idea of
•world power" into reality. As Cove wrote in 1928, "foreign affairs have
become an increasingly important, one might say al 1-i mpor tant , part of the
laperial question". '

In perial Foreign Policy

The war and its aftermath wrought changes in Britain no less than in
the international situation and in the Dominions. The enormous cost of the
var altered for all time Britain's economic and financial position. From
king the world's greatest creditor nation she had become one of the
largest debtors. Overseas investments had been liquidated at an alarming
rate. Overseas markets had been lost. Industrial investment and
Productivity were sluggish. The imperative need to "balance books', yet
*lso to respond to domestic pressures for an increased share of government
e *f*nditure, enforced stringent economies in defence. Even so, the
disparity in defence expenditure between Britain and the Dominions remained
stubborn, as the Found Table pointed out.

°cve to Hichers, 5 Dec 1928, Lothian Papers 243, fols 590-94.

Estimated per capita defence expenditure, 1922-23'

Total*

Faval

Great Britain

11 - 18-7

1

-6-8

Canada

3-11-11

0

- 1 - 4

Austral ia

5-18-0

0

- 8 - 2

Few Zealand

5-13-0

0

- 4 - 7

South Africa

2 - 3-6

0

* Includes war

pensions and service

of

war debt

Before the war, those who constituted the London Moot believed that

the British Empire could not survive unless the Dominions contributed to

its support. In the aftcimoth of mr, the belief was stronger than ever.

is the Root argued In December 1930, naval predoni nance was "no longer

within the unaided resources of the British isles".'- 4

Britain's essential weakness impressed Itself in connection with

India and the dependencies, as Curtis made clear:

"The discharge of a task so gigantic accumulates on
Great Britain resentment, discredit and hatred
throughout the world. Mistakes are inevitable and are
always multiplied where strength is inadequate to the
tasks imposed. A few Dyers might precipitate world-
wide disaster".-

Ia 1923 Kerr proposed the creation of an "Imperial Council" or "Councils"

* or the dependencies, including representatives of the Dominions as well as
People who have lived long in the Colonies or Dependencies concerned".

[ Kerr, 3 "The Imperial Conference", ff7, Sept 1923, p 700.

"Draft Circular to the Dominion Groups", 22 Dec 1920, Lothian Papers
17 <fols 16-29), fol 21.

f Curtis, J "Preliminary Sote on the Questions to be Raised
1921, Brand Papers, box 41.

3

saw his proposal as the first step towards transferring the
^pendencies from Britain's control to that of the Inperial Conference. 1
| fl 7 ertheless, the task of co-opting the Doninl ons into supporting Britain's
r i\e in India and the dependencies was one which, for all Kerr's and
Curtis's prompting, the Moot appears wisely to have abandoned..

The task of co-opting the Dominions into supporting imperial defence
and foreign policy was not abandoned. It was, in the Round Table view,
essential that the Empire should remain a single "personality- in world
affairs. Despite the more extreme manifestations of Dominion nationalism,
Bound Tablers believed that here, at least, they were on common ground.

"Oiity in international affairs of the British Enpl re ... is no less a
part of the new orthodoxy than the recognition of the equality inter s° of
t It cemhers of it." The problem, as Malcolm put it, was "how to make the
partnership work". 2

The League of Kations transformed the context both of British foreign
policy anc of the Angio-Dominion relationship. The Moot subscribed to
miner's view (originally "a simple formula for the Yank") that the
Aspire /Common weal th was both a "prototype" and a "pillar" of the League.
Connonweal th unity was therefore essential for tbe League's success. * But
tie Dominions' separate representation added a new dimension to the problem
co-ordinating British and Dominion foreign policies. Writing in the

^ Kerr, " Kenoxandum for circulation to the Moot" [sent 11 Dec 19285,
Lothian Papers 243, fols 580-88.

’’ tKalcoln, 1 "The Meeting of the Imperial Cabinet", FT, June 1921
<pp 535-157), pp 552 and 542.

Milner's rote attached to Grigg to Milner, 1 Aug 1919, Grigg Papers,
MSS Microfilm 999. For an interesting critique of this argument, see
J DB Miller, "The Commonwealth and World Order: the Zlmnern Vision
and After", JICH, Vol VIII (Oct 1979), pp 159-74. Vhat Miller refers
to as the M 2inmern vision" was common currency within the Moot.

319

Table , Kerr described Dominion representation as "a matter of form
rf t>out political substance”. ’ Von Haast of the Few Zealand Round Table
though that it was "one of those political steps which was meant to please
lie Doxnl n i ons without meaning anything and which on the other hand is going
lo endanger the whole fabric of the Empire". s

Von Haast* s views were unusual. Generally, opinion in the Dominions

regarded their representation at the League as a synbol of their ’equality"

rtth Great Britain, and proof of their "separate and i ndependent" foreign

policy role.' 7 ' League representation was au important factor in the

development both of Dominion opinion on i nternatlonal affairs and of the

ucblnery to put that opinion into practice. As Kerr came to realise, so

long as Dominion policies ran on lines parallel to British policies there

*as little danger of disruption.

"Representatives of the nations of the English
speaking world find they think differently from the
other peoples. They have similar processes of
comprehending a problem, and they are irresistibly
impelled into sympathetic co-operative action in
working it out".' 1

iadeed, as Hodson later argued, the League night provide a "co-ordinating
factor' in Anglo- Dorai nion relation*, and the collective system night
iurrish "at acceptable warp for the fabric of Commonwealth foreign

tKerr,] "The British Empire, the League of Nations, and the United

States", FT, March 1920, p 239.

H F von Raast lo Curtis, 0 March 1920, Brand Papers, box 42.

See, eg, New South Vales resolution for the Melbourne conference of

Australian Round Tabiers, 20 Sept 1919, RT Papers c 802, fols 224-25.

Interview in Toronto Dally Star, 7 Hov 1922, Lothian Papers 19,

fols 223-31.

pollcT* ' 1 Probleis woulcl arise > however, if British and Dominion policies
^gan to diverge, or if the collective system itself came under strain.

In contrast to the prewar period, the London Round Tablers recognised
tkat. despite the lack of adequate i&achinery for doing so, Imperial foreign
policy would have to be franed with an eye on the Dominions. Grigg
described this as "the imperative necessity, In spite of all difficulties,
of keeping our policy in line with the opinion of the Dominions". 2 Cove
puttie question only slightly differently, when he wrote that "the real
cru < will always be, does the policy adopted commit us to a path which,
frta the nature of things, the Dominions themselves cannot in the long run
be expected to follow". * There were, of course, areas in which the Round
Tablers bel ieved that Dominion opinio* was wrong, au«l should therefore be
overridden or cajoled; nevertheless, the Integrity of Imperial foreign
policy remained an immensely important litmus-test which the Round Tablers
applied throughout the 1920s and '30s.

A series of foreign policy decisions in the early 1920s made clear
ttat successive British Governments failed this test. First there was the
Chaiai incident, when Lloyd George and Churchill attempted to rush the
^oainions into supporting a fait, accompli . A different British Government
Unexpected the Dominions merely to endorse British decisions in
connection with the Treaty of Lausanne. The Pound Table pointed the moral
tiat "if the Empire is to avoid the shocks which are inevitable under the
’resect want of system, there must be continuous consultation between

t Hudson, 1 "British Conmonwealth Relations", ET, Dec 1933 <pp 42-61),

PP 53 and 56.

Gr lgg to Curtis, 11 April 1924, Grigg Papers, MSS Microfilm 1001.

hove to Kerr, 16 Dec 1920, Lothian Papers 224, fols 349-56.

rtpres* ntative5 of a11 P* rt ® before, and not merely after, a crisis has
tJ lset m ■ ' lQ 192f5 * the Treaty of Locarno posed the most Important threat
y, far to the unity or Imperial foreign policy, committing Britain to the
glance of power in Europe, but leaving it open to the Dominions whether or
30 t to follow. The Round Table initially supported Locarno, provoking a
Hated correspondence between Kerr and Loring Christie.

Christie argued that Locarno was "at variance with the Round Table
Una of the past 7 or 8 years". It illustrated the extent to which the
League had become ■Europeanised", and to which British foreign policy had
followed suit. The Empire "could agree upon and pursue a common foreign
policy only if all its numbers could refrain from implicating themselves in
‘he security arrangements of special regions of the earth'. The "Imperial
co-opeiotloii project" had now broken down. The Empire could only be
cooceived "not as a unit but as a number of different members": there
'cajnot be a comiiio.'i policy". 2

Christie was in effect arguing the Imperialist case against the
British government. Kerr could only reply that Christie went too far in
Hviding the world into "water-tight compartments" . European problems were
■n 'act "world problems" , and although he hoped that Britain "will
•»creasiagly draw out of" the League, the "only practical course is to
'•arry on along the son**what anomalous lines which prevail at present".®

tKerr.l "Inperial Diplomacy* , RT, Sept 1924, p 664.

t Christie, 3 "Notes based on discussion by Dominions and Foreign

Policy group, BIIA", 8 Feb 1926, Lothian Papers 20, fols 333-50.

ferr-Christle correspondence, Lothian Papers 20, fols 364-86 and 221,

fols 72-99.

urT subsequently accepted some of Christie's points.’ In many ways,
j^rao was a turning-point for him: thereafter, he opposed all attempts to
1>vo l7e Britain in the “internal politics* of Europe.

If the major portion of blame for the breakdown of Imperial co-
operation in foreign policy attached to British governments, the Bound
Table also held Dominion governments culpable. "The real reason for the
absence of an effective control over foreign policy by the Dominions is
that they are not for the moment i nterested" . ? The Dominions were "living
In blinkers" , lulled into a false sense of security by Britain's apparent
ability to continue bearing the "lion's share* of defence expenditure.’

The Balfour Report. and the Statute of Westminster did nothing to
alter this situation. Writing in the Found Table, Harrison Moore
eafhasised that "the principle of a common allegiance and the principle of
differentiation of function are in every way as important as the principle
of equality of status". * But public opinion In Britain and the Dominions
seened largely impervious to such reasoning.

The changes of 1926-31, as Kodson commented, "evolved against the
background of a world in which the collective system played the leading
r «le in international affairs, and seened likely to grow in strength". s
? lthin a few years the threat* to the collective system became apparent:
the need for greater Conmonwcal th integration became increasingly urgent,
is Hobson, again, emphasised, "the British collective system of security is

1 t Kerr, 1 "The Imperial Complex", FT, Sept 1926, pp 673-89.

I Kerr, 1 "The New Imperial Problem", FT, June 1923, p 492.

I Kerr, } "The Next Imperial Conference", FT, March 1926, pp 231-33.

1 t toore, 1 "The Crown and the Dominions", FT, Dec 1930, p 105.

1 Hodson , 1 "British Common wealth Relations", FT, Dec 1933, p 61.

323

giiW a reality, whatever may be the future of the world system". 1

In 1934 the Found Table Identified two essential features of a
CcBionwealth foreign policy: first, the defence of the collective system,
aD d secondly the maintenance of an alignment with the United States. 2
locreasingly, however, the Round Table (and Lothian in particular) saw a
contradiction between these two features. "Appeasement" was thus born out
0 f a retreat from Europe and into the •Oceanic* world of America and the
Dcninions. The Round Table’s increasing desperation for a common Imperial
foreign policy led it to grasp, if necessary, at "a foreign policy for the
British Commonwealth, less one Dominion".-

Parallel with the Found Table's attenpts to build a real Commonweal tb
foreign policy went an increasing emphasis on defence arrangements. As
early as 1933, the Round Table was again floating the possibility of
Doninion contributions to the Royal Savy.* It was the possibility of a
Joint system of air power which the magazine found most attractive,
however. The Dominions lagged far behind Britain in naval expenditure.

They might therefore provide more than their fair share of air power, so
that "the Commonwealth of British nations will accord in fact with its
constitutional fornwlae". 5

1 CHodson,] "The Ccordinafcioc of Defence", RT, June 1936, p 462.

^ f Lothian,) "The Empire, the League and Security", RT, Karch 1934,

p 239.

v CHodeon, 1 "The Imperial Conference", RT, Sept 1937, p 697.

tHodson,] "British Corononweal th Relations", RT, Dec 1933, p 61.

^ tGen Fuller,] "Air Power and Imperial Defence", RT, June 1934,
pp 490-507.

jyrK*- t ^ e CpimiQDwealth t he

rn «t..t o, the Shift in Routd TabIe attltudes t0 „ ards „ nerlca

>hlci took place during the war C aa hardly ^ 6xa8gerated . Qf M>

** recognised Adrien's entry into the war to have been decisive, first

„ averting the financial collapse which threatened Britain's war effort in

W17 ' S " d in prOVldl “S th * manpower which ensured that It was the

Central Powers and not the Allies which snccuabed i„ I918 . . sfter tbe war ,

tie inerican axis remained central to the Round Tabters' strategic and

political thinking: Tt is not too much to S a, that if the British

Como n wealth is to survive, and if the world is to he guided towards peace

U “ Uy ' “ iS eSSe “ tial «“* »»• Mt.4 States and the British
Comionwedlth should act in friendly oo-o f4 ration".*

Kerr/Lothian was. of course, uniquely enthusiastic In calling for
Anglo-Anerican co-operation. He vi.iud Africa fluently, on Rhodes
Trust business which he often combined with a, ore dl.ectly political
interests. He claimed "to have southing more than the impressions of the
ordinary British gJobe-trotUr V * To a certain extent his cUi. was
accepted In Britain. Lord Halifax later mote »r ’the rare intuition which
fe displayed ... in divining how Anei leans would act and feel if this or
!ia t line were taken by Croat Britain".*

foj. * he T f * rs * F oint > see Brand, V a , an J national Finance (London,

C jJ,’ r rJ rO « UC ni O0i f ° r the S5eCOnd ’ s * e f Coupland, J "The Unity of
civilisation", RT, Sept 1916, pp 661-62. 3

f^Kerr, ] "A Programme for the British Commonwealth" , RT, March 1922

forr to Austen Chamberlain, 24 Jan 1926, Lothian Papers 227, fol 109.

feUfax, -Preface" to Curtis (ed>, The African Speeches of Lord
Lothlao (London, 1941), pviii.

Africa wao Kerr/Lothian' s -fad- ** ,

a . as East Africa was Grigg's, or

CUlna Curtis's. Occasionally, he was driven , , , .

ariven to complain of his Round Tabl

colleagues' refractoriness.’ Far more off™ . v ,

olten ' S ot his own way. Other

I00J d Tablers were at times equally snthusUst.e advocates of A„g,o-
aet.cn P-^ershlp. It was Curtis who provide., the jw r aWt , nost
forceful argument for African colonial responsibility. And u was Brand
.0 defined -strengthening tie ties between the Bngl.sh speaUng races- as
018 of tte " k,,n objects of Round Table policy. *

Tbe Round Tablers believed that friendly relations between Britain
and America were a necessity ,f the Empire was to remain united. There
«s, of course, the peculiarly vulnerable position of Canada. Kore
"■erany, the Dominions as a whole were believed to stand in an equivocal
porn, on between Britain and Africa.’ Cultural Americanisation -as
recognised even in that most. -British- of Dominions, Re- Zealand."
folltlcal Americanisation was an aohnow.edg-i possibility. Or.gg condemned
Britain's obligations onder the Straits Convention on the grounds that the
Unions would not follow, and that -,f -* , s „ ore that feature in the
*«>*nt of the overseas democracies, -a shall find them over a course of
.'ears ranging themselves Instinctively and inevitably, not behind us, but
*&:nd the United States".’

fo]s 633-34 tMdn *° CurUs ’ S? A ° S 1Q5Ct Lothi *'* P «P*rs 252 ,

" VIndow * of Freedom", FT, Dec 1918, pp 1-47- r grand 1
Xemorandum" flaU 1010] , Brand Papers, box i 2 ' 3

fKerr, ] "Anglo-American Relations", FT, Dec 1926, pp 1~2.

fols 457-74** 1 U * t0 K ° 0t * fcirc * lat * d 1928.) Lothian Papers 21

0n lhe St,alts Convention, [sent to Ramsay
Donald 29 Feb 3924,3 Grlgg Papers, MSS Microfilm 1001. *

326

Another factor which impelled Britain towards friendly relations with
the Uai ted States was the latter's naval pow* r . Kerr claimed that the
f fl shi»8 ton Treat 7 of 1921 committed the two countries to "a steady attempt
a t co-op*rati °n" because it shared "the historic function of seapower
between the two navies". 1 The role of the British Admiralty in reviving
the naval arms race later in the d*«:ade was roundly condemned: "the United
States can financially afford to build five ships to our one". 5. The
revival of Anglo-American antagonism threw Kerr into another of his fits of
blue funk: he even talked of Britain and America "driftfingJ into
competition with its Inevitable end, another world war".*

As well as the negative aim of avoiding conflict between the two
countries, the Xoot had a more positive conception of the role which Anglo-
Aierican co-operattoa might play In world affair*.

The proposal that America should take up the baton of colonial
sd*inistration in the Kiddle East formed an important pa: t of the Round
Table's discussion of the tero»r> of peace. In making it, Curtis also
suggested that Auer lean rule should extend to Mexico and Liberia, and that
Africa should take a forward idle in " regenerati ng" the "unhappy people"

°f Russia.* Id fact, America was offered only Armenia, "where she could

1 fKerr.l "The British Commonwealth, the Protocol and the League", AT,
Dec 1924, p 5.

tKerr,] "The Naval Conference", RT, Sept 1927, p 660; of Dove to
K «rr, 18 July 1927, Lothian Papers 231, fols 507-20: the Anericans
’have the whip-hand of us" .

Kerr to Frank B Kellogg, 30 March 1928, Lothian Papers 226,
fols 292-93.

i

c Curtis, J "Windows of Freedom", FT Dec 1918, pp 20-34.

money" . ' If

sot profit and where she must of necessity spend large SUBB of

1[Sl o- F re n ch greed was the immediate proMem , . Bore fundaBental proHen

was the attitude of Americans tlu=nselv es Kerr nr . , ..

Kerr noted the prevalence of the

Wl4f that I "’ PerlallS " was ‘—"I *»« -democratic. IMS he
Characterised as a fora, of nalvet*. Kerr M _ u _ lnni(lUy IbcUm4 tQ

optimism: "the issues are comparatively 3lmple , „„ d tSe education of

[Anerlcanl public opinion could b* rapid". =•

"Education" was also the Round Table's character Ist.c solution to the
problem of Tricon reluctance to become .solved In the framework cf
international security. America's rapid retreat Into Isolationism
following Versailles was the cause of considerable dlsUluslonn*nt amongst
the Eound Tablers and the., allies, boring Christie reported the
atimsphere in America in ,920 to be "horrible" - "100% American and to hell

“ Uk the reSt ° f Ue “ 1r:d - T *««• - ***« to compare the American

people to "children playlr.v i„ a pleasant garden". <

.he "e«l.ical Ion" of African opinion was a «oal shared by the Council

“ Foreign Relations, which the Root's Intervention helped to catalyse into

a more active existence i„ 1922." Prominent amongst the reformed Council's

Krters were the Root's contacts from J F Rorgan and Co (the bank which

June ^r; d 5^ ker '’ " T ' re dnd tbe 01d «T,

Kerr to Curtis, 15 Oct 1913, ST Papers c 310, fols 229-37. See also

1° *ay 1922, Stand Papers, box 70, hoping that

politic T X cve " l “ a '‘y undertake 'the uvain responsibility for the
political education of Russia and China".

Christie to Kerr, 12 Jan 1920, Lothian Papers 207, fols 282-37.

Toro * to DalIy SUr ' 7 Kov 1922, Lothian PapGrs ls -
above, p 220.

uodl ed British purchases In Africa tefor# 191s> and fro- „ 1wb . s
R ation at Versailles: Shotw.ll. Ccol.dge, barnot, Juhn v Davis, S or M „
, Davis, Charles P Howland, Paul D Cravath and laalah Bo.u*„. Whitney
Shepardson, the Round Table's African correspondent, was the first
secretary of the reforned Council. The Council's am was defined as that
„f -developing a reasoned American foreign policy. ,„d,v,dual members
were prominent In urging a more -constructive- and expansionist policy and
a more sympathetic approach to Britain.’

The Round fablers' traffic with America was by no neons all one-way.
although their emphasis on the -education- of American opinion was apt to
obscure the fact. Indeed. American attitudes and anticipated American
reactions exercised a powerful influence on the Round Tablets' approach to
a wide range of foreign policy Imuas.

Once it was clear that Africa would » w t Join Britain in the League,
Ue Round Table t.*UUd on the necessity of revising Britain's commitments
Uld6r Aft,Cl * S 10 «■ "Africans are too fend of talking high ideals

^ UaVlng US t0 d ° a11 tbe "° r * ln attaining them", Grigg renarked to
hccyAstor.* Britain simply did not have the resources to carry out her
obligation* without African backing. It was more dangerous to make
fitments which couia not be impie merited than not to make them in the
& place: -those who need our support nay interpret [ there! more
lIt *rall y than we do ourselves-.* Moreover, the enforcement of sanctions
b Z tbe League entailed the possibility of conflict between Britain and

^urence Shoup and Viiiiain Kintner, imperial Brain Trust <Kew York,

v "'» p 16 and passim .

Gr ig& to Nancy Astor, 21 Sept 1922, Grigg Fapers, MSS Microfilm 599.

tKerr.j "The British Empire, the League of Nations, and the United

CQ tes-, rt, March 1920, pp 244 and ff.

329

X^rica, particularly over the still unresolved question of belligerent
neutral rights. (Kerr favoured re-defining the controversy by
distinguishing between -public" and -private' wars, but this was
problematical while America stood out of the only internet. lonal body which
could make such a distinction. ) Another reason for disembarrassing the
league of autonatic comrai tnents was that such a course was believed to make
it more likely that America would Join.* Vlthout American participation,
Curtis believed the League to be largely "a sham", and an additional burden
01 Britain rather than an additional security. 5

America's attitude was by no means i nroed lately clear, of course: as
Siepardson wrote, Harding won the 1920 election by "bringing together in
his support nen who believed In the League, non who believed in & League,
and men who believed in no League at all".' 1 The Xcot's contacts in the CFR
were Initially optimistic concerning American attitudes. The turning point
appears to have been 1924, when John V Davis stood unsuccessfully os
Dteocrat presidential candidate, on a programme which included a more
"constructive" foreign policy. The following year, Shepardson uade it
c^ear that American Isolationism was likely to stay, and that "the road
towards political stability" was one which "Europe must travel alone".*'

Host members of the Moot appear to have accepted that Amei lean
Participation in collective security should now be discounted. Kerr

1 tKerr.3 "The British Comnorwealth, Freedom and the Seas", FT, March
1929, pp 243-43.

tKerr,) "The British Comonwealth, the Protocol, and the League", FT,
Dec 1924, p 20.

1 Curtis, 3 "The World in Conference", ST, Sept 1920, p 750.

4

5

tShepardson, 3 "The Passing of Voodrow Wilson", RT, Dec 1920, p 27.
t Shepardson, 1 "President and Senate", RT, June 1925, pp 457-71.

330

rewained »pW-tio. Vhile noting tiat ABerlc<>ns ^ Qf ^ ^

of international re.m, and Intermix responsibility which in Craat
Britain in a.ionatic-, he asserted that it was "only a question of tine for

ue united States to play her fun pdrt i„ the international world-..

The enormous hopes which Kerr attached to American participation in
ihe franework of International security go a long way to explain the
extraordinary attitude which he adopted towards the -outlawry of war-
proposal Which emerged from the KeUogg-SHand correspondence of 19 2 r- 20 .

Scorned the proposal in hyperbolic terns: -inanely important-, the
teginning of 'a new era", 'bringling) into being for the whole world a
system fundamentally similar to . . . the Sritish Commonwealth of
Iitions- The reason was t.ansparent: the proposal -puts the United

SUtes morally behind the treaty settlement, inarch as she would hardly

be indifferent - having signed it - to an attempt by any P c „ Br to upset it

bj force of arms".* The fundamental misjudgment inherent in such reasoning
**s exposed by Shotweii:

• • . fch* pr*6*nt proposal Is not the outlawry
propose. The fornuU 'renunciation of war as an
instruct of national policy* is the only one

r 6u * Ubl « for policy as things stand

at f r *** nt< T3ie outlavry people do not seen, to
r ihat ’ tecbnkan J ctpeaii ng, outlawry would

• al, f ox tW hind of sanction which they definitely
find fault with' 1 .' 1 ^

1

2

fKerr.l "Anglo-American Relations", FT, Dec 1926, pp 7 and 16.

[Kerr 1 'The Outlawry of Var" , FT, June 1926, pp 473-75.

rJ 3Ugh !. ICerr,s * rticle m out of the best you have written'
*err, 21.5.23, Lothian Fap-rs 231, fol 531.

Dove
Dove to

w:x'm8? u pp%“^: 5 r var '' p 495; of frerr -’ " The ?eace pact -

4

Jaae S t Shotwell to Sl.epardson Ccooy), 23 June 1928,
<=33, fol 701.

Lothian Papers

331

Outlawry reinforced rather than replaced Anerica's confidence in its
isolation. Kerr did not draw the obvious conclusion, however, that Britain
should now look elsewhere for support. On the contrary, "if . . . Great
Britain is forced to choose between association with a Europe drifting back
to the balance of military power on the one hand, and with the United
States on the other, she will Inevitably choose the latter*. The choice
Mil be forced upon her by the Dominions". 1

fo r npe in the IS 20s; Commitment an d Conciliation

The Round Table's reaction against tho Treaty of Versailles began
even before the ink was dry. "err had been the only number of the Moot who
had approved of the mandate which Lloyd George took to Paris. Yet even he
vis disturbed by the cour&e of the Allied negotiations, pointing out to
Lloyd George "several tines . . . th.it, while every exaction on Germany was
jjstified on its merits, the accumulation of these will place Germany in an
utterly impossible position".- Like Lloyd George, Kerr comforted hinself
with the thought, that no treaty w os permanent, and that the Covenant of the
Ltague provided explicitly for revision. *

Vhatever tie temporary situation, it was clear that Germany was
'potentially still the most powerful state in Europe". * It was therefore
unrealistic to expect that Germany would "submit to her present position of

1 l Kerr,] "Towards Peace or Var?'\ RT, June 1930, p 467.

2 Hankey, The Supreme Control at the Far Is Feace Conference, 1919
(London, 1963), p 97.

Harold Ficholson, Diaries and Letters, 1930-39 (London, 1966), p 82.
See also A Lentin, Guilt at Versailles (London edn, 1985), pp 135 ff.

■Kerr, 3 "The Locarno Treaties", RT, Dec 1925, p 3.

subordination for ever'.'

*o»nd Tablers found particular f.„t , he reporatl0n6
clauses. As Brand pointed out, not only were the sues claimed -fantastic-,
but they were also profoundly destabilise on all the econoales Involved.*

11 1921 the Table SUSgested -’’-round cancellation of Inter-Allied

debts as the key to a acre moderate «ttU-„t.- other aspects of the

terms Imposed on Germany which the Pew Table criticised Included those
relating to the Saar '/alley and the Rhineland, and the limitation of
Germany's army. Germany's losses of Upper Silesia, Eupen and BalmSdy were
criticised on the grounds of national self-determination, as was the

prohibition against union with Austria. Germany's other .osses were on the
vhole believed to be just ifi*d. *

The peace settlement's legacy of unsolved problems was believed to be

even nore ominous In Eastern Europe. There the patchwork of ethnicities
ws a standing contradiction to the ideal of national self-determination,
■lobody believes that the frontiers of Eastern Europe to-day are stable":
l«fced, violent conflict wa„ -certainly much nore than a hypothesis". *

The Round Tables' attitude to Europe was "benightedly insular", as

' p*a3l ' * " Eur °' p '' Ue Co ' ,en - nl -hd the Protocol , FT, Xarch 1925,

Pe -° draUOn ’ and Inter - AUle < 1 *M»\ FT,

fHeadUnr-Kor ley and Horsfall,] "The Aftern^th of Victory". rt
Dec 1921, pp 112-13. y ' *'

4

5

Aff! d - la ^° r i by,} " ProbIero5 of Euro P* ; the Paris Conference and
A£t e r rt, March 1920, pp 293-321; of t Headlam-Karley et al.l
Problems of Europe", RT, .Sept 1921, pp S4S-67.

{Kerr,] "The Security Pact", RT, Sept 1925,
Locarno Treaties", RT, Dec 1925, p 10.

P 648; fiiea. J -The

Grigg candidly admitted.' TJiey recognised few British interests in
Europe* other than the security of North- Vest Europe and a general
conaitment to the restoration of stable economic conditions. 3
Eundacentally, they believed that Britain was an Oceanic not a continental
power. Her future lay with the Empire/Comnonwealth and the United States
ratter than with Europe. The attempt to involve herself in European
diplomacy would be M as ridiculous as a fish out of water*. *

Detachnent fron Europe was exacerbated by the Sound Tablers' reading
of the long-term future. "Europe can only be stabilised in one of three
ways - by the predominance of one group, by the balance of power, or by
federation*, Kerr declared in 1926. Of these three options, the first two
were inherently unstable, and only the third offered a permanent solution.'’
Tie Round Table welcomed Br land’s pan-Eur opeanist diplomacy of the late
1920s, agr**ing that Europe "must think conti dental ly" . *

Ph* long-term trend in Europe was thus believed to be towards
economic and political integration, with Britain and the Commonwealth
forning a separate bloc. It followed th.it Britain could best help Europe
by following her* “ancient diplomatic tradition of limited entanglement" in
the continent’ s "internal problems"* or "leaving Europe to stew in ite

Grigg to V Turner Perkins, 11 April 1924, Grigg Papers, XSS Xicrofiln
1 00 1 (opposing plans for a Channel Tunnel >.

lKerr.3 "Cologne, The Secorlty Pact and the League", RT, June 1925,
pp 431-50

3 IL Christie,! "A Basis for Imperial Foreign Policy", FT, Karch 1924,
p 264.

' t Kerr , J "The Crisis in Vorld Affairs", FT, June 192G, pp 454-55.

I Harold Butler,! "Europe at the Cross-Poads" , FT, June 1920, p 462;
cf l Salter, 3 "The United States of Europe", FT, Dec 1929, pp 79-99.

6

1 Kerr, 3 "The Crisis in Vorld Affairs', RT, June 1926, p 463.

334

own Juice", as Lord Davies later put It. 1

This also -as the conclusion

a " e “" I “ tl0 ‘ ° f short-term prospects. -I e l5 „ Ue
E „ lre would kee P - «l«r of Europe as Grigs „ ote to ^

1924 .

great 6 war w ,n Un of P'^entlng another
that lhall d t ! T 20 or 30 > ears » and I think

prelini narv fr \ m keep “ uch alcof trom aU the

o M ? AS P ° Sslble - Ve af e ^uch more

aloof Hke th nc 5t ° P 11 ultinatel y If «e stand

European ril 3 * US ' th * n If we »° "esslag about in
Europe" ° ursel '" s a <* the

The Round Tablers* reaction against Tare. Hies was in Urge part a
reaction against the policy of France. In Ka,,.„ Ue gouad Tab , e

reported -a real divergence between Prance and Britain on their views as to
fost-war Europe" In atmosphere of ala. mien prevailed. Dove worried
Where Britain's league conu.i Imenls would lead her if there were another

-hr, and the "real offer,.:.-, if , ot the technical aggression, cane from
France." Others in the Xowt were equally distorted. "We cannot allow
Mncar* to min Europe. If w. do then Germany and Russia must inevitably
Join up", Brand wrote, after .are ting Dr Virth.’ G.igg, as Lloyd George's
secretary, was the recipient of numerous rumours, of French preparations
f * ™ r ' ° f Fre “‘ ;l1 offers of support for America in case of an Anglo-
^ rlCa,> “ ar ’ of Fr e“o'' conspiracy with the Vatican for the domination of

i-ord Davies, "'Round Table' or 'Vorid Comnonwealth'?", Tie
"ineteenth Century an.t After, vol CXVIi (Jan 1935), p 47.

° rI «S to Bailey, 8 hay 1924, Gr igg Papers, KSS Microfilm 1001.

f Headlam-Morley, J "The Paris Conference", RT, Hatch 1921, p 274.

Dov,: to Grigg, 11 April 1922, Lothian Papers 18, fol 138.

Brand to Grigg, 20 April 1922, Grigg Papers, XSS Xicrofilm 999.

5

335

g, stern Europe and for control of Constantinople. «

France's occupation of the Kuhr in 1S23 epitomised her policy in the
ijaediate postwar period: disastrous for Germany and herself alike.

•France is to my mind directly responsible for the probable failure of the
dc*»cratic experiment in Germany", Dove concluded, not for the first or
last time. The Found Table found Britain's Conservative Government to be
alnost equally culpable. Its failure to stop Fiance was "an abject
surrender of the whole moral position of the British Coraimnwealth" . 2

Kerr/Lothian in particular has received criticism as a " Francophobe" ,
a trait which is often ascribed to his apostasy. In fact, the religious
element appears to have been quite superficial. 2 Bor w*s Francophobia
apparent before 1919, although an Anglocentric disdain for "Latin"
behaviour sonetimes was. Francophobia, if such it was, was the direct
outcome of the years 1919-23. Kerr's views w»re common currency in the
Xcot. Grigg's maiden speech as an M7 was devoted to an attack on French
policy, and he was a persistent critic of Biitish policy towards France
tlrojghout the decade. Brand even criticised Kerr in 1925 for taking a
line tco conciliatory to French concerns.*

1 This last from George Grahams, British Ambassador in Brussels, who

wrote via Grigg because be believed the Foreign Office to be riddled
with Ronvan Catholics: Grahame to Grigg, 7 Feb and 26 Sept 1922, Grigg
Papers, MSS Microfilm 1000.

Cove to Brand, 9 Oct 1923, Brand Papers, box 70. f Horsfall, 1 'The
Problem of Europe", FT, Dec 1923, pp 22 ff.

Kerr suffered religious doubts in 1912-13, and finally converted from
Fonan Catholicism to Christian Science In 1922. Nevertheless, he
claimed that the differences between the two religions were much less
than was commonly supposed: Kerr to Lady Anne Kerr, 11 March 1922,
Lothian Papers 467, fol 2.

’ Fan sard (Comnons), 5th Series, Vol 102 (2d March 1923), cols 561-91.

Brand to Curtis, 6 Feb 1925, Brand Papers, box 182.

k

336

The Round Table did not share the commonly accepted view that the

• Locarno honeymoon" was a benevolent period of Franco-German rapprochement,
facilitated by an impartial Austen Chamberlain. On the contrary,

Chanterlain was accused of pursuing a policy 'subordinate to the policy of
France", and of "supporting . . . the French Wgeavony' . 1 "Psychologically,
of course, France lost the war and Germany won it*, Kerr wrote to MacDonald
in 1928.

"France to-day has no real belief in the possibility
of European problems being settled peacefully, and is
doing everything she can to get us Into an entente
which is really ant i-Ger man, though labelled
' Locarno* . " 2

The Round Tabler* were now profoundly more sensitive to the Gernan point of
view than to the French, and cut their cloth accordingly. "Ve must
'assist' Stresemann" , Dove wrote In 153?. There were "people in Germany
always hovering near the popular ear on the look out for a chance of
Setting back what they regard a* their own by force". The factors working
against democracy in Germany were so strong that it was "amazing" it had
survived so long. "Disai name at Is, of course, the burning ^uest i on . "*

For the first time since the fail of Lloyd George, the Round Tablers
found an Identity of purpose with the British government following the
elections of Xay 1929. "Ve think pretty much on the sane lines", as
McDonald had written to Kerr in 1928.'* Alas, the situation in 1932 was

1 (Kerr,} "A Pled for an Independent Foreign Policy", RT, Dec 1928,

P 1.

2 Kerr to MacDonald, 16 Nov 1928, Lothian Fapers 243, fols 561-62.

3 Letters fron Dove to Brand, [Sept 1927], Lothian Papers 21 (fols 416-
40) , fols 419, 429, 432, 426.

* McDonald to Kerr, 19 Hov 1928, Lothian Fapers 243, fol 563.

I

337

v«ry diffe rent from tliat ln 192 8. The disarmament conference over which
geoderson presided (despite resigning fron the Foreign Office in the crisis
0 i August 1931) found little common ground amongst the main protagonists.
Even Britain contributed to its unsatisfactory d£nouempnt. , by "dissolving
its substance in streams of tepid water".'

Against a background in which the threat of authoritarianism in
Cernany was now a real rather than a speculative danger, the Pound Tablers
redoubled their efforts to gain acceptance for a negotiated end to the
■artificial" balance created by the peace settlement. Treaty revision was
now inevitable "either by consent or by force"; nothing should be excluded
■except the Western frontiers of Europe". 3

Clibai. Silver its ^ Evsslg. and Jap* a

Like many of their contemporaries the Round Tablers were alarmist
about the spread of Bolshevism in the immediate aftermath of the
revolution. India was "a pretty likely field for Bolsheviks"’, and it was
also "pretty clear that the peoples of South America, Africa and China,

"ill be quite Incapable of resisting l Bolshevism! . . . unless the Western
Powers help then to do so”.'’ Fever the less, the Round Tebleis were dubious
of the value of Allied intervention in Russia itself. Indeed, the Allies'
support of the Whites "was probably the decisive factor in the triumph of

tH Butler, 3 "Towards the World Conference", FT, Sept 1932, p 697.

tterr.J "The Foundations for Disarmament" , FT, Dec 1932, pp 1-20.

Dove to Brand, 24 April 1919, Lothian Papers 492, item 1.

Kerr to Curtis, 15 Oct 1918, FT Papers c 610, fols 229-37.

338

Soviet regime", by associating the latter "uHffc + v

o latter with the cause of Russian

national* 30 " • '

PeapIte thelr h ° 8tUU y t0 *°lste Vlk Ideas the Round Tablnrs
advocated a cautious policy of economic appeasement In the early i 920s . .

lIoyd George attempt to carry out such a policy at Genoa In ,0 22 „ as ,
tauever, recognised to have been a failure. The fundamental cause was
hanevl to be the publicity surrounding the conference, forcing the
reiteration ol propaganda on both sides at a tine „ he „ Russia was - in
retreat Iron Cormunlsn- and should be allowed to do so -as easily and
quietly as possible*

r

The view that Russia was In retreat from Communism made sense at a
UK -hen Var Comuunlsm was being dismantled In favour of the Re. Economic
Policr, although even so the "extreme adaptability and the -will to power-
ol the Soviet leadership refined a worry.* By the late 1920s, however,
the flaws in such a view were apparent, nil. it was -almost Impossible to
S*t at the truth about Russia-*, It was nevertheless clear that the Soviet
leadership was heading towards a confrontation with the market forces let
by the RTF. The course of this confrontation was charted In a series
” impressionistic articles by Knur Ice Hindus. The Implications were

z

3

4

5

Karch A 19 ^ P&r ’ 3 ^ 5 R,?V05Uti0n **** Counter-Revolu tion in Russia", RT,

PP 342 ff. This line was dictated by the Moot: see Kerr to
Per. Jan 1020, Lothian Papers 214, fol 144.

View £ Gri8S ’ 28 Aprn !922 ' 0rl S8 Po P er& - K3S Microfilm 1000. This
was supported by Herbert Hoover: See the ‘Note of a
hversat ion between Kr Hoover and Xi Kerr" attached.

!?Jr Vllllan Peters, 3 "The Conminist Experloent in Fussla",
^ 22 > pp 538-54.

June

Kerr to Dove,

1 Sept 1927, Lothian Papers 231, fols 536-37.

Kfc/

Spelled out by Lothian: the Bolshevik leopard had not changed Its spots,
an A the first five-year plan was "clearly . . . designed from a military
atandpoint". 1 Soviet Russia thus remained a standing menace to European
peace. Whether the menace became a real threat depended entirely on the

European situation.

The situation in the Far East was equally worrying. The Round
Tablers (unlike their Australian colleagues) had been firm supporters of
the pre-1914 Alliance with Japan. Nevertheless, the latter's opportunistic
policy during the First World War introduced doubts. Weighing up the pros
and cons of renewing the Alliance (due to expire in 1921), Kerr emphasised
Japacese •chauvinism" and her desire for 'exclusive privileges" in China as
factors rail ita ting against renewal. 2 Equally important was the attitude of
the United States, from where it -as reported that "Britain's gains from
such an all lance could certainly not balance her losses". 2 Kerr therefore
chested an international conference at which the Alliance could be
dropped, and Japan could be made to realise that "British, American,

Ucnition and Chinese Interests really run together, and . . . that her only
course was to keep on good terms with all of us".' This was, indeed, the
outcome of the Vashington Conference of 1921.

The Far East presented "the most probable storm centre of any trouble

tie Immediate future", the Found Table declared at the time of the

t Kerr, 3 "The Political Foundations for Disarmament" , AT, Sept 1931, p
730.

f Kerr, 3 "The Anglo-Japanese Alliance", FT, Dec 1920, pp 67-97.

IRay Stannard Baker,] "The United States and the Old Vorld", AT, June
*921, pp 573-74.

* Kerr to Dove, 13 July 1920, Lothian Papers 209, fols 300-05; CKerr.J
Tbe Anglo-Japanese Alliance", loc .oil, PP 96-97.

fftahiagton Conference. ’ Curtis, of C our-»

' course * became obsessed with China.

“* e,ten ' ° f MS 0tSeSS, ° n CflUSad Irritation within the Moot:

sr!gg , for instance, claimed that -Lionel has completely gone off the

I ,el ' ertheUsS - CurUs «— » «P^lned Ms interest largely in
:erK 0f lBPerU1 COr,Cf,r " £ Economical !y , the Hop! re stood to benefit

„sly by the restoration of stable conditions in China.- Politically,
am. was -the greatest field- wherein the principles for which the
Commonweal th stood -are at leave with those of Karx- . - Finally, the Far
Eastern crisis was a testing-ground for the theory of Imperial co-
operation, and the means by which the -Dominions will ... be carried on
b, the force of events to some fern of really organic union".*

Curtis lobbied furiously for a more active British policy in China.
Salter was roped In to advise the Rationalist Government on financial
affairs, and Feetham to investigate the future of the Shanghai Settlement.
Gee'We report concluded that Shanghai was a model for the rest of China

and that extra-terr 1 tor iallty should last -not years, but decades*. *>

Curtis’s Own activity culminated in the publication of The Capital Que S , ion
"’China in 1S32. His conclusions were surprisingly modest: merely that
Vestern p owers should transfer their diplomatic representatives to

f Kerr, j - The Washington Conference", FT, Dec 1521, pp 1-2.

Gf igg to Hichens, 15 Dec 1531, Grigg Papers, MSS Microfilm 1003.

Curtis to Feetham, 27 Aug 1930, Curtis Papers 3, fols 176-79.

t0 the "aboriginal" Moot, 6 Aug 1930. Lothian Papers 252, fols

"femorandum f or Discussion at Blicirling", 19 S*pt 1932.
'-o^hiaxi Papers 268. fols 742-51.

Suiunarlsed in [Shanghai group: Sir Frederick Vhyte ot al.J
Shanghai" , FT. Sept 1931, pp 738-68.

341

faking, and that Britain should send "a statesman" to advise the
govarnsant In China and Instruct the public at hone. 1 It would be
difficult to find a more striking illustration of the Inperialists' faith

in -character". 2

By the tine Curtis's book was published, the Far Eastern situation
iad teen transforned by Japan's invasion of Kanchuria. At first, the Round
faWe appeared to favour Vestern intervention. A failure to restore
Chinese sovereignty would "precipitate the fall of the flanking Government"
and "have very far-reaching results with regard to the attitude of the
Chinese towards foreign interests generally". 3 Gradually, however, the
Found Table's line began to soften. It was realised that the Vestern
powers had no stomach for a fight. Japan's "war-minded" determination was
acknowledged. Finally, sufficient ambiguities were discovered to refute
the argument that Manchuria was a "test-case".” The Lytton Report - which
blaral both sides even-handedly - was therefore accepted, as the best of a
bad Job.®

The Manchurian crisis had the effect of converting Found Table
interest in the Far East into deep anxiety. From now on, there was the
coastant danger that Japan "will repeat on a far greater scale the power

1 Curtis, The Capital Question of China (London, 1932), pp 245 ff.

2 For which see Kathryn Tidrick, Empire and the English Character
(London, 1992).

fVhyte.l "China, Japan and Manchuria". RT, March 1932, pp 266-81.

4 See in particular, fVhyte.) "The Far East", RT, June 1932,

PP 552-68; [Hubbard, 1 "The Shanghai Standpoint", RT, June 1932,

PP 569-73, and (Chancellor,! "Xanchukuo". RT, Sept 1932, pp 808-18.

CP Young,] -The Lytton Report", RT, Dec 1932. pp 64-89.

diplomacy which succeeded so well in Kanchukuo" . 1 This fear was reinforced
ly the Australian Round Tablers. 3 In Lothian’s mind, the danger of an
jnglo-Aoerican breach was equally important.” He urged the Foreign Office
to aa* e a concerted effort to bring about an Anglo-American alliance to
contain Japan, and he lobbied strenuously against the proposal (scouted by
Jevllle Chamber lain, Simon and others) to revive the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance. *

The Far Eastern situation exploded again In 1937. Guy Vint thought
that Japan's naves were largely the result of accidents, but he was
contradicted by Lothian, who asserted that Japan was aiming at the complete
domination of eastern Asia. 5 A further article by G E Huobard was even
lore alarnist: the Pacific islands, Malaysia, Borneo, "even Australia" were
tow at risk.* The Found Tablers would have welcoimed a policy of
confrontation, but they recognised that Britain was unable to act without
the support of America. 7 Events in the Far East thus provided an unwelcome
diversion from the European crisis of the 1930s.

1 C Lothian, 1 "Power Politics in the Pacific", FT, Dec 1934, p 18.

2 CPiesse,] "Australia and Japan", KT ; Dec 1933, pp 85-101; Leonie
Foster, High Ropes (Melbourne, 1586), pp 100 ff.

3 Lothian to Hodson, 29 5ov 1934, Lothian Papers 286, fol 614.

4 Christopher Hall, Britain, America and Arms Control, 1921-37 (London,
1987), pp 161-32.

5 iVint.l "Smoke and Fire in the Far East", FT, Sept 1937, pp 725-39;
[Lothian, 1 "Power and Opinion in Vorld Affairs", RT, Dec 1937,

pp 1-3.

IG E Hubbard,] "Japan's Challenge to the Vest", FT, March 1938,
pp 230-45.

7 ILothian,) "The Commonwealth and the Dictatorships", RT, June 1938,
pp 435-52.

Dicta to

rsblps

Paul Kennedy has made on excellent case for arguing that

•appeasement" constituted a persistent tradition in British foreign policy,
froa the late nineteenth century onwards.' "Appeasement" was also a policy
to which the Round Tablers had frequent (although not uniform) recourse.

The balance between conciliation and confrontation was, of course,
constantly shifting, and varied from country to country. The determining
factor was undoubtedly the nature and extent of any threat to British
interests, weighed against the advantages accruing from a policy of

compromise.

That power-pol i tical calculations provided the basis of the Bound
Tablers' views on foreign policy is best illustrated by their attitudes to
Fascist Italy. Writing for the Found Table, G X Trevelyan emphasised that
tte destruction of liberties in Italy was "not an expedient . . . but an
essential part of the Fascist programme". Nevertheless, he saw no direct
connection between Xussolini's internal policies and the policy which the
British government should pursue. On the contrary, he urged the government
to "treat (Italy's leader si . . . as equals and as friends". 2 Dove
expressed sympathy for Xussolini's imperial ambitions, suggesting that
Anatolia might be "a hopeful place". In 1933 he was still writing of
tossol ini's Italy as "a friend". 2 '

Xussol ini'* increasingly bellicose attitude towards Abyssinia failed

Paul Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy (London. 1983), pp 13-39.

f Trevelyan,] "Italy under Xussol ini", FT, Sept 1923, pp 754-63.

Dove, "The Colonial Problem of Europe", 21 July 1926, Lothian Papers
20, fols 390-97 j Dove, ■ Memorandum" , 21 April 1933, Lothian Papers
208, fols 844-48.

.tf- induce a change of heart. Indeed, the Round Table's Initial reaction
*6 one of sympathy. 1 Hodson complained that Lothian's attitude appeared
to he that it was the condition of Abyssinia rather than the bellicosity of
Italy which was the main danger to the world. 2

The Hoot's public attitude was transformed by Hoars' s speech at the
league of Fations in Septenber 1935, declaring that Britain stood for
collective sanctions against aggression. British prestige was now at
stake: it would he "fatal" to let Kussollni "get away" with his plunder. 3
Privately, however, attitudes were rather different. Brand wrote of "this
danable sanctions clause", and thought Hoare's action disastrous. "God
kiows what we should do."* The subsequent. d£b£cle proved that the League
bad failed in the one case where it night have been expected to succeed.

Tie Pound Table therefore redoubled its call* for the Covenant to be
#*ae:ulated. * On the question of Anglo-I tal ian relations, it was hoped
tlat steps might be taken to re-establish "mutual respect" and friendship.®
The Hoot's persistent desire for friendship with Fascist Italy
prefigured closely its attitude towards Hazi Gernany, which presented
problens different in degree but not in kind, to the extent that both were

IG Fitzgerald, 1 "The Last Partition of Africa?", AT, June 1935,
pp 5C7-23.

2 Hodson to Lothian, 16 Aug 1935, Lothian Papers 304, fols 764-66.

3 t Lothian, J "The League in Crisis", AT, Dec 1935 Cpp 1-16>,

PP 7 and 14.

* Brand to Dawson, 2 Sept 1935, Brand Papers, box 198.

tLothian,] "The World Crisis”, AT, June 1936, pp 443-60; [Lothian,]
'The Commonwealth and the League", FT, Sept 1936, pp 655-74.

ICJ s Sprigge,] "Britain and Italy: Past and Future", AT, Sept 1938,
PP 708-22.

dictator-chips with crude but possibly containable ambitions.

In the long-running debate over "appeasement", the Round Tablers have
often been cast in a peculiarly conspiratorial rdle. This is especially
true of Dawson and Lothian, both identified at the tine by Claud Cockburn
(and, through hin, by Vansittart) as key members of a "Cliveden Set"
iatrlgulng to bring about 3rltlsh acquiescence in Hitler's foreign policy
aims. 1 The failure of "appeasement" and the realisation of the utter
barfcarisn of Hitler's r6glne resulted in an historiography characterised by
recrlnl nation and the apportioning of blame. The opprobrium cast on Dawson
aid Lothian reflected also on their colleagues: variously, "Milner's
Ilndergarten", "the Milner group", or the Round Table as a whole. 2

The recent hlstor iography of "appeasement" has been more
discriminating. First, there has been a greater emphasis on the structural
constraints on British policy, and a consequent downplaying of the role of
iadividual personalities.- Secondly, as Robert Holland has pointed out,

"with Europe once core on the Mark Standard, the basic validity of . . .
t the appeasers' J insights «nay be better appreciated than the artificial
dogaas prevailing after 1939 usually allowed" . * Finally, the

1 For the "Cliveden Set", see Michael Astor, Tribal Feeling (London,
1963), pp 136-47; Patricia Cockburn, The Years of The Week (London,
1968), pp 227-46; Richard Cockett, Twilight of Truth (London, 1989),
pp 37 ff.

See, eg, A L Rowse, All Souls and Appeasenent (London, 1961); A J P
Taylor, English History, 1914-45 (London, 1965), p 418; and, nore
recently. Kathryn Tidrick, Expire and the English Character (London,
1990). pp 271 ff.

The seninal work in this field is Gustav Schmidt, The Politics and
Economics of Appeasement (Leamington Spa, 1986, English translation
of England in der JCrfse, 1931). See also Volf gang J Mommsen and
Lot ha r Kettenacker (eds) , The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of
Appeasement (London, 1983).

Robert Holland, The Pursuit of Greatness (London, 1991), p 150.

4

|i*toriography of *appeasemoat" has begun to move away from the old,
invented and rigid dichotomies. Vilii ajn Roger Louis, for Instance, has
daiineated admirably the ambiguities and complexities In the views of one
lilcerlte who was generally regarded as an " anti -appeaser " , Leo Amery. 1

If the old distinction between "appeasers’* and "anti-appeasers" no
longer seeus adequate, it would perhaps be more appropriate to view British
responses to Fazl Germany as a spectrum or continuum. Vi thin such a
spectrum It night be possible to Identify five nain types of response:
■collaboration", by which is meant a fundamental agreement with Fazi aims
aad Ideology; "acquiescence", meaning the willingness to accept Fazl
demands as and when they arose; "conciliation", by which is meant the
attempt to arrange more or less limited concessions by prior negotiation;
•resistance", neaning a commitment to defending the status quo: and "anti-
fascism", neaning a commitment to eradicating Fazlsra from Germany Itself.

There Is no evidence for suggesting that any of the Found Tablers
favoured a policy of "collaboration", in the sense outlined above. Fone
hid any sympathy for Mosley's "Blackshirts*. For did they view continental
iiscists as, in the contemporaiy phrase, "nen of the future". A Round
Tsble analysis of Mussolini's doctrines in 1927 concluded that fascism was
** exercise in "political archaeology" . 2 Fazisra was, in Lothian's view,
even more reactionary: a movement based on "racialism and violence", "far
*° re devastating and devitalising to the soul of Germany . . . than the
e 'ils against which the Sazis protest". 3 Dawson, famously, admitted

Va Roger Louis, In the Name of God, Go! (London, 1992), pp 111 ff.

( (McClure, 1 "Fascist Rule after Five Years", RT, June 1927, pp 498-

513.

(Lothian, J "The Rocoil from Freedom", FT, June 1933, pp 489-90.

<doC toring Bbbutt's dispatches to The Tlaes in order to suppress information

a&oving the true horrors of lazism. 1 By contrast, Hodson altered an

article by Powys Greenwood in 1935 because the latter "sees the Nazi r6gine

through rather too rosy spectacles " . 2

The starting-point for all the Round Tafclers was "conciliation": this

ws the policy which the Round Table advocated consistently throughout the

192Cs. As early as December 1932 Horsfall and Butler expressed doubts

about this policy, in the light of Germany's slide towards autocracy. 3

Horsfall's doubts were strengthened by a trip to Germany which coincided

with the first violent excesses of Nazi rule:

"I don't believe that anything which it would be
possible to give Germany In the way of revision
would satisfy it, rather the reverse, that every
concession merely whets the appetite .... My own
opinions are tending more and more to the view that
. . . our influence would be far greater if we were
felt to be indissoluble from France." 4

Grigg visited Paris and Brussels at about the same time, and came back with

slnilar impressions. It was "quite inconceivable that France should enter

htc a discussion of possible revisions of the Treaty with a Government of

t'aat kind", he wrote to Dawson. 0

The doubts expressed by Butler, Horsfall and Grigg were the first
iidication that the question of policy towards Germany would become a

1 The History of The Times, Vol IV, part 2 (London, 1952), p 734.

Oliver Woods and James Bishop have pointed out that such practices
are not unknown in the newspaper world, where the need to keep a
correspondent in a country is often the overriding concern: The Story
of The Times (London, 1983), p 294-95.

2 Hodson to Lothian, 8 Feb 1935, Lothian Papers 295, fols 662-63.

3 Dove to Lothian, 9 Dec 1932, Lothian Papers 268, fols 836-37.

* Horsfall to Dove, 27 March 1933, Grigg Papers, MSS Microfilm 1003.

J Gr igg to Dawson, 20 March 1933, Grigg Papers, MSS Microfilm 1003.

346

for c °" tentl0 “ *«*» «• toot. lavertheless, lt „ ould p*
I""*** 1 ' deSCrlbE tto " ** tM * *««• «« -~.t.. of - resIstonce .,

'** aI °“ e "° nU ‘ fOSClS "' <WMCh ' ««» 1939. was largel y the pre=er „ e of

da ComuDlst Party). Doubts about "coidlUH™.

uoncuiatlon* did not necessarily

translate Into opposition to the policy. - ,s every attest at redress to

* “ 0mnS than 8 StarUng P° lnt further desanda,- 0r. g8 ashed In
1W . -let, If concessions are warranted, and if they can ensure peace,
they mist be made. ■ 1

me case for persevering was put most forcefully by Dove and Lothian.
*ve agreed that it was "repulsive" to concede to the * asis wh *t had not
been conceded to Stresemann or Briining.* He a lso agreed that> lf push came
to shove, "we shall have, for the same reason as brought us into the war
ii 1914, to go to war again and save France".* But it would take "four or
live years" for Germany to re-arm; and in the meantime there was a
•treathing space" which could be used to undermine Hitler by removing
GCraan 8rSevdIlces - Moreover, it was essential to be able to show that "we
** done everything in our power to get the world onto a better plane" so
Xli ^ minio * s and (crucially) the United States would fall in line."

Before looking at the concessions which the "coaci 1 iatlonists"
feCt6d t0 be nBde ’ lt is n ®C«*sary to make three points. First, they did
^^®^"conciliation" to b? merely a series of fliL-hfliL concessions, but

The Tines, 27 Feb 1934.

^° 7 6i Xenoraadum, 21 April 1933, Lothian Papers 206, fols 644-48.
fols ’575-76 1Sh F ° relsn PolIc / H ' 3 * a X 1933 * Lothian Papers 276,

p?!®' "The Round Table; Fote on 3rltish Policy", 7 April 1933, Griff*
mss MicrofJln 1003. ’ SS

349

Hcpwl * Dstead for a one ~ off * all-round settlement: "a moderate revision
# . . which would te accepted as final*.’ Secondly, "if there are to be
concessions. It Is essential that they should be made before they can be
glowa to have been exacted under German threats". 2 Thirdly, it was "by no
jeans certain what Germany means by rovision". The aim of "conciliating"
Hitler was a gamble. 3 Nevertheless, it was clear that, as Nornan Ebbutt
put it, the Treaty of Versailles was "the most valuable tool in the
agitator's bag". 4

There was no disagreement within the Moot over the inevitability of
changes in Germany's military position. It was frequently asserted that
Gtrnan re-armament was only a matter of time. The same was true of the
re-nilitarisation of the Rhineland. As early as April 1933, Lothian made
clear that the majority of the Kcot regarded the use of sanctions to
eHforce the demilitarised zone as both unjust and unworkable.' 1

There was equally little debate within the Moot on the question of
■aintainlng economic links with Germany. The Round Tablers were committed
to aa all-round liberalisation ol world trade. Brand (who in other
respects was a sceptic regarding "conciliation" > played a leading rdle in
Ue 'Joint Committee" of British creditors, which ensured that short-term
credits to Germany were maintained throughout the 1930s. His over-riding
concern, however, was to safeguard the interests ol his own bank, which had

1 Lothian to Grigg, 26 April 1933, Lothian Papers 269, fols 650-53.

"German Foreign Policy", RT, Dec 1935, p 104.

I Lothian, J "The Future of the League?", RT, Dec 1933, p 6.

4 IBbbutt,] "ITazi Germany", RT, June 1933, p 513.

Lothian to Grigg, 26 April 1933, Lothian Papers 269, fols 850-53.

IttBsted heavily in Germany.’ Lothian's advocacy of "a sort of Ottawa
•♦conoalc Mttte l eu n spa" * was perhaps uore controversial. Again, however,
th* proposal had its roots in econonic liberalism. The bloc which Lothian
envisaged was not intended to be highly protectionist, but a step towards a
gereral tariff reduction. 3 Aoery also recognised special German economic
Interests in eastern Europe, although he inclined to a core protectionist

solution. 4

The territorial settlement of Versailles was. of course, criticised

at the tioe by the Round Table. An article by Toynbee in June 1933 again

pretested against the Treaty's ban on Austro-German union, but was non-

comittal on other German claims. 5 Privately, Lothian was prepared to go

Fuch further. As he wrote to J A Spender in April 1935, avowedly

condeasing his recent Burge Memorial lecture.

■I venture to prophesy that within a decade or two
mankind will be organised in four or five great
entities. The real question is whether that is going
to be done by conquest and empire or by voluntary
federation. Japan and Germany are going to set out
along the road of empire, and Eastern Europe nay
utter a sigh of relief at being freed fron the
spectre of war even at the price of subject ion" . «

Ibis vas not an argument which Lothian was allowed to put in the Pound

* Hell Forbes, "London Bankc, the German Standstill Agreements and

'Economic Appeasement' in the 1930s", BNP, Vol XL (1987), pp 571-87.

“ Lothian to Smuts, 16 March 1937, Lothian Papers 333, fol 880.

“ f Lothian,] "The Root of our Present Discontents", PT, March 1936,

PP 229-38.

' Louis, op clt . pp 113-16.

f Toynbee, 3 "Treaty Revision", PT, June 1933, pp 584-604.

LothUn to J A Spender, 30 April 1935, Lothian Papers 296,

f ols 728-29.

pftje. Sovertheless, be was allowed to put forward bis basic premise: that
eastern Europe was, economically and politically, bound to fall
increooinsly under German influence, and that it was not in Britain's
interests to try artificially to reverse the trend.’

The Round Tablers were reluctant to see Britain making any
corcesslons in the colonial sphere, other than by guaranteeing an "open
door". Both Lloyd George and Neville Chamberlain appeared favourable to
colonial restitution early in 1936, provoilng a storm of Tory outrage (in
which Airery was prominent). Vriting In the Round Table, Lothian sided with
118 former Round Table colleague rather than with his former employer. -
Ancther article by Hodson purported to show that the economic argument for
restitution "simply does not hold water". The British Government was
advised to give a "patient, straight-forward and unequivocal" no.*

The success of "conciliation" depended above all on a willingness to
conpromise: on the one hand, "some sacrifice on the part of the
jeneficiaries of the existing settlement", on the other a readiness to seek
adjustments by "diplomacy or conference" rather than force.' 1 Hitler’s
unwi 1 1 ingress to corapronise overwhelmed the policy of "conciliation",
forcing its advocates to choose between "acquiescence" in increasingly
extrene demands and "resistance" from a position substantially weaker than
16 1933. The choice was difficult, especially so because (as Brand later

1 t Lothian, 3 "The Pew Vorld Si tuation" , ST, Sept 1937, pp 717-13.

(Lothian, 3 "The Root of our Present Discontents", ST, March 1936,

PP 235-38.

I Hodson, 1 "From Agadir to Suremburg", ST, Dec 1936, pp 106-09.

* I lothian, 1 "Power and Opinion in Vorld Affairs", RT , Dec 1937,

PP 15-16.

352

it was almost impossible to know where to draw the line.'
Hitler's first breach of the Treaty of Versailles, re-introduclng
conscription in 1935, appears to have caused little stir within the Xoot.
tie re-militarisation of the Rhineland in March 1936 went ouch further
towards undermining the policy oi "conciliation". The reaction of Dawson
ac d Lothian was to shift towards "acquiescence". Others in the Xoot
reacted by shifting the other way. Hodson now argued that it was
•dangerous" to suggest that "important adjustments must be made before
there can be stability". 2 Another Round Tabler who objected to Lothian's
lore forward line was Curtis. As yet, however, neither Hodson nor Curtis
was prepared to support a policy of "resistance". Hodson's view was that
collective security was "in the lon g-run necessary and right", but that,
until the democratic powers bad sufficient force to ensure compliance, it
renained "off the nap". 3 Curtis urged, in effect, a policy of bluff.

Wile Eritain should not "say anything whcb could lead Gernany ... to
infer that in no circumstances would we be drawn into war over eastern
Europe", neither should Britain make any commitments. 4 Even Grigg,
described by Hodson as "the most forcible advocate" of collective
sanctions 5 , was as yet unprepared to back what he described as a policy of
'unlinited liability":

1 "Lord Brand on Geoffrey Dawson" [typescript of BEC interview, not
broadcast, Feb 19621, Brand Papers, box 198.

2 Hodson to Lothian, 13 May 1936, Lothian Papers 323, fols 6C9-11.
Hodson to Curtis, 9 June 1937, RT Papers c 811, fols 116-119.

* [Curtis, 1 Memorandum, Oct 1936, RT Papers C 811, fols 102-C6.

Hodson to Lothian, 8 July 1935, Lothian Papers 304, fol 745.

we have no right to endanger the security of the
empire for the sake of nations which do not belong
to it ... . a universal and unconditional
guarantee of every existing State can lead to
nothing but another awful conflagration". 1

One important effect of the Rhineland crisis was to re-inforce the

Bound Tablers' insistence on the necessity of Empire re-armament. Gustav

Sehaidt has argued that "appeasement" was adopted as a counter-strategy to

Goman re-armament largely because the alternative, British re-armament,

was found unacceptable. 2 In the case of the Round Tablers, however, a

belief in the necessity of re-armament cut across differences on policy.

From 1936 onwards, the Noot called for the immediate Introduction of

conpulsory national service. 3

The Round Tablers had long criticised the ban on Austro-German union
as one of the most unacceptable aspects of the Versailles settlement.
leTertheless, the manner of 1 ts accompl ishment was still shocking. * While
the Found Table still oscillated between "acquiescence" and "resistance",
the balance was tipped decidedly in favour of the latter. Even Lothian
deplored "the momentum and prestige that totalitarian power diplomacy has
gained*. The "paranount necessity" now was for "armed power" and a
'defensive and political integration" of the Vestern democracies to prevent
Or defeat further unilateral acts of force. 6

1 Gr *8S> The Faith of an Englishman (London, 1936), pp 14S-46.

^ Schmidt, up sit , p 11 and passim.

tHodson,) "The Arny in Imperial Defence", PT, Dec 1936, pp 23-33.

Lo ”is, op clt . p 116 , sees this as the decisive moment in A nary 1 s
change of attitude to Germany.

f Lothian, 1 "The Commonwealth and the Dictatorships" , PT, June 1938,

PP 435-52. Cf Lothian to Sir Revile Henderson, 14 Xarch 1938,

L °thian Papers 362, fols 394-95.

354

W**;'

' i _. v rue Sudeten crisis confirmed the direction In which Round Table

pH# was heading. In May 1939 Lothian urged Halifax to make it clear

that Britan would side with Czechoslovakia if Germany resorted to force.’

tt the time of Munich, he feared “another Hoare-Laval plan" which would

•split the country and the democratic world". 2 Only Dawson still clung to

the policy of "conciliation", primarily on Imperial grounds:

"Ho one who sat in this place, as I did during the
autumn of '35, with almost daily visitations from
eminent Canadians and Australians, could fail to
realize that war with Germany at that time would
have been misunderstood and resented from end to end
of the Empire".®

Iorsf all's post-mortem was gloomy. Chamberlain and Daladier were not only
guilty of "naiveU in negotiation", they were also guilty of
•adnlnistrative Incapacity". Even now there was talk of further
concessions, but this was "no moment for negotiating from weakness" . a
Eodson surveyed the reactions to the crisis in America, India and the
3o*inions, and found overwhelming evidence of disi 1 lusionnent and a loss of
Jritish prestige. 5 In his last article for the Found Table, Lothian urged
the Vestern democracies to form "a Grand Alliance against aggression" to
,DS *re the ultimate triumph of 1 iberal -democratic values.* 5

this examination of the Round Tablers' tortuous passage from

1 Lothian to Halifax, 31 Hay 1938, Lothian Papers 362, fol 364.

Lothian to Bancy Astor, 16 Sept 1938, quoted in Christopher Sykes,

Fa icy; The Life of Fancy Astor (London, 1972), p 393.

&a*S0n to Seville Chamberlain, 8 Bov 1940, Dawson Papers 81, fol 43.

' (Horsfall, ] "The Crisis and the Future", ST, Dec 2938, pp 1-12.

(Hodson et al,l "Overseas Reactions to the Crisis", FT, Dec 1938,

PP 28-57.

(Lothian, 1 • The Grand Alliance against Aggression", FT, June 1939,

PP 441-56.

I

tjfcaBCiliatioB" t0 "resistance" points to a number of conclusions. Perhaps
t ke *ost striking is the extent to which the labels "appeaser" and "anti-
apjeaser" confuse the Issues involved. Of crucial importance here was the
inability of the sceptics to formulate alternative strategies. This in
turn reflected a basic agreement on assumptions. Two in particular stand
out: that Britain had few Interests in eastern Europe, and that her true
interests lay in an "Oceanic" group centred on the Enpi re/ Common weal th and
the Uaited States.

Ritchie Ovendale, in his study of the "English-speaking world" and
■Appeasement" , concluded that the Doninions and the United States had
little direct influence on the formulation of Chamberlain's policy, and
that they were mainly used as an excuse to justify policies formulated for
other reasons. ' At first sight, this would appear to indicate a large
difference between Chanberlain and the Round Tablers. The real situation
vas by no means as clear-cut. Some of the Dominion Round Tablers (such as
Dutcan) were keen supporters of a policy of "Oceanic" detachment. Others
vere not. The Toronto member J X Haodonnell, for instance, thought that
"the condition of . . . keeping the Empire together is to be keen on and
loyal to the League". 2 Xevertholess, the Round Tablers certainly believed
a policy of "conciliation" and detachment was supported by a majority
ls »the Eominions. Even so, the relationship between Round Table and
Pinion views was not entirely one-way. Lothian wrote to a number of
®°*lnion leaders, urging then to take a nore active role in lobbying the

Ritchie Ovendale, ' Appeaseaenf and the English-speaking World, 1937-

3 $ (Cardiff, 1975>; cf Robert Holland, Britain and the Comxonwealth

Alliance, 1916-39 (London, 1961), pp 1 67-205.

*“cdonnel 1 to Lothian, 20 July 1936, Lothian Papers 321, fols 460-61.

£itid> government. ’

“*“* ° f tle ROUDd TaWerS> e is, Of course, impommibu

M *' SUr °' KeVer,h6l ‘ =C ’ 11 Sh ° Uld - en phasised that the Po,, d , Ws „ ae

e0a “ St,nt ln itS adTOCa ^ « "coocillatioa" towards Gmrmmry
fro . »» onwards. In the 1920s the Moot f ouad ltself „ frequeat

W“ 1# * to Government policy. ,» the I930 s, no British government
attempted the hind of one-off, aU-round settled which the Pound Tablere
lh0 u 5 ht essential . Ironically, Just as Feville Chamberlain shifted British
pulley towards a more accommodatiag attitude to Germany, the Pound Tablere
selves were moving firmly f„ the opposite direction. Although Lothian
a,d the Pound Table magazine perhaps helped to create the right atmosphere

a ** ,rU, “ , » Ponies, the Rcu*J Table must be discounted as a direct
influence on bis Governnent.

Zeicrali an P^yf'/prj

The deteriorating international situation of the late 1930s gav* force
to the federal ideas which had inspired the Round Table's creation.

Curtis, of course, had never given up his federalism, although he was
rCCd t0 adDU that " we have • • • to think In longer periods of time than
at the ou tset". 2 In the late 1920s he had started work on a third
fle " ° f Round TabJe Studies, whose purpose was to "explain the British
^oweal.h so far as to enable its citizens to see better how to

?!» J-otbian to Mackenzie King, 4 June 1936, Lothian Papers 321,
f ols 700 Q3 thiaD t0 Snuts - 8 Jul / 1936 > Lothian Papers 324,

3

"^ eB,3r andum for Discussion at Blickling", 19 Sept 1932,
Zllan Papers 268. fol 751.

the dutleS Whlch U la ? s u P° n then-.’ His work consisted largely
0 f a heterodox and discursive sweep through history, tracing a conflict

txtw* 60 the "Jewish" and "Graeco-Roman" ideals, and describing the
emergence of "Commonwealth" from the latter. Professor George E Catlin was
probably not alone in finding himself "unable entirely to comprehend
[Curtis'sl drift". 2 The Moot decided against sending Curtis's final volume

to the Dominion groups 3 , and the Round Table connection was only briefly

mentioned when the work was published, as CivJtas Del.

Although Curtis's volumes concluded with a plea for federation - if

necessary, starting just with Britain, Australia and New Zealand - the

leisurely manner of bis producing them and the lack of a specific cchoaxs
are indications that even he, at this stage, realised that federation was
not practical politics. The sane was true cf Lothian, despite his
assertion in 1935 that events were "driving the issue to the front with
tremendous speed" . A

A debate on the Xoot's attitude to Imperial federation was prompted by

tie impending twenty-fifth anniversary of the Pound Table, towards the end
of 1935. Brand and Grigg both argued strongly against any re-assertion of
federalist belief by the Xoot as such; Curtis and Lothian both argued
equally strongly the other way, although Lothian cautioned against any
explicit mention of Curtis or endorsement of his writings.* After

1 Curtis to Lord Chelmsford, 14 Karch 1926, Curtis Papers 3, fols 32-34.

? Catlin to Kerr, 5 June 1929, Lothian Papers 234, fol 52.

3 Xlnutes Of RT meeting, 19 to 20 Oct 1935, FT <0> Papers.

1 Lothian, Pacifist) is Not Enough (London, 1935), p 43.

5 Lothian to Hodson, 6 Aug 1935, Lothian Papers 304, fols 761-63; cf
c «rtis to Xacadan, 26 April 1945, Curtis Papers 90, fol 73.

j^gthy debate the federalist view prevailed, and it was therefore

anaounced that

"the spirit and purpose of the review and of the
groups of nen responsible for it remain the same.
The organic commonwealth of free peoples, as the
only permanent foundation for liberty and peace,
is still a vision, but it is a vision that has
inspired twenty-five years of effort, and that
will continue to inspire the renewal of that
effort in the years to come".’

igsin the lack of urgency was clear, although so, too, was the absence of
a0 j idea that the Commonwealth had passed beyond the stage when federalism
would be practical at all.

It was only in the last few months of peace that federalism once more
be:are an issue capable of inspiring and mobilising significant numbers of
activists. Both Lothian and Curtis set about lending their support and
attenpting to provide guidance. They were particularly excited by Clarence
Streit's Union Now, published simultaneously in America and England in the
spring of 1939, and urging a thoroughgoing union of all fifteen
denocracies. Lothian and Curtis thought Streit wrong in including economic
union, omitting dependencies, and modelling his proposed constitution on
til* centralised American state. Nevertheless, Lothian especially realised
Africa to be the key to o new system, and therefore welcomed Streit’s book
*ith fervour. He urged his American contacts to organise support for
Streit, while Curtis set about recommending the book to all and sundry in
Boland.? Hodsoa was pressed into writing two appreciative articles for

1 Godson,] "Twenty Fi ve Tears", FT, Sept 1935, pp 653-59.

2 See, eg, Lothian to Frank Aydelotte, 6 March 1939, Lothian Papers 3G9,
f °l 42 j Curtis to Lionel Robbins, 6 June 1939, Curtis Papers 16,

fols 174-75.

a

359

ik# found Table. '

Somewhat less enthusiasm was felt for "Federal Union", a purely
British organisation launched in autumn 1938 by Patrick Ransome, Charles
llnb»r and Derek Rawnsley. Curtis initially suggested to Lothian that the
t*> of them could "model our attitude towards these young men on the way in
vlici lord Hilner treated us" . 2 Curtis tried hard to convert the younger
kd to an Atlantic rather than European federation, and, when he failed,
attempted to oust them. Ke soon found, however, that they were not to be
overawed, and, indeed, that they had plenty of other potential Milners,
itcluding Lord Beveridge. Curtis and Lothian parted company with the
Federal Unionists in some bitterness. As Kimber later put it, the Found
Tabl«rs had been "not helpful". 3

1 "Union How" , RT, June 1939, pp 476-88, and "Union: Oceanic or
Continental" , RT, So pt 1939, pp 733-44.

2 Curtis to Lothian, 2 April 1939, Lothian Papers 386, fol 734.

3 Sir Charles limber, "Federal Union" in Peter Catterall and C J Morris
<eds> , Britain a ad the Threat to Stability ia Europe, 1918-45 (London,
1993), pp 107-09. See also Andrea Bosco, "Lothian, Curtis, Kinber and
the Federal Union Movement" , J Conteap Hist, vol 23, no 3 (July 1988>,
pp 465-502.

360

Five nonths after the fall of Singapore, Duncan wrote gloonlly from
gout* Africa of a widespread belief that, even If the Allies won the war,
•the British Empire will be gone beyond recovery" . ' Many historians would
agree with this prognosis. The years 1939-49 saw a series of humiliating
gilitary defeats for Britain, a radical diminution of her economic and
finaacial power, the first sterling crisis, the independence of Jordan,
India* Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Burma and Israel, and the secession of Ireland.
Hove all, the war and its aftermath confirmed the emergence of two
colossal "superpowers", increasingly antagonistic, but sharing a rhetorical
attachment to anti-imperialism. As early as 1940, Britain and its Empire
ws financially and militarily dependent on American goodwill. As Sir
Michael Howard famously wrote, "the British Empire had come to an end,
alaost as imperceptibly as it had begun". 2

Vhat is most striking in retrospect is the remarkable resilience of
the Emplre-Conmonwealth before 1939, achieved by a judicious combination of
concession and consolidation, and by skilful management and diplomacy. 3
The Pound Tablers themselves believed that still more could have been
achieved, given the political will in Britain and the Dominions. Did they
finally recognise the writing on the wall in 1940, 1945 or 1949? On any
reckoning, the Empire /Commonwealth would have to change. But was it
inevitable that it would be "gone beyond recovery"?

1 Duncan to Curtis, 28 July 1942, RT Papers c 813. fol 88.

2 Michael Howard, Tho Continental Commitment (London, 1972), p 147.

John Darwin, "Imperialism in Decline?", Hist Journal, vol XXIII

(1980), pp 657-79.

^ j nn rinn fln nt apd the Ro ' JDd Table M«ga?s re

The war caused significant problems of organisation and commitment
rtthia the London Moot. Both older and younger members naturally made a
priority of war service. Monthly meetings continued, but attendance was
irregular. The Moot spent much of the war "living from hand to mouth" . 1 A
eitilar experience appears to have afflicted the Round Table groups in the
Doiinions. 'rfhile these continued to send articles for the Round Table
»jazine, they too found it hard just "to carry on". 2

The numerical preponderance of "aboriginal" London Pound Tablers was
brokea by the time the war ended. Lionel Hichens was killed by a German
boab, in October 1940. Two months later Lord Lothian died (perhaps
untecessarily). 3 Sir Patrick Duncan died in July 1943, and Geoffrey Dawson
in loveaber 1944.

Other long-standing Round Tablers remained committed to the Moot,

but in many cases war-related work made conti nuous and active participation
difficult. Curtis was an energetic organiser of the Chatham House
servicenen's study groups at Oxford. Brand spent nuch of the war in
Vasbiigton, first as Chairman of the British Food Mission, then ac Treasury
representative. Grigg filled various junior ministerial posts in London
fcelore succeeding Lord Moyne as Minister Resident in the Middle East in
1944. Coupland spent the middle part of the war in India. Only Horsfall
a &C Malcolm remained in London throughout.

Dawson to Feetham, 31 March 1943, Dawson Papers 83, fols 77-80.

T H Laby to Curtis, 23 March 1943, (Melbourne file,) RT (0) Papers.

Lothian died of uraemia, after refusing treatment on religious

grounds. Curtis survived a similar illness the following year.

362

throe of those recruited in the 1930s - Hodson, Macadam and Harlow -
put their propaganda skills to good us© in tho Empire Division of the
]Uaistry of Information. Hodson subsequently went to India in 1941-42 as
Viceroy's constitutional adviser; on his return, he again entered the
gervlce of the home government, in the Ministry of Production. Maud wac
busy »*ith administrative work at the Ministries of Food and Reconstruction.

Lord Hailey occupied a quasi-official position in the Colonial Office,
reporting on Sative Administration and Political Development in Africa,
helping to keep the Belgian Congo within the Allied orbit, and
propagandising the cause of Empire in the United States and Canada.

Keeping the Pound Table magazine going was the main preoccupation of

the Root. Hodson resigned as editor in September 1939, and was succeeded
by Coupland. The latter was also anxious to "pull my weight* in the war
effort by working for the Ministry of Information, but he was dissuaded by
Brand, who Insisted that editing the Round Table was itself 'an important
«r work".' Nevertheless, Coupland resigned after seeing the March 1941
issue off the press, in order to concentrate on his Indian wort. The
editor of The Economist, Geoffrey Crowther, was brought in to edit the June
1911 issue, before flying to the United States on Ministry of Information
foslness. Crowther remained a member of the Moot until October 1944, but
was a relatively infrequent attender.

Curtis was anxious to persuade Dawson to edit the Round Table
blowing his resignation from The Times, announced in July 1941.

Wtheless, Dawson suggested that the magazine needed "someone younger

1

Coupland to Brand, 25 July 1940, and Brand to Coupland, 26 July
1940, Brand Papers, box 153.

^ fracher". ’ Dawson himself found such a person in the form of Henry
gi^ko, M?. whom Dawson considered "to 'hold the right thought' about most
thing 1 **- 2 Brooke edited the next three issues, from September 1941 to June
19 * 2 , bat found the strain of doing so increasingly difficult. Hailey
persuaded Brooke to give up and Dawson to take on the job. 3 Brooke
reaainod an active member of the Moot until 1966.

Dawson's editorship lasted from September 1942 to November 1944.
Kacadam thought Dawson's first issue "much the best ve have produced since
the war*. 4 Sadly, Dawson's failing health necessitated first the
assistance of Malcolm and then the search for another editor. Various
candidates were considered, including Giles Alington and Rohan Butler.
Eventually the position was offered to Deraot Korrah, an All Soule prize
fellow and a loader — writer for Tbo Timoc who had joined the Moot in 1943,

on Dawson's recommendation. Morrah's position was at first insecure: ho
ws appointed "acting" editor with a four-man advisory committee consisting
of Kalcoln, Hodson, Horsfall and Macadam. The editorship (now a part-time
post paying £500 pa> was offered to Hodson in December 1045, but the latter
insisted that “the general need for bringing the R.T. abreast of the times*
^uired a full-time editor, and he was unwilling to consider the proposal
of a acre ly part-tine post.® The offer was renewed early in 1946, but by
ttan Hodson was settling into a new Job at The Sunday Tines. Horrah

Dawson to Curtis, 2 April 1941, RT Papers c 661, fol 11.

* Dawson to Feetham, 31 March 1943, Dawson Papers 63, fols 77-60.

Halley to Malcolm, Grlgg, Horsfall and Macadam, 1 June 1942, RT

*ap«rs c 862, fol 59.

Xacadam to Dawson, tSept 1942,3 RT Papers c 662, fol 104.

Hodson to Macadam, 13 Dec 1945, RT Papers c 863, fol 132.

editor of tlie Bound Table (combining the position with leader-

, 0 -itiiS for Tbe Tiaes and Tbe Dally Telegraph ) until the end of 1965.

jforrah's editorship, despite its uncertain start, gave the Round

fabJe a much-needed continuity. Horrah hinself was

"a very individual and richly-flavoured personality
. . . deeply attached to the Roman Catholic Church,
the tridentine mass, the constitution, comnon law,
all ritual both sacred and secular, heraldry tandl
the medieval concepts of feudalism and status".’

jtorrah's sonewhat anachronistic views were not prominently displayed in the

»$azine he edited. Undoubtedly a large part of the reason was that, like

Dotc, ho saw himself as "the scribe who puts on paper the collective views

of the hoot". 2 This attitude gave a renewed inpetus to the Round Table's

efforts to formulate a corporate policy.

The Moot was strengthened in the late 1040s by the recruitment of

three new members, all of whom were to remain actively involved until the

lOTOs and later: Hicholas Mansergh, Dcnzil Karris and Sir Olaf Caroe. 3

Xaasergh, from an Irish Protestant family, was another wartime enployee of

the Ministry of Information, and later one of the foremost Commonwealth

historians in post-war Britain. His views were fervently Anglophile but

essentially pragmatic. Denzil Karris provided a double continuity, both

^h his father Sir Villlan and with Lazard Brothers, of which he was

* aia 8* a 8 Director from 1947 to 1971. Vartime service with the Ministry of

^noaic Warfare and the Washington embassy, and an important role at the

Charles Monteith in Lord Blake and C S Hlchols <eds), Dictionary of
rational Biography, 1971-80 <19661, p 590.

torrah to Curtis, 16 Jan 1946, Curtis Papers 96, fol 92.

Lord Halifax agreed to Join the Moot in 1946, but appears not to
have attended any meetings. John Holt, a businessman with shipping
Interests, was briefly a member, from 1948 to 1950.

11 plan and Washington conferences, gave political depth to hi

lareha

c0Qb parable economic and financial expertise. Caroe's Interests were
^political and strategic. A former Indian Civil Sorvaat and tho last
British Governor of the Forth-West Frontier Province (returning to England
•With a cense of having boon almost mortally wounded" *> , he wrote many
/found Table articles on the Fiddle East and Asia.

Finance was loss of a problem than it had been in the 1930s, largely
because of a *1000 pa bequest from Abe Bailey, who died in 1940. The Round
Table also received *250 pa from Sir Ernest Oppcnhcimcr from 1939 to 1944. 2

A secondary factor was the lower rate of remuneration paid to editors after
1939. (Dawson refused to accept any payment at all.> The magazine account
showed an excess of income over expenditure in 1944-45, * although this
proved a short-lived phenomenon. By 1949, the expenses of producing the
aagazine were *1340 more than the income from sales, and the Round Table

was once again eating into its capital reserves.*

The war inevitably led to a reduction in Round Table sales, which
fell from 3672 copies in June 1939 (with another 746 distributed free) to
2751 in June 1943 (and only 212 distributed free). 5 The Foot considered
helving the price of the magazine for the duration of the war, but decided

1 Caroe, "Lionel and O.C.", l Aug 1962,1 RT Papers c 668, fols 101-05.

2 "The Round Table Ltd.: Report on Accounts", 19 April 1940, Brand
Papers, box 153.

‘Points for the Council's Report", l Fay 1945, J ST Papers c 863,
lol 59.

j ‘Annual Accounts 1949-50", Brand Papers, box 171.

*inutes of RT Meeting, 14 June 1945, RT (0) Papers. Sew Zealand was
still the Round Table's best overseas market, taking more than twice
as many copies as Australia, and more than Canada and the USA
combined: Minutes of RT meeting, 2 July 1941, i

^inst such a nove "since it was thought that the influence of the Round
Table would not be substantially increased by an increase in the number of
subscribers and purchasers".’ After the war, the Pound Table's circulation
revived, before resuming its slew but steady decline in the 1050s.

and the F ederal Debate

la contrast to the First World War, there was considerable confusion
over British war aims. This point was emphasised by Duncan in the early
aantks of the war. For what, he asked, was the British Empire fighting?

To liberate Poland? To vindicate the "principle of non-aggression"? To
crush Hitlerism? In his view, the British Empire, "the most vulnerable of
all the Great Powers", had stumbled into the war without any clear idea of
its purpose. 2

The crux of the problem was the future of Germany. The Moot agreed
that there could not be another "peace to end peace". Any post-war
settlement nust be one which could "be negotiated with a liberal German
Government" . * Yet the Moot harboured few illusions as to the state of
Cernaa opinion. Indeed, it seemed clear that 'most Germans . . . are far
■ore deroted to Hitler than they ever were to the Kaiser". -

How, therefore, was peace to be secured? One suggestion - frequently
^ferred to as the "French’* solution - was to partition Germany and deprive

1 Minutes of RT meeting, 24 Jan 1940, Ulfl.

Dtncan to Curtis, 14 Hov 1939, RI Papers c 613, foL 67.

1 Coupland, J "War and Peace", RT, Dec 1939, p 21.

' "Inside Germany", RT, March 1940, p 341; see also "Germany from

Mlthin" , RT, March 1944, pp 115-20, describing Hitler as "genuinely

Popular".

iy. of her industrial base. Yet this would certainly not make Germany
• liberal"- Aa alternative solution was put forward by Sir Viliam Harris.

G^rnany should be subjected to a long period of "trusteeship": "a
^telling, with variations, of the story with which we are faisi liar in the
Colonies and India and South Africa".' Here again, however, the costs and
tie dangers were clear. Kany in the Hoot therefore despaired of
forsula tin 8 a set of war aios morG comprehensive than "the negative fact

tiat we cannot cone to terms with Hitler". 2

Ihe Moot's reticence infuriated Curtis: "the Round Table in
particular was founded to influence public opinion on those long-distance
(and even middle-distance) problens which politicians, government servants
aid Journalists combine to ignore". Var ains - or, as Curtis preferred,
•jeace aims' - were the very thing the Round Table existed to discuss.

That the magazine was not doing so was all the more lamentable in that, in
Curtis's view, the Round Table did have a coherent "peace aim": federalism,

as outlined in Hodson's Round Table articles of September 1935 and June and
September 1939. 3

Curtis claimed that the war had brought federalism into the realm of
practical politics. There was some Justification for this claim. Even in
tie Foreign Office federalism enjoyed a brief popularity, culminating in
Churchill's offer of a permanent Anglo-French Union, in June 1940 . A In

* Harris, "Somj Reflections About Var Ains", 31 March 1940, RT Papers
c 784, fols 8-12.

Coupland to Brand, 21 Aug 1940, Brand Papers, box 153.

: Curtis to Hailey, 8 Sept 1941, Curtis Papers 98, fols 25-26.

Andrea Bosco, "Federal Union, Chatham House, The Foreign Gffice and
Anglo-French Union in Spring 1940" in Bosco <ed>, The Federal Idea,
Volume 1 (London, 1991).

4

19*0. Curtis urged the Round Table to exert pressure on the
Go ,ern»» T ' t to extend its offer to all the Dominions and to the governments-
in-exil® of forway, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg. Poland and Bohemia
•eliould be invited to consider . . . the status of a British Dominion as it
^ before 1914". 1

In Curtis's mind, there was no longer any 1 neonpat 1 bi li ty between the
oceanic and continental dimensions of federalism. This was by no means
clear to others in the Moot. "Vhat if the Dominions rejected the idea and
the othors Jumped at it?" asked Horsfall. "Ve should find ourselves
overnight a continental power and little else." 2 Brand argued that the
striking fact of the situation was that "we are dependent on the
United Statoc". Union with a handful of European states presently under
Hitler's heel "would ... bo decisive as against any further association
with the United States and the Dominions". 3 la December 1941 the Sound
Ta ble published an article by Brand which described as "entirely
impracticable" any federation involving the United States. Brand made
clear his belief that any federation not involving the United States would
tunable to maintain international security. '

Curtis threatened to resign, and to take Bailey's 41000 pa with him.
claimed to be continuing the work for which the Round Table was founded,
at| i to which Lothian had dedicated his llfe. c The record of Lothian's

1 "Personal View of Lionel Curtis on the line to be followed by the

Round Table", 17 Sept 1940, RT Papers c 764, fols 13-16.

Horsfall, "The Round Table", 26 Sept 1940, UlU, fols 20-22.

Brand, "Memorandum", [circulated 3 Oct 1940,3 iMd, fols 16-19.

1 Brand, ] "Anglo-American Co-operation" , AT, Dec 1941, pp 5-16.

Curtis to Hailey, 23 Dec 1941 (draft), Curtis Papers 98, fols 35-39;

Cur tis to Xacadan, 8 Jan 1942, i&U. fol 42.

k

meeting with the Koot, in November 1940, contradicted him: Lothian had
tbao ® r 3 ued for an " An P hict 7° nlc Council- for the United States and the
British Comnonwea 1th, but "no separate plea ... for Imperial
frieratioa* . 1 According to Malcolm, Imperial federation was one point the
jkot could agree on: the majority was "all for the policy of the earliest
possible organic union with the Dominions". The "point really is that what
m don't agree to is the idea of going for union with the U.S.i. now <A la
Streit )*. 2

Malcolm undoubtedly exaggerated the support for Imperial federation
Kithin the Moot. He continued to believe that Inperial federation was both
practicable and likely, although he thought a start night have to bo made
with Just Australia and Mew Zealand.® Nevertheless, ho rejected Curtis's
particular scheme, on the grounds "that Union to be workable would have to
be very close indeed - which would of courcc increase Dominion and perhaps
U.I. reluctance to accept it'. 4

Grigg, Horsfall and possibly Coupland were by now firm advocates of
co-operation per se . Grigg urged the Moot to dissociate itself conpletely
froa Curtis's views. However, Grigg's own attempt to define Round Table
a l*s, towards the end of 1944, had, according to Macadam, no chance of

1 Couplaad, "Lord Lothian's Last Talk at Cliveden", pasted into ninutes
of ST meeting, 30 March 1941, RT <0> Papers. Curtis thought
Coupland's version "distinctly coloured by his own point of view":
Curtis to Hailey, 13 Oct 1941, Curtis Papers 96, fol 31.

Kolcolm to Hodson, 16 Jan 1942, RT Papers c 675, fols 19-20.

3 It 11.

Kalcolm to Curtis, 16 Dec 1943, Lkid, fols 121-22; cl Malcolm,
"'Decision' and 'Action'*, Agenda, Vol 1, Bo 2 (April 1942),

PP 184-89.

teing accepted by the rest of the Koot. ’

Brand also opposed Curtis's federalism He was consistently hostile
towards integration with Europe, and he found "the idea of a world state
„itb 1000 million Asiatics - one man one vote - just dreadful",
lerertheless, at this stage he opposed Empire federalism on pragnatic
grounds. He still held as the ideal "the unity of the British
Coiaonwealtb" , but he now doubted whether either the Dominions or Britain
coi Id agree to an "organic union" which did not include America. This, be
reilised, was a much longer-term project. 2 Hailey was more synpathetic to
Curtis's views, describing himself as "a convert" after reading Decision. 3
Like Brand, however, he regarded the attitude of Anerica as decisive. 4

Dawson characteristically refused to comnit himself either to
Curtis's views or to those of his critics. Indeed, the “quarrel . . .
seems to ne to be largely imaginary and in any case likely to be solved by
events". Vhile Dawson thus favoured an "attitude of vigil and waiting on
events", this did not mean that he dissented "from (Curtis's! general views
on the future of the British Commonweal th" . *

The younger Round Tablers sought to mediate between Curtis and the
rest of the Moot. In May 1945, Macadam suggested to Hodson that

Macadam to Grigg. 15 Nov 1944, RT Papers c 863, fol 35.

Brand to Curtis, 13 Aug 1943, Curtis Papers 98. fols 57-62. Curtis
himself never supported "one man one vote" for India and other non-
Buropean countries, although Hodson did: Hodson to Curtis, 20 Dec
1941, RT Papers c 784, fols 36-38.

Hailey to Curtis, 17 July 1941, Curtis Papers 98, fo! 23.

* Hailey to Curtlo, 3 Oct 1941, J_hid, fols 29-30.

Dawson to Curtis, 14 Oct 1942, RT Papers c 784, fols 45-46. Curtis
accused Dawson of being ■ Asquithian" : Curtis to Dawson, 19 Oct 1942,
UiU, fols 52-54.

■we should try to persuade the rest of the Moot to agree,
as many of then do, that Lionel's ideas are sound, the
only difference of opinion being ac to the practicability
of then at the present tine" . '

iBTgrtbeless, by now a largo part of the problem was Curtis himself, and
dognatic insistence on "100 per cent, subnission to his point of
fie/< a Coupland reported from Oxford that Curtis was becoming “so

offensive .
fccalan was

. that I have to avoid him as much as possible". 3 Even
driven to describe him as “the square peg in the Round Table".

a

fayymvealth Cp-Qcera.tlga^..tlie_PpaiiilQns la Var tire

Vita the "lamentable exception" of Eire®, the self-governing
Coalnions followed Britain into war in September 1939, as they had done
t*nty-fl7e years earlier. In Australia and Hew Zealand, belligerency was
considered automatic. Curtis appeared to favour a similar doctrine,
liplying in an article for the Found Table that there was no such thing as
aDoainlon right of neutrality; but on this point the Moot was divided, and
*is article was amended accordingly.®

Ihe informal arrangements which had characterised Anglo-Doainion
relations in the interwar years had clearly failed to prevent war - as,

1 facadam to Hodson, 14 Kay 1945, RT Papers c 863, fol 55.

Grigg to Sir Herbert Baker, 11 Xarch 1942, Grigg Papers, MSS
Wcrofilo 1005.

Coupland to Grigg, 9 Cfct 1943, (Lothian box), RT <0> Papers.

facadam to Crowther, 22 June 1943, RT Papers c 862, fol 131.

tKaasergh.l "The Conference of 1944", FT, Sept 1944, pp 311-17.

Coupland to Brand, 20 Aug 1940. Brand Papers, box 153. The article
an obituary of Abe Bailey, the amended version of which appeared
in FT. Sept 1940, pp 743-46.

I

372

Udaad, had tbe Lea 8 ue Nations, devotion to which had proved a major
obstacle to Commonwealth Integration. It therefore seemed clear to the
gouod Table "that we must plan to make the l Commonwealth! system stronger
in the future than in the past" . 1 nevertheless, the existence of
diffarent, and at times conflicting, pressures made it difficult to arrive
a* any firm conclusions concerning the future direction of Anglo-Doninion
relations. Horsfall complained that the whole exercise was "hardly less
emulative than to enter for one of Xr Littlewood's pools". 2

Smuts was prominent in urging the development of new Conmonwealth
■achinery which would enable South Africa and the other Dominions to
participate more fully in regional decision-making. On the other hand, he
was firmly opposed to the kind of federal isn which Curtis espoused. 3
(Duncan thought Curtis's scheme, shorn of its European dimension, both
•attractive" and "a necessity*, and he believed that South Africa would
Join. 4 ) A more worrying consideration, however, was the strength of
Africaner republicanism, and the Hoot was certainly aware of the weaknesses
ii Ssuts's coalition.®

In Canada, relatione with the United States were the primary
consideration, but it was an open question whether those relations provided
as obstacle to, or could be tied in with, closer Commonwealth integration.

* IHodson,] "The Commonwealth and the Settlement", RT, Sept 1043,

pp 306-12.

Horsfall, "The Round Table", 26 Sept 1040, RT Papers c 784,

fols 20 - 22 .

Sauts to Dawson, 26 Jan 1940, Dawson Papers 81, fols 29-30.

' Duncan to Malcolm, 26 April 1942, RT Papers c 875, fols 33-35.

Sce » eg, Malcolm to Curtis, 20 March 1942, RT Papers c 875, fol 27.

The South African Round Table was more upbeat.

Ik

Jf itially. the Canadian Round Table was optinistic. believing that the
Ogdeieburg Agreement of August 1940 paved the way for "a more profound
oDioa* of the whole "English-speaking world". 2 By 1944, however, it was
clear that the majority of Canadians was "equally opposed both to the
Centralization and l to! the dissolution of the Commonwealth" . 3

Iho conflict in the Far East brought the Pacific Dominions into the
front line of the war. Initially, the effect was to underline their
dependence on the United States. The Australian Round Tablo defended
Curtin's "Australia looks to America" article of December 1941.**
fevertholess, few Australians believed that co-operation with the United
States would be detrimental to the Anglo-Dominioc rolaticnship. & Curtin
and his colloaguec made much of the running in proposing ways to strengthen
Ccamanweolth co-operation.

Cm the main point at issue within the Moot - not co nuch whether
federalism was desirable, as whether it was practicable - the evidence of
Canadian and South Africaa opinion overwhelmingly supported Curtis's
critics. The evidence from Australia and Hew Zealand indicated that
support for some form of closer integration was not only possible but
likely. Indeed, H McClure Smith, the editor of the Sydney Morning Herald ,
Informed Curtis in 1940 that "if Australia and Hew Zealand were the only

“Canada", RT, March 1941, pp 340-57.

(George V Brown, 3 "Canada: the Future of the British Commonwealth” ,
W. March 1944, pp 186-92. The following quarter, the Round Table
reported an opinion poll showing 491 ol Canadians in favour of the
status 21X for inclusion in the US, and 241 for independence:

"Canada", RT, June 1944, pp 270-76.

H Bailey,] "Australia", RT, June 1942, pp 416-22.

See » eg, P F Irvine to Curtis, 18 June 1942, Curtis Papers 98,

*ol 45.

5

g^ijooe whose consent was needed, it would not be difficult to secure
9X0l% «t least, of the Imperial nachinery which you and I believe to be
pessary".’ nevertheless, union between Britain and the two antipodean
pinions (even if it had been possible) was clearly a different
proposition to Imperial federation, let alone to the kind of "union of
dtaocracies" which Curtis now advocated.

Uncertainty regarding South Africa's future direction apart, there at
least ceemed little reason to believe that the Comnonweal th was in the
procoss of dissolution. The Moot was therefore increasingly confident in
abating new machinery for strengthening "functional* co-operation
between Britain and the Dominions. Various measures were urged: more
freqjont Conferences, Joint sessions of Parliamentary delegations, a
permanent secretariat, institutionalised exchange and contact at civil
service level, and "the organisation of a common sycton of defence*. 2 The
emerging structure of the United Hat ions gave further grounds for hoping
tlat the Dominions would confront "the centrifugal forces in Imperial
development* in order to “share in the permanent leadership of the world* . s
Osly thus could Britain, let alone the Dominions, hope to "command the
authority of a world Power comparable to the U.S.A. and the U.S.S. R.". 4 .

1 H McClure Smith to Curtis, 21 June 1946, <ed ctee file,) RT (0)

Papers. For similar opinions from Hew Zealand, see, eg H F von Haast
to Hodson, 24 July 1941, RT Papers c 784, fols 41-43; Sir Janes Grose
to Curtis, 4 March 1943, Curtis Papers 98, fol 68.

(Morrah, J "Organization of Security", FT, Sept 1944, pp 299-304; cf
(Kaosergh, J "The Conference of 1944", ibid., pp 311-17.

(Morrah, } "Concert of the Vorld" , FT, Eec 1944, pp 3-9.

' " Common Counsel", RT, March 1944, p 107.

fill* yostm r Foreign Policy

■The fat is in the fire again', Macadam exclaimed, in May 1945.’ The
iB *>diate reason was a request from the Melbourne group for a re-statement
of Round Table ains, to be used in recruiting new members. Curtis now
do^nded that the Moot should make a definite choice between federalism and
co-operation, and that the losers should resign. 2

Hodson was given the difficult task of producing a document “which
would be acceptable to all nenbers of the Moot, including Mr Curtis". 3
Hoison perfcrned this task with considerable skill, although,
significantly, Brand and Grigg (now Lord Altrincham) were absent from most
of the neetlngs which discussed his draft.* 1 The resulting document was
seat to the various Round Table groups early in November 1945, with the
eniorsenent of the Moot.

As Korrah later remarked, some degree of "blurring" was implicit in
the Round Table's statenent.* Curtis was no doubt unhappy with the
observation that federalism was not "immediately practical politics"; sons
of his critics could hardly have welcomed the assertion that co-operation
ws at best "a stopgap and a pis aller " . On the whole, Hodson' s memorandum
inclined towards the federalist view, albeit in terns more discriminating
tton Curtis's own.

1 Macadam to Hodson, 14 May 1945, RT Papers c 863, fol 56.

Curtis to Macadam, 26 April 1945, Curtis Papers 98, fols 73-4.

Minutes of RT Meeting, 30 July 1945, RT <0) Papers.

The most important meeting appears to have been on 25 Sept 1945,

attended by Curtis, Hailey, Hodson, Horsfall, Macadam, Malcolm, Maud

aad Morrah: Minutes, FT <0> Papers.

*orrah to Altrincham, 8 Oct 1947, RT Papers c 784, fol 67.

376

"The ultimate Ideal remains the union of nations in
an organic Commonwealth .... Though 'ultimate'
the Ideal is not to be thought insubstantial or
without effect on current policy .... Its
adoption implies, first, that the opportunities of
events must be seized to try to move towards the
ideal, little by little, and that policies should
be opposed which would tend in the long run to
frustrate it. Secondly it implies that continuous
and positive efforts should be made to create the
general conditions in which the ideal could be
brought to reality."'

The memorandum succeeded in what had become its primary purpose: that

is, persuading Curtis to stay in the Moot. It was less successful in its
other purpose: that of providing a basis for the revitalisation of the
Doainion groups. The Melbourne group agreed that only the British

Cononvealth "as a whole" could renain a world power; nevertheless, "the

cooparative method . . . should be tried to the utnost as the most hopeful

line of advance ". 2 The Sydney group also declared itself in favour of "the

continuance of the Commonwealth and its closer integration". But

"Ve do not subscribe to the view that organic union
is possible ... in any near period of time; nor
. . . that it is possible at all without the
achievement of vigorous statesnanshi p generally
favourable to the Conmonwealth ideal (and this
statesmanship does not exist in the United Kingdom
or Australia to-day)". 3

He Toronto group failed to produce a collective reply, but when its
Secretary, H Macdonnell, put the case for federalism at a neeting, "the
0 *ly person who gave mo much support was the one member of the gathering

"Memorandum on Round Table Aims and Policy", Nov 1945, Curtis Papers
158, item 9.

‘Tha Round Table (Melbourne Group): Reply to London
Memorandum . . . ", 20 Dec 1946, Curtis Papers 98, folc 133-34.

"The Round Table Aims and Policy. Conclusions of the Sydney Group
Formulated as at 1st October 1948", (Sydney file,) RT <0) Papers.

377

^ v*e tight" . 1 Perhaps the most disappointing response was from Hew
£>alaod. There, von Haast continued to support Curtis's line, but "the
^j or it7 would not even agree that the ultimate ideal of tho Group or of
t ba * 3 va»ent should be an organic and articulate union". 2

Vlth such views filtering in from the Dominions, Curtic'c critics
felt increasingly emboldened to challenge the lines of policy laid down in
1945. fetters came to a head towards the end of 1947, after Morrah
published a leading article pointing out that "the Round Table has not
recoded from its belief in organic union as the ultimate idoal". 3
Altrincham wrote a furious letter, denouncing federal union as "wrong and
very dangerous" . a Morrah suggested relaxing tho rule of anonymity to allow
the issue to bo debated in the Found Table. Vhile the Moot rejected the
idea of signed articles, it was agreed that Altrincham and Curtis should
put their respective views forward, to be followed by others from the Moot,
the Dominion groups and elsewhere. 5 Thus the Round Table published
articles by Curtis and Altrincham in March 1946, by Brand in June 1946
(followed by further contributions from Curtis and Brand in September), by
Sir David Kaxwell-Fyfe <on behalf of “United Europe") in September 1948, by
th* Melbourne and Sydney groups in March and September 1949, and by Max

5 Xacdonueil to Morrah, 8 April 1948, (loronto file,) RT (0> Papers.

H F Von Haast to Curtis, 29 Aug 1946, Curtis Papers 98, fol 127. Von
Haast later explained that recent recruits to the Hew Zealand group
"ere "very narrow and anti Imperialistic in their attitude: Von Haast
to Curtis, 13 March 1947, Ibid, fol 143.

t Morrah, 1 "Heiress and Inheritance", FT, Sept 1947, pp 311-18.
Altrincham to Morrah, 7 Oct 1947, RT Papers c 784, iols 65-6.

Klnutes of RT meeting, 29 Oct 1947, RT <0) Papers.

Balofl (with a further reply by Curtis) in June 1952. •

The lmt Table debate 0f l9 ‘ 8 ' 5? Indicated the breakdown of

<b< coeproeise on federalism which had been negotiated in 1945 , and which

* 10 eff<Ct 6660 lc eJ “ s,e “ ce Sine. 1®17 or even earlier. It should
*•*“ be eaphasised that there was much co™ ground between the different
protagonists. -Everyone is in favour of the end Lionel seats-, Brand
asserted, in 1948.- All tabors of the ^ could agree Qn ^ necesslty

of mictaining, and if possible strengthening, the ties which bound the
E^>i re/Coamnnwea 1th; all could agree on the importance of preserving the
valuas for which they believed it stood.- The real question was whether
federallsn was a practicable way of achieving those ends. And here Curtis
now found himself in a ninority of one.

The reasons are to be feund less in any developments in the Dominions
thenselves (although, as after the First World Var, these were clearly
liportant) than in the new context of international relations. Between
19*5 and 1948 changes in that context transformed the situation of Britain

2

3

Curtis,] ■ Untempered Mortar", RT, March 1948, pp 524-34;

iBraadT ^R\V B [ italn ' S R61S iD tbe VorId To ~ da y". iMi, pp 535-44-
PP 633 I 42 . Vc t Commonwealth and Western Union", PT, June 1948.

PP 749-61 : S U BraadJ " A XT, Sept 1948.

PP 742-48- y r 6j " I#Xt St6pS l0r ' United Eur °Pe-. ibid.

P 7 > : l) t«lbourne Group,] "An Australian View of Empire"

Policy- or ^ lS y*™y G ™u P> 1 "Commonwealth and'common

P^rLlof-’ f?V ' PP 317 ~ 22 > t^loff,] "Britain and European

^. PP 219-23 1952> PP211 ' 18; CCurtis > 3 Real Issue".

3r «nd to Morrah, 8 March 1948, Brand Papers, box 171.

, l 04 a rah ' ] " rW0 Vlews of Em P lre: An Introduction to Debate"

PP 519-23.

PT, March

federation project had been built.

The dominating fact of postwar international relations was the "cold
l(ar . : the unconcealed and barely contained hostility between Soviet Russia
ani "the Vest". Curtic wac anongst those who moved most quickly towards
outright hostility to the Soviet rdgine. In January 1940 he warned against
•tie danger of drifting into a policy of appeasement with Russia".’ Much
0 l the appeal of his postwar federalism was in its call to arms against the
Soviet nenace. 2 Others were initially Dore equivocal. As late as October
1947 Altrincham argued that the Common weal th’ s role was "to stand between
the two great federal blocs, the American and the Soviet". 2 By then,

hovever, the "cold war" was an accepted fact. As Curtis wrote to Brand,
Altrinchan* s policy "would . . . alienate almost every reader of The Round
Table*; rejection of it was "one point on which I think we agree".-*

It was not the fact of the "cold war" which divided Curtis from
others in the Moot, but interpretation of its consequences. One of the
»»t lnnediate effects of the "cold war" <ii not, indeed, of the war
itself) was to dispose of the notion that Britain could avoid implication
ia the security arrangements of western Europe. Despite its record in the
^Os aid '30s, the Moot appears to have had no hesitation in accepting
tkls conclusion. The case was overwhelming: Britain was now "intimately

Curtis to Morrah, 14 Jan 1946, Curtis Papers 98, fol 89.

See, eg, von Haast to Curtis, 13 March 1947, Curtis Papers 89,

*ol H3.

Altrincham to Morrah, 7 Oct 1947, RT Papers c 784, fols 65-66.

' ^rtis to Brand. 15 Oct 1947, Curtis Papers 98, fol 161.

■ftygteA to the European continent" . • Nevertheless, very few sembers of the
jkot shared Curtis's enthusiasm even lor the very limited proposals for
Ea-npeaa "union" associated with Churchill and Bevin.

Undoubtedly the most Important consequence of the "cold war" both for
Britain and for the Dominions was to re-enphasise their dependence on the
Bn, ted States. America's power was now "overwhelming" . 2 The Anglo-
iwrican relationship was therefore bound to be unequal. But this in no
taf detracted from Round Table enthusiasm for it; indeed, the
precariousness of Britain's position made it all the more urgent. As
godson wrote in 1947, "we are undergoing the final death throes of the 19th
century - that century in which British military and economic power
dominated the world and enabled the United States to grow up in a
kindergarten of her own". 3

The echo of Kerr is suggestive. Vas Airerica now to return to her
■kindergarten", as she had done after the First World War? Or would she
accept the baton of world responsibility, as Kerr and Curtis had urged her
to do a generation earlier? In the immediate aftermath of the war the
answers to these questions were by no means clear, and the Round Tablers
followed Canhan's reports from the United States with undisguised anxiety.

late as December 1946 Brand thought that the forces pulling America in
eltfcer direction were finely balanced.* 1 Only after the enunciation of the
^*aa Doctrine in March 1947 - itself a response to Britain's threatened
^'hdrawal from Greece - was Canham sure that America would face up to her

fferrah,] •Partnership and Policy", XT. Dec 1946, pp 3-7.

Brand to Lippmana, 30 Dec 1946, Brand Papers, box 171.

Bodcon to Canham, 24 Feb 1947, <US file,) RT <0> Papers.

f Brand, 1 "Some Thoughts on the United States", XT, Dec 1946, pp 8-21.

.yrtoric rMpowlMHtios'.’

Curtis believed that the various changes in the International context
wrought by the “cold war" had strengthened the case for federalism. But he
bilged that inperial federation by itself would now do little to meet the
aeeds either of Britain or of the Dominions. He therefore advocated a
federation of all democracies, Commonwealth, European and American. "You
are certainly ‘saying a mouthful'", Brand commented. *

Curtis's optinism regarding American opinion was undoubtedly the
weakest point in his argument. Curtis frequently asserted that, once a
start was made with some countries, the United States would be bound to
join. 3ranc pointed out that probably the reverse was true: that if the
United States did not join from the outset, which she was extremely
unlikely to do, then certainly Canada and probably the other Dominions
would stand apart, with the consequence that the Commonwealth would
dissolve. 3 In Brand's view, Curtis's federalism - which, a few years
before, he had regarded as nerely impracticable - was now positively
dangerous. 4

island; Iputrality and Secession

Throughout 1938-39, the possibility of Irish neutrality was a major
preoccupation of Horgan's Round Table articles. In September 1939,

Fusibility became reality. Horgan condemned de Valera's policy as both

(Canton,) "A Two-Vorld Policy at Vashington" , RT, Sept 1947,

PP 362-69.

Brand to Curtis, 14 Oct 1947, Curtis Papers 98, fol 159.

3

Brand to Curtis, 17 Oct 1947, Curtis Papers 98, fols 164-65.

Brand to Xorrah, 25 Aug 1949, Brand Papers, box 171.

382

and hypocritical, claiming that the Taoiseach was fully aware
freedom depended on British protection.’

De Valera's insistence that partition was the greatest obstacle to
Irish belH8 erenc y *® s P ut to tbe test ln th ® summer of 1940, whoa the
British Government resolved to enter negotiations, linking the two issues.
Curtis, at Eevin's request, organised an All Souls group including Toynbeo,
Brierlj and Adams, which drafted a scheme for an executive authority for
the whole of Ireland, indirectly elected by the existing legislatures of
Blre and Ulster, which would bring Ireland into the war, and form the basis
of a sure permanent post-war constitution. 2 The All Souls scheme provided
a storting point for Britain's proposals, subsequently modified to cover
only the British use of Irish ports. Nevertheless, de Valera rejected
these overtures, probably because of scepticism concerning Britain's
ability to deliver Ulster. 3 Horgan, possibly aware of the course of
events, comnented that "not even the abolition of partition would, failing
Gersan attack, induce us to enter the war" . *

Round Table articles from Eire cane to an end ln December 1940, as a
result of the Irish Government's restrictions on unofficial news. Horgan
continued to send shorter articles via northern Ireland until March 1942;

1 t Horgan, ] -Neutral Ireland", RT, Dec 1939, pp 134-47. Curtis took a

similar view and in subsequent years used "Irlshry" as a synonym for
irresponsibility: eg Curtis to Korrah, 17 June 1949, Brand Papers,
box 171.

Curtis to Bevin, 12 June 1940, enclosing "Memorandum on Ireland",
^rtis Papers 90, fols 104-06.

See Paul Canning, British Policy towards Ireland, 1921-41 (Oxford,
198 5) and Clive Ponting, 1940: Xyth and Reality (London, 1990), pp
18 9“94. Canning argues that Churchill scuttled the negotiations,
Pereas Ponting suggests that he was reluctant to intervene.

* Morgan) "Divided Ireland". RT, Sept 1940, pp 864-78.

tW t Birc'c

tb4res ft«r Kansergh and other writers attempted to keep Round Table readers
JB touch with events in the south. Mansergh recognised that Eire would
c$rr j less weight in the Commonwealth after the war.’ More worrying was
the effect of neutrality on Eire itself, where opinion was reported to have
becow distinctly isolationist and inward-looking. 2

Horgan's articles were resumed in June 1946. His pleasure at Fianna
Fail's defeat in the 1945 election was ill-concealed. Indeed, Morgan fully
expected a new warmth in Anglo-Irish relations under Costello's coalition
government, despite its inclusion of Republican representatives. 3
Costello's announcement of moves to repeal the External Relations Act
therefore came as a shock.

"At a time when the preservation, not only of peace,
but of freedom and civilization, depends on a firm
alliance between the Atlantic States ... Mr
Costello's Government has embarked on a policy which
makes it virtually impossible for us to participate in
such a combination."* 1

It was with a mixture of sadness and anger that this self-styled
'lationalist of an older and more moderate school" greeted the final
severance of Eire's troubled connection with the British Crown.®

It ic by no means clear whether Horgan's Pound Tabic contributions
represented the views of the Moot. (Curiously, there was no editorial
coaett on Irish secession. > Kansergh wrote disparagingly of his articles
*6 1950, -rather as though our articles on France were written, if not by a

1 i Mansergh, J "Ireland", RT, Deo 1943, pp 66-68.

* Kansergh, 1 "Ireland", RT, Sept 1943, pp 370-76.

[ Horgan,3 "Ireland: few Policies and Pacts", PT, Sept 1948,

PP 767-92.

Morgan,] "Ireland and the Commonwealth", RT, Dec 1948, pp 44-49.

Morgan,! "'The Republic of Ireland'", RT, March 1949, pp 150-55.

tk

at least by an Orleanist". ’ However, tbls was at a tine when

Mu**-

t 6ae»e d that tbe Irlsl1 Re P ubllc drawing closer to co-operation with
Co■B^ I1>^eallt^x, aQd whea tbe ar S uments o f the past could only serve to
finder such developments. Horgan was in fact to continue as Round Table
correspondent in Ireland until his death in 1967.

Inglis continued to send Round Table "chronicles" on India until
• 942 , when he returned to England. His successor as The Times'
correspondent, James Hoi burn, acted as Round Table correspondent until 1946
(with occasional articles from Sir Francis Low, editor of The Tines of
Ml a). Thereafter, the task of producing Round Table articles was shared
tetweea Geoffrey Tyson (a member of the Legislative Assenbly and editor of
Capital, the Calcutta financial weekly) and G A Johnson (assistant editor
of the Calcutta Statesman). All these correspondents tended to endorse the
broad lines of government policy in India, as did the Hoot as a whole,
ferertheless, the two most effective influences on Round Table policy were
avCocpland and Hodson, both of whom were to be found on the nore
progressive wing of British opinion on India.

Before the war. Hodson had argued that "in the long run, undoubtedly,
better course is to give India full self-government, since to prevent
* r from securing it night be ta) serious additional defensive burden". 1 2

Initial effect of the war was to strengthen Britain's reasons for
lining ia India, at the same tinre as making repression easier. 3 In

1 fansergh to Horrah, 23 Jan 1950, Curtis Papers 98, fol 217.

Hodson, -The Round Table", Icirc 6 Jan 1939), Brand Papers, box 153.

^ Brown, Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope <Yalc 1989), pp 314 if.

385

tie longer term, however, the circumctancoc of the war reinforced Hodson' s

orgumoat. The attempt to find some stable alternative to British rule

therefore became a matter of increasing urgency.

The appointment of Amery to the India Office in Kay 1940 gave a boost

to hopes of a successful wooing of Congress collaboration. Amery' s idea,

Kith which the Round Table sympathised, was to invite Indian leaders

■ during the war" to agree on a constitution to be implemented " after the

war".' Amery's strategy almost immediately ran up against Churchill's

■crude" conservatism, however, and the "August Offer" of 1940 was an

enasculated version of Amery's original scheme.® As Hcdson later wrote,

"the general impression was one of taking as much with one hand as was

given with the other. The note of boldness or inagination or generosity

l was) wholly absent". This, Hodson added, was "not being wise after the

event": at the time, as a member oi the Empire Division cf the Ministry of

Information, he had pressed for a change in the wording of the "Offer". 3

Amery frequently discussed the situation in India with his friends in

All Souls and the Round Table. * After one such discussion with Curtis and

others, in December 1940, he recorded in his diary that

"the practical upshot . . . was that nothing can be
done at the moment ... to end the deadlock, but
that what is vital is that somebody should start
the work of serious study so that when the

1 V R Louis, In the Sane of God, Go! (Hew York, 1992), p 128: pp 123-79
are an illuminating account of Anery's tenure of the India Office.

2 Ibid. pp 128-136; cf G Rizvi, Linlithgow and India (London. 1978),
pp 156-58.

3 Hodson, The Great Divide (London, 1969), p 86.

* Amery also wrote one article for the Round Table ("New Proposals for
Indian Settlement", Dec 1940, pp 101-15) and collaborated with
Coupland on another ("India in the Post-War World", June 1941,
pp 500-10) .

I

atmosphere is better a real project can be produced
which might form the basis of an agreement".’

Over the next few months such plans took a more definite form, with

Coupland volunteering to conduct a study under Huf field College auspices,

and Kith Amery's appointment of Hodson as the Viceroy's Reforms

Coamissioner.* Hodson produced a memorandum on the steps needed to lead

India to Dominion Status, which Amery welcomed as “evidently entirely

fulfilling the objects with which I sent him out"; nevertheless, by the end

of 1942 Hodson had returned to England, having failed "to consolidate his

position with Linlithgow". 3

Coupland's mission led to the publication of two volumes of history,
The Indian Problem, 1833-1935 <1942) and Indian Politics, 1936-42 <1943),
which have continued to exercise an important influence on the
historiography of Anglo-Indian relations. 4 Coupland also published a third
volune on The Future of India <1943). The latter attempted to square the
circle of Indian constitutional advance by means of an elaborate scheme for
a three-tiered structure of government, with intermediate federations of
provinces <two predominantly Muslim and two mainly Hindu) grouped around
river basins. Coupland's scheme was based on suggestions made by Maurice
Teatts. Round Table contributor between 1934 and 1937 and now Census

i J Barnos and D Hicholson <eds> The Empire at Bay: The Leo Amery
Diaries, 1929-45 <London, 1988). p 669 (entry of 15 Dec 1940).

Ibid , pp 674-75 (Coupland 15 Feb 1941, Hodson 5 March 1941). Amery
admitted that it "docs look as if I woro perpetrating the mutual
jobbery which is sometimes charged against All Soule!" (5 March 1941,
ihii, p 675).

Ihll, pp 740 <28 Oct 1941) and 846 <26 Hov 1942).

See eg G Rizvl, “The Transfer of Power in India. A 'Re-Statement* of
an Alternative Approach", pp 127-44 of R F Holland and G Rizvl (eds) ,
Perspectives on Imperialism and Decolonization (London, 1964).

4

Commissioner for India.. Coupland's sch _ „ as „ eU recelved 1#

tot widely condemned i» India. Part of the reason was that Copland
hi reelf was viewed with suspicion following tiie puWl0 , tl0n of hSs

voures. which, as adward Thompson reported, were frequently used by the
Government to attack Congress. 2

Coupland and Sodson were both weil piaced to observe the Cripps
Mission Of March- April 1942. Coupland was swiftly brought into the
■frippery" in Delhi, and his synpathles were strongly with the atten.pt to
bring Congress into government. On the crucial sticking- point of the
Mission, Coupland could not see “why , . . Vinston and Amery worry
overnuch- about the prospect of an Indian quasi-Cabinet. «Ve are going to
abdicate in a few years. If Vaveli (the Commander-in-Chief 1 is sere of his
°" position, What does it matter if the Indian leaders are in virtual
control Of domestic government?- nevertheless. Coupland laid the blame
for the failure of the Mission squarely at Congress's door.* He attributed
Congress's attitude to an "Inferiority complex- and the fear that co-
operation would weaken the independence novement. Hodson agreed, but he was
■Uo are inclined to blame Cripps's negotiating tactics, and in particular

5/2/69-99^ ^ C0U?Und ' 8 Kay 1943 and n ° tes ' Upland Papers

IMd^S/S/? d? UP } a d n ?' 6 Apr11 1 19431 ' ^ S/"»0| British reviews,
uaa, b/3/1-47; Indian reviews. Ibid, 5/3/204.

M8ry ’ 10 ApM1 1912 <p 226> ' C «P 1 “d Popers, MSS

Couplaad, -The Impracticability of Full Cabinet Governn*nt at

CounU^’ \ 2 ^ rl \ 1 , 942> to Indian diary

has ^ ’ ? K f. Folitics ' M6-42 <Oxford, 1943), p 2QS T his view

Sr^.- — <—• ■=-

proalses' wMch subsequently had to be qualified.’

following the failure of the Cripps Mission. the situation in India

^tariorated rapidly. Hoi burn reported "a revolutionary outbreak which has

ju parallel since the Xutiny". 2 The responsibility for ending the deadlock

^thought to lie primarily in Indian, and especially in Congress, hands.

fcitain itself was "only too ready" to leave India. 3

Tie "growing inadequacy" of British power was acknowledged by Hodson

In o Rojnd Table article of March 1945. The "Quit India" disturbances had

been "terrible" , but also badly organised, ill-timed and half-hearted; and

tu Kuelins, the Communists and the army had all remained aloof. Britain

always promised to hand over power only after an agreement had been

reached which vould prevent civil war.

"The argument is sound, but it is a question of
degree; for Britain herself can give no absolute
guarantee that in the future those catastrophes will
not attend her own rule. The longer self-government
for India is delayed the more likely it is that they
will."*

It was clear, therefore, that a policy of trying to hold on to India was
likely to be bloody, expensive and self-defeating. The question was,

her British objectives could still be met by conceding independence and
ffsegotiatl ng comnon aims.

The Round Table had long been involved in the business of reassessing
*ltiGh interests. Vith the sharp decline in Britain's economic stake in

‘ upland, Indian Diary, 9 April 1942 <p 224), l oc . e l l ; "Appendix 1:
Letter fron X r Hodson, 6th May 1942", LbiA, PP 244-50.

Alburn,] "India: Government and Congress", RT, Doc 1042, pp 53-63.

Colburn, j "India: Lord Linlithgow 1 s Reign in Restrospoct" , RT, Dec

15 «3, p p 52- 56 .

Godson, j "Britain's Opportunity in India", RT, March 1945,

PP 122-29.

jldi*> tkoe* interests boiled down to the creation of a stable political
^ atrategic partner. India was, as Anery put it with only clight
^ggeration. 'possibly lie potentially] the greatest power in Asia".'

India's own interests compelled her to remain a member of the
C0J *,nwoalth was frequently asserted in the Pound Table' c wartime Indian
cojeeatarie*. as in Coupland's Buffi eld volumes. Various reasons were
adduced for this view: India's need for industrial expertise and finance,
tte stabilising influence of association with more experienced democracies,
the continuing loyalty of the Princes and of large sections of tho
population, and, above all, India's need for son» defensive association in
a xorld increasingly dominated by large, expansionist Powers. 2

Like the British Government, the Pound Table was slow to accept tho
Inevitability of Pakistan, which it regarded primarily ac a bargaining-
counter, and as likely to reproduce in more virulont and intractable form
the problcn of minorities. Instead, Hodson suggested that an all-India
government be given powers over foreign policy, defence and communications:
and that sovereignty in all other matters be devolved to the provinces,
which could then decide what powers to transfer either to regional
•othorities or to the central government. * Similar ideas formed the basic
of the Cabinet Mission's proposals in 1946, which Hodson welcomed as
'statesmanlike" and "infinitely flexible'. 4 Even after Pakistan was an
“ocoaplished fact, tbe Pound Table cast doubt on its viability, and

A «ry to Coupland, 27 July 1943, Coupland Papers 5/2/32-33.

2 See, inter aim . I Coupland, J "India in the Post-war Vorld", RT, June

194 1. pp 500-10.

I Hodson, ] "India's Fatal Hour", RT, March 1946, pp 153-58.

* 1 Hodson, ] "India's Task", RT, Sept 1945, pp 340-48.

390

as inevitable its unification with India.'

The nearest that the Round Table came to opposing the Labour
^naant's Indian policy was in February 1947. with the announcement of a
ijaB-li^it to the British presence in India. In a rare comment on the
India* situation, Hailey attacked the Government's policy, declaring it
pracipi tate an< * injurious to British prestige. 2 Macadam circulated an even
jjre virulent attack by John Coatman, the former Round Tablet contributor,
greo at this stage, Coatman believed it possible for Britain to retain
control of central government in India, and thus hold out for better
terms. 3 Hodson (writing in the Sound Table ) was less convinced.

"If British will and British resources were still
matched to the task, another decade of British
rule . . . might well leave a more united, peaceable
and prosperous India than is likely to emerge after
ten years of independence. But neither the will nor
the resources are to-day so matched."

Tie fundamental reason for Britain's withdrawal was thus clear.

Iewrthelecc, Hodson was able to put a more positive gloss on Britain's
retreat, indeed, the constitutional transfer of power was a remarkable
aehieveaant, and the culmination of decades of British policy.*

fo-Xidd ir Fast; Expansion and Contrac tion

Britain's "self-interest" in the Middle Sast was, in the Pound
Table's view, quite modest: the security of communications, bases and oil

^Ppliee, an d the exclusion of other military Powers (including France).

1 I Hodson, 3 "Valediction to India", RT Sept 1947, pp 330-38.

' fiaosard (Lords), 5th Series, Vol CXLV <20 Feb 1947), cols 1029-36..

3 Xacadan, "For circulation to the editorial committee", 14 March 1947

Brand Papers, box 171.

{ 1 Hodson, J "Valediction to India", RT, Sept 1947, pp 330-38.

*• tW '**’ ' BrUala S ' JPf>ly P«rsu. slon , ond ad vlce Khen u ls

^ lred , tat ■benevolent despotism l s out of the quest , Qo . ,

rte fable-s topee for . new u 4oglo . 4rat> reUtIons , ftep

1MS *" Shared by UbOUr ' S Forei *“ ‘-y. Sraest Be vl n. * That snot
tope6 were swiftly disappointed was the result of tK0 !actQrs . ^ ^

none of the Arab states, least of all Egypt, perceived Britain's
dIB0ds to be so aodest. The second „ac the corrosive issue of Palestine.

Tie first of these factors was lar«»i 7 i Rn or^- un

67 1 8 nor ed, the second was the subject

of increasingly anguished consent and analysis.

fcrtng the late 1930s. the round ratio, under the influence of

Ccupland, had briefly supported tte proposals of the Peel emission for

' ta Firtltl0D ° f PaleStiDe ' Af * er I9 < 5 ’ — r the influence of Altrincham
Hi levlll Barbour (a trenchant critic of Zionism,, such a policy was

decisively rejected. = Revulsion towards Zionist terrorisn was undoubtedly
an important factor: so too wac the belief that a snail Jewish state would
te economically and militarily vulnerable, and likely to lead to the
displacement of larger numbers of Middle Eastern Jews than it could itself
adsorb. Above all, there was the wider context of Anglo-Arab relations,

*d tie fact that Arab (and indeed Aslan) opinion regarded Palestine as a

^Harold Boeley.l “The Empire and the Arab East", J?r, March 194b,
ff.. 7 “ 42 - Altrf nchaa put sinllar conclusions to the Colonial

in September 1945: V R Louis, Imperialism at Bay (Oxford,
iyV 7 ), p p 49-52.

Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary <London, 1983) , p 113
and Passim .

Barbour's Hist Domlnus: A Study of the Falestine Controversy
ondon, 1948). For Barbour's Influence, see Korrah to Curtis,

A P ril 1952, RT Papers c 855, fol 148.

test of Britain's goodwill.* In Altrincham's view, not oven American
goppcrt for Zionism could weigh against such considerations: "the Empire
cannot afford to allow its relations with the Arab world to be seriously
prajudiced by any other . . . interest". *

The Pound Table supported the creation of "a democratic State of
Palestine, with an Arab majority", as part of a wider federation
eoconpassing Trans- Jordan, Syria and the Lobanon. The Zionists should be
left to “make the bost terms they could". » Caroe continued to advocate
8 ush a solution even after the announcement of Britain's intention to
resign the Mandate, and the United Fationc' vote in favour of partition."

The manner of Britain's departure from Palestine was to many
observers ignominious. To Earbour it was "the only honourable course",
giren that it was impossible to fulfil Britain's pledges to both the Arab
aci the Zionist communities. In his view, indeed, Britain's action would
wia her "the friendship of the Middle East as a whole". *

By 1949, Britain had been forced to concede Dominion status to Ceylon
Ml full independence to Burma; Malaya was in the grip of a costly guerilla
kar ; and local politicians elsewhere were making significant inroads into

(Altrincham, J "Palestine: Confusion, Fear and Hope", PT, Sept 1946,
PP 313-22; l Caroe, 1 "Palestine in Asia", RT, June 1948, pp 643-48.

(Altrincham,] "The Empire and the Middle East", RT, Dec 1945,

PP 26-34.

(Barbour, 1 "Resigning the Mandate", RT, Dec 1947, pp 448-54.

' (Caroe,] "Palestine in Asia", RT, June 1948, pp 643-48.

(Barbour,] "Resigning the Mandate", RT, Dec 1947, pp

A

448-54.

393

British pc wer ‘ The B “ pire ’ sure *y. "-as in terminal decline.

This was not how it appeared to the Found Tablers. The latter had
loig regarded Britain's Aslan colonies, and especially India, as being in a
cuss apart from those in Africa and the Caribbean. All were in the sane
constitutional "precession", but "great distances separate the van from the
rear".' There was little reason to expect an immediate "knock-on* effect.
Indeed, Britain's Asian decolonisation was cited as a warning against the
too-hasty concession of political structures which could then be turned
against British rule. 2

Far from being characterised by defeatism, the Round Tablers'
attitude to empire in Africa and the Caribbean underwent a revival during
and inaediately after the war. 3 In this they were led by Lord Hailey,
whose African Survey had rapidly become a "bible" in Colonial Office
circles. 4 John Cell has pointed out that Hailey's ascendancy at the
Colonial Office was relatively short-lived. 5 His influence over the Found
Table was nore lasting. He wrote at least one Round Table article himself,
and arranged authors for others. Differences of emphasis opened up in the
late 1940s, especially between Hailey and Curtis, but on the whole the

* tHailey.l "The Future of the Colonies - , RT, Dec 1942, p 9.

See. eg, Hailey's speech in Hansard (Lords), 5th Series, Vol CXXX1V

<20 Dec 1944). cols 465-71.

As was the case in Britain generally: see J A Gallagher, The

Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire (Cambridge, 1982).

* A H X Kirk-Greene, Introduction to Hailey. Native Administration and

Political Development in British Tropical Africa (Liechtenstein.

1979), p vili>

1 » Cell, Hailey (Cambridge, 1992), p 295.

j, t ur acknowledged Halley’s authority on colonial questions.* Xalcolm,
g^nd a*d Grigg appear to have held views very similar to Hailey's. The
gpjod Table magazine was certainly consistent in putting forward such
fit**-

Hailey himself stressed that his colonial philosophy was not an
attack on British policy, but an extrapolation of it. He was "surprised to
dUcorer" the strength of popular feeling "that there is something
inlerently wrong - if not indeed discreditable - in the possession of
Colonioe" . 2 He deplored the tendency "to overlook much that has been
aclievod", and he frequently highlighted tho liberal-humanitarian
cottinuities in British colonial thinking. 3

Ac Roger Louis wrote, Hailey was "a godsend for the defence of the
British Empire": an "Englishman who spoke to Americans with greatest
authority and persuasiveness". 11 A large part of the reason was that he
spoke in the right language: partnership, progress to self-governnent ,
wolfare and development. Hailey emphasised the latter in particular: the
aoed ior a "for more effective intervention on our part to promote
1 colonial] development" . e

The new emphasis which Hailey and the Round Table placed on colonial

See, eg, Curtis to Korrah, 17 June 1949, Brand Papers, box 171.

f Hailey, J "Future of the Colonies", RT, Dec 1942, pp 8-16. The Round
Table's solution was a massive increase in Imperial "education", from
primary school upwards, as outlined la three articles by F B Kalin
entitled "Education In Empire": RT, Sept 1942, June 1943 and Dec
1944.

Halley, Britain and her Dependencies (London, 1943 >, p 8.
v * Louis, Imperialism at Bay (Oxford, 1977), pp 12, 10.

1 Hailey, ] , "Future of the Colonies", RT, Dec 1942, p 12.

^elop-at was an undoubted advance. (It was also of potentially great

vantage t0 Britain itself, by facilitating the supply of dollar-free

products; but this was a point which the Round Table was keen to

play down. 1 ) There was a corollary, however: "that political advance will

t#an illusion, and aay be a danger, unless it rests on a firmer foundation

0 f economic and social achievement" . In e ff cc t, Hailey had identified a

obstacle to colonial self-government: economic backwardness. Especialy

ms this the case as financial self-cuff iciency was deemed to be an

indispensable condition of sel f-governmont . *

Another aspect of Hailey's philosophy which deserves emphasis is his

opposition to the idea of international ieing the supervision, and

especially the administration, of the colonics. This was an issue on which

a lunber of Round Tablers felt strongly, as they had done in similar

circumstances at the end of the First Vorld Var. " Again, the main danger

was believed to cone fron America. The new emphasis on colonial

derelopacnt in British policy was thought to provide a convincing argument

ag«inst such a possibility. Indeed, the 1940 Welfare and Development Act

“had for the first time envisaged the Colonies as an
Integral part of the Commonwealth; and the guiding
principle of policy was now to be found in our
determination to equip them to take their part as
nenbers of that society of free and advanced
peoples" . &

' "A Hundred Millions for the Colonies", RT, Sept 1947, pp 356-61.

Hailey, Vorld Thought on the Colonial Question (Johannesburg, 1946),

P 8.

"Self-government is not self-government If someone else pays all the
bills": [GH Bunn, 1 "Federation in the British Caribbean", RT, June

19W . PP 234-39.

* eg, Malcolm to Macadam, 20 May 1942, RT Papers c 862, fol 54.

5 'Tbe International Interest in Colonies", RT, Dec 1944, pp 24-30.

1 1 Sound Table was satisfied that the trusteeship scheme eventually
by the United Hat ions would prove no more than a minor
lscon70 tien c e to British colonial adninistration. »

Oc the central question of colonial political development, Hailey and
Round Table deserve credit for the pressure they applied for an
generation Q f the process of indigenising colonial administrative
services. 2 Here again, however, there was a corollary: that the
ia&ufiicioat extent of such indigenisation was an obstacle to
constitutional advance. 3 The Round Tablers also envisaged a protracted
period of const! tut ion- making, grouping colonies into regional federations,
before some important aspects of self-government could be transferred.* 1
Hailey further muddied the waters of colonial political developnent
by casting doubt upon the appropriateness of the Westminster model in non-
European (not just settler and "plural") societies. This was the main
issue on which he and Curtis clashed. As Curtis wrote, "1 rather feel that
vlen (Hailey) talks of sel f- government for tropical Africa he means
coajthinj rather different from what I mean* . * Hailey's ambivalence
toknrds the Westminster nodel was closely tied up with his fear of
?reMture political concessions: "it would be a misfortune if . . . the
present few abdicated in favour of another group of very few less likely

1 'The Trusteeship System”, RT , March 1946, pp 127-32.

tSir C Jeffries, ) "A Service In Transition", RT, Sept 1946,

PP 356-58.

ifcisi; Hailey, "?ost-Var Changes in Africa*, Journal of the Royal
Society of Arts, vol Cl II (1955), pp 579-90.

fciley, Vorld Thought on the Colonial Question (Johannesburg, 1946).

S Cu m S to Xaj L Hastings, 9 April 1947, Hailey Papers, Fhcdes House,
^ Brit Bmp s343.

Wes to advance the interests of the

tun

tho»se

nany".' Instead, HaiLey

new life into "indirect rule" as the basis for a nore complex and
tjarefore nore protracted constitutional experiment. * On this point the
jeuod Table followed his lead rather than Curtis's, suggesting in 1949
•tint the pace of political development in Vest Africa is altogether too
fast for stability or real democratic progress". 3

Vhilo Britain's colonial rule suffored a number of setbacks during
and imaediately after the Second World Var, the Round Tablcrs clearly did
not regard those setbacks as indicating a process over which Britain had
lost control. In Asia Britain still retained a foothold. In Africa and
the Caribbean the colonial Empire had weathered the storm relatively well,
it the very least, there was still roon for manoeuvre.

Crawn ard Citizenship

The Statute of Westminster left certain elements of Commonwealth
cosstitutioaal unity intact: namely, comoon allegiance to the Crown and
(pirtly as a consequence) an underlying common citizenship. 3oth came
uaicr attack in the late 194Cs: the first as a result of India's desire for
* republican constitution, the second as a result of legislation introduced
b 7 Britain and the "white" Dominions.

Despite "a certain formal 11 logic" in the local privileges and
Rations pertaining to British subjecthcod, the Round Table believed

Hailey, Britain and her Dependencies (London, 1943), p 44.

Hailey, Fative Administration (Liechtenstein, 1979 edn), pass ion- •

3 l ^rd Kilverton, ] "Indirect Rule in West Africa", RT, torch 1949,

PP 125-30.

tl* s y steB " had ’ aEd has ’ « reat advantages".

"It enabl ®d citizens of different parts of the
n^Zf th ^ intermarry without problems of looing
andwnrf^f ■ H festered the growth

and work of unofficial all -Commonwealth association
.... it made possible official and military
elaboration. It opened the door of opportunity in
the public services of the United Kingdom - civil,
diplomatic, colonial, military - and in the
professions, too ... . It was of groat importance in
the working of the diplomatic and consular system
abroad. - 1

Canada first called into question the continuing existence of this system,
by its legislation defining Canadian citizenship, passed in 1946. But it
ws Britain which delivered a -fatal injury- to the system, by its passage
of the 3ritish Rationality Act in 1948.' Because of the hurried mannor in
which the British government introduced this legislation the Round Table
cojld do no more than protest at a fait acconpli . Nevertheless, it was
difficult not to draw the conclusion that in the eyes of British
politicians “the effectiveness of the British Commonwealth as a corporate
association ... is not so supreme an interest". *

The debate on the position of the Crown raised equally fundamental
issues, although in this caso the arguments for retaining the existing
Sjstei had to bo weighed against the more serious consequences of

^flexibility.

The speed of Britain's withdrawal from India had the one advantage
it allowed the creation of succescor states by an amendment of the
let, rather than by waiting for new constitutions to be agreed,
^iporarily at least, India and Pakistan accepted Dominion status within
tk * ^“asnvealth. Their right to decide whether or not to continue this

1

2

i Hodson, 1 -The British Subject", RT, June 1948, pp 655-63.
[ *orrah,l "Hall a Conference", RT, Sept 1943, pp 731-35.

399

rh.fmmr'* «» s not disputed.’

irr* n o”

India' 6 desire for a republican form of government seemed to many
observers to provide an insurmountable obstacle to Conmonwealth membership,
j^rd iltriacham declared himself unequivocally in favour of “consolidating
ogr system in its present form", rather than "exploring the terra Incognita
0 f a Cro-nlecs Commonwealth- . 2 Hodson later recalled that this was also
the view of sone othor -older members-.* It was not the view of the
younger menbers, nor of the Pound Table magazine. Indeed, the Bound Table
ws keen to point out the enormous advantages of Indian membership of the
Conctwealth - both to India itself and to the other menbers. - In an
influential article published in International Affairs, Hansergb argued
liat Eire's status after 1937 provided a precedent for Indio. 6 Similarly,
Bodsot eaphasised the “pragmatic" nature of the Comnonweal th, and he
suggested that in some circumstances “the existing recognised symbolism may
. . . actually work against the cohesion of the Comnonweal th" .*

The acceptance of republican India's continued nenbership of the
ConoLwealth, by the "practical, indeed traditional, resource of saying in

1 IGA Johnson,) "India: Division of the Indian Enplre", FT, Sept 1947,
pp 370-77.

2 (Altrincham,) "Episodes of the Xonth", national Review, Vol CXXX1I
<Jan 1949), pp 3-7.

3 Hodscn, "The Round Table, 1910-1981", RT, Oct 1981, p 327. It is
likely that Hodson was here referring to Xalcoln and Brand.

* See, eg, [Geoffrey Tyson,) "India: An Enigmatic Future", BT, June
1948, pp 690-95.

5 *aasergh, "Implications of Eire's Relationship with the British
Coaacnwealth of nations", IA, Vol 24 (Jan 1946), pp 1-8.

6 I Hodson, 3 "The British Subject", RT, June 1948, p 856.

400

that ao crisis exists’, was welcomed by the Round Table.' JCansergh
ut#r observed that the -period of self-destructive rigidity on this issue"
^ been ended none too early; and that an earlier decision night have
MT8 d Buraa and Ireland for the Commonwealth. 2 Although this might have
t# 8 n in the minds of some nembers in 1949, Horrah provided a convincing
reason otherwise, at least in the case of Ireland: "for there the republic
baen set up for the sake of separation from the United Kingdom, rather
than separation endured for the sake of the republic". 3

The London Declaration made a special case for India; but it is
unlikely that the Round Tablers believed that such a distinction could he
Blntained. Hevertheless, the only real cause of worry at the time was
South Africa. The secretary of the South African group interpreted the
Eeclaration as giving Xalan the "opportunity of having one's cake and
eating it".* On the other hand, as Xorrah argued, "the achievement of a
South African republic outside the Commonweal th, following the model of
Ireland, has not been made easier"; the effect of the London Declaration

■ight therefore be "to split CXalan'sJ own party ". b

The link between monarchy and Commonwealth was by no means broken.
Iadeed Xorrah was keen to make the monarchy more of a Commonwealth, and
less of a purely British, institution, suggesting at various times a
F^lpatotic Court, a greater representation of Commonwealth citizens in the

1 t Xorrah, 1 "Crown Without Sceptre", RT, June 1949, pp 203-07.

Kaasergh, The Cozmont/ealtb Experience (London, 1982 edn).

V °1 2, p 160.

3 l Xorrah, ) "Crown VI thout Sceptre* , p 205.

( ^dd to Xorrah, 2 Xay 1949, CSA file,), RT <0> Papers.

5 I Xorrah, J "Crown Without Sceptre’, pp 205-06.

401

entourage, and a Commonwealth (iacludlag Indian) role in the
donation ceremonies.' Common allegiance clearly remained an important
between Britain aad the "old" Dominions. Even in those countrloc with
^poblica* constitutions, the Queen's role as Head of the Commonwealth
fg^ined a symbol of "the sense of belonging together", and one which could
jjglp to strengthen that sense. 2 nevertheless, contributors to subsequent
issues of the Ro ' jnd Table recognised fully the extent to which the decision
0 l 1949, la conjunction with the earlier decision to admit Asian member-
states, had transformed the nature of the Conmonwealtb. 3

1 See Korrah's series of articles "The Coronation and the
Comnonwealth* : PT, Sept 1952, Dec 1952, Sept 1Q53, Dec 1953.

2 [ Hodcon, 1 "Tho Future of the Commonwealth", PT, Sept 1956, p 221.

3 See, eg, I Sydney group,) "Tho Conuoonvoalth: an Australian View", PT,
Sept 1960, pp 351-53.

S»* *‘ ' ■

TABLE A BE T H E FQSTVar Qj ffl QSffiALlL 1Q4Q-66
■Certainly we have got to have much better management than we now
*ve of our public affairs, and a good deal of luck, to hold our place in
tie world* . 1 Brand's comnent of 1949 reflected the toll of a decade of
sttbacks to British power and prestige, and to the unity of the
g^>ire /Commonwealth. fet there was still room for manoeuvre, and it was
still possible to think of Britain as a "world power*.' By the 1960s, this
ws to longer so. Sometimes reluctantly, sometimes with an unseemly haste,
successive British governments wound up Britain's extra-European
ccDitnents, and adjusted her diplomacy to the realities of her position,
lie process was uneven, and (even at a very late stage) amenable to
teiporary reversal; but the underlying trend was all one way.

•Iiperialisn" was dead, and its erstwhile practitioners soiaetines
uiconfortably " prehistoric" . s

How were the Round Tablers to respond to this trend? Clearly there
was a range of responses in Britain as a whole, from "diehardism" through a
graceful pragmatism to "anti- Imperial ism" . There were expressions of
r, gret from some of the older Round Tablers; criticisms, also, of the
“Mgecent of Britain's decline. Nevertheless, the general attitude of the
fcot was realistic and forward-looking. The Round Table owed its very
e *istence to the apprehension that British power was a limited and
lining commodity; but also to the belief that a relationship based on
Partnership was more valuable than one based on dependence. Necessarily,

2

Brand to J X A Ilott, 16 Dec 1949, Brand Papers, box 171.
fcfloy to Moriah, 5 March 1964, RT Papers c 868. fol 130.

^,’gMOd Tablers re-examined tie parameters within which such a
^aerslip « ulcl be >»<»« to worn. Some of the older and <as now appeared)
lees realistic aspirations were laid to one side. The igni s fatuus of a

j^nwealth ■world-state’ was, at last, decisively rejected’; even the
jotlon of a comaon defence and foreign policy was discarded. Instead, the
l0 uid "a tie concentrated on the retention and development of those aspects
0 f CoiscmreaUk co-operation which were likely to survive: "the exploration
»b 4 cultivation of relationships which are the more numerous and the more
stable because of their very modesty".*

Sone conmentators (especially in Britain) doubted whether the progeny
of Eaplre, the Commonwealth, had any relevance in the modern world. This

*as not a view which conmended itself to the Moot. Indeed, to all the

jostwar Found Tablers the Commonwealth was a connection whose importance
Ito its nembers, and to the world) was far greater than that of a mere

'eipty shell. • 51 Footed in history, intimately connected with 'British"
political ideals, yet now extended to encompass a diversity of national
cultures and traditions, the Commonwealth was still capable of enriching
tie li?es of its nenber states in a way unique amongst international
>rg«ni sat ions.

th»» Rwad Table KagAZlna.

Corti

Sand Altrincham appear

to have been unable to attend many meetings in

1

2

3

Except by Curtis, who continued to preach Western, Atlantic and
Commonwealth federation until his death.

'Empire to Commonwealth and Beyond", PT, Nov 1070, p 380.

tJohn Holmes, 3 "Can the Commonwealth Survive?", RT, Dec 1963, p 12.

yearly 19506. <Botfc died in 1955. > On the other band, Xalcolm was a
fr€ quent attender until his death (also in 1955), as were Brand until 1963
and Horsfall until 1965. Hailey was still active until at least 1964, and
Brcoke until 1966. Hacadan, Koud, Korrah and Hansergh continued to
participate in Hoot activities until the 1970s, Caroe and Harris until the
early 1930s. At the time of writing, Hodson remains an active nenber of
t le Moot - sixty-four years after first joining it.

The Hoot in the 1950s thus consisted of a small number of
•aboriginal" members, a larger number of interwar and wartime recruits, and
the ttree oenbers recruited in the late 1940s. • Only one member was added
in the 1950s, the banker Sir Oliver (Lord' Franks. He joined the Hoot in
1951, but appears not to have taken any active part after 1959. Sir Keith
3ancock was invited to re-join in 1950, but apparently decided against
doing so.

Formal meetings of the Hoot took place less frequently after the
Second World War than before: with the exception of special meetings, there
*ere on average eight a year in the 1950s, compared to twelve or more
before 1939. nevertheless, these were well attended, and much business
spears to have been conducted by informal personal contact and
correspondence. It was still possible to say "that the Moot is not a
soaaittee, but rather a closely knit working group". 2

The primary responsibility for what was published in the Round Table
*^2iae was, of course, the editor's. The Hoot continued to play an
‘■Want role, however: discussing the choice of subjects, suggesting

Coupland appears not to have attended any meetings after the war;
Barlow's membership lapsed in 1951.

krlcw to Korrah, 20 July 1951 (Hoot file,) R? <0) Papers.

2

405

P** 0 ”' lD 3gree1 ^ ^ l>ne to be t. ta „ on controversial

"**“■ ' DIfferenCeS ° f ° Plni °" — Stable, but consensus -as still
‘° r the “** part Successf “ily. ■ 1 The most notable feature of the
earller tOUad ftW * - that ’ u, l* s * otherwise stated, articles -ere
fished as representing the corporate view of the Hoot - was, to a large
ert eit, retained. This was one reason why the anonymity of articles was
preserved,- another was that this practice M de it easier to obtain -really
informed writing from the fountain-head", a

individual me libers of the loot continued to provide a significant
(although significantly diminished! proportion of -policy- articles, scan

325 ° f tl,0Se 1<lenUfIed betW **“ »*« 1966. 3 Xorrah himself wrote for

virtually every issue before 1965. Hodson contributed at least 19 articles
between 1945 and 1966, and Caroe wrote at least ,9 between ,948 and 1900
(anl a substantial number of signed ones thereafter!. Horsfall and Brand
contributed articles on a wide variety of subjects. Altrincham wrote on
the Kiddle East, JCalcolm on Central Africa, Xaud on Southern Africa.

Srcote covered British politics between 1949 and 1961. Xansergh wrote

occasionally on Commonwealth relations. Karris and Franks on financial and
•cododIc questions.

*ost of the articles published in the first part of the Round Table
Ve,e n ° W commissioned from individuals outside the Moot. Despite a

K V Hodson to author. 2 Sept 1QQ4.

fW 6 t0 H K <Bunn y ) H * ad > nd CSept 1957] (Dornant file, > ST <Q)

«ni*ihe r fi£"“ ”* ^ to thli practice

Appendix D, " Round Tablo Articles, by Author".

406

jvely low rate of remuneration’, the Round Table attracted many able
jB d vell'inf° r:Ded writers. To the extent that the Moot can be said to have
a preference for a particular type of writer, that preference was still
for officials and administrators (either current or forner). Anongst the
uny who wrote for the magazine in the 1950s were Lords Blrdwcod, Gladwyn,
Iil?erton and Twining, Sir Evelyn Baring, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Malcolm
jacdonald and Romney Sedgwick. Chatham House was undoubtedly an important
source of contacts: Macadam was Director-General until 2955, and Korrab
llB=elf was "at the hub of things" there. 2

Politicians constituted a rather smaller group of Round Table
contributors. Lord Alport, Joe Griroond and the Labour peer Lord iistowel
*ere among the few invited to write in the 1950s. Academics and
Journalists were better represented: amongst the former Elizabeth Munro,

Kax Beloff and Isaac Deutscher, amongst the latter Edward Hodgkin, D K
Iclacfclan and Oliver Voods. All Souls was still an important connection:
Geoffrey Hudson, J E S Fawcett and Professor Hanbury were amongst those who
*rote for what Morrah called "the College quarterly organ". 3

The responsibility for providing quarterly "chronicles" was still in
fie hands of the local Round Table groups in the "old" Dominions. (The
group in Newfoundland contributed articles in March and December 1943.)
ikder the unwritten "constitution of the Round Table", these groups enjoyed
a sort of 'dominion status'", which Morrah interpreted as the right to

1 "Mildly out of line" with payments even in "the most genteel, high-
minded, prestigious American market": F V Collins to Morrah, 17 Oct
1963 <US File,) RT <0> Papers.

Macadam to Mrs Pat Curtis, 28 Jan 1960, RT Papers c 867, fol 59.

Morrah to Prof E E Evans-Pri tchard, 27 June 1949 (Dormant file,)

RT <0> Papers.

k

fecide editorial policy on local issues.' Articles which did not represent
tte consensus view of these groups, or which were commissioned directly by
London, were published with an editorial disclaimer.

glsewhere, the Round Table *s arrangements were with individual
alters. Ireland and the United States presented few problems. From the
Corner, Horgan continued to send "rather provocative" articles* until his
death in 1967. John E Sayers of The Belfast Telegraph <" about the only
medium here which is trying to give a lead in 'healing the history and
binding the wounds* of this divided community" 5 ) contributed a regular
section on Northern Irish aflairs after 194-8. In America, Canham arranged
forVillian Stringer (also of the Christian Science Monitor) to succeed him
iron torch 1956. 4 The Moot found it more difficult to obtain dispassionate
authors for the UK article. A succession of writers was employed between
the late 1940s and early 1960s: Colin Coote, S V Mason and G D Vood of The
hoes, Peter Utley (Xorrah's son-in-law), and the Conservative MPs Julian
laery, Iain Xacleod, Sir Edward Boyle, Peter Kirk and Thomas Ireaonger.
Surprisingly, it was the journalists rather than the politicians who were
found to be nost partisan.

After 1947, the Found Table published regular "chronicles" from both
•*dia and Pakistan. At first, these were still written by British
•tpatrlates: Geoffrey Tyson, G A Johnson and Neil Kclnnes (all professional

Korrah to C V * Gell, 12 Nov 1953 (SA file,) RT (0) Papers.

Horrah to Sir David Lindsay Keir, 19 Jan 1948 (UK file,) RT (O)

Papers.

Sayers to Morrah, 12 Nov 1964 (1964-65 file,) RT (0) Papers.

his own request, Stringer alternated with Frederic V Collins (a
freelance Journalist) from June 1961.

journa liot6> in Jndia, and F X lanes aad Peter Easor (both ex-TCS, now
j^glae&sncc) in Pakistan. Not until 1954 was the responsibility for these
articles transferred to indigenous journalists. N Majurader provided
articles froa Indio until 1960, Eric da Costa thereafter. Osman Siddiqul
sent articles from Pakistan until 1966. At first Morrah found these
articles "a good deal more tendentious than we have been accustomed to*;
but 'that I think we must expect if we decide to go on eaplojing aboriginal

pens' . '

The Found Table's coverage of the dependent Empire (other than India)
had been very patchy before 1939. Morrah saw it as one of the tasks of his
editorship to rectify this situation. 2 "Policy" articles on Vest Africa,
the Vest Indies, Ceylon, Malaya, etc, constituted a signif icantly increased
proportion of the Found Table after 1945; nevertheless, regular
'chronicles" were ruled out because of considerations of space. An
exception was made for Central and (briefly) East Africa. From 1954, the
Jtound Table published six-monthly articles by Garfield Todd,

DTK Villiams and John Spicer on Central Africa, and by Anthony Low on
East Africa. Here the Moot was less inclined to enploy "aboriginal pens".

Vhen the Round Table was first published in 1910, it was a virtually
unique source of information on different aspects of Enpire politics.

Af ter 1945 this was no longer the case. There were now several other
iwrnals specialising in Commonwealth affairs (such as The Commonwealth and
£*pi re Review, or London University's Colonial Review) as well as a host of
academic journals on related subjects. Moreover, newspapers, radio and
Revision were now able to provide a far broader coverage of international

1 Morrah to Hodson, 29 Nov 1954 (India file,) RT (0) Papers.

' Morrah to Brand, 2 April 1948, Brand Papers, box 171.

409

**• “““ n0 ” 8 ° f “* pr ° ble “ t in a publication which, as soon as

* ,PPear8d ' “ tW ° t0 three “”«* ^ind events-. ■ In 1955 Rodson.

MS “ lde eX?9r,en ° e the question whether it „ 8S

^ihle for a quarterly to survive-, nevertheless, the Root was

understandably reluctant to close the Pound Table : -the genera, fee, log

ms provided the magazine dealt with a sufficient number of

fundaments, iosuea of long-term Interest there was still an Important rv,e
fcr the journal to fill".*

Hodoon had a point, however. The Pound Table's paid circulation,

after reviving briefly f n the late ,940s. decllned frM ^ ^

H36 in I960. 3 <The Round Table 's ,

S dCtual readership was much higher, of

cron: many subscribers were libraries, banks and companies with an

interest in foreign affairs, governs departments, officers' messes and

tie like., The financial Indications were disturbing. 8y , 960 the Pound

Me was making a trading loss of *239, pa. rising to 14388 , n ms .

Me,'s *1000 pa came to an end in 1964. The Round Table's investments
•°»had to be sold off at an alarming rate. By 1966 the Round Table was
‘ending for an unprecedented financial crisis.*

E Kidd t0 Kacadaa - 14 Jan 1959 <SA 3T <o> Paper*.

XI cutes of RT neeting, 14 Dec 1955, RT f0> P apors .

Sports file*) R? 5 ?;, a p <l Re P° rt R of the Cou "-' il for I960 (genual

f the fi ^; > cfo T se < ? * Z ZZZZ

“ an Canada, Australia and Sooth Africa combined, 6 COpleS

Annual Reports for 1960 and 1965. (The 1965 figure include .

" Ur * as assistant editor, as .ell as Kbrrah* s^s edUor f *

n?:,*Tr^r st “ nfcs and Finaac,ai position " ( 19651

..ggggacf. and foreign Policy

The last Round Table article to suggest a concerted defence policy
for the Commonwealth was published in December 1950.’ Even before then,
boNevor, the Moot had distanced itself from such ideas. Responding to
jeozies' call for a Commonwealth committee on the lines of the CID, Xorrah
observed that "no special apparatus for achieving a united Commonwealth

policy either existed or was demanded by member Governments". Nor was it
likely that there was a need.- Local and specific collaboration was still
possible, as when China threatened Indio, or Indonesia menaced Malaysia.

But the idea of a Commonwealth defence system was now patently
anachronistic.

The early Round Tabiers had favoured Commonweal th integration partly
In order to provide a framework for Britain's own defence. Now Britain
clearly derived the bulk of this support from elsewhere. The American
alliance was believed to be vital for British security. So, too, was an
alliance with other nations In western Europe. The Dominions no longer
looked primarily to Britain to supplement their own defence. In the case
of Canada, this was implicit in the Ogdensburg agreements of 1940. In the
case of the Pacific Dominions, the notion of a British-led defence system
survived a little longer 3 , but finally succumbed under the impact of Mao
Ise-lung and the Korean war. The AffZUS treaty of 1952 passed almost
without comment in the Round Table.

One Canadian contributor to the Round Table asserted that "the common

t Anthony Head,) "Manning the Defences", RT, Dec 1950, pp 44-51.

fMorrah,) "The United Nations in Action", RT, Sept 1950, pp 299-303.

See, eg, [Sawer,] "Australia: A Debate on Foreign Policy", RT, Sept
1943. pp 808-13.

3

jrltisb assumption’

was

that Canada and Australia have been seduced

« a

tieir all«S iance b y the Americans". 1 This was not the case with the London
found Tablers, who were only too conscious that the "old" Dominions, like
Britain itself, were merely asserting their own national interests in a
*orld profoundly different to that which existed before 1939. In the new
security systems created after 1945 Comnonwealth aembership was "simply
irrelevant" . 2 "Ve still seek to preser ve world peace by concentrations of
jnchallengeable force", Morrah observed in 1960; ’but the Comnonwealth is
not one of them" . 3

If Britain and the old Doninions afforded striking evidence of the
redundancy of "Commonwealth unity in defence and foreign policy", the new
DoHnions provided conclusive proof. Nehru's policy of non-alignment
(subsequently followed by Ceylon, Ghana and other Afro-Asian member-states)
ws the negation of the old conception of Commonwealth unity. The Round
Table's Indian correspondent was often savage in his attacks on Nehru's
policy. 0 The Moot was far more circumspect. Hodson nerely suggested that,
by keeping India in the Comnonwealth, Nehru tacitly admitted "that complete
Mtiosal independence is an illusion". * On the whole, Hodson recalled,

"there was no feeling that 'he who is not for us is against us'. India's
ton-alignment was regretted but her reasons were well understood" . e

1 t Holmes,! "Can the Commonwealth Survive?", RT, Dec 1963, p 14.

2 (Sydney group,! "The Commonwealth: An Australian View", RT, 9.60,
p 355.

( Xorrah , J "The Commonwealth: A United Kingdom View, ibid, p 335.

See, eg, f Naj under, ! "The Foreign Policy of Mr Nehru", RT, Sept 1954,
PP 363-68.

(Hodson,! "The Future of the Commonwealth", RT, June 1956, p 220.
Hodson to author, 2 Sept 1994.

412

The Commonwealth had thus "quite ceased to be a unit of power in the

that Curtis postulated". 1 But if Curtis's vision was no longer
^levant, other ideas of the early Round Ta biers still were. In
particular, Kerr's "larger idea" seemed more realistic now than when it was
first enunciated. As Brand put it in 1946, "the problem of the British
^^awcalth " was "more or less merged . . . in the problem of the
Bngl i sh-speak i ag nations". 2

In his inaugural lecture as Smuts Professor at Cambridge, Xansergh
suggested that if "the United States is not within, equally it is not
altogether without the contemporary Commonwealth".'' Most overseas writers
for the Rcund Table also assumed that the Commonwealth as a whole was
intimately linked to the United States, as a result of Britain's "special
relationship". The Canadian and Australian contributors to the September
1960 Ruuad Table agreed that their Commonwealth links enhanced their
countries' ability to "exert the proper suasion on American leadership". 4
Even the Indian contributor gave the Geneva Conference of 1954 as an
eiuple of the fact that, as a result of her links with 3ritaln, India
'cojld not be ignored by the United States".* The American contributor,
for his part, saw the Commonwealth as "a bridge to the whole uncommitted
•orld". ®

1 CKorrah,] "The Commonwealth: A UK View", RT, Sept 1960, p 335.

2 Brand to Lippraann, 30 Dec 1946, 3rand Papers, box 171.

3 Xansergh, The .Tame and Nature of the Convconwealth (Cambridge, 1954),
p 28.

' t Brady, ] "The Conmonwealth: A Canadian View", RT, Sept 1960, p 343;
c * (Sydney group,] "An Australian View", iiid, p 350.

(Kh j under, 3 "An Indian View", ibid, p 377.

(Canhaa, ] "A View from the United States", ibid, p 390.

k

I

413

To what extent, therefore, did the Round Tablers see the "special

relationship" as a means of extending (or, at least, prolonging) Britain's

g lcbal influence? Vere they, like Macmillan, tempted to see Britain's role
j 8 playi^S Greece to America's Roire? The answers are by no means
straightforward. Certainly, the most common image of America was still
tkat of a "young" nation: naive, but teachable. Britain, for her part, was
•full of garnered knowledge", even if " overcome for a while with
*eariacss". ’ But the Round Tablers were seldom tempted to over-estimate

Britain's purchase on American policy, or to under-estimate the
countervailing influences operating in Washington. * As one Canadian
contributor wrote, America's policy was neither "Invariably wise", nor
jlwya responsive to the interests of her coalition partner*.'

The possibilities but also the limitations of the Anglo-American
•special relationship" were perhaps best illustrated in the Middle East.

In the early 1950s, this was one area where Britain could still clalD to
exercise a predominant Imperial power. The "cold war" reinforced the
Inclination to "hang on", in order to counter Soviet expansion and to
retain a leverage on American policy. Both considerations "forced the
policy nakers . . . into much less flexible postures than they would have
liked*. **

On Egypt the Moot appears to have been divided. The Round Table
^ried contradictory articles: one by Julian Amery arguing for the

* Caroe, The Veils of Power (London, 1951), p xviii.

See here Hodson, The Atlantic Future. Problems in Anglo-American
Relations (London, 1963).

1 Brady, 3 "A Canadian View", RT, Sept 1960, p 343.

John Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation (London, 1988), p 145.

414

tion of Britain's presence, others by Sir Frederick Leith-Rccs
Recounting the strategic importance of the Canal and describing Britain's
Y » ition as "untenable". 1 But on the general question of Britain's
jtrotegic interests in the Middle Bast there appears to have been litle
dieegraonent. Curtis adopted what Brand called "a tough imperialist
attitude" after visiting Cyprus: indeed, he thought that the reasons for
lolding on to Cyprus were "now twice as strong as when Disraeli bought the
island". 3 Carco also emphasised the strategic significance of the Kiddle
last, although he concentrated on the oilfields of the Persian Gulf rather
than on Egypt or Cyprus.

Vith Curtis's encouragement, Caroe worked up a Round Table article of

larch 1949 into a took, The Veils of Power, published In 1951. ^ This urged

that "aonething ... be put in the place of British power as exercised

iron India". His specific solution was for a "Northern Screen" extending

Iron Pakistan to Turkey, supplied and guaranteed by the Commonweal th and

the Atlantic Powers.'* After the publication of his book Caroe

"went on a tour of the U. S. for the 3ritish Foreign
Office . . . and had talks with State Department
officials and others on these lines .... 1 have

more than once ventured to flatter myself that
J F Dulles’ phrase 'the Northern Tier' and his
association of the U. S. with the 'Baghdad' countries

lAnery,] "The Future of the Suez Canal Zone", RT, June 1953,
pp 220-27; [ Lei th-Ross, I "The Egyptian Imbroglio", RT, March 1952,

PP 113-25; tiigjn, I "Cross- Purposes in Egypt", RT, June 1954,

PP 223-35.

Brand to Macadam, 31 Jan 1952, Brand Papers, box 171; [Curtis, 3
'Review of the Survival of Political Man by Errol E Harris", nd [May
19523 , RT Papers c 865, fols 154-57.

Caroe' s article was "The Persian Gulf: A Romance", pp 131-37; for
Curtis, see Curtis to Sir Vm Haley, 27 Oct 1952, RT Papers c 365,
fol 202 .

Caroe, The Veils of Power (London, 1951), pp 135 and passim .

415

in Asia were influenced by the thinking in Veils of
Power* . '

j^rtheless Caroe's influence was both limited and short-lived. His
itslstence that "the prerequisite of any effective policy* was an Anglo-
jaerican policy on Palestine "on lines which must commend themselves to
isiatic opinion " 2 fell on deaf ears. By the late 1950s American policy in
the Kiddle East was "in an awful mess". The new emphasis on "an American
1 . 8 . policy 'free of entanglements'" Caroe found "both naive and
disconcerting " . 3

Caroe's experience thus underlined what was already known in the
abstract: that America could not be relied on merely to underwrite British
jolicies. The most striking illustration of this was, of course, the Suez
crisis, when the United States showed an "apparently uncritical support for
Jjssar and his ambitions"' 1 , and Britain and France were forced to beat an
Ijnoaiaious retreat.

Coranvealth Relations

The Suez crisis has rightly been seen as a pivotal episode in postwar
Mtish policy. It raised fundamental questions concerning Britain's
opacity to act as an independent power, the nature of the Anglo-American
•elationship, the rSle of the United Fat ions, and the extent of Britain's
«*aitnent to the Commonweal th. The crisis divided the Moot, with the

1 Quoted in C Hitchens, Blood, Class and Nostalgia (London, 1990),

PP 209-90.

Caroe, The Veils of Power (London, 1951), p 155.

Caroe to Horrah, 19 Jan 1950 (Dormant file,) RT ( 0 ) Papers.

' ( 8 ir Geoffrey Furlonge,! "The Middle East Imbroglio", RT, June 1963,

P 240.

A

'V n V

p^gult that "we had to told three successive dinners . . . before we could
•oougt agreement ... to make a leading article".’ The latter took
the patriotic view that the intervention was Justified even if it was
tangled; tut it relied heavily on the government's claim that the aim was
t0 separate the Israeli and Egyptian armies. 2

India was especially critical of Britain's action - prompting some
aeibers of the Moot to question the value of her continuing Commonwealth
■erierstip. 3 Canada was also strongly critical, and not Just because of

the "/ery inadequate 'public relations' job" which the secretary of the
Toronto group blaned. 4

In its Commonwealth context, the Suez crisis raised an additional
question: why it was that Britain failed to consult its partners. As
latsergh later emphasised, this failure "added to the sense of outrage'. *
Yritiag for the Round Table, Hodson suggested that Britain's partners might
have read the signs. But on the whole he thought that Britain's failure to
consult them - before acting "outside previously declared policies, In a

way that intimately concerned their interests, and might have provoked war'
" a lamentable example of a Commonwealth member "unwilling to fulfil the
responsibilities of 'belonging together'".-- Harris saw the episode as "a

1

2

3

4

5

«

Xorrah to J V Collins, 6 March 1957 (VZ file, > RT (0) Papers.

fMorrah.l 'After the Cease-Fire", RT, Dec 1956, pp 3-7.

Caroe to Morrah, 28 JTov 1956 <ed ctee file,) RT (0) Papers. Indians
thoaeelves (including Rajagopalachari > put the same question.

Macdonaeil to Xorrab, 23 Jan 1957 (Toronto file,) RT (0> Papers.

Mansergh, The CozuronHeal Lh Experience (London, 1982 edn>, Vol 2,

P 171.

tHodson, ] "The Commonwealth and the Crisis', RT, March 1957,

PP 1L4-20.

417

Ration of all that the Round Table stood for, not necessarily because the
policy of Invading Egypt was wrong, but because the action was taken
bilaterally '. 1

Vhat is perhaps most surprising Is the strength of this emphasis on
consultation. The Commonwealth was no longer "a unit of power"; only some
of Its lumbers shared a conroon foreign policy. Vhy, then, the need for
consultation? And yet the need was felt. Clearly, therefore, the
Co**ntwealth had a continuing function in the formulation of its members'
foreign policies, which the Round Tablers and - to judge by their reactions
to the Suez crisis - most of the member governments still thought to be
jifortant. But Suez inevitably had an inpact on this aspect of
^Bsocwealth relations. Before the crisis, it was still possible to talk
of Conoonwealth members "modifying our own several views by the process of
iiscussing them . . . under the Cotunonweal th shelter". 2 After, it was
possible only to speak of governments "knowlingl one another's Binds". 3

The Suez crisis had another effect, in Britain Itself, and especially
so the right of the Conservative Party: which was to embolden those critics
of tho Commonwealth who, having always seen it as an instrument of British
policy, now derided It as a liability. In the late 1950s these critics

still relatively mute, but with the rapid broadening of the
^oonwealth they constituted, by the early 1960s, a vocal chorus. The
Pound Table characterised them as "the racists, the narrow regionalists and
''ogle-minded believers In national sovereignty". 1 * They were thought to

Harris to Kacadan, 22 Karch 1900 <Sydney file,) RT <0> Papers.
IHodson,] "The Future of the Commonwealth" , XT, June 1956, p 220.
tXorral,] "The Conmonweal th: A UK View", FT, Sept 1960, p 036.

‘ IT Raison,] "The New Round Table", RT, July 1900, p 214.

I

418

sentative of the Conservative party, and certainly a small
parity of the British people as a whole.’ But the Round Table was the
first to admit that they had a point. The Commonweal th was the outcome of
j-reelliont pragmatism"; it had to demonstrate its continuing value if it
*re to survive. "Is there anything which the Commonwealth does that
cannot as well be done without It? .... Has it still a meaning and is
it still worthwhile?" 2

In September 1960 the Round Table brought together answers to these
questions from various parts of the Commonwealth, and from the United
States. Host were realistic, unsentimental, yet also profoundly positive
about the new Commonwealth which (as most acknowledged) had come into
existence as a result of the decisions of 1947-49.

The Round Table' e> Indian correspondent observed that Indians had now
forgotten “the bitter memories, and remembered only the pleasant aspects,
cf their relations with Britain"; and that "the politically articulate
sections of the people“ were still "steeped In British ways of life and
thought". 3 Horrah expanded the point. British rule - like the Roman
Empire - had brought with it a "stock of possessions" which would continue
'to fortify the nations of the Commonwealth": in particular, the English
k&SJage and English common law. A Other writers cast their nets wider. A

Table editorial of 1966 asserted that the Commonwealth existed partly

IT Raison,] "Is the Commonwealth a Farce?", RT, June 1964, pp 215-21;

SC Leslie, "British Attitudes to the Commonwealth" , XT, July 1973,

PP 363-75.

IHodson,] "The Future of the Commonwealth", RT, June 1956, pp 218-19.

tXaJuader, 1 "The Commonwealth: An Indian View", RT, Sept I960,

PP 372, 376.

4 ( *>rrah,J "A UK View", Ibid , pp 339-40.

k

Ky

r to foster "liberal,
it# *»«ber-states.

i^crdB

119

constitutional and democratic Institutions"

In

"The political systems of these countries nust
increasingly adapt to the spirit and character of their
peoples. But it is important that they should retain
certain essential elements in the British tradition: the
independence of the Judiciary, the Integrity of the
public service, a high standard of business ethics and
the freedom of the Press."’

emphasis on the building-blocks of the "British" inheritance continued
,o lnforn a large part of subsequent Round Table discussion of the
•awning" of the Commonwealth.

The assumption that Britain had used its power In the past to promote
•British" political values was, at the very least, open to question. But
:ko aesunption was not really essential to the argument: the postwar

Comonwealth was, after all, a very different creature from the earlier

Sipire. A more serious criticism might be that the Round Tablers' views
wre a little fanciful in a Commonwealth which Included Ayoub Khan's

?«kiGtan or Fkrumah' s Ghana - let alone one which was soon to contain a
uar-j»j ority of dictatorships and one-party states. Indeed, the secretary
Jf the Sydney group wrote in 1955 that "some members have questioned
•lather any content remains in the Commonweal th idea when it Includes
Entries with the policy at present carried on by Ghana". * nevertheless,
; 1® revival of democratic values in the Commonwealth, in the 1980s and
,9o «i reflects well on the Sound Table's tenacity.

the Round Tablers' emphasis on a common bedrock of liberal and <as
s ®*>* them) "British" values was one answer to the question: what is the
lu ' lD 5 of the Commonwealth? But the Round Tablers also offered another

<T Raison,] "The Sew Round Table", RT, July 1968, p 212.
kcCallum to Harris, 27 July 1965 <1964-65 file,) RT (O) Papers.

perhaps BOre ln line with the realities of the contemporary
j^nwealth. This was that "it is ln the bridge concept that the principal
of the new Common wealth resides’. ’

the ’bridge concept’ applied at a non-governmental level:

facilitating those "inter-relations of a cultural, professional and private
*iad’ which Hodson described as "the grass-roots of the Common wealth,
little affected by the political mowing-machine". 1 2 * The "bridge concept"
also applied at an official level. If the Conmonwealth had lost its value
as a "unit of power’, by the sane token it had gained a valuable new role,

as one of the few associations which enabled representatives of countries
with very different policies to meet ’not to agree but to seek to
understand". 31 There was still nuch actual co-operation at an official
le7el, on such matters as finance, trade, education and research. The
Comonwealth also opened up many bilateral relationship;;. One weakness of
the Comonwealth which the New Zealand contributor identified in I960 was

that in most cases the strongest, ties were still with Britain. 4 But the
London contribution welcon»d the close ties between Canada and India as an
euaple of what could be achieved, and expressed a hope that in the future
'there will be a complete nexus, providing equally firm ties of each with
each".*

Tho most important application of the "bridge concept", in Xorrah's
’i«w, was one which was only made possible by the developnent of the "new"

1 t Korrah, J "A UK View", FT, Sept 1960, p 338.

^ [Hodson,! "The Future of the Commonwealth", FT, June 1956, p 220.

^ [Holmes,! "Can the Commonwealth Survive?", FT, Dec 1963, p 15.

* Uikman,] "A New Zealand View**, FT, Sept 1960, pp 362-63.

f Korrah,] "A UK View", ifcia, pp 337-38.

after

1947-49.

■The determining feature of the present Commonwealth,
and Its principal point of contrast with the
Commonwealth of the past, lc its multi-racial
character. It Is Important to look at this as a
positive foundation for the devlopment of the future
Commonwealth, and not as a dilution of Its more
concentrated Integrity when under white hegemony . H ’

1 few of

the

older Round Tablers found it difficult to look on the roulU-

rfl cial character of the Commonwealth as a 'positive foundation". Brand,

for iastance, rogardod the "old" Dominions as the only "leal part of the
Cowoawealth which still exists". 2 Jevertheless, by the early 1960s most

Sound Tablers were at least realistic and often emphatic*! ly positive about

the aulti-racial character of the Common wealth as a whole. (They were also

positive about the increasingly aulti-racial character of Britain. 9 > The

coctrast with a previous age was often striking. It would not have been
possible for Kerr or Curtis, for instauce, to have written that Vest

Indians or Africans or Indians "have also a good deal to give to their
fellow nembers of the Commonweal th" ; or that "their cultures have itches

•hich we are beginning to appreciate'.*

"It is a most difficult thing to Judge at what stage ... a colonial
F°*r is to consider it justifiable to hand over authority", Halley said in

I Nor rah, J ’A UK View*, RT, Sept 1960, p 336.

Brand to Hodson, 21 Aug 1962, Brand Papers, box 371.

See, for instance, the three articles published under the title
‘Britain and Her Inmigrants" in June [Sheila Fatterson) , September
I Alfred Shernanl and December 1965 [Sir George Sinclair!. Sherman's
“as hostile to the new wave of inmigration, but was accompanied by an
editorial disclaimer. The other two were not.

Raison,] "Is the Commonwealth a Farce?" , RT, oune 1964, p 221.

t

422

gave it as his opinion that there

was

"no other way than to apply the purely pragmatic test
that when people really want it they will be able to
show it so Strongly that it is better to give it to
them. Otherwise the whole course of administration

is going to be too much of a burden, both to the
government and the people".'

galley's Judgment might almost be considered an epitome of expert and
official British opinion in the age of decolonisation. nevertheless, there
were important exceptions to Bailey's rule of thumb, and it was only after
the majority of colonies was firmly on the road to indepordonc© that the
process was recognised as being "impossible to stop". 2

The most plausible accounts of decolonisation emphasise the need for
a 'pluralist" explanation. Changes in Britain, the colonies, and the wider

international context all need to be taken into account; and their

interactions in particular circumstances offer the best hope of explaining
both individual acts of decolonisation and the general process itself.*
Bailey's observations of 1955 indicate that he laid more stress on
the metropolitan and colonial than the international aspects of the
problem. This was also true of moat contributors to the Found Table
msjazine. In the case of Malaya, the "cold war" clearly delayed the
transfer of power. Those writers who saw the possibility of a similar
Comaunist threat in Africa tended to emphasise the importance of preparing
colonies more thoroughly for Independence." Other writers, such as Elspeth

Halley, "Post-Var Changes in Africa", Journal of the Foyal Society of
Arts, Vol C1II, no 4955 <6 July 1955), pp 579-90.

' CHowick.J "Transition in Kenya", FT, June 1961, p 272.

3 A B Porter and A J Stcckwell, British Ioperlal Policy and

Decolonization, 1938-64: Vol 1 (London, 1967), pp 3-7; John Darwin,
Britain and Decolonisation (London, 1988).

4

Eg, "The Cold Var in the Tropics", RT, Dec 1900, pp 15-21.

discounted tie appeal of Communism. 1 The "cold war" was therefore
f< ^rded either as an unimportant factor in decolonisation, or as a reason
fo rd«layiug tie process - not as a reason for hastening it. American
intl-colonial isn was less of a worry, too. Xorrah believed that it was on
tke wane. 2 Hailey reacted furiously when one article invoked it. "Since
lave we come to welcome the US as a partner in the control of our

jep«ndencies

9«3

Host of those associated with the Pound Table thus saw decolonisation
priaarlly as the outcome of the metropolitan-colonial relationship. Hailey

thought that tie two most important factors involved were Britain's
reluctance to incur the financial and political costs of repression, and

the icevitabi 1 ity of the growth of local nationalism. The first governed

jttitudes to tie second, so that (Hailey inplied) nationalists would
affectively be knocking at an open door. Perhaps the classic example of
this was tie Gold Coast. Oliver Voods argued in the Pound Table that the
’tll-forvading" support for Skrumah's CPP made self-government
avoidable.* 1 But most writers in tic Pound Table were unhappy with the
simple formula of nationalist demands leading to metropolitan concessions,
if they recognised it to be basically true. A larger role was still
®»’isaged for the metropolitan power. As Sir Evelyn Baring (Lord Howick)
P" 1 it, the government's aim should not be to gain "a perhaps transitory
Clarity with the more impatient and vocal . . . Nationalists", but to

t Huxley, 3 "The Ethos ol Segro Africa", RT, Dec I960, pp 7-14.

1 Korrah, ] "The Coranonwealth: A UK View", RT, Sept 1960, pp 336-37.

Halley to Xorrah, 25 June C1S62J (Fhodeslas file,) RT (0) Papers.

floods, 3 "Self-Government in the Gold Coast", FT, Sept 1952,

PP 326-32.

i

' as 000(1 * cliance as • • • possible ... to a new and independent
tjof«ri»» ent to succeell "• , Vbat » tJ »en, were the conditions of success?
Iiuraatlvely, what were the preconditions of British departure?

First it is necessary to draw a distinction between those colonies

^ich contained a significant number of white settlers and those which did
l0 t. Central Africa clearly cane into the first category. Kenya and
Tanganyika were also conceived in the same terms until the late 1950s -
both initially received "multi-racial" <te weighted) constitutions. The
Pound Table had adopted an equivocal line on East Africa In the 1930s, torn
between the settler and trusteeship ideals. The same was true in the
1950s. Blspeth Huxley argued that the British government was honour-bound
jot to give in to the 'rising [African! racialist tide*.* In the sane
issue, however, Anthony Low argued that *the years of aul tiracial isra are
already numbered*, and that "concessions will be forced from the Government
and tie Europeans unless they oiake them gracefully*. 7 Low reiterated his
doubts in subsequent articles. The demise of * multi-racial ism" in East
ifrica was therefore southing for which Hound Table readers should have

tefn prepared.

The problem of co-existence between different ethnic groups was not
confined to the areas of European settlement. It was perhaps at its most
acute in Kalaya. Sir Sidney Caine, writing in 1953, bel ieved that Kalaya
»0uld have to remain under British rule for “at least a generation", if
'acut« internal dissension* were to be avoided.' 1 (Four years later, he

1 l Howick, 3 "Transition in Kenya", RT, June 1961, pp 272-77.

* “(Huxley,) "Economic Man in East Africa", AT, Sept 1955, pp 323-33.

flow,] -East Africa: The Royal Commission", PT, Sopt 1955, pp 419-24.
' f Calae,J "Malaya after the Emergency", AT, Sept 1953, pp 350-58.

,.*# looming Malayan

independence,

albeit sceptically.)

Inter-ethnic

rivalry was again a recurrent theme of the Pound Table's coverage of
Hrlca. Elspeth Huxley asserted that "fitness for self-government

pr®« u PF oses a Political unit which is, so to speak, self-governable". She
*at on to list examples of the way in which the ’cartographer-countries"
of Africa flew in the face of ethnic facts, and suggested a need for
redrawing boundaries to create "viable political units" before further
K 76S towards self-government. 1 Ethnic tendons were seen as one reason

Ghana and other countries descended into one-party rule so soon after
independence . 2

The need to create "viable political units" was believed to work also
in tie opposite direction, in favour of amalgamation or federation on a
regional bads. This was, of course, believed to apply with epecial force
to Central and East Africa. In the latter case, Kowick argued for the
■alntenance of existing (High Comoission) co-ordination even after the
denise of " mul t i-raclal ism" . * Another area where federation was believed
to be an essential prerequisite to independence was the British Caribbean.

In 1949 GFI Hunn listed the (mainly econonic) reasons: the need for
planning development, raising loans, redistributing population and

encouraging agricultural diversity rather than iuter-islar.d competition.'"

demise of the short-lived Vest Indian Federation was thought to
le »ve a question-mark over the viability of many of the saaller

1 f Huxley, J "African Independence and After", RT, Dec 1955, pp 17-20.

C All Ka2rui , 3 "Constitutional Experiment In Africa", FT, June 1903,
pp 241-49.

IHowick, ] "Transition in Kenya", FT, June 1901, pp 272-77.

4 tlunn,] "Federation in the British Caribbean", FT, June 1949, pp 234-
39. .

One consideration which applied to all colonies approaching
j^pendence was the need to build up a cadre of indigenous administrators.
f>e progress made in this direction in the Gold Coast was thought to be one
r## *on why self-government was possible at such an early stage there. 2
jloflwhere, progress was not so good. Eai ley's main criticism "of the pace
idopted by us" in Africa was that, unlike the comparable situation in
Iudlai "little or nothing has been done in the years gono past to prepare
the African by experience of adrai nistrat ion to take up the new powers that
# re being given to him". 3 Host writers thought that the newly-i ndependent
countries would have to rely on British or European expatriates for soma
tiK to corie. To some cases (such as Figeria) the generous pensions for
administrators taking early retirement were criticised, on the grounds that
•ore encouragement should be given to them to stay.*

The counterpart to administrative preparation was political
preparation, and here again there were grounds for thinking that the pace
of decolonisation was too fast. Hailey, after writing a memoir on Curtis
isd dyarchy in India, opined to Horrah that a similar "school for embryo
*ioisters* would have been useful in Africa." Hailey's doubts went
farther. As he earlier wrote to Curtis, in his heart of hearts he believed
flat parliamentary sel f-governnent was "not suited to oriental or African

iLady Huggins,] "Failure of a Federation", FT, June 1962, pp 273-78.

IVoods, 1 "A fiascent DonlDlon", FT, March 1955, pp 149-55.

SaUey, "Post-Var Changes in Africa", lot s i t -

f f Slr Henry Villink,! "Eigeria: The African Giant", FT, Dec 1959,

PP 55-63.

5

Salley to lorrah, 18 Sept 1960, KT Papers c 867, fols 73-74.

conditions* . 1 Most contributors were optinistic regarding the

'*» ture

of parliamentary institutions in Britain's ex-colonies.

j^vertheless, many shared Hailey's doubts about the pace of refora. As
jl«peth Huxley wrote in 1955, parliamentary government was "as nuch a
Europe® 0 invention as the internal conbustion engine or tfco dynamo; and
like these, it needs a certain grasp of technique ... to nake it work". 7

Two questions might be put in conclusion. How did the Round Tablorc
view the process of decolonisation as a whole? And was the Round Table an
influence on government policy? It is perhaps easier to answer the second
question than the first. There is little evidence to suggest that
cofitributors to the Pound Table attempted to influence short-term policy,
lost articles were retrospective coaments on British moves: it was the
gorernment which set the agenda, and forced the pace. The Hoot itself was
■ore Interested in the effects of newly- i independent countries on the
Cosaonwealth than in the processes which led to independence. In most
cases it is not clear what the Xoot's views were. But if the contributions
of outside writers ore taken os a guide, it is clear that attitudes to
decolonisation were, at best, equivocal. Most writers recognised what
Anthony Low described as the "Scylla and Chaiybdis" of British policy; the

datgers of going too fast or of going too slow. 0 Many writers (but uot
to*) erred on the side of caution. "Vhat is needed above all else is

Elspeth Huxley wrote in 1955.* Yet time was in perilously short
Su Pply. Xost writers therefore simply «ade the best of the circumstances.

Hailey to Curtis, 17 April 1947, Halley Papers, MSS Brit Emp s 343.
t Huxley,] "African Independence and After", l ee - fi ll. •

Uow,] -East Africa", PT, March 1956, pp 202-C3.
tHuxley,] "Economic Man in East Africa", FT, Sept 1955, p 332.

4

. Historically, the Round Table was linked In a peculiar degree to
South Africa. The older Round Tablers (Altrincham and Horsfall, as well as
^■Kindergarten- members) always retained a sympathy for the position of
ife whites in Africa, and for the notion of a white cultural (ar.d, in a few
cases, racial) superiority, fet the Round Table vas also in the forefront
of those extolling the Co auoon wealth as a -bridge" between races. The
contradiction was always latent in Round Tablers' views. After 1948 - with
i South African governn^nt wedded to discri ml nation not "as a phase" but
'in perpetuity" ' - the contradiction had to be faced. Inevitably,
different members responded in different ways. Even if all could agree in
rejecting the policies of the Nationalist government, apartheid raised
fuDdaoental questions which were painful, discomforting and divisive.

Curtis's response to the South African situation was idiosyncratic,
ilthough no "racist* In the modern sense of the word - he came "to realise
our own crime in treating the Native majority as helots", and protested
strongly against the unofficial "colour bar" in his London club 1 2 - South
Africa was still his blind spot. In 1947 and again In 1952 he argued for
•AM was, in effect, total apartheid. The instrument of his proposal was
creation of a "Negro Dominion' (initially under international,

‘•eluding South African, control) north of the Zanbezi, which would, in his
n *». exercise an "overpowering" attraction to the ni 11 ions of black South

1 IXorrahJ "A Leaf Falls', FT, June 1961, pp 219-23.

tetter to Johannesburg Star, reprinted in Vlndous of Freedom and
Other Papers (Oxford, 1052), pp 39-42; Curtis to Philip Radcliffe
(Oxford & Cambridge Club), 31 Aug 1955, RT Papers c 866, fol 195.

,4ft4cat&r ^ would “ l S ra te north, and "the dream of a white South Africa
* realised-.’ Curtis had two main points: first, that South Africa
•touM be allowed to expand to include South-Vest Africa, Southern Rhodesia
aid -the Protectorates; and secondly that apartheid should be treated with
gT1 patliy, to the extent that regional policies should be governed by the
attempt to make "white South Africa" a reality.

Curtis was alone in favouring South African absorption of Southern
Elodesia : most of the Moot supported the alternative policy of Central
ifrican Federation, partly as a counter-weight to "Afrikaner" domination to
tie south. The transfer of the Protectorates was no longer considered a
serious proposition, either. Indeed, the Found Table now published
articles by Romney Sedgwick, Sir Bvelyn Baring and Maud, all arguing
strongly against transfer and in favour of a more active British policy of
development. 2

On the second point Curtis clearly struck a chord amongst older Round

Tablers, but on the question of solutions he was again largely isolated.

Ic Brand's view, the determining factor was that

"black and white are Inextricably mixed in South
Africa. If the whites went, the blacks would sink
back into barbarism; If the blacks went, the whole of
the South African economy would be irretrievably
ruined " . s

Brand recognised that apartheid was a sham, nevertheless, his opposition
racial discrimination was limited by his continuing belief In the

1 Curtis, "South Africa's Future in the Commonwealth", Listener,

7ol XXXVII, (3 April 1947), pp 489-91; Vlndows of Freedom, Iq c c lt-

2 t Sedgwick,] "A Trust in Africa", FT, Karch 1950, pp 121-26; [Baring,]
"Tho High Commission Territories", FT, Xarch 1952, pp 141-51; [Maud,]
"The High Commission Territories", FT, Dec 1963, pp 26-50. Baring
was British High Commissioner in South Africa 1944-51, Xaud 1959-63.

Brand to Curtis, 3 April 1947, Curtis Papers 98, fol 145.

$tc *dtj Of a gradualist, "Rhodesian- solution. In 1961 he deplored
. 4 tt#r»tioaal condemnation of South Africa, reiterating his belief in a
■Bortbern European* antipathy to intermarriage, and asserting that
daiocracy in South Africa was ’totally inpossible at present" because it
vould threaten the foundations of a "great commercial, industrial and
financial state".’ Horsfall held similar views, and in 1960 he contributed
a Found Table article ’to argue for a more sympathetic understanding of the
coBplicated situations you (South Africans] have to face". 2

Other members of the Moot were more perceptive in realising that the
fundamental problem was not Just the short-sightedness of the ruling
lationalist party, but the racial aspirations of the white electorate.

Bailey - perhaps exceptionally anongst the older generation of Round
fablers - argued such a case after reading an article by Edgar Brookes on
the erosion of civil liberties in South Africa.

"I accept the conclusion it draws, namely, that the
m! ntenance of Vhite supremacy must inevitably
Involve a r^gine which makes it impossible to
maintain civil liberties . . . but I do not find that
this conclusion shocks the Vhite population here
(British or Afrikaner) as nuch as it should do. It
seams to me that most Vhite people here are content
to feel that if Vhite supremacy cannot be retained
without offence to the principle of Civil Liberty,
then so nuch the worse for the principle." 3

Filey's attitude to apartheid was again different in that he understood

Clearly the international implications involved. Vhereas Curtis, Brand and

forsfall all saw apartheid as a "South African problem" - and argued that

1 Haaserd (Lords), 5th series, Vol 229, <23 March 1961), cols 1259-62.

‘ Xorrab to Kidd, 29 April I960 <SA file,) RT <0) Papers; the article

VOS "The South African Tragedy", RT, June 1960, pp 221-33.

Bailey < from South Africa) to Hodson, 13 Oct 1959 <SA file,) RT <0)
topers.

£--©rttiei«» from Britain or elsewhare was inappropriate - Hailey realised
, that failure to criticise South African policies "will discount the

estimation in which the Commonwealth Is held and will certainly impair the
influence it can exorcise in world affaire". 1 This consideration - as well

as opposition to the effects of apartheid in South Africa itself - weighed
heavily aleo with the younger Round Tablcrs. Hodson, Maud and Xansergh
were all committed to the extension of 1 i beral -democratic values and to the
vision of a multi-racial Commonwealth. Vrlting in the Round Table, Hodson
made clear that there could only be one answer if the Rationalists forced
Britain and her other partners "to choose between a uni-racial Commonwealth
with South Africa as a member and a multi-racial Commonwealth without
her" . *

Horrah was concerned to handle the question of apartheid "with
special editorial punctilio”; indeed, "the more we oppose apartheid the
aore careful we oust be to do justice to its advocates" . ■* This reasoning
led the Found Table to publish a statement of the Rationalist view,
approved and amended by Verwoerd after an interview by Brand and Erwin
Schuller. 4 (The Johannesburg St ar re-printed the article, with the comment
that it bad bad to gc "far afield" to find such a reasoned statement of the
government's case.*) The Xoot was also anxious to publish more radical

1 Hailey, "African Colonies and the Crown", Listener, Vol XXIVII,

(10 April 3947), pp 542-43.

2 (Hodson, 3 "Dr Xalan and the Commonwealth" , FT, June 1351, pp 219-26.

3 Korrah to Lord Gladwyn, 9 Dec 1964 and 11 Dec 3964 <1964-65 file,)
RT (0) Papers.

* (Schuller/Verwoerd, 1 "Apartheid In Practice", FT, June 1954,
pp 259-63.

5

Johannesburg Star, 2 Aug 1954.

,.<ritioi6B of the government' c policies than was obtained through the South
t African group. At the cost of friction with the latter, the London group
obtained articles from Pat Duncan and C V M Cell, both of whon argued that
- only extra-parliamentary agitation would bring about the fall of the
Jationallst government. '

The South African group Included notable liberals In the form of Leo
Barquand, Harry Lawrence and Edgar Brookes. But the najority of the group
consisted of supporters of the United Party, including Its leader,

Sir J P de Villiers Graaff. The group found it difficult to conceive of an
opposition to apartheid which was not const 1 tut Iona 1 (and therefore purely
white). There was little attempt to cover what Pat Duncan described as
•the vital political struggle . . . the acharne struggle for the soul of
the rising African political novenent". 1 2 3

The South African group's DP connections also tended to colour its
reporting of apartheid legislation. Xarquand and Brookes contributed some
lard-hittlng articles, but the group often insisted on an editorial
disclainer. Other articles gave the impression of extenuating Nationalist
jolicies. Generally, the majority of the group seemed to accept the UP
tellef that "any fast move in the direction of integrating the non-European
peoples" would "alarm the Vhite electorate", and was therefore a political
impossibility.® As Duncan observed, "in stated policy l the DPI differs
^rdly at all from the National ists" . 4 The younger’ members of the Xoot

1 f Duncan, 1 "Satyagraha in South Africa", RT, March 1953, pp 13G-37;

fGell.l "New Parties in South Africa", PT, Dec 1953, pp 48-56.

3 Duncan to Morrah, 19 Nov 1952 (SA file,) FT (0) Papers.

3 "South Africa", RT, Dec 1959, pp 90-94.

* [Duncan,] "Satyagraha in South Africa", RT, March 1953, pp 130-37.

. In 1954 Morrah reported then as being "disappointed that the
i, United Party has not . . . put up more of a root-and-branch resistance to
the policy of apartheid".' Morrah was also increasingly critical of the
OP, which he came to regard as "ultimately somewhat acquiescent" In the
■malpractices" of the Fat tonal ist government. 2

Verwoerd's announcement, oarly In 1960, of a referendum on the

republic brought to a head the divergence of opinion between South Africa

and the rest of the Commonwealth. Xorrah was not optimistic.

"If the republic has to come, I think the prevailing
U. K. view would be strongly in favour of keeping It
in the Commonwealth. 3ut I don't feel at all
confident that all, or even the majority, of the
other countries concerned would agree .... Xy
impression is that the voters on October 5 who think
they can ha/e a republic within the Commonwealth for
the asking ore living in a fool's paradise."*

lad so it turned out. The Round Table argued in vain for the continued

rembership of South Africa in order that its government might "be converted

to a more humane view of race relations". 4 Verwoerd hi itself answered that

argument, by his conduct at the Prime Ministers' meeting of March 1961.

Sflflfci&l Air led and. Rhodesia.

Central Africa raised much the same questions as its neighbour to the
south, with two important differences. On the one hand, the white nioority

1 Morrah to Mrs James Carruthers l Violet Karkhami , 9 Dec 1954
(SA file,) RT (0) Papers.

2 Morrah to Kidd, 30 July 1963 (SA file,) RT (0) Papers.

3 Morrah to Kidd, 29 Sept 1960 (SA file,) RT (0) Papers. The Canadian
group was of "the general view . . . that S.A. should be kicked out":
H V Macdonnell to Morrah, 25 Jan 1961 (Toronto file,) RT (0) Papers.

* [ Morrah, 1 "A Republic of South Africa", RT, Dec 1960, pp 3-6.

434

very much smaller. On the other, it was (until about 1958 or 1959)
^officially committed to an ideal of * multi-racial ism" which deflected sone,
at least, of the criticism directed at its neighbour. Again there appears
to have been a division within the Moot, roughly between older and younger
generations.

The older generation was certainly in the ascendant in the late 1940s

and early 1950s. In 1949 Elspeth Huxley was commissioned to write on
■Greater Rhodesia". She listed the reasons which n»de federation an
•econonic necessity", then stated the one reason which counted against
federation: the deep cleavage, even opposition, between the native policies
of Southern Rhodesia and the territories of lortlern Rhodesia and

lyacaland.

So do compromise on both sides was a necessity.

’The British Government nay have to sacrifice, as
trustee, some aeasure of ultimate African self-rule
in return for greater security and prosperity. The
Europeans of Southern Rhodesia, on the other hand,
will have to yield some measure of their resolve to
confine the development of each race in separate
channels. " 1

Kalcolm, who wrote on Central Africa the following year, was less
restrained. In his view, the British governnent should seek to peisuade
Africans that unity was "in their best interests", but it could not allow
then to influence its policy. Power must, "so far as hunan foresight can
go, be strictly reserved for the Vhite race".'

flalcola supported amalgamation of the three territories on the same
basis as the Southern Rhodesian constitution - not federation. In 1951 he
*rote a trenchant critique of the proposals drawn up by the London

CHuxley,] "Greater Rhodesia", FT, June 1949, pp 227-33.
[Malcolm,] "One Rhodesia or Two?", RT, June 1950, pp 220-25.

435

dcc of officials . 1 Altrincham tried to persuade him to moderate his
. criticism, and arranged a meeting with Velensly, who was prepared to accept
: J the proposals. s Korrah conveyed Sir Evelyn Baring's opinion "that closer
inion is essential ... if any balance is to be preserved with the Union
at all. and that we are now approaching our last chance to achieve it". 3
falcolm remained Impervious. Reserving powers would nerely produce
friction, without placating African "ninority f sicl opinion, and that not
of a highly enlightened character" . *

Despite differing on the constitutional question, Altrincham's views
vere not far out of line with Malcolm's. Commemorating the centenary of
2hodes's birth, he recalled that Rhodes had been a lifelong opponent of
•Downing Street", and asserted that black-white relations in Africa were
being "embittered by well-meaning interference from oversea". Unlike such
•Ignorant" meddlers, Rhodes would never have dreamt of "surrendering
[Africa's! defence and guidance to its present-day black inhabitants".®
Ironically, it was through Malcoln's contacts in the British South
Africa Company that Garfield Todd, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia from
1953 to 1958, was induced to act as the Round Table's correspondent.® Todd
wsa rara avis - a liberal white Rhodesian. His articles emphasised that
*11 hope of stability depended on the growth of a more "liberal spirit"

1 I Malcolm, 1 "Parturiunt Montes", RT, Sept 1951, pp 337-43.

^ Altrincham to Korrah, 28 July 1951, and Morrah to Altrincham, 31 July

1951 (Rhodesia® file,) RT (0) Papers.

* Morrah to Malcolm, 10 Aug 1051, l.bid-

* Malcolm, "Closer Union", 19 Sept 1951, ibid

5 I Altrincham, 3 "Rhodes and Rhodesia", RT, March 1953, pp 103-17.

^ Bills Robins to Malcolm, 22 March 1954 and cable 27 April 1954
{Rhodes ins file,) RT <0> Papers.

It

436

t his white countrynen. After he was ousted by a party csjifc, Todd
.. jre* increasingly outspoken in his attacks on white Rhodesian politics,
?r ospting frequent complaints of bias from Rhodesia House. By 1960 it was
. cl«°r that Todd's viows no longer accorded with the dominant opinion in the
loot. Vhile Xorrah expressed the vie* that the Federation still
represented a "niddle way* of " partnership" , Todd quoted Lord Malvern as
speaking of partnership between "the rider and the horse", and called on
iritain "to suspend the Southern Rhodesian constitution and to send troops
• to the Colony" . 1

Because of support from younger members of the Moot, Todd was allowed
to continue writing for the Round Table until June 1962. But his
contribution to that issue, again calling for British Intervention, was too
luch for sone members. Horsfall thought Todd's views "intolerable", and
Todd hinseif "simply a discredited politician who has lost any support he
iad in his own country". 2 Horsfall's view prevailed, and Korrah therefore
*rote to Todd to terminate the agreement. The Moot, he said, had asked him
'•o find a correspondent "nore in synpathy with official policy both in
Salisbury and in Whitehall".®

Harry Grenfell of the Chartered Company then provided a one-off
article more on the lines which Xorrah required. - 1 A nore permanent
arrangement was made with DTK Williams, a journal 1st and public relations
officer employed by the Federation. Again he took a strong pro-settler

1 (Xorrah, 1 "A Republic of South Africa", RT, Dec 1960, pp 3-6; ilodd.l
'The Xonckton Report", ibid. PP 22-28.

( Horsfall to Worrah, 18 July 1962 (Rhodesias file, > RT (0) Papers.

3 Xorrah to Todd, 1 Aug 1962, Ibid.

‘ ( Grenfell , 1 "Central Africa in 1963", RT, Sept 1962, pp 361-67.

I

} 1 bs. -In his view th© African was "a born dictator". The United Nations

.,*r compared to a Fa2i rally; and he suggested that the British government

"going back on its word", out of an " inexpl icoble desire to bow down to

tfc* will of Africanism" . 1 Xorrah considered Vill iaras’s articles “a useful

corrective". Nevertheless, "the younger members of our editorial committee

iiought you were pushing us too far towards the other extreme".* At Maud’s

request the British High Ccmmlss loner found a new correspondent, John

Spicer <" intelligent, liberal, balanced and with very sound Judgement"),

: *ho wrote from December 1965 onwards.® (By then, of course, Halley was the

only member of the older generation still alive.)

Smith’s decision to declare independence in November 1965 at last

iorced the Moot into accepting the position which Tcdd had teen urging:

that of calling for direct rule by the British government.

"There are two main reasons for this. First, it lias
been openly and blatantly humiliated ....

Secondly, it would be wrong to leave the territory
under the control of a small minority, however much
they nay represent the most advanced elements of the
population. Government on the basis of race is l>ad
government and can only endure by becoming steadily
worse. "

ivea at this stage, the Round TsbJe opposed handing Rhodesia over to
•ajority rule, because "this would lead to a break up of Vbite Rhodesian
society and the ruin of the economy". Instead, Britain should assume
responsibility for "the next decade at least". If sanctions did not work,
iorce - "overwhelming and decisive" - would have to be used.” Otherwise

1 rVillianK,] "Rhodesian Divorce", FT, Sept 1953, pp 342-52; [ idem . 3
■Rhodesia and Nyasaland", ibid, pp 409-14.

; Korrah to Williams, 23 March 1964 (Rhodesias file,) RT <0> Papers.

Jack Johnston to Maud, nd [Dec 19645 (1964-65 file,) RT (0) Papers.

4 f Beaton, J "A Policy for Rhodesia", RT, March 1966, pp 107-11.

Cojnaonwealth would break up; and It was "difficult to imagine a more
ilid end to so hopeful an experiment" . ’

jfifl r.nmBQD Market

As early as 1926, Harold Butler had predicted that "unless Great
jritaln forms part of a larger economic unit, she cannot avoid becoming:
part of a European economic union". 3 At the time, his observation was to
te understood as part of a plea for the liberalisation of intra-
Comonwealth trade. The disappointment of such hopes under the Ottawa
sjsten perhaps gave force to the observation.

A generation later, the idea of an opposition between Commonwealth
tnd Common Karket was clearly no longer realistic.

"The nations of the Commonwealth, for as long as they
have enjoyed sovereign control of their own fiscal
systems, have been accustomed to adjust them to a
strict calculation of their own material advantage
.... They will scarcely complain . . . if in the
hard bargaining necessary in Brussels British Ministers
give first though not exclusive consideration to
tangible British interests." 3

the Round Table was firmly of the belief that British entry into the Common
Iar'set conformed with "tangible British interests". Three main reasons
»ere adduced for this view. First, "we cannot help being a European
?ower". It was better to be in Europe, in a position of leadership, than
wtside and unable to influence. Secondly, "America prefers to deal with
: ‘ Jr op€ as a unity, and regards England as part of Europe". The alternative
to entry into Europe might not include a continuing "special relationship".

D Austin, "Vby not Surrender to Mr Smith?", RT, July 1966, pp 238-44.
tButler,] "Europe at the Cross-Roads", RT, June 1926, pp 476-501.
HCorrah, J "Commonweal th and Common Market", RT, June 1962, pp 223-27.

Ij, and pcrhapc moot importantl y, Britain's economy was "distinctly
«lOgg ish "» and threatened to remain so without new opportunities for
gjpaosion and access to larger markets. ’

Korroh persuaded Brie (Lord) Roll ("the official nearest to the
C«Btre of negotiations* -) to write a key-note article for the Round Table.
foil acknowledged that the views of Commonwealth governments ranged "from
the cautionary to the almost plainly hostile*. Vere there any grounds for
loping that the negotiations could clear some of the obstacles? Roll
thought so, if the problem could be *taken apart into its nain
constituents". Koreover, it was necessary "to compare not what is with
what is proposed, but what is proposed with what might otherwise be". And
ia this connection, a Britain "with a faster rate of economic growth, with
wider trading possibilities, with a stronger voice in Europe, must be a
»re useful member of the Commonwealth" . 7

The Koot was primarily interested in the long-term political
consequences of entry. Roll expressed the opinion that many of the
political aspects of the Treaty of Rome night never be implemented. Horrah
«s less cynical. Despite the fact that the Comnon Xarket possessed no
federal institutions "it cannot he immune to the natural processes of
station". Indeed, "it is . . . bound ... to change its attitude as new
Koblens emerge". Federation was therefore likely to be on the future
*genda,

"The political right of secession scarcely touches the
economic impracticability of unscrambling the eggs. If

1

1

(Korrah.l "Britain in Europe", RT, Sept 1962, pp 323-26.

Xorrah to Kidd, 29 Sept 1961 <SA file,) RT (0) Papers.

I Roll, ] "Commonweal tb and Counion Xarkets", RT, Dec 1961, pp 7-19.

44C

we enter Europe we enter for good; and we cannot be
sure that the Europe we enter will remain immutably a
confederation of sovereign states, and will never
develop on organic lines.*

jritain could participate in both the Common Market and the Commonwealth

•without incompatibility", precisely because the Commonweal th "no longer

106 any political structure in the domain of foreign policy and defence",

ffcereas the Market existed in order to pursue "a Joint policy*, in ever

increasing fields. Vhether "the British people are psychological ly ready

{or so momentous a change" was another matter. 1

The Round Table groups also contributed to the debate. On the whole,

*.hey vere more sympathetic to the British position than were their own

governments. According to the Helbourr.e group, Xenzles's criticism of

Britain "surprised not only Mr Sandys but also many Australians". There

*ere good grounds for thinking that "the short term losses night he less

and the long-term gains greater than government spokesmen suggest". 2 From

Canada, Kacdonnell reported that opinion was coming round to the

"Toronto Globe and Kail point that if joining the
Common Market will mean increased prosperity for
Britain, she will be a better market for Canada and
other Commonwealth countries than a Britain in the
doldrums'* . 3

In lew Zealand opinion was very largely against British entry; but the New
kalacd group was divided*, and there were those who saw "considerable
^traction ... in the idea that preferences . . . might be surrendered In

1 CMorrahJ "Britain in Europe", FT, Sept 1952, pp 323-26.

“ {Melbourne group, J "Australia and EEC", R7, Dec 1951, pp 43-48.

3 H V Kacdonnel 1 to Morrah, 25 Oct 1961 (Toronto file,) RT <0> Papers.

* G Vood to Jforrah, 11 Oct 1961 <NZ file,) RT <0) Papers.

441

■

. r «4«rn for assurances of expanding outlots In a united Buropo*.'

Do Gaulle's veto necessitated "an exercise in what Delane used to
^all 'the delicate art of journalistic curvature". 2 The search for a
ifider economic unit went on. In 1967 the Round Table supported calls for a
forth Atlantic free trade area.* Vhen the debate on the Common Market was
reopened in the early 1970s, the Round Table once again joined the
advocates of British entry, emphasising the advantages to be gained by all
Comouwealth nenbera from a stronger and more European Britain." 4

Iftf law Round Table

"Like a familiar landscape, the British Comnonweal tli
changes gradually, alnost Imperceptibly, but in the
long run radically .... Ho single event, even if
noticed when it happens, is more than a passing wonder,
yet in a couple of generations the changes nay leave
only the broad contour of hill and valley to recall for
the returned exile the scene of his childhood."®

lodsoa’s choice of simile was peculiarly apt. Even the most radical

changes in the structure of the Comnonweal th - such as the Statute of

Westminster, or the London Declaration - were mainly synbolic, confirming

trends which were already apparent. The most significant changes were

emulative. Some the Round Tablers had welcomed; others they made the best

°f- But the Commonwealth of the 1960s was a far cry from that of 1910,

v &en the original Round Tablers had set out on their mission.

tEZ gp, J "SZ: Concern over UK-EEC negotiations" , ST, Xarch 1962,
pp 410-15.

Korrah to R V Xacdonnell, 6 Feb 1963 <Toronto file,) FT CO) Papers.

C Beaton, 1 "An Important Proposal", ST, Jan 1967, pp 3-5.

"Britain, the Commonwealth and Europe", RT, Oct 1971, pp 431-35.
CKodson.l "The Future of the Conmonweal th" . RT, June 1956, pp 215-21.

442

In 1963 the death of the last aboriginal Round Tabler, Lord Erand,

•ted the Hoot to decide on a special meeting at Dltchley, to consider
the Round Table's future. Invitations were sent to the overseas groups,
but, os the disgruntled secretary of the Sydney group later commented, the
notice given was "short, very short if there was a genuine desire to seek
Opinion".’ nevertheless, three of the five groups sent nenoranda. The Hew
Zealand group was generally content with existing arrangements. 2 The South
African group called for more articles from the newly Independent
ctwntrles, and suggested that each issue should concentrate on a single
topic.* The Sydney group was primarily concerned to forestall the
possibility of the Round Table being re-constituted as a "Commonweal th-
Attrican" review.-* In later communications the group was more ambitious,
proposing an enhanced editorial role for the overseas groups, including
'Bjch more pre -publication comment" and "a more vigorous expression of
sentiment". The group also wanted more coverage of the "old" and less of
the "new" Commonwealth. 14

The Dltchley meeting considered the various options. Karris was
inclined to think closure inevitable, but the rest of the Moot was strongly
in favour of continuing. The need to bring the magazine "more up-to-date",
as the first step towards increasing its circulation, was realised. ffo

1 XacCal lum, "The Round Table", 17 March 1965 (Sydney file,) RT (0)
Papers.

2 "The Round Table . . . Views of the HZ group" 1 19635 ibid .

3 H K Robertson, "SA and the Round Table", 30 Kov 1963 (Beaton file,)

RT (0) Papers.

* D XacCal lum to JCorrah, 29 Hov 1963, ibid.

5 D XacCal lum, "The Round Table", 17 Karch 1965; tocCallum to Korrah,

13 April 1964 (Sydney file,) RT (0) Papers.

I

I

4*3

decisions were reached, but there was an agreement to look Into the
posaibilitioG of forming groups in the "new" Commonweal th and of
' introducing signed articles. It was also agreed that the Moot should be
Btrengtk eae<1 by recruiting "younger members who have already shown their
- interest In the contemporary problems of the new Commonwealth" , and also a
Be y editor. (Morrah was now 67 and anxious to retire.)’ The banker Sir
Jeremy Xoise and the former Colonial Secretary Viscount Boyd had already
been recruited in 1900, the Journalist and future minister Tinothy Raison
la 1962. Five new members were added in 1964: the Africanist Dennis
Austin, the Journalist Leonard Beaton, Richard Hornby MP, the diplomat Sir
Stotert Vade-Gery and the Insurance broker Sir Robin Vi 11 lams. All were, In
lorrah's description, "young progressive Conservatives". 2

Beaton was taken on as assistant editor, with the intention that he
would replace Morrah. (He did so at the end of 1965, earlier than
expected, because of Xorrah's illness.) Canadian-born, he was (like the
rest of the Moot) a strong believer both In the American connection and in
the "modern" Commonwealth. Indeed, for him the two elided, and there were
only two real models for the developed world, the "British" and the
Connunist. nevertheless, he was at home in India (and France, where his
vlfe was born), more so than In Australasia, where he found the general
’tew of the Commonwealth "adolescent" . 3 In 1965 he was sent on a tour to
establish contact with the existing groups, look Into the possibility of

1 Karris to John tCadwallader?! , 11 Hay 1965 (Beaton file); Kacadam to
Sir Robin Williams, 20 Kay 1964 (Koot file,) RT (0) Papers.

2 Korrah to KacCallum, 22 June 1964 (Sydney file,) FT (0) Papers. Boyd
dropped out of the Koot in 1964.

^ Beaton, "Report on Round Table Trip" f 19651 (Beaton file,) RT (0)
Papers.

I

444

n * w on ® 8 > and gather impressions as to the best way forward for the
L.-gOtiod Table. He cane back with the firm conclusion that the nogazine

gftould drop Its rule of anonymity, partly in order to move with the times,
partly In order to attract new readers with "names", and partly because the
govad Table had lost ©one of Its “authority" amongst the general reading

1

Although he mode contact with several suitable group members In India
aid Pakistan, Beaton confessed himself "baffled about Just how we can make
effective use of the groups". He found the Canadian group virtually non-

existent. The Australasian groups were still strong and intellectually
distinguished, but they "have never concerned thencsel ves with Commonwealth
affairs and really have no views on then". 2 This problem of the groups was
never really resolved. An Indian group was started In 1967, but within a
few years It and the Canadian, South African and Hew Zealand groups had
become virtually moribund, with the result that articles were commissioned
directly from London. This left the Australian groups iD an anomalous
position. The practice of publishing signed and more controversial
articles made group editing redundant, but the Australian groups were still
Jealous of their responsibility for commissioning articles. Faul Daniell,
^■ployed as a promotional consultant by the Xcot, suggested that these last
r e«aining groups should be wound up, since there was no longer any "driving
Purpose behind their existence" .* The London group neither wound up the

1 Ifcid. Hodson had suggested relaxing the rule of anonymity as early
as 1935: Minutes of RT meeting, 12 to 15 Jan 1935, FT (0) Papers.

Beaton to Vade-Gery, 1 June 1965 and 14 June 1965 (Beaton f lie, > RT
(0) Papers.

J P S Daniell, "Some Thoughts on Found Table Groups", 31 March 1969
(Moot file, > RT (0) Papers.

445

nor attempted to revive them. From Leonie Foster* * account it is
g:' thafc fc ^ e raanner of the Australian groups* demise left a cense of

resentment. 1

In July 1066, the "new" Round Table was launched, with a vigorous
editorial setting out the "central objectives' for the Commonwealth, and
promising "strong views on public issues". a The 'new' Round Table

C o#si» te, i largely of signed articles - unsigned chronicles cane to an end

in 1S67, except in the case of Rhodesia. They were often written by the
leading experts in their fields, more often now academics than officials.
Steadily, the Round Table's circulation climbed bach up; and the Immediate
financial danger was met by a very successful appeal (bringing in some
425,000 over three years). Another financial crisis closed the publication
between October 1961 and January 1903, before the Round Table returned in

its present form, with a new publisher, but still fulfilling the same
fuaction, as both advocate and "thinfc tank for the contemporary
CoHacn wealth" . s

1 Foster, High Hopes (Melbourne, I960), pp 153 ££.

2 l Raison,) "The Sew Round Table", FT, July 1966, pp 211-14.

2 I? Lyon,), "The Round Table Revived and the Contemporary
CoaDon wealth" , ST, Jan 1933, p 10.

440

ffiffCLPSIQSS

Earlier historians have generally portrayed the history of the
jound Table as an anticlinax. Starting out full of vigour and
eonfidence, the Round Tablers (according to this view) were quickly

frustrated In their original alms, and consequently drifted on with a
disintegrating sense of cohesion and a diminishing sense of purpose.

There is something to be said for such an interpretation. By
the 1950s and ’60s the Moot was clearly no longer a cohesive group in

•be sense that the original Root was. Nevertheless, It is important not

to underestimate the differences within the earlier group, nor to
overestimate those withlo the later group. The most significant single
Issue in Edwardian Imperial politics, the tariff question, was left to
one side, the subject of an agreement to disagree. There were frequent
reports of "fearful ructions" within the Xoot. The wartime
iisagreements within the group were perhaps the most bitter of all. Yet
‘be Xoot carried on. In the 1920s and '30s new issues divided the Xoot:
lenya, China, Germany. But in some respects the interwar Xoot was more
cohesive than before. Certainly, it was able to reach a consensus on
«Qy important policy matters. Even after the Second Vorld Var, with
the predominance of ■ Kindergarten" members broken and a whole range of
contentious issues brought to the fore - the Cold Var, Indian
Impendence, decolonisation In Africa, apartheid, Suez, Europe - the
**tent to which the Xoot both sought and reached a consensus was

triable.

The "failure" of the Round Table " «ov©j»nt" has tended to
°^ure both the extent of disagreement between Curti6 and his

'V

., C oll«ag ues before the publication of hlo Problea of the Coaaoawealth and
<%* persistence of a belief in ultimate "organic union" thereafter.

There was much conraon ground between Curtis and his critics before 1916,
Ixit-aleo significant differences over tactics, timing and the powers of
j federal government. These differences were undoubtedly inportant in

preventing the group from carrying out its original strategy.

Federalisn was always more attractive as an abstract and undefined idea
than as a concrete scheme. John Kendle was undoubtedly right in
Identifying Dominion national isn as another major obstacle to the
realisation of the group's original aims. Sever theless, it is by no
leans clear that either the differences within the Xoot or the form

which Dominion nationalism took would have been the same had it not been
for the outbreak of war-.

In the 1920s and '30s, most members of the Hoot combined an
acceptance of the i npractlcabl i lty of immediate federal union with a
belief In its ultimate realisation. Vith hindsight this seems
reaariably optinistic. The trend of Anglo-Donlnlon relations continued
to be towards greater independence. Yet the Round Tablers Interpreted
this as clearing away the deadwood, in order to build on surer
foundations. They were wrong: but were they inevitably so? At the time
there seemed gocd reason to believe as they did. Few Dominion
MUoaalists (even in Canada and South Africa) conceived of a future
Wside the Empire; and the Round Tablers were perhaps more realistic
than their critics in thinking that there were powerful inducements to
Certainly they were more realistic in thinking that the long-
l ® r * alternative to "organic union" was not unity derived from co-
ition. Curtis was more prescient than Jebb.

448

Only In the late 1940s did the belief in Imperial unity become

QV>' : /

% UI to*aWe. It is sometimes said that America killed the British Empire.
It would appear from an examination of the Round Tablers' views in this
crucial period that this was partly the case - in the sense that
Britain, no less than the "old" Dominions, now looked to America rather
than the Empire for the framework of its security. This in turn
reflected the long-term decline in British power , which had prompted the
Bound Table's creation. Evan so, the Round Tablers believed that the
Commonwealth still had an important role to play - now defined in terms
of diversity rather than unity: and os a "bridge" rather than as a "unit
of power".

Both the tenacity and the adaptability of the Round Table
■ajazine and Its editorial Moot can be seen throughout their history.
Those who constituted the earlier Moot were certainly tenacious In
clinging to the idea of Imperial or Commonweal th unity. At the same
tire, they were also realistic in responding to the inevitability of
change. They were seldom tempted to retreat into a purely negative and
reactionary "diehardism" , and they were perhaps important in countering
the influence of those who were.

The extent of the Round Table's influence is, of course, ve/ y
difficult to assess. The Round Tablets were an undoubted influence on
60 *e aspects of Lloyd George's policy, especially in India and Ireland.

11 is one of the Ironies of Round Table history that a movement founded
^strengthen the Empire should have as its most enduring achievement
tie fact that it helped to smooth the Empire's disintegration.

I '^rtheless, the Round Tablers were not conscious of the process. They
Sieved that they were helping to save the Empire by revitalising and

£ffip»cti-ag the Imperial ethic: stabilising and enhancing the Inperlal
C00n0 ction by basing it on surer foundations.

Even in the case of India and Ireland, the Round Table appears
to have been less significant as a direct Influence on government policy
than as an interpreter of policy shifts. Once sore change in policy
hecaae inevitable, there was a market for serviceable ideas. The Round
Table's interpretation of the Imperial ethic helped to accojunodate
change without allowing the whole Inperlal position to slip, by
providing the language in which concessions could be portrayed as the
natural outcome of previous policy. Thereby the Round Table helped to
liBit change, as well as making it respectable. It Is this mediating
rdle, between conservatism and radicalism, and between officialdom and
opinion, which is the roost sti iking aspect of the Round Table magazine
as a whole.

Despite their close contacts with officials and pol icy-itakers,
asa group the Round Tablers were ultimately somewhat marginal to the
real political process. They were seldom able to influence the making,
as opposed to the interpretation, of British policy. This In itself
sajs sooe thing about the nature of British Imperial isn. The Empire was
useful to the extent that it served British interests. As far as those
^positions of power were concerned, it was hardly an end in Itself.

• ;a£J2EL X-±

0f) TABLE EDHQBS

PklliP

Kerr

g«gin*ld Coup lord
Oeoifrey Dawson

John Dove

g V Hodson

Sir Reginald Coupland
Geoffrey Crowthcr

Beery Brooke

Nov 1910 - Dec 1916’
Karch 1917 - June 1919
Sept 1919 - Dec 1920
Karch 1921 - March 1934=
June 1934 - Sept 1939=
Dec 1939 - March 1941
June 1941

Sept 1941 - June 1942

Geoffrey Dawson
Dernot Nor rah
Leonard Beaton

JUcbael Howard/ Rotei t Jackson
loterl Jackson
il exaider MacLeod
Svan Charlton
?eter Lyon

Sept 1942 - Dec 1944'*
March 1945 - Sept 1905=
Dec 1965 - April 1970
July 1970 - Ost 1971
Jan 1972 - Jan 1975
April 1975 - April 1979
July 1979 - Ost 1981
Jan 1983 - present

totes indicate issues for which editor was primarily responsible.

Assisted by sub-committee of Oliver, Brand and Craik 1911-13; by Grlgg
(assistant editor) Sept 1913 to Karch 1915.

Assisted by Hodson (assistant editor) from Oct 1930.

Assisted by Harlow, Sept - Dec 1938.

Assisted by Malcolm, Sept - Dec 1944. (Dawson died in Fov 1944.)

Assisted by Hodson, Karch - June 1946; by Beaton (assistant editor)
froa 1964.

451

|£E£ mii-B.

fflflffRS QP THE LQHDQfl XQQT BEFORE 19*1
{excludes occasional guests]

Altrincham, 1st Baron, see GRIGG

AJffiRY, Rt Hon Leo

0GLESEY, Xarquess of

ADSTIB, Dennis

BIKER, Sir Herbert

BARIETT, Guy

BEATOH, Leonard

BOYD, Viscount, Alan Lennox-

BEAID, Baron, Robert Henry

BIOOKB, Baron, Henry

BCCHAI, Alastair

BILL, Hedley

BfTLER, Harold

ClROE, Sir Olaf

CECIL, Viscount. Lord Robert

CBARLTOH, Evan

CBIRDL, Sir Valentine

CHRISTIE. Lori ng C

COUPLAID, Sir Reginald

C *AIX. Sir George Li 1 lie

CJOVTHER, Sir Geoffrey

^RTIS, Lionel

-DATES OF ATTEEDAECE

»WS0I.

Geoffrey

indicates infrequent attendance.

1910

- 20 - ?

*1909

1964

-83

*1913

- 32 - ?

1976

- 87

1964

- 73

*1960

- 64

1909

- 63

1941

- 66

1971

- 76

1978

- 85

*1931

- 34

1948

- 77

1910

- 35 - ?

1979

- 83

*1915

- 21 - ?

1923

- 26

1913

i

**

ro

•o

1909

- 22 - ?

1941

- 44

1909

- 55

1909

- 44

1

? indicates lapse of attendance. Middle date indicates last recorded

k attendance at RT Meeting. RT membership was informal: these dates
cko " attendance.

I

452

pOfEi Joba

1910 -

34

ptfCAl. Sir Patrick

11910 -

37 - ?

gpfARDS, Karcue

1975 -

83

FFSTHAK, Hon Richard

*1910 -

49 - ?

FKilKS, Baron, Sir Oliver

1954 -

59 - ?

GOSB-BOOTH, Baron

1975 -

84

GglGO, Sir Edvard, 1st Baron Altrincham

1912 -

55

BAILET, 1st Baron, Sir Kalcolo

1935 -

69

BAIOKK, Sir Keith

*1924 -

25, 1934

HA1L0V, Vincent

1938 -

50 - ?

BAIKAI, Nicholas

1979 -

83

H1CHBIS, Lionel

1910 -

40

BGLSOS, Henry Vincent

1930 -

present

BGLLA!D<-KARTII), Robert Martin

1909 -

21 - ?

BOLT, John

*1948 -

50

BOEIBT, Richard

1954 -

81

UOESFALL, Percy

1921 -

65

WARD, Sir Michael

1970 -

79

*»ICI, Viscount

*1909 -

11 - ?

BWD, Rt Hon Douglas

1956 -

78

I1GRAK, Derek

1971 -

present

WKSOH, Robert

1970 -

present

J UBS0M, Sir Leander Starr

*1909

Philip, 11th Marquess of Lothian

1909 -

40

^tor-Boyd, Alan, See BOYD

^18, Samuel Clement

1966 -

80

11th Marquess, see KERR

14th Baron, Simon

*1909 -

21 - ?

Sir I vi son

1931 -

74

35

, Bt Hon Malcolm
UCIIITOSH, John
IACLB3D. Alexander

miCOLM, sir Dougal

(AfSBBGH, Hicholas

HAIR IS, Adan Donzll

KAIRIS, Sir Villian

jlACD, Baron Redcliffe-, Sir John

j(ESTOF, 1st Baron, Sir Janos

KILLER, J D B

KIIHER, 1st Viscount, Sir Alfred

KOERAH, Dernot

KOESB, Sir Jereny

OLIVER, Frederick Scott

PEISOS, John Hubert

PESRY, J F

iacdoialb

RAISOH, Rt Hon Tinothy
Redclif fe-Xaud, Baron, see MAUD
Robinson, Geolirey, see DAVSOS
SELBOSSE, 2nd Earl, Vllllam
SttEL-XAnLAHD, Rt Hon Sir Arthur
T80XSOS, David
V «B-GERY, Sir Robert
David

?IlLl **S» Sir Robin
Viscount

^BAM, Hon Hugh, Lord Leconfield
ZlD «8I, Sir Alfred

453

• 1934

1972 - 75
1975 - present
1911 - 55

1947 - 74

1948 - 83
•1909 - 29 - ?

1934 - 79
•1912 - 21 - ?

1973 - 75
1909 - 25
1943 - 74
1960 - 83

1909 - 21
•1934 - 36
•1910 - 33 - ?

1952 - present

1910 - 20 - ?

1909 - 13, 1915 - 21 - ?
1966 - 89
1964/79 - present
1973 - 87
1964 - 93
•1909 - 10 - ?

*1913 - 29 - ?

1914 - 19 - ?

454

I22BB31I-C.

' S 0^TA£LE.£WRL<*&* BY SUBJECT ,_l91Q-66__ai

11. 10

9. 14

12. 18

12.39

12. 45

to

to

to

to

to

6. 14

9. 18

9.39

9. 45

3.66

gapire/Cwealth Relations

7. 1

3. 6

5.5

3.7

6.3

(financial/econ)

(-)

<-)

<1. 0>

(0.6)

(1.2)

UK inc H Ireland
(I Ireland) '

24.5'

21.7'

11.6

<0. 4)

15.6

(0.2)

14.5
(2. 7)

<iinancial/econ)

(4.4)

<10. 5>

(3.8)

(6.3)

(4.7)

Ireland/Eire 1

(8. 9) '

<8. 4)'

7.5

5.7

Canada

11.8

8.3

8. 0

7. 1

7.7

Austral ia

10. 7

8.4

8.3

6.5

7.5

law Zealand

10. 0

6.9

8. 0

7.3

5.8

South Africa 2

10.6

5. 1

8. 1

7.3

7. I 2

ladia/Pakistan

6.9

4.4

7.8

8. i

9.6

Ejypt/Paloctine 3

0.6

0.8

1.8

0.5

Vest Africa

-

-

0 . 1

-

1.1

East Africa

-

-

1 . 1

0 . 1

2. 1

Central Africa

-

-

0. 4

0 . 1

3.3

etc Eapire/Cwealth

-

-

0. 4

0.2

2.9

Bapire/Cwealth (total)

82.2

59.2

68.6

62.3

67.9

International Relations*

7. 4

25. Q a

12. 0

22.3*

6.4

(iinancial /econ)

<->

(0.8)

(3.3)

(2.1)

(2.9)

USA

-

8.0

6.5

6.7

7.1

Europe

7.3

7. 0

8.9

4.4

5.5

Ureland/Eire) '

6.2'

<3gypt/ Pale stine)*

1.4*

Kiddle East

-

-

0.2

1.0

2.0

Asia/Pacific

3. 1

-

3.7

3. 1

2.9

etc

0 . 1

0.2

0.6

International (total)

L7.8

40.6*

31.4

37.7*

32.1

drived fron number oi pages devoted to each subject; overlapping subjects
<e 3 "India and Commonwealth Relations") apportioned equally.

1 Ireland and Eire included in UK to 9.16 (sub-total includes N Ireland);
Included in Eapire/Cwealth to 9.45.

2 South Africa included in Smpire/Cwealth throughout (includes
Protectorates).

T E 8ypt' Palestine included in Eapire/Cwealth to 9.45.

4 International relations includes war coverage /peace alms, 1914-16 and

1939 - 45 .

0ELU&

k apttcj.fs ry mith™? inm

IQ-66 (%>

11. 10

12. 18

12.39

12.45

to

to

to

to

6. 14

9.39

9. 45

3.66

•JaXlSjZ articles

\ Identified by London RTer

49(57)

58(71)

47(58)

28(46)

27(32)

■ ■ by Dominion RTer/gp

17(20)

-

5(6)

2(3)

10(12)

■ ■ by non-RTer

19(23)

23(29)

29(36)

31(51)

48(56)

1 unidentified

15

19

19

39

15

•Chronicle" articles

l identified by London

RTer

15(16)

1(2)

4(4)

16(16)

2(2)

• " by Dominion

RTer/gp

81(84)

83(95)

57(61)

52(54)

42(42)

• - by non-RTer

-

2(3)

32(35)

29(30)

55(56)

X unidentified

4

14

7

3

1

Derived Iron number oi articles by each author.

Figure in brackets denotes % o f total identified.

'Ibnlnion RTer/gp" includes ail articles sent by overseas RT groups.

Joint articles counted as half.

'Chronicle articles": all articles from UK, Canada, Australia, Sew Zealand,
South Africa printed in second half of review; Indian articles from June
W18, Irish articles from June 1925, printed in second half; US articles
iron June 1920 (printed in either half); Pakistan articles from March 1948,
teotral African articles from June 1954, Hast African articles from Dec
1^4 to Sept 1958, printed in second half.

Sprints of documents, speeches, etc not counted.

jflgSKL OF TE£ L 1

12^: EITOK/iFHICAL ffQTES

^p ftl 1GHAK . 1st Baron, see GEIGG.

jjpET. Rt Hon Leopold Charles Maurice Stennett <1873-1955):
b Gorakhpur, UP, India; s. of Charles F Anery (Indian Forest Dept), brought
up by oother in England from 1877 <fci& Harold killed In action 1916); a
1910 Adel 1 2 a Florence (Brydde), d. of John Hanar Greenwood of Ontario,
s l6ter of 1st Viscount Greenwood; 2 a (elder John executed for treason
1945, younger Julian Conseivative politician). Fduo Harrow. Balliol
College Oxford <lst in Greats 1896); Fellow of All Souls 1897; 1896-97
private sec to Leonard Courtney X? ; 1898 " Xanchester Guardian" cor res in
Balkans; 1899-1909 " Tine s" staff <SA war corres, ed " Times History of the
Si Far"); 1902 called to Bar; 1907-10? funded by Rhodes Trust;

U E6UCcessful Unionist candidate 1906, 1908, Jan and Dec 1910; 1911-45
Unionist/Ccnservative MP for Sparkbrook/S Birmingham; founder member of
Bapire Parlt Asscn; 1914-16 nember of Intelligence Service, Flanders and
Balkans <Lt Col); 1916-10 Asst Sec to Var Cabinet; 1918-21 Milner's Parlt
Under-Sec at CO; from 1919 Rhodes Trustee; 1921-22 Parlt and Financial Sec
to Admiralty; FC 1922; 1922-23 First Lord of the Admiralty; 1924-29 Sec of
State for Colonies <from 1925 also for Dominion Affairs); 1940-45 Sec of
State for India; CR 1945; pubs inc "Ky Political Life " <3 vols, 1953-55).

AIGLESEY . 6t,h Marquess of, Charles Henry Alexander Paget, succeeded cousin
1905 <1885-1947): £ of Lord Alexander Paget; m 1912 Lady Victoria Manners;
Is, 5 d- Educ. Eton, Sandhurst; Royal Horse Guards; Lord Chamber la i n to
Queen Mary 1922-47; GCVO 1928.

AtSTIT. Dennis Gilbert <b. 1922): Research Fellow, ICS and Chatham House;
!«ader in Commonwealth Studies, Dniv of London; 1960-83 Prof of Government,
Ianchester Univ; Many pubs on Africa.

BIKER. Sir Herbert, kt 1926 <1862-1946): s. of T H Baker; m Florence
fcaeades; 3 a, 1 d.. Fduc Tonbridge School; qualified as architect;

Practised at Cape Town, 1892-1902, Transvaal 1902-1913, London and Delhi
Hereafter; works include Groote Schuur, Rhodes Memorial, Hew Delhi
kgislativ© Buildings, Cover omen t Houses at Hairobi and Mombasa, Rhodes
fouse Oxford, Bank of England; KCIE 1930.

JJKXQI. Leonard (1929-71): Montreal; married Katherine Bougarel of

J r »oce, 1 d. EdU£. West mount High School, McGill Univ, St Catherine's
plug* Canbridge; staff Montreal "Gazette"; 1954-56 London staff Reuters;
”66 naval corres " Tinted'; 1957-62 defence corres " Guardiart ' (also reported
Co ^n Market negotiations); 1963-65 Director, Institute for Strategic

457

l^jes; Found Table editor 1965-70;
doited Times.

1970-71 freelance Journalist;

1971

H22, Rt Hon Alan Tindal Lennox-, 1st Viscount, cr 1960 (1904-33): a of
jlatJ Valter Lennox-Boyd; m 1935 Lady Patricia Guiness; 3 a. Educ Sherborne,
Clrist Church Oxford; unsuccessful candidate (Conservative) 1929; HP for
lid-Beds (Conservative) 1931-60; Parlt Sec, Kin of Labour 1938-39; Min of
food 1939-40; Min of Aircraft Production 1943-45; PC 1951; Kin of State,
Colonial Office 1951-52, Transport 1952-54; Colonial Secretary 1954-59;
bnaglng Director Arthur Guiness, Sons & Co 1960-67; various directorships;
OB) 1961-64, President 1964-83 Royal Commonwealth Soc; Chun VSO 1962-64;

CH I960.

Robert Henry, Baron, cr 1946 (1873-1963): a of 2nd 7iscount Hampden
(Unionist MP and Governor NSW); a 1917 Phyllis Langhorne (d. 1937), sister
of Jatcy Astor; 1 a (killed in action 1945), 2 d.. Ellii Marlborough, Mew
College Oxford (1st in Modern History 1901); 1901 Fellow of All Souls;

1902- 09 Asst Sec and Sec to Inter-Colonial Council of Transvaal and ORC;

1903- 09 sec to Transvaal delegates, SA National Convention; 1909-60
Director Lazard Bros & Co Ltd, 1922-59 Director Times Publishing Co,
director Lloyd's Bank and other financial institutions; 1915-18 member
Imperial Munitions Board, Ottawa; 1917-18 Deputy Chairavan, British Mission
la Vashington; 1919 financial adviser to Lord Robert Cecil at Versailles;
1920 Tice-President, International Finance Conf, Brussels; 1922 SA
financial rep, Genoa Conference; 1929-31 member Macmillan Ctee on Finance
atd Itdustry; 1941-44 Chairnan British Food Mission. Washington; 1944-46
Sep RX Treasury, Washington (UK delegate at Bretton Woods and Savannah
Confs); 1951-56 member BBC General Advisory Council; CHO 1913; pubs Inc
*Vsr and National Finance" (1921).

2KQ££, Rt Hon Henry, Baron Brooke of Cumnor, cr 1966 (1903-34); s. of
Lecnard Leslie Brooke, artist and Illustrator; older brother killed In
action 1918; xu 1933 Barbara Mathews, Conservative activist, ij_ Baroness
Brcoke of Tstradf elite 1964; 2 £ (inc Peter, Conservative politician), 2 d.
&£ Karl borough, Balliol College Oxford (2nd in Greats 1926); 1926-27
tutor in philosophy, Balliol; 1927-30 staff of Economist; 1930-35 member,
1936-38 deputy director, Conservative Research Dept; 1938-45 Conservative
I? for Vest Lewisham; 1941-42 editor The Found Table; 1944-54 member,

Cettral Housing Advisory Ctee; 1945-55 member, London County Council; 1950-
66 Conservative XP for Hampstead; 1954-57 Financial Sec to Treasury; 1957-
6' 1 Xio of Housing and Local Government; 1961-62 Chief Sec to Treasury and
tywster-Geaeral ; 1962-64 Hone Secretary; 1971-73 Chairman, Joint Select

Ct«e

on Delegated Legislation; PC 1955, CH 1964.

Sir Harold Beresford, kt 1946 (1883-1951): & of Dr A J Butler; a
'*t0 Olive Waters of Dublin; 2 a, l i- Edu_CL Eton, Balliol College Oxford

Alt

*o*rd;

'n Greats 1905); 1905-12 Fellow of All Souls; 1907-08 Local Govt

, 1908-14 Hone Office; 1914-17 Foreign Office; 1917-19 Ministry of

4our ; 1920-32 deputy director, 1932-30 director ILO; 1939-43 Warden of

458

jtffield College; 1942-46 Minister at H X Embassy, Vashingt on; CB 1919, KCXG
1946; a**/ P ub «-

g^£QE, Sir Olaf Kirkpatrick Krunse, kt 1944 (1892-1961): s. of Via Douglas
Caroe, ecclesiastical architect; a 1920 Frances Morion Rawstorne, 2 a-
glia Winchester, Jtagdalon College Oxford (2nd in classical oods 1913);
1914-19 Queen's Regiment (Capt); 1919 entered ICS, 1923-32 posts in HVFP,
Persia 0 Gulf, Vazlristan, Baluchistan; 1933-34 Chief Sec to Governor FVFP;
1934-39 Deputy Sec, 1939-45 Sec External Affairs Dept, Govt of Indio; 1946-
47 Governor HVFP; CIE 1932, CSI 1941, KCIE 1944, KCSI 1945; 1951 Vice-
ChairnBn, Overseas League; 1959-77 President, Tibetan Society of OK; 1966-
69 Deputy Chairman, 1969 7ice President, Conservative Commonwealth Council;
M ny pubs.

f f EGIL . Lord (Edgar Algernon) Robert, 7iscount of Chelwoud, cr 1923 <1864-
1958): & of 3rd Marquess of Salisbury, fciJi of Lady Selborne; a 1889 Lady
Eleanor Lambton, i of 2nd Earl of Durham. EsikiL Eton, Univ College Oxford
( 2 nd in Jurisprudence 1886, President Union); 1886-88 private sec to
lather; 1887 called to Bar, 1899 QC; 1906-10 Conservative MP for East
Earylebone; 1911-23 Independent Conservative MP for fiitchln; PC 1915; 1915-
18 Par It Under-Sec for Foreign Affairs, 1916-18 Minister for Blockade;

19L8-19 Asst Sec of State for Foreign Affairs; 1919 Chairman, Supreme
Economic Council, Versailles; 1920-22 SA delegate, LHs; 1923-45 President
Lis Union; 1923 Lord Privy Seal (resigned over Velsh Disestablishment);
1924-27 Chancellor of D of Lancaster (resigned over Cabinet oppn to
disarmament) ; 1928-30 President, Fat Assocn of Building Societies; 3924
Voadrow Vi Ison Peace Prize; 1937 Uobel Peace Prize; CH 3950; many pubs, Inc
'A Great Experiment: an Autobiography (1941).

CB1RQL , Sir Valentine, kt 1912 (1852-1929): of Kev Alexander Chirol;
ae?er married. Educ France, Germany, Sorbonne; 1872-76 clerk in FO; 1876-
92 travelling corres for London " Standard* etc; 3892-97 Berlin corres
Times"; 1897-99 deputy director, 1899-1912 director "Times" foreign
department; 1912-14 member of EC on Indian Public Services; 1915 FO Mission
to Balkans; many pubs Inc " Fifty Years in a Changing Vorl<T (1927).

£*KI£LLa, Loring C (1885-1941): fc. Amherst, Fova Scotia. Educ Acadia Univ,
^vard Law School (LIB 1909); lived in USA 1909-13; 1913-23 legal adviser
t0 Dept of External Affairs, Ottawa; member, Canadian delegation at
tersaiUes; 1923 moved to London to take up financial career; 1935-39 again
ie 3al adviser to DEA, Ottawa; 1939-41 Canadian Minister to US.

££a 2Uffi, Sir Reginald, kt 1944 (1884-1952): s. of Sidney Coupland, doctor;
»«ver married. Educ Vinchester, Few College Oxford (1st in Greats 1907);
W-13 fellow and Lecturer in Ancient History, Trinity College Oxford;

* 13 T8 Beit Lecturer in Colonial History, Oxford; 1920-48 Beit Frofessor
History of British Empire, Oxford, and Fellow of All Souls; Round Table
iter 1917-19 and 3939-41; 1939-50 Fellow of Puffield College Oxford;

RC on Superior Civil Services in India, 1923; Adviser, Burma Round

Table Conference, 1931;
jjgeion to India, 1942;
% and politics.

number, RC on Palestine, 1936-37; member, Cripps
CIE 1928, KCJIG 1944; many pjbs on Imperial history

CKiJX, George Lillie, 2nd Baronet, Inherited title 1927 (1874-1929): &.
of Rt Hon Sir Henry Cralk, Conservative XP; a 1923 Mary Frances, i of Rt
Hon Alfred Lyttelton HP. Etillfi. Eton, Hew College Oxford; 1899 enlisted in
City Imperial Volunteers; 1903-09 legal adviser, Transvaal Chamber of
Cosaerce; 1910-14 Chief Constable, Ketropolitan Police; 1914-19 Lovat
Scouts (Capt, wounded, MC) ; 1919-29 Managing Director, Common wealth Trust
Ltd.

CffiflflBE . Sir Geoffrey, kt 1957, Baron Crowther of Headingley, cr 1963
(1907-72); a of Dr Charles Crowther, agricultural chemist; a 1932 Margaret
Vortt of Delaware, USA; 2 4 i. Educ Leeds Grammar School, Oundle, Clare

College Cambridge (1st, Modern Languages and Economics); Yale and Columbia
(Coaconwealth Fund Fellow 1929-31); 1932-35 staff, 1935-33 asst editor,
1938-56 editor, Economist ; 1931-32 adviser to Irish Government; wartime
service in Kin of Supply 1940-41, Min of Information 1941-42, Min of
Production 1942-43; 1955-60 Chairman, Central Advisory Council for
Education (Eng), author of "Crowther Report"; 1963-71 Chairman, Ctee on
Consumer Credit; 1969-72 Chairman, Commission on the Constitution; numerous
coapany directorates; Chancellor, Open University, 1969-72; pubs Inc An
Outline of Honey (1941).

CPRTIS . Lionel George (1872-1955): a of Rev George J Curtis; m 1920 Gladys
Edna (Pat), d of Prebendary Scott of Tiverton. Educ Haileybury, lew
College Oxford (3rd in Greats 1395); private sec to Leonard Courtney XP
then Lord Velby, Chairman London County Council; 1899 enlisted as despatch
rider, CIV; 1902 called to Bar; 1901 acting, 1902-04 Tow Clerk,

Johannesburg; 1904-06 Acting Colonial Sec, Transvaal; 1906-09 Organizing
Sec for SA Closer Union Societies, 1907-10 member, Transvaal Legislative
Council; General Sec for Round Table from 1910; 1912-13 Beit Lecturer in
Colonial History, Oxford; 1919 member of Life section, British delegation,
Versailles; 1920 founder (R>11A (Hon Sec 1920-30, Councillor 1934,

President 1944-55); 1921 Sec to Anglo-Irish Conference, 1921-24 CO adviser
01 Irish affairs; 1923-55 Fellow of All Souls; 2VV, R11A Liaison Officer in
toford; CH 1949; offered knighthood, but refused, 1924; nominated for Wobel
Peace Prize, 1947; numerous publications.

gffiQI, (George) Geoffrey, Robinson (1874-1944): §. of George Robinson,
Ranker ; changed name 1917 after inheriting Dawson family estate at Sottle,
Jerks; B 1919 Cecilia Lowley, d of Sir Arthur Lawley, 6th Baron Venlock; 1
2 d- Edui. Eton, Magdalen College Oxford (1st in Greats 1897); 1898 All
50018 Fellow; 1893 Post Office; 1399-1901 Colonial Office; 1901-05 private
500 to Milner; 1905-10 editor, Johannesburg " Star* , 1906-10 n TinesT SA
^rree; 19U & t a ff " Times? , editor 1912-19 and 1923-41; Pound Table editor
H9-20 and 1942-44; 1919-23 Estates Bursar, All Souls, and director,
J^Udated Gold Fields of SA Ltd; 1921-22 Sec to Rhodes Trustees, 1925
'rust

460

i

nQjjl, John (1872-1934): S of John Matthew Dovo < Managing Director of
^llrerpool, London & Globe Insurance Co); never carried. Educ Rugby. Few
College Oxford (Greats); 1898 called to Bar; 1903-05 Asst, 1905-07 Town
V clerk. Johannesburg; 1907-11 Chairman, Transvaal Land Settlement Board;

1917-18 member Var Office Intelligence Dept; 1918-20 Director, Commonwealth
Tr6 st Ltd; Pound Table editor 1920-34.

jfffQAF. Rt Hon Sir Patrick (1870-1943): 5 . of John Duncan, tenant farmer of
Banffshire; a 1016 Alice Dold, 3 &. (2nd killed in action 1942), 1 d-
^George Vatson's College Edinburgh, Edinburgh Univ, Balliol College
Oxford ( 1 st in Greats 1893); called to Bar; KC 1924; entered civil service
1894, private see to Xilner at Board of Inland Revenue; 1S01-C3 Colonial
Treasurer, 1903-07 Colonial Secretary, 1906-07 Acting Lt-Gov, Transvaal;

BA for Fordsburg 1910-20 and Yeoville 1921-36; 1921-24 Minister of
Interior, Public Health and Education; 1933-36 Minister of Nines; 1937-43
Governor-General of SA; CMC 1904, GCXG and FC 1937.

fEETHAM . Hon Richard (1874-1965): a. of Rev Vm Feethom; is 1920 Leila, i of L
V Christopher of Ladysmith; Is, 2d. Esius. Marlborough, Few College Oxford
(2nd in Greats 1897); called to Bar 1899; KC 1919; legal staff, London
County Council; 1902 Deputy, 1903-00 Town Cieik, Johannesburg; 1905-10
legal adviser to High Commissi one: oA; 1907-10 nenber Transvaal Legis
Council; 1915-23 XLA for Paiktown; 1916-19 1 st Batt Cape Corps <Lt); Judge,
Supreme Court Transvaal 1923-30, Fatal 1931-39, SA 1939-44; Chairnan, Ctee
on Functions (India) 1910-19; Chinn, Irish Boundary Coimisslon 1924-25;

Chan, Local Govt Commission, Kenya 1926; Adviser, Shanghai Municipal
Council 1930-31; Chnn, Transvaal Asiatic Land Tenure Act Coiinilssion, 1932-
35; Chmn, Vi t watersrand Land Titles Commission, 1946-49; CMC 1924.

FiiSKS , Rt Hon Sir Oliver Shewell, Kt 1946, Baron Franks of Headlngton <b.
19)5): ^ of Rev R S Franks; m 1931 Barbara Hay Tanner; 2 &. Educ Bristol
Oraauar School, Queen's College Oxford; Fellow 1935-37; Prof of Philosophy,
Glasgow 1937-45; Min of Supply 3939-46 (Fermt Sec 1945-46); Provost of
keen's College Oxford 1946-48; British Ambassador to Washington 1348-52;

^ 1949; Director 1953-75, Chnn 1954-62 Lloyd's Bank; various other
directorships; Chnn Commission of Inquiry into Oxford Univ 1964-66, Ctee on
Official Secrets Act 1971-72, Ctee on Ministerial Memoirs 1976, Falkland
Islands Review Ctee 1982; Frovost of Worcester College Oxford 1962-76;
Chancellor of Univ of E Anglia 1965-34; CBE 1942, KCB 1946, GCMG 1952, CM
1977 > KCV0 1985.

5*^2. Rt Hon Sir Edward Vi Ilian Kacleay, kt 1920, 1 st Baron Altrincham, cr
! Hs (1879-1955): h Madras, India; a of Henry Bidewell Grigg (ICS); a 1923
J 03 Joan Dickson- Poynder, si of Lord Islington; 2 a (elder John disclaimed
!* lle 1963), 1 d. Educ Winchester. Hew College Oxford (3rd in Greats
9)2) ; staff " Times? 1903; asst editor "Outlook 19C5-06; 1908-14 head of
r'Jonial Dept, Times’*; 1914-19 Grenadier Guards <Lt Col, KC, DSO); 1919-20
^‘itary Sec to Prince of Vales; 1921-22 private sec to Lloyd George; 1922-
* a tional Liberal XF (Oldham); 1922-25 sec to Rhodes Trustees; 1925-30
^nor Kenya and High Commissioner East Africa; 1932 Chnn, Milk

k

•« ^organisation Ctee; 1933-45 Conservative MP (Altrincham); 1939-40 Parlt
-Sec to Minister of Information; 1940 Financial Sec, 1940-42 Joint Farit
Under- Sec, Var Office; 1944 PC; 1944-45 Minister Resident in Kiddie East;
1948-54 editor "National Review' (from 1950 '’National and English RevieW)-,
CXG 1919, KCVO 1920, KCHG 1928; many pubs.

BAILE£| Rt Hon Sir (Villiam) Malcolm, kt 1922, 1st Baron, cr 1936 <1872-
1969): a of Hammett Hailey (surgeon); a 1596 Andrelna, & of Count Hannibale
3alzani; 1 s. (killed in 2W> , l d. <d. 1922). Educ Merchant Taylors, Corpus
Gbrlsti Oxford (1st in Greats 1894); 1895 joined ICS; 1912-18 Chief
-onmissloner Delhi; 1916-17 member of Govt of India Reforms Ctee; 1919-22
finance Member, 1922-24 Home Member, Executive Council; 1924-28 Governor
Punjab; 1928-30 and 1931-34 Governor UP; 1930-31 delegate, Round Table
Gonfs; 1935-33 Director, African Research Survey ("An African Sjrve /' 1938,
revised 1957); 1935-39 member, LHs Permt Mandates Comal ssi on; 1937-38 chmn,
Air Defence Ctee; 1938-39 chmn Ctee for Co-ordination of York on Refugees;
1940-41 head of Econ Mission to Belgian Congo; 1946-66 Rhodes Trustee; ?C
1949; 1953-56 member General Advisory Council B3C; roenber o* gov bodies
50 AS, Int African Inst, Royal Central Asian Soc, Royal African Soc; CIE
1911, CSI 1915, KCSI 1922, GCIE 1923, GCSI 1932, GCKG 1939, OK 1950; many
pubs.

HAIGCCK , Sir William Keith, kt 1953 (1893-1985): k Melbourne; a of Rev Vm
Hancock; a 1) 1925 Theaden Brocklebank (d. i960), 2> 1961 Marjorie Eyre.

Educ Melbourne CEGS, Melbourne Univ, Balliol College Oxford (Rhodes Scholar
1922, 1st in Modern History 1923); Fellow of All Souls 1923-30; Prof of
Modern History, Adelaide 1926-33, Birmingham 1934-44; 1941 Supervisor of
Civil Histories, Var Cabinet Office; 1949-56 Prof of British Commonwealth
Affairs and Director of ICS, London Univ; 1957-65 Prof of History, AM,
thereafter Emeritus Professor; XSE 1365; many pubs.

BAJLQi, Vincent Todd (1893-1961): s. of Rev Vincent Harlow; m 1924 Margretta
Badcock. Educ Durham School, Brasenose College Oxford; 1917-19 Royal Field
Artillery; 1923-27 Lecturer in Mod History, Southampton; 1928-33 Keeper of
Rhodes House Library; 1930-35 Beit Lecturer; 1938-48 Rhodes Prof, London;
1939-45 Empire Division, Min of Information; 1950-61 Beit Prof; 1950-51
Conaissioner for Constitutional Reform, British Guiana; 1951-52
institutional Consultant, Sudan; 1953 Anglican Member, British Council of
Churches; CMG 1952; many pubs.

SiCHEIS, (Villiam) Lionel (1874-1940): posthunous a of John Ley Hichens of
st Ives, brought up by mother Catherine; a 1919 Herraione, & of Rt Hon Gen
s *r Seville Lyttelton; 3 s, 3 d- Educ. Winchester, Hew College Oxford;

‘aster at Sherborne School; 1899-1900 CIV; 1900-01 Egyptian Ministry of
Stance; 1901-02 Town Treasurer, Johannesburg; 1902-07 Colonial Treasurer,
Tr *nsvaal; 1907 member, RC on Decentralization in India; 1909 Chmn, Board
of Inquiry into public services of S Rhodesia; 1910-40 Chnn Camnell Laird &
(shipbuilders) ; 1914-18 Chnn, Central Council of Assocn of Controlled
Flr *s; 1915 Imperial Munitions Board, Ottawa; director, English Steel Corp,

LondoD Kldland a Scottish Railways etc; member Carnegie UK Trust; pubs on
.•industrial partnership" ; killed In bombing raid on London.

BQES3S. Harold Vincent <b. 1906): & of Prof T C Hodson (expert on ethnology
Of India); a 1933 Margaret Elizabeth Honey of Sydney; 4 &. Kduc Greshams,
Balliol College Oxford; Fellow of Ail Souls 1928-35; 1930-31 staff of
Economic Advisory Council; 1931-3; asst ed, 1934-39 editor The Round Table ;
1939-41 Director Empire Division, Ministry of Information; 1941-42 Reforms
Cosnissloner, Govt of India; 1942-45 Kin of Production; 1946-50 Asst
Editor, 1950-61 Editor " Sunday rimes’'; 1961-71 Provost of Ditchley; editor
1973-88, Consultant Editor 1938-93 " Annual Register*-, many pubs.

fiOLLAEK -KARTIS), Robert Martin (1872-1944): of Rev Frederick Vhitmore

Holland; u 1397 Eleanor Mary Martin; 6 a; took surname Martin in addition
to Holland 1917. EdiiiL Eton, Trinity College Oxford; director Martin's Bank
Ltd; director, Union Discount Co of London, Gas Light and Coke Co, Alliance
Assurance Co; chmn, Southern Railway; 1903-35 Hon Sec Bankers' Clearing
House.

EM. John Alphonse (1906-68): a of Robert langstaff Holt; a 1937 Pamela
Esther (ne6 Holt); 1 &, 2 4 EiLbi. Radley, Merton College Oxford; served in
RA and TA 1938-45 (Vest Africa, France, Belgium, Germany: MBE) ; Chmn 1949-
67, director 1967-63 John Holt A Co (Liverpool); director, Cunard Steamship
Co.

EORSBY , Richard Phipps <b. 1922) s. of Rt Rev Hugh Leicester Hornby; ja 1951
Stella Hichens; 3 3 <i. Educ Winchester, Trinity College Oxford (2nd in

Xod History, 1948); 1941-45 Kings Royal Rifle Corps; Master, Eton College
19*8-50; joined Unilever 1951-52, J Valter Thompson & Co 1952-31 (director
1974-81); 1955 and 1956 unsuccessful Conservative candidate; 1956-74 XP for
Tonbridge (Conservative); 1959-63 PPS to Duncan Sandys; 1963-64 junior
sinister, CRO and CO; 1969-74 member, B3C Gen Advisory Council; 1970-72
Kaber, ctee of Inquiry into Intrusions into Privacy; 1971-74 British
Council Exec Ctee; 1976-33 director, 1983-90 Chmn Halifax Building Society.

[ SQ2SPALL, Percy (1338-1965): h Yorks, moved to S Africa at early age; m
Victoria College Stellenbosch, Oxford (1st in Greats 1912): 1932-13
kcturer in Classics, Stellenbosch; 1913-19 private sec to Governor-General
High Commissioner SA; 1919-23 employed by English Electric Co Ltd (asst
kiaging Director 1926-23, non-executive director from 3930); director of
subsidiaries Marconi Vireles* Telegraph and Marconi International Marine
fr 0a 1946; 1930-37 head of Issues Dept, 1937-47 Managing Director, 1947-61
Erector, Lazard Bros; director, English Electric Valve Co from 1947.

Viscount, Charles Robert Grey, succeeded father 1917 (1879-1963): £.
? *th Bari Grey; a 1906 lady Mabel Palmer, 4 2nd Earl of Selbourne; 1 4.
^Private; Life Guards; unsuccessful Conservative candidate 1910; 3914-
ssrved on Western front; landowner/ farmer .

£ABSS2fl> Rt Hon Sir Leander Starr o ar r> *

of Robert Jameson, Journalist; never married a ®® 3 “ 1917>: ^Edinburgh; a
College London; Qualified as doctor 1 S 7 *' O°dolphln School, Ifnlv

negotiations with Lobenaula- iaqiIos a \ r° Ved to S Afrlca 1889-90

led Jameson Raid, sentenced to 1*3 mnj x" * lstrator > Kashonaland; 1895-96
Ladysmith; 1900-10 member of Can* sonant; defence of

Jinister Cape Colony; PC 1907- 19io-?> f ° r fciml>erle y. 1904-08 Prime

to England 1912; 1902-13 director -q “ o *°' Harbour; returned

' iyi3 “* 7 President, British SA Co.

(1882-1940): & of ^Jor-Gen 1 !^^!^ ° f succ ^ded cousin 1930

Howard d of 14tb Duke of *or£lk^ *" d Lad * Ann * Pitealan n 6 e
1914. Eluii Oratory School Edgbaisto/ kIlled action

History 1904); 1905-08 asst do Inte^ T f? rd <Ut In Xodern
Transvaal Indigency Commission 9 t o, , 1 CouncI1 ; 1907-08 sec

ne Round Table; private s*o t i ri-!, ? edltor "The State”; 1910-16 editor
Chronicle” 1921-22,- sec to Rhodea i916 " 21i edltor

Duchy of Lancaster , 1031-3? ? arit u' le *1* ‘ 9 ? 5 39 ’ !931 Chancellor of
Indian Franchise cie. run Cov“ov^ nuf ° f Stdte for !ndia - :93 2 Ch™
libassador to US; CH 1920, KT 1940. agreements); PC 1S39; 1939-40

L^IE. S.JJJ.I «•«.* t Perth, VA; . 1924 Doris

service 1WV, Balliol Col le^OxfordrBhJ^fi * e } bajne ^ after war
Lecturer in Philosophy, OnU “ll n . Tv DFhI1): 1922 ~ 2 ~

l»«i so»« T pu MI cations^ 1 "' “ IreU '" 1 Dftve! '>P«"t Council, 1955-65; CEE

nth Karouess,

see KERR.

!f??’ S i“" lose P* Frase r, 14th Baron, Inherited title 1887 < 1871 - 1933 ,.

«££ “T* ^ • °F'ahderra d *rian^l fe cKr

Unions ■ l2L3TrS ° n n 0reStry i ? f 7 ’ 28 ?arlt ^r-Sec of sut 8 for
Wness-shuf r 9 A 0ver f eas oettlenent Cteo, 1929-33 convener,

“2th acres n S^oUand I " ter ' >sts South Africa and

ffSiHAH,

(JW^ Sir Ivlson Stevenson, kt 1955 (1894-1974): 5 of V Ivlsnr

3 d' Ba lSt i y ; “‘"‘“'S”* " I** Carol 1 no lad/co, tett oTcrZon DS-
4 - Kelvll]e <«>•«• ^ioburgh, King.* College London Cbrist^

464

College Cambridge; 1914 19 City of Edinburgh Royal Engineers (Archangel
1919) ; Sec and Director-General RiiA 1929-55; Asst Director-General and
principal Asst Sec, Ministry of Information 1939-41; editor, - Annual
feglstei " , 1947-73; founding President and Trustee, National Union of
Students; Deputy President, Victoria League; Council Member and Fellow,
ling's College London; QBE 1919, CBE 1935, KCVO 1974.

^rDOSALD. Rt Hon Malcolm John (1901-81): s. of Ramsay MacDonald; a 1946
Audrey Fellowes Rowley; 1 d. MlKL Bedales, Queen's College Oxford; 1923,

1924 unsuccessful Labour candidate; LCC 1927-30; M? for Bassetlav 1929-31
(Labour), 1931-35 (National Labour); XP for Ross and Cromarty 1936-45 (Nat
C<jvt>; Farit Under Sec, Dominions Office 1931-35; PC 1935; Sec of State for
Dominions 1935-39, Colonies 1935 and 1938-40; Kin of Health 1940-41; High
Commissioner Canada 1941-46; Gov Gen Malaya 1946-48; Corar-Gen SE Asia 1948-
56; High Commissioner India 1955-60; Gov Gen Kenya 1963-64, HC 1964-65;
special envoy 1966-69; Rhodes Trustee 1948-57; Chancellor Durham 1970-81,
Pres Royal Commonwealth Soc 1971-81 and VSD 1975-81; OM 1969.

IALCQLM, Sir Dougal Orme, kt 1933 (1377-1955); s. of Vm Rolle Malcolm
(banker) and Georgina, d of Lord Charles Vellesley; a 1) 1910 Dora Claire
Stopford (d. 1920), 2) 1923 Lady Evelyn Farquhar, widow of Col Francis
Farqufcar. Educ Eton, New College Oxford (1st In Greats 1899); Fellow of
111 Souls 1899; Colonial Office 1900; 1905-10 private se«-: to Lord Sel borne;
1910-11 private sec to Lord Grey, Gov-Gen Canada; 1912 Treasury; 1912
director, 1937 President British South Africa Co; director of nunerous
oth?r British and BA/ Rhodes! an companies; 1925-23 Chan, Ctee on Education
and Industry; 1928 n»mb*r, British Economic Mission to Australia; Vice-
Cbair, Court of Governors LS5; KCXG 1938.

lAiSBFGH , Philip Nicholas Seton (1910-1991): h. Tipperary, Ireland; s. of
?hil 1 p St George Mansergh (landowner); a 1939 Diana Xary Keeton; 3 a, 2d-
idia. Abbey School Tipperary, College of St Columbia Dublin, Pembroke
College Oxford; 1937-40 Tutor in Politics; 1941-44 member, 1944-46
director, Empire Division Ministry of Information; 1946-47 Asst Sec
‘'opinions Office; 1947-03 Bailey Prof of Commonwealth Relations, R11A;

*>ber, editorial board - Annual Register* 1947-73; Councillor, R11A 1953-
5?; 1053-70 Smuts Professor, Cambridge, thereafter Emeritus Professor;
i955-62 member, General Advisory Council BBC; 1966-76 member, Advisory
^uncil on Public Records; editor-in-chief, India Office Records on
Transfer of Power, from 1967; Master of St John's College Cambridge 1969-79
'fellow 1950-91); OBE 1945; numerous pubs.

(Adas) Denzil (1906-1983): & of Sir William Karris; a 1934
3 Vaterfieid; 1 &. 2 d.. Educ Winchester, Trinity College Oxford; 1929-39
'"’rice f or Lazard 3ros & Co Ltd; 1939-40 staff, Ministry of Economic
®rfare; 1940-45 Var Trade Dept, British Embassy Washington; 1945-4G
Jncipai Asst Sec, FO; 1947, Deputy Leader vJK delegation to Marshall Plan
Vashlngton Confs; 194 7_ 71 Managing Director, 1971-73 Director, Lazard
^ 4 Co Ltd; Director Barclays Bank, English Scottish 4 Aus Bank, Aus 4

465

1 1 Banking Group, Commercial Union Assurance Co, P & 0 Stean navigation Co;
GJK 1944.

MIS . Sir William Sinclair, kt 1919 <1873-1945): ^ of Chari e» Karris
(accountant), moved to HZ soon after birth; a 1) 1903 Eleanor Hary
FerguS3on <d. 1906) , 1 g. <Denzil Karrl&), 2) 1934 Elizabeth Vllford Good.
BsikSi. Wanganui, Canterbury College, Christ Church Oxford; 1890 ICS; 1896-99
Asst Magistrate UP; 1899-1901 Under-Sec to Governor UP; 1901-04 Under-Sec,
2904-06 Deputy Sec, Home Dept Govt of India; 1906-10 lent to Transvaal
(Civil Service Commissioner); 1910-12 Magistrate and Collector Aligarh, UF;
1913-16 Acting Sec, 1917-19 Joint Sec Home Dept Govt of India; 1919-20
Keiorms Commissioner, 1919-21 Home Sec, Govt of India; 1921-22 Governor
Assam; 1922-28 Governor UP; 1923-29 member, Council of India; 1929-37
Principal, Armstrong (later King's) College, Kewcastle and 1932-34 Vice-
Chancellor, Durham Unlv; CIE 1914, XCIE 1919, KCSI 1921.

IMI2. Sir John PrimaU Sedciiffe, kt 1946, Baron Redcl i f f e-Haud, cr 1967
(1906-1952): s. of John Prlmatt Xaud, Bishop of Kensington; a 1932 Jean
Hamilton (professional pianist); 1 £, 3 & (2 surviving). Educ Eton, Kew
College Oxford (1st in Greats 1928), Harvard; 1929-32 Junior Research
Fellow, 1932-39 Fellow and Dean, University College Oxford <1932 Rhodes
travelling fellowship, studying Johannesburg city govt; 1S37-39 Tutor to
Colonial Administrative Services Course); 1939-43 Master Gf Blrkbeci
College, London; 1941-44 Deputy Sec and Second Sec, Kin of Food; 1944-45
Second Sec and Sec, Kin of Reconstruction; 1945 Sec, Office of Lord
President of Council; 1945-52 Permanent Sec, Kin of Education; 1946-50 UK
delegate to UJTESCO confs; 1952-59 Permanent Sec, Kin of Fuel and Power;
1959-61 High Commissioner, 1961-63 British Ambassador, SA; 1963-76 Master
of University College Oxford; 1964-67 Chairman, Local Govt Management Ctee;
1956-69 member, RC on Local Govt in England; 1973-74 nenber, PX's Ctee on
Looal Govt Rules of Conduct.; member BBC Brains Trust and frequent
broadcaster; CBE 1942, XCB 1946, GCB 1955; pubs on local govt.

SESICE, Sir James Scorgie, kt 1911, 1st Baron Keston of Agra and Eunottar,
cr 1919 (1865-1943): & of James Keston (Aberdeen registrar); m 1891 Jeanie
McDonald CBE; 2s(l surviving). Edui Aberdeen Grajaraar School, Aberdeen
0l, tv, Balliol College Oxford (ICS probationer 1833-35); 1885 ICS, various
P*ts in SVFP and Oudh (later UP); 1399-1903 Financial Sec to Governor UP;
1905-06 lent to Transvaal (adviser on civil service reforn); 19C6-12 Sec to
^loanee Dept, Govt of India; 1912-18 Lieut-Gov UP; 1917 Indian rep at Imp
• ar Conf; 1918-iQ Finance Member, Governor-General's Council; 1919
Chairman, ctee on financial relations Govt of India/provinces; 1920-26
Chairman of Governing Body, 1920-43 member of Council, R11A; 1928
Chancellor, Aberdeen University; 1932 President, Royal Statistical Society;
'»36-43 President , Liberal Party Organisation; chairman of 5 companies,
Sector of 9 others; CSI 1908, KCSI 1011; pubs on India.

Rt Hon Sir Alfred, kt 1895, Baron cr 1901, Viscount cr 1902 <1854-
/25>; t Giessen, Hesse-Darrastadt; s. of Charles Milner (doctor, d. 1882)

4 Kary lerne <d. 1809); ill 1921 Violet Georgina (widow of Lord Edward

466

Cecil, sister of Leo Kaxse; editor "National Revletf 1932-48; d. 1958).

Germany, King's College London, Balllol College Oxford (1st in Greats
1876); 1876 prize Fellow, New College; 1881 called to Bar; 1882-85 staff
• Fail /fell Gazette"; unsuccessful Liberal candidate. Harrow 1885; 1885-89
private sec to GJ Goschen; 1889-92 Director-Gen Accounts and Under-Sec for
finance, Egypt (wrote "England in Egypt*); 1892-97 Chairman, Board of
Inland Revenue; 1897-1905 High Commissioner SA, 1897-1901 Governor Cape,
1900-01 Administrator and 1901-05 Governor, Transvaal and ORC; 1905 Rhodes
Trustee; various City directorships; member, Var Cabinet 1916-18 (missions
to Russia Jan 1917, Douellens March 1913); 1918 Sec of State for Var; 1918-
21 Sec of State for Colonies (1919-20 mission to Egypt); 1921 president
Tariff Advisory Ctee; 1925 Chancellor-elect, Oxford University; CB 1894,

5CB 1895, GCHG 1397, KG 1921; various pubs.

SQBBA1. Dermot Xichaei XacGregor (1896-1974): & of Herbert Arthur Korrah
(novelist and poet); n 1923 Gertrude Ruth Houselander; 2 d- Educ
Fitchester, Hew College Oxford (1st in Xodern History 1921); 1915-19 Royal
Engineers (Palestine and Egypt); Fellow All Souls 1921; 1922-23 civil
servant (Xines Dept); 1928-31 leader-writer “Daily fall*; 1932-61 editorial
staff "The Tiaesf*', editor (part-time) of The Round Table 1944-65; fron 1945
necber, Council of Commonwealth Press Union; 1956-71 Chairman, Press
Freedom Ctee; 1961-67 leader-writer “Daily Telegraph"; from 1953 Arundel
Herald Extraordinary; many pubs on royalty.

KQESE . Sir (Christopher) Jeremy, *t 1975 (b. 1928): s. of Francis John
Xorse; a 1955 Belinda Kills; 3 a, Id- EdiuL. V inch ester, New College Oxford
(1st in Greats 1953); Fellow of All Souls 1953-68 ar.d fron 1983; Joined
Glyn, Kills & Co; Director, Bank of England 1965-72; Chnn, Ctee of Twenty,
IXF, 1972-74; 1975-77 Deputy Chnr,, 1977 on, Chmn Lloyd's Bank; director of
ICl and other companies; Chancellor of Bristol Univ from 1989; KCXO 1975.

OLIVER , Frederick Scott (1364-1934): £. of John Scott Oliver (nerchant) and
Catherine (d. l$69>j n 1393 cousin Katharine Augusta, d of lord McLaren; 2
S. 1 i- Ediui. George Vatson's College, Edinburgh Univ, Trinity College
^abridge; 1889 called to Bar; 1392 entered Debenham 8 Freebody; 1906 study
°f "Alexander Hamilton M ; 1910 "Pacificus" article* on Ireland in ■ 7i.
and series of pamphlets etc; 1917-18 Sec to Cabinet Ctee on Economic
Offensive; later ill-health, retixed, 3 volume work on Valpole.

__ John Hubert (1893-1979): i of Arthur A Pensonj q 1) 1S29 Xarjorie
Crawford Of Belfast, 1 2d; 2) 1974 Ellen Mary Cunming. Edli£.

""known; served in Royal Engineers 1910-19 (KC>; civil servant; 1937-41
“°**i&sIoner for Finance, Newfoundland; 1944-45 Sec Gen, British Supply
liasl on, Washington; 1947-53 Attache, British Embassy, Vashingtoo.

467

K

ZBBBZi John Frederick, oka Peter, <1673-1933): a of John Perry (small
landowner); ml) Irish wife (separated 1907) 2) Canadian, 2s, Id- Educ
Magdalen and Sew College Oxford (2nd In Greats); 18S6 Fellow of All Souls;
Colonial Office <SA dept); 1SOO seconded to Milner, Asst Imperial Sec, then
Imperial Sec; 1S03-11 sec, Rand Native Labour Assoc (organised Chinese
labour); 1912- Canadian rep Lazard Bros, director Bank of Montreal and
numerous other conpanies; 1915 nenber Imperial Munitions EOard, Ottawa;
returned to England 1932.

KAISOi. Rt Hon Sir Timothy Hugh Francis, kt 1991 <b. 1929): s. of Maxwell
and Celia Raison; a 1956 Veldes Julia Charrington; Is, 3d. Educ Eton,
Christ Church Oxford; ed staff " Picture Post" 1953-56, "Hew Scientist"
1956-61; editor "Crossbow" 1958-60, "Few Society " 1962-68; KP for Aylesbury
1970-92 (Conservative); junior ninister N Ireland 1972-73, DES 1973-74; Min
of State, Horae Office 1979-83, Foreign Office 1983-86; PC 1982; Chan,

Select Ctee on Educn, Science and Arts 1987-39; Vice-Chairman, British
Council 1987-92; Chun, Advertising Standards Auth Since 1991; Nansen Medal
(for World Refugee Year) I960, many pubs.

KJBIfiSQfi, (George) Geoffrey, see DAWSON.

SELBQFNE. 2nd Earl, VII 11am Valdegrave Falmer, inherited title 1895 (1853-
1942): s of 1st Earl of Selborne: m 1883 Lady (Beatrix) Maud nAe Cecil (A
of 3rd Marquess of Salisbury, sister of Lord Robert Cecil; close interest
in early RT, providing inny contacts; d. 1950); 3 a (1 killed In action
1516), 1 d- Educ VI nches ter. University College Oxford (1st in Modern
History 1881); private sec to father (Lord Chancellor) then HCE Childers
(Sec of State for War, then Chancellor of Exchequer); 1835-86 Liberal XP,
1386-92 Liberal Unionist. XP for Petersfield CE Hampshire); 1892-95 Liberal
Unionist XP for V Edinburgh; 1895-1900 Under-Sec of State for Colonies; PC
1900; 1900-05 First Lord of Admiralty; 1505-10 High Commissioner SA,

Governor Transvaal and CPC; 1915-16 President of Board of Agriculture
(resigned over Ireland); 1319 Chairman, Joint Ctee on Indian reforms; 1924-
42 Chairman, House of Laity; director of Lloyd's Sank, etc; GCXG 1905.

SIEEL-KATTT.flFp , Rt h'on Sir Arthur Herbert Drummond Ramsay-, Baronet or 1917
(1876-1935); h India; & of Col E H Steel (Bengal Staff Corps); a 1901 Mary,
4 and heiress of Sir Janes Ramsay-Gibson-Xa itland (changed name on
“arrioge) ; 2 i, 2 &. Fduc Rugby, Balliol College Oxford (1st in Greats
3 399, i & t in Jurisprudence 1900); All Souls Fellow 1900; 1902-05 private
** to CT Ritchie then Austen Cliamber lain ; 1906 unsuccessful Conservative
candidate; 1905-07 Special Commissioner to RC on Poor Lawsj 1907-10 private
to Lord Milner; Conservative MP for E Birmingham 1910-18, Erdiagton
1918-29, Tanrworth 1929-35; 1911 chair nan Unionist Pat ty; 1915-17 Parlt
tnder-Sec for Colonies; 1917-19 Head of Dept of Overseas Trade; 1919-24
paging Director, Rio Tinto Co; FC 1924; 1924-29 Minister of Labour; pub
Tbe Few America" (1934) and various articles.

468

i

iAJ)E-GBEI. Sir Robert (Lucian), let 1983 (b. 1029): & of Prof H T Vade-Gery;
m 1962 Sarah, 4 of A D Karris; Is, 14- Educ Vinchester, Few College
Oxford (1st in Greats 1951); 1951-73, and 1987-89, Fellow All Souls; 1951
joined Foreign Office (Econ Relations Dept, Bonn, Tel Aviv, Saigcn, Cabinet
Office); Minister,. Madrid 1973-77, Moscow 1977-79; Deputy Sec of Cabinet,
1979-82; High Commissioner to India, 1982-87; Director, Barclays de 2oetc
Vedd since 1987; Chran of Governors, SOAS since 1990; CXG 1979, KCVO and
XCKG 1983.

yff.L* AMS . Sir Robin, 2nd Baronet, succeeded father 1954 <b. 1928): a of Sir
Herbert Geraint Villiaos KP; m 1955 Vendy Ad^le Marguerite Alexander; 2 £.
fijllKL Eton, St John's Cambridge; Royal Artillery; 1S52-91 Insurance Broker,
1951- Lloyd's Underwriter; 1954 Churn Bow Group (Conservative Research
Society); 1954 called to Bar, 19G9 Chnui Anti -Common Market League; 1973-76
Director, Common Market Safeguards Campaign; 1973-89 h'on Sec Safeguard
Britain Campaign, 1989- Campaign for Independent Britain.

yCLMSR . Ft Hon Viscount, RounUell Cecil Palmer, 3rd Earl of Selbourne,
succeeded father 1942 (1337-1971): £ of 2nd Hail of Selbourne; ia 1 > 1910
Grace, 4 of 1st Viscount Ridley, 2 a, 3 4; 2) I960 Valerie Irene de Tlionka.
Educ Vlnchester. University College Oxford; Conservative Hr for Mewton
1910-18, Aldershot 1916-40; Asst Director, War Trade 1916-18; Farit Sec
Beard of Trade 1922-24; Asst Postmaster-Gen 1924-29; PC 1929; Kin of
Economic Varlare 1942-45; director of Boots and other companies; 1955-59
Churn of House of Laity; CH 1945.

YIBD3AM . Hon Hugh Archibald, 4th Baron Leconfield, succeeded brother 1952
(1877-1963); fi 1908 Maude Kary Lyttleton, 4 of 8th Viscount Cobhara, no
children. Educ Eton, Mew College Oxford; suffered from tuberculosis; 1901-
OS private sec to Lord Milner; 1903 purchased farm at Standerton; 1910-20
KIA for Standerton (Unionist); 1921-23 Jo' burg City Councillor; 1930
returned to England, farned; various pubs.

21BKSRI, Sir Alfred Eckhard, kt 1936 (1879-1957): & of Adolf Ziranern
(rerchant); n 1) 1912 unknown American 2) 1921 Lucie Hirsch of Aberystwyth.

Winchester, Hew College Oxford (1st in Greats 1902); 1903-04 Lecturer
it Ancient History, 1904-09 Fellow and Tutor, Kew College; 1912-15 Staff
inspector, Board of Education; 1918-19 staff Political Intelligence Dept,

F 0; 1919-21 Vilson Prof of International Politics, Univ College of Vales;
1922-23 Prof of Political Science. Cornell USA; 1925-39 Director, Geneva
S^ool of International Studies; 1930-44 Montague Burton Prof of
International Relations, Oxford; 1943-45 Deputy Director, Research Dept FO;
iHS, involved in creation UIESCO; 1947-49 Visiting Prof at Hartford (Conn,
^A), settled there; many pubs.

469

tfPMPII F

ffllKD TABLE AUTHORS < WHERE KRO VN1 '

1 lo 1 (Bov 1910)

[KerrJ Introductory: Found Table
{Kerr.J Anglo-German Rivalry
[Harris, 1 India and English
(London gpj British Politics
(Villisoc.J Affairs in Canada
ISA gpj South African Politics

ynl 1 Ho 2 (Feb 1911 )

{KerrJ The Anglo- Japanese Alliance
(KerrJ British Politics
(VillisonJ Canadian Affairs
[J C Vatson, 1 Australian Situation
(SA gp.J South African Politics
( IZ gpj SZ: History and Politics

?ol 1 So 3 (Hay 1911)

[Kerr,] Hew Problem of Imperial Defence
[Kerr,] Emigration Question in Japan
[Oliver,] 1887 and 1807
[Harris, J Hindus and Mohammedans
IVillison,] Canadian Affairs
IE Scott,] Australian Politics
ISA gpj South African Politics
IK gpj Hew Zealand Affairs

Z nLl Ho 4 (August 1911)

t&rr,] Conference and Empire
^Holland,] Spirit of Coronation
!c raik,] Colonial Heutrality
lp eel,l Egypt

Oliver,] British Politics
Allison,] Canadian Affairs
Scott,] Australian Af fairs
12 gp,3 Hew Zealand Affairs

1 "Can gp", -Aus gp H , etc: author unknown, but article sent by Round
Table groups.

Ell ? 5 (Dec 1911)

llerr,3 Britain, France and Germany

IV F Johnston, ) Congestion of Business

[IZ gp, 3 Defence Policy of Sew Zealand

[Oliver, 3 United Kingdom

[ Vlllisou, 3 Canada

[Koore et al,3 Australia

[SA gp, 3 South Africa

[IZgp, 3 lew Zealand

(Karris,) India

gfll 2 I o . fi ( torch 1912)

llerrj Balkan Danger
[ Brand, ) Lombard St and Var
IXalcolm, ) Declaration of London
(Perry,) Early Maritime Confederacy
[Oliver,) United Kingdom
[?illison,J Canada
[KacCallum, ) Australia
[Tyndall,) South Africa
(1 R Atkinson,) Sew Zealand

M-2.Jp . 7 -.CJ.uae .1912)

[Karris, 1 Durbar and After
[Brand and Craik,) Hone Rule
[anon,) Other Irish Question
Uusgp,) Brisbane General Strike
[Oliver,! United Kingdom
IVillisoa.) Canada
llathaa et al,) Australia
lSA 5P» ) South Africa
[Bussell et al,) Sew Zealand

&I-2 So fi (Sspt 19122.
tlerr , ) India and Empire

| Cri 5g ( Perry and Stevenson, ) Canada and Havy

^ightfoot, ) Labour Movement in Australia

Oliver,] UK

^illlson.J Canada

^ggleston,) Australia

134 gp, ) South Africa

112 gp, J Sew Zealand

g o! 3 go 9 (Dec 1912)

[Craik (based on Percy),] Arbitration and Var

[Craik and Bonn,] Balkan Crisis: 1. Outlook, 2. Gcrnan View

[Karris and Seton.l India: Old Vayc and Few

[rev: "Dalgety's expert- , ) Australian Banking and Currency

[Oliver,] OK

[Villieon,] Canada

(Eavin ot al,l Australia

[SA gp. 3 South Africa

HZ gp. 3 Hew Zealand

y r .l 3 Fo 10 (March 1913)

(anon,) Policy and Sea Power

[anon,] Unionists and Food Taxes

[V P Johnston, 3 Onion of England and Scotland

lanon.3 Political Crime in India

l Oliver, 3 UK

[V'illison and S D Scott,] Canada
CAusgp, J Australia
ISA gp, 3 South Alrica
ISZ gp, 3 Hew Zealand

M.3.IQ 11 Uune. -19.1.3}

(Childs, 3 Balkan Var and Balance of Power
lanon,] Ministers and Stock Exchange

(Stevenson, rev: Villison and Kylie.l Grain Growers in Canada
(de Burgh,] Ethics of Empire
lanon, 3 UK
(Cangp, 3 Canada
Hus gp, ) Australia
ISA gp, ] South Africa
gp, ] Hew Zealand

gflU Iq 12 (Sept. 1913)

ICrigg based on Percy, 3 "Downing Street"

IJB Holland, rev: Karris, 3 Arya Samaj
1 tylie , 1 Hew World and Old: Canadian View
Itoncan,] South Africa and Native Question
Oliver and Crigg.3 UK
Can gp, j Canada
Jusgp,] Australia
j SA gp, 3 South Africa
puncaa et al.l South Africa
IZ gp,3 Hew Zealand

y n T A Ho 13 (Dec 1313)

(Grlgg and CraikJ Irish Question

(R B Holland, rev: Lovat Fraser,] Islam and Empire

(Grant,} Canada and Anglo-American Relatione

(anon.l UK

(Can gp, 1 Canada

(Aus gp. J Australia

(Feetham, ) South Africa

(A R Atkinson,] Hew Zealand

ynl 4 Ho 14 (March 1014 )

IGrlgg, 3 Irish Crisis

(Colvin,) South African Strike

(Zianwrn, ] Education and Working Class

(Kavor,) lev Autocracy in China

[Brand,] UK: Kikuyu Controversy

(Can gp, J Canada

(Aus gp, 3 Australia

(Duacan.3 South Africa

ISZ gp, 3 lew Zealand

Vol A .Jfa. 15 -LLuiul .1.914 ) .

(Grigg and Eggleston,) Koval Policy and Pacific Question

(Duncan,] Indians and South African Compatriots

(SA gp, ] South African Constitutionalism

tCraik, ] UK

(Can gp, ] Canada

(Aus gp,] Australia

IHorsfall , ] South Africa

IHZ group,) Hew Zealand

Sal 4 gp IP {He pt 1914 )

tKerr,] War in Europe

{Grl gg.) Germany and Prussian Spirit

tSeton-Vatscn, J Austro-Servian Dispute

I Brand, ] Lombard St in War

‘•wnj UK

10 a & gpj Canada

‘Borsiall,] South Africa

•anon,) White Book Sunmarized

Slr Edward Grey's Speech, August 3

y n ] fi Nn 17 (Dec 1914 )

f Amery, J Lord Roberts

fferr.J Four Months' Var

(Grigg.l nationalism and Liberty

(Ziamern and Seton-Vatson, ] Doctrine of Ascendancy

(J D Vi Ison, 1 Russia and Ideals

(Brand,! Var and Financial Exhaustion

(A Phillips et al J UK

(Can gp.] Canada

(Aus gp.l Australia

(Duncan,] South Africa

(IZ group,] Hew Zealand

(Dove and Percy,] Official Publications: Russia, Germany, Bolgi

gQl 5 Ho 18 (March 1915)

[anon,] Politics of Var

(Grigg.l Dominions and Settlement

l Kerr,] Schism of Europe

(anon.J Nietzsche and "Culture-State"

(Can gp.l Canada
(Strong ot al , 3 Australia
(SA gp, 1 South Africa
(IZ group,] New Zealand

gfll-5-flQ 19 (June 1915)

j l Kerr,] Burden of Victory

(Brand and Perry,] Finance in Var

(Hichens and Zimmern, ] Var and Industrial Organization

tierr,] Foundations of Peace

tanon,] European Diplomacy

(Can gp,] Canada

Uus gp,] Australia

(IZ group,] New Zealand

ia l_5 Ho 20 (Sept ]<n;>)

lK err,J National Duty in Var
(a &on,3 industrial Situation
(Brand, ] England’s Financial Task
lKer r,] End of Var

j^er,] American Public Opinion and Var
gp, 1 Canada
J us gp,J Australia
gp, J South Africa
1,2 group,] Hew Zealand

r

fylA-SQ 21 iPec 1915J

t Kerr, 3 Harvest ol Var

(Brand, 1 British Bapire's Financial Task

(2innern,J Var and English Life

[at»on,l India and Imperial Conference

(anon,! Land Settlement after Var

(anon.l United Kingdom

(Can gp, 3 Canada

(Utkan and Lightfoot.l Australia
UCacgregor.l Hew Zealand

H 6 *o 22 (March 1916)

C Kerr, 3 Var for Public Right
(aaon.l Production in Peace and Var
IZinnern,] Problem of Vomen in Industry
(Beer.1 America's Reaction tc Var
[Can gp, 1 Canada

(Strong and Sanderson,! Australia
[Vyndham.J South Africa
[12 gp.l Hew Zealand

toL. fi Iq .23. -(J-uae-19.161

IKerr.l Principle of Peace

IZinnern. 1 Labour Movement and Future of Industry
(aaon.l Considerations affecting Reconstruction
(Beer.1 German-Aroericat Submarine Controversy
(Can gp, 1 Canada
i Uusgp, ) Australia

(Fitzpatrick et al,l South Africa
152 gp.l Hew Zealand

M 6 Kn 7 A fgppt 1016)

[forr,] War Aims

Harr,] Ireland and Empire

l Won, 1 France

(2iEnern,l Imperial Dilemma

iCan gp, 1 Canada

lAue SP»l Australia

lF e®tha* and Duncan, 3 South Africa

1,2 8P.1 Hew Zealand

1 fll 7 Mo 25 (Dec 1916)

(KerrJ Making of Peace

(anon, I necessity for Constitutional Reform

(acon.J Industry and Finance

(Kerr, J Labour and Reconstruction

(anon, J Native States in India

(anon.l UK

(Can gp. 1 Canada

(X Atkinson et al.I Australia

(Vjrndham, 1 South Africa

(H2 gp,) Hew Zealand

/nl ? Ho 26 (March 1917)

(Coupland, 1 Last Phase

(Oliver,! Var Conference of Empire

(Zinmern, ) Hew German Empire

[Beer,] US and Future Peace

(Toynbee et al , 1 Methods of Ascendancy

(anon, 3 United Kingdom

(Eggleston et al , 1 Australia

!I2 gp,l Hew Zealand

ial ? Hq .2 1. ( J un e .1 9 .1ZJ..

(Coupland, 1 Var of Liberation

(Kerr,) Developments in Constitution of Eopi

(H Jones,) Education of Citizen

(Beer,) America's Entrance into Var

(Toynbee,) Turkey

(aeon,) UK

(Can gp, ) Canada

ilicholas and Moore,) Australia
(Duncan,) South Africa
112 gp, ) Hew Zealand

Efll-7 Ho 23 <5ept 131Z2

(Coupland, ) Three Years

(Headlam, ) Internal Problem in Germany

lp erry, ) Finance alter Var

(Coupland,) Problems in Reconstruction

1 Beer, j US at Var

(anon,) UK

(Can gp, j Canada

Nicholas and Moore,) Australia
[ v yndhaa, Duncan and Malcolm,) South Africa
gp, 1 Sew Zealand

476

goL.fi- KQ 29„.Utec..l917>

tlerr.3 Gathering of Sat ions

Villians, rev: Kerr et al3 Genesis of Situation in India
(Beer, 3 America's Part in Var
(Coupland, 3 Freedom and Unity
(Coupland, 3 Turkey, Russia and Islan
(anon, 3 UK
(Can gp.l Canada

(Scott, H Atkinson and Lightfoot. 3 Australia
(Duncan, 3 South Africa
(IZ gp. 1 Hew Zealand

fri ft Ho 30 (March 19 18 1

(ferr.) Victory that will End Var

( Beer, 1 America's Var Aims

(Zinmern, 3 Three Doctrines in Conflict

(lanier.l Peoples of Baltic Provinces

(Siaon, 1 Palestine and Jewish Nationals

(anon, 3 UK

(Can gp,3 Canada

(K Atkinson and Peden,} Australia
(Kalccln et al,3 South Africa
(IZ gp, 3 Hew Zealand

M-8 Ho 31 Uune 1918A

l Coupland, J Ordeal

ILeland.J Growth of American Var- Power

Uerr.J Irish Crisis

t Toynbee, J Russia, Germany and Asia

IRVillianto,] Indian Politics

l anon, 1 UK

tCai gp,] Canada

tPickea, Coupland and Eggleston,) Austral ii
•IZ gp, J F e w Zealand

^i-8-Io 32 <Sept 191&L

tCoupland, Percy and Zimmern, 1 Unity of Civilisation

•Beer,] America's Vlll to Victory

10 Villians, J Spirit of Russian Revolution

•Curtis,) Better Governmentt of UK

•Heston, J Kontagu-Chelmsf ord Report

[as *on.) UK

| Ca ° gp, J Canada

•Hlcholas and Graham,] Australia
Vdbam and Duncan, 3 South Africa

•IZ

8P» 1 Hew Zealand

^ 9 No i'-l (Dec 191S)

(Curtis,) Windows of Freedom
(aeon,) End of War

(Zimoern,) Principles and Problems of Settlement
(Brand,) Financial and Economic Future
(anon,) Industrial Reconstruction and Govt
(Can gp, ) Canada

(X Atkinson and Nicholas,) Australia
(Vyndham, ) South Africa
(12 gp,) Hew Zealand

Ifll 9 Ho 34 (March 1919)

(Kerr,) Practical Organisation of Peace
(aeon,) America and World Responsibility
deeper,) Bolshevik Aims and Ideals
(anon,) German Democracy at Cross-Roads
IR Williams, ) Indian Politics
(Zimmern,) UK
(Can gp, 3 Canada

(Eggleston, Batty et al.) Australia
(Hill.) South Africa
!I2 gp.) Hew Zealand

7ol 9 Ho 35 (J une.. 1919-1

(anon.) Peace of Versailles

(Brand,) Finance and Reparation

(Curtis,) League of Nations and Commonwealth

(anon,) Military Effort of Empire

i Laeper, ) Revolt Against Bolshevism

(anon,) US

iChirol,) Indian Politics

( anon, ) UK

( Can gp, ) Canada

IK Atkinson ct al,J Australia

' Si 8P» J South Africa

'■ gp, 1 Hew Zealand

476

yol 9 »Q 36 <Sept 1019 >

[Korr,) Harvest of Victory

[Brand,] Econonic and Financial Situation

CR Villians,] Constitutional Reform in India

[anon, 3 Rationalisation as Remedy

[Horsfall,] Switzerland and Neutral Standpoint

[anon,] UK

[anon,] India

(Can gp,3 Canada

(Xoore and X Atkinson,] Australia
[SA gp, J South Africa
[IZ gp, ] Few Zealand

Y.0l l.ft .JQ - 32 . Ute C 1919?

(anon,] Price of Liberty

(anon,3 European Reconstruction

l anon, 3 Railway Strike

(Toynbee,) Outlook: in Riddle East

[anon,] General Botha

lanon,] UK

[anon,] India

[Can gp,] Canada

[Eggleston et al,3 Australia

[SA gp, J South Africa

( IZ gp, J lew Zealand

yol 10 Ho 36 JXanJLjmi

IKerr,] Empire, League and US

[Brand,] International Financial Co-operation

Canon,) Growing F.espcnsibility of Labour

IHeadlanrKorley,] Problems cf Europe

ILeeperJ Russia

fanon.] Tangier

lanon,] UK

Canon,] India

[Can gp. ] Canada

Nicholas et al,l Australia

f SA gp, ) South Africa

f SZ gp, ) Hew Zealand

lanon,] Review: John Hugh Allen

toj 10 ?Q 39 (June 1920 >

(Dove and Kerr,] Last of Peace Treaties

(Kilner.l Situation in Egypt

[Shepardson,) America and Treaty

(Cbevalley.) Case of France

[Bonn,] German Situation

[Headlan-Jforley , 3 Problems of Europe

[Dawson, ) UK

[Can gp, 3 Canada

[Kills et al,l Australia

[SA gp, 1 South Africa

(JTZ gp, J Jov Zealand

[onon.l India

ynl 10 lo 40 (Sept 1020>

[Curtis,] Vorld in Conference

[T S Lawrence,! Changing East

[Shepardson,] Candidates for Presidency

[Macartney,] Austria To-day

[Trevelyan,] Case of Italy

[ Head laa-Xor ley , 3 Problems of Europe

(Brand et al, ] UK

(Can gp, 3 Canada

(Aus gp, 3 Australia

(FZ gp, J Jew Zealand

(anon,) Memoir of G L Beer

I

Vol li Bo 41 (Dec 1920)

(GriggJ Conreonwealth of Sations in 1921
(Shepardson, 3 Voodrow Vi Ison
(Hogarth,] Egypt

(Brand,) International Financial Conference

(Kerr, 3 Anglo- Japanese Alliance

(Headlan-Korley, 3 Problems of Europe

(Dawson et al,J United Kingdom

* J Jill ians, 3 1 ndia

ICa:i gpJ Canada

•Shann et al,3 Australia

lSi 8P,3 South Africa

1,2 gp, 3 Few Zealand

frl 11 Iq 42 (March 1Q21)

[Dove & Kerr,] Ireland and Hone Rule

[Dove,3 Migration of Races

[Beadlan-Korley, ] Paris Conference

Hankcy, Diplomacy by Conference (signed]

[ Sgglcston, ] White Australia

ISA gp, ] S Africa and Enpire

[Horsfall & Pybus.J United Kingdon

[anon,] India

[Can gp,] Canada

[licholas et al,J Australia

[SAgp.3 South Africa

ItZ gp, 1 lew Zealand

ypi 1 : Iq-4S.-U.um 192V

[Curtis,] Ireland

IKalcoln, J Imperial Cabinet

IR S Baker, ] US and Old World

[Headlaxr-Korley , 1 Problems of Europe

[Dawson, H Baker 4 Horslall.J United Kingdon

l Whyte,] India

[Can gp, 3 Canada

[Eggleston, Hicholas et a], I Australia
ISA gp, J South Africa
l HZ gp, J Sew Zealand

fell 11 Ifl 44 -<SgRt.J9.2i;.

I Grigg preface,] Imperial Conference [Report]

[Curtis & Dove,] Ireland

IKerr,] Prosperity and Industrial Peace

(Hale.I Imperial Conference fron American Standpoint

(Saunders, Headlan-Korley et al,J Problems of Europe

(R Williams,] India

ISidebotham, Horsfall & H Baker,] United Kingdom

(Can gp,] Canada

(Aus gp,] Australia

ISA gp, ] South Africa

182 gp, 1 Sew Zealand

461

r

ynl 12 So 45 CDeo }

[Kerr Intro, J Vashington Conference
(Pore, 3 Ireland

[Brand,] Currency and Exchange

[Headlan-Korley a Horsfall,] Aftermath

lanon.J Anerlca and Conference

[R Villlans, J India

(Borsiall et al.J United Kingdon

[Can gp, 3 Canada

Uus gpj Australia

[SA gp, J South Africa

[U gp, J Sew Zealand

of Victory

7q 1 12 So 46 (March

[Kerr,] British Commonwealth
[Horsfall,] Cannes, Genoa and Revival
[Shepardson, 3 American Reflections
[Eanse/,] Vashington Results
(Dove,] Letters from Genaay
(Horsfall & Childs,] Bear East
(anon,] Indian Problem in East Africa
[Horsfall et a 3.1 United Kingdom
(Can gp, 1 Canada
(Portus et al,] Australia
[SA gp,] South Africa
[12 gp. 1 Hew Zealand

¥ol 12

f Horsfal 1 , ] Genoa
J a Eon, ] American Opinion
Dovo a Curtis, J Ireland at Cross-Roads
Peters,] Russia
f'ove,] Letters from Egypt
; Dawson & Horsfall,] United Kingdom
iS Reed,] India
| Can SP.J Canada
[S a sp,J South Africa
,J 2 8P» 3 Sew Zealand
ius SP,3 Australia

[Kerr,] America and International Probl
[G K Young,] Austria 1

[ Vlllert , J Malady of Europe
[Barrington- Ward, J Ireland
[Vise,] Hague Conference
{ Dawson a Horsfall,] United Kingdon
[Hailey,] India *

[Can gp, J Canada
lAusgp, 3 Australia
ISA gp,J South Africa
[IZ gp,J few Zealand

Y’q1_13- Iq 49 (Per

[Horsfall,] Hear East

[Trevelyan,] Italy and Fascist!

[Feethan, ] Colour Question

[anon,] Auerican Politics

[Vise,] Gernany

(P Toung.l Xa lady of China

[Layton,] United Kingdon

[Ind gp, ] India

[Can gp, 1 Canada

fius gp,] Australia

ISA gp, ] South Africa

I Iz SP> J How Zealand

£fil 13 Ho 50 nf/ir ch 1 923)

* Eorsf a 11,1 France and Germany
f anon, ] Ireland

I Brand, ] Future of Reparations
[ Kerr,] Valter Page
I Fisher, ] League of nations
I anon, ] America
tanoa.J Lausanne Conference
| Barrington-Vard, ] United Kingdon
l *icolls,] India
lCa “gp, J Canada
^s gp ,j Australia
gp,] South Africa
2 gp.J Hew Zealand

gol 13 Bo 51 filing 1<fr a ^

tEsrr,] Sew Imperial Problem
I Horsfall.] France and Gernanv
t Dove A Rice,] Kenya
[ anon, J Uni ted States

[DHall,] British Agriculture

(anon, J Ireland

tlamier.) East-Central Europe

[Barrington- Ward, Horslall & Lockhart ]

[Can gp, ] Canada

(Ausgp, 3 Australia

(SA gp, 3 South Africa

HZ gp, J Hew Zealand

United Kingdom

Vol 13 Ho 52 (Sept ]^\

{Kerr, 3 Inperlal Conference
[Horsfall ,3 France and Germany
[A Rose , 3 China

[Trevelyan,] Italy under Xussolini

IShepardson, J Anerican Affairs

IH Xoore.J Ireland - Australian Inpression

*2TS?f ^22' Horsfa11 8 Pybu " 1 “■*-

t Ausgp,] Australia
fSA gp, J South Africa
lIZ gp, ] Hew Zealand

M 14 Ho 5 3 (Dec 1923)

l Eove.J Imperial Conference
i Horsfall.) Problen of Europe
[Brand,! Inflation and Deflation
Shepardson,] America and Enquiry
[G Bel 1 , J GB and Iraq
[anon. 3 Ireland

Janon.) Economic Condition of India

-JC Bailey, Lockhart A Barri ngton-Vard, ) United Kingdom
|Can gp, J Canada

A'JSgp,] Australia
Jj 1 8P.1 South Africa
p 12 8PJ Hew Zealand
roceodings of Imperial Conference

484

jpl 14 Ho 54 < March 1924)

l Kerr, J Imperial Conference

l Horsfall,] France and Germany

[Shepardson,) American Politics

[Christie, 3 Imperial Foreign Policy

[V B Harris,] French in Morocco

[Dove,J Holiday in Ireland

[ Earrington-Ward a Brand,] United Kingdom

[F Williams,] India

[Can gp.l Canada

[Aus gp, 3 Australia

ISA gp, J South Africa

IfZ gp, 3 New Zealand

Vnl 14 Ho 55 (June 1924)

[Horsfall,] Labour at Hein
[Kerr,] Socialism and Unemployment
[ Shepardson , 3 American Politics
(Grigg. J Should Ve Guarantee Settlement?
[anon,] Ireland

l Earrington-Vard & Faber,] United Kingdom

[P. Williams,] India

[Can gp, 1 Canada

(Ausgp,] Australia

ISA gp, 3 South Africa

ISZ gp, 3 N»w Zealand

IDove,] Irish Boundary Question

gflL-IA Ho 5ft <Sept 1924)

1 Herr, ] Imperial Diplomacy
tXilner,] Egypt and Sudan
(Horsfall,] London Conferences
(Herr,] Labour and Capital

(Shepardson,] American Presidential Campaign

(Eachelder,] Aspirations of Indian Nationalictc

(Dove,] Irish Boundary Question

(anon, 3 United Kingdom

(°an gp, ] Canada

Uus gp, ] Australia

tSA gp, ] South Africa

ltz gp, 3 Sew Zealand

ypl 15 Ho 57 <Iec 1924)

[Kerr, 3 Commonwealth, Protocol and League

[Curtis, 3 Irish Boundary Question

[Horsfall a Kerr, 3 Geneva Protocol

[Sbepardson, 3 United States

[anon, 3 America and Philippines

( Barrington- Ward, J United Kingdon

[R Williams, J India

[Can gp, 1 Canada

[Aus gp, 3 Australia

[SA gp, 3 South Africa

(I Z gp.J Hew Zealand

Vnl 15 No 56 (Xarch 1925)

[Kerr, 3 Europe, Covenant and Protocol
[Brand,} Gold Standard
(anon. 3 China
(Horsfall. 3 Industry

(Sbepardson. 3 President. Secretary and Borah

(anon, 1 Ireland

(RVilliams, 3 India

[Barrington- Ward, 3 United Kingdon

(Can gp, 3 Canada

(Pcrtus ©t a 1,3 Australia

(Malcolm et al,3 South Africa

(FZ gp,J How Zealand

ioULS Ho 53 JLJ line .1925 2.

(Brand,! Milner

(Kerr, 3 Cologne, Pact and League

(Sbepardson, 3 President and Senate

(Dove, 3 Letters from Abroad

(Horsfall, J Industry

(Hlgginbottom, 3 Indian Rural Problem

(anon, 1 United Kingdom

(Horgan, 3 Ireland

(Can gp, ] Canada

l Aus gp, 3 Australia

‘SA gp, j South Africa

112 gp, 3 Hew Zealand

frl 15 No 60 (Sept 1925)

l Herr, 3 Security Pact
t Brand, 3 Gold Standard
(Rose ,3 China

(Horsfall,! British Industry
(X Bobertson, 3 Xorocco

(anon.l Religion and Science in Tennessee

(anon.l Irish Scene 1925

(Barrington- Ward et al,J United Kingdom

(Can gp, 3 Canada

(Aus gp.3 Australia

(Duncan et al.3 South Africa

(IZ gp, 3 Sew Zealand

itel 16 So 61 (Dec 1925)

(£err,3 Leearno Treaties

(anon, 3 Irish Free State

(Horsfall,! Greek Note-book

(J H Jones,! Industrial Progress

(A C Frazer,] Achimota

(anon,] Indian Frontier Problem

(Stevenson,] Labour and Enpirc

(anon,] American Kotes

(anon,] United King don

(Can gp.J Canada

(Aus gp, ! Australia

ISA gp, ] South Africa

(IZ gp, ) New Zealand

M ie No 52 anarch . 1.920 1

Herr,] Next Imperial Conference
UcClure, 3 Fascist Reforms in Italy
lShepardson.3 American Prosperity
1 Horsfall, 1 Control of Expenditure
lDove.3 Var Graves in Flanders
tCoatman, 3 India
l anon, 3 United Kingdon

l3onrdillon & Horgar., 3 Ireland Boundary Settlement

l Dafoe et a 1,3 Canada

li us gp, 3 Australia

lSA gp, 3 South Africa

112 gp. 3 New Zealand

Boundary Commission: Letter fron Chairman l beethan)

ypl 16 Ho 63 <Juce 1926)

487

{Kerr, ] Crisis la World Affairs

(H Butler, 3 Europe at Cross-Roads

{Ccatman.J Indian Problem

IShepardsoL, 3 Prohibition in US

{Carey, 3 ILenace to Hongkong

{Barrlngton-Vard,] United Kingdom

{Horgan.J Ireland

{Can gp, I Canada

{Atsgp, 3 Australia

ISA gp, 3 South Africa

{HZ gp,3 Hew Zealand

Tnl 16 Ho 64 (Sept 1926)

{Kerr, 3 Imperial Complex

lanoc.J Empire Trade

lanon.J Locarno and Commonwealth

(anon, 3 Inter-Allied Debts

{via Sir R Livingstone. 3 Dyarchy in Ulster

(anon.l Canada and Havy

(Chaplin,! Southern Rhodesia

{Ccatman,! India

{ anon, 1 Great Britain

(Horgan, 3 Ireland

(Stevenson (rev H Wrong),! Canada
lAuc gp, J Australia
ISA gp,l South Africa
I HZ gp,J Hew Zealand

£al 17 Ho 65 (Dec 1920)

IKerr,! Anglo-American Relations
(anon,! Iraq Parliament
I aeon,) Geneva

I Crone, J Education of Filipino People

l anon, J Great Ngami Trek

(Ccatman,) India

Ucon, J Great Britain

IHcrgan, J Ireland

ICan gp, } Canada

lAusgp, j Australia

1SA gp, 3 South Africa

:iz gp, 1 Hew Zealand

EAl 17.Ia.S6 march 19272.

l Whyte, J Imperial Conference

(anon.J American Industry

lanon.J World Economic Conference

Canon,] China

Canon,] US and Nicaragua

(Coatman, J India

Canon,] Great Britain

[Horgan.l Ireland

[Cangp,] Canada

CAus gp,) Australia

(F Clarke et al , ] South Africa

[ HZ gp, 3 New Zealand

Report of Inter-Imperial Relations Committee

Zfll 17 Ho 67 (June 1927)

l Kerr, 1 New Problem of Africa

(Hubbard.3 Picture of China

(HcCluro.3 Fascist Rule

(anon,J President and His Party

(Hawtrey, 3 Economic Future of GB

(Coatman, 3 India

(anon.J Great Britain

(Horgaa,! Ireland

(Can gp, 3 Canada

(Ausgp, 1 Australia

ISA gp, 3 South Africa

(5Z gp, J New Zealand

Kfll-17 Ha 6S <Sept 192 72

IKerr,] Naval Conference
tH V Harris,! Geneva

IH Williams,! India Reforms: Princes' Standpoint
Klennell,] China

t Horsfall,] Reflections on Industrial Situation
t Coatman, ] India

t Barrington- Ward, 1 Great Britain
Morgan, J Ireland
JCangp.l Canada
Uusgp, 1 Australia
ISA gp. ] South Africa
gp, 3 New Zealand

Vftl 18 go 69 (TW

Canon.] Commonweal th
C Dove, ] Germany and Geneva

(Horsfall.] Reflections on Industrial + ,
(via B Embassy , Moscow] Russia Situation

(Shepardson.l American Preoccupations

(anon. J Reforms and Hindu-Koslen Bitterns
(anon, J Honolulu bitterness

(Coatmn, 1 India
(anon,! Great Britain
(Eorgaa.) Ireland
(Can gp, 1 Canada
(Ausgp, 1 Australia
(12 gp, 1 Sew Zealand
ISA gp, 3 South Africa

YQl lg SO 70 (Karoh IQpjp

I Kerr,] fiaval Problem

IVhyte,} Manchuria

laaon.J Plea for national Economy

(Coatman, ] India and Simon Commission

(Shepardson.l United States

(aion.J Working of Reforms: Indian View

(Henson,] Great Britain

(Horgan.J Ireland

(Can gp, ] Canada

•Ausgp,] Australia

; i2 gp,] Hew Zealand

; SA gp, ] South Africa

1 8 So 71 ( T une

l^err.l Outlawry of Var

Patercon,] Egypt

j Butler, j African Labour Problem
Hodgkin, 1 China

ohepardson, 1 American Campaigns
a *>n,] India K c

! Harris, ] Great Britain
•} 0r gan, ] Ireland
, “ SPJ Canada
*“ S 8PJ Australia
J A 8P.J South Africa
l,z 8PJ Hew Zealand

(Curtis, 3 Task of Simon Ccmd ssio *
[Siegfried. 3 Frenchman on British Fim<

[Kerr, 3 Peace Pact Sh Ea P lre

[Vhyte.3 China in 1928

(Shepardson.) Smith and Hoover

[Dove & Bovley, J Birth-Rate r

(anon.3 Great Britain ommon wealth

I Horgan, ] Ireland

(Can gp, 3 Canada

(Ausgp, 3 Australia

(SA gp, 3 South Africa

(FZ gp, 3 Hew Zealand

Vol 19 So 73 <Dp^

tKerr.3 Piea for Independent Foreign Policy
(Shepardson. 3 Next President of US 7

(Brand,] Reparations and Var Debts
l XcClure, 3 Italy in 1928
(anon, 3 1 nperial Communications
lanon.J Return of Commission to India
J Butler ’ J Industrial Xisgivings
XaraisJ Afrikander Culture and Politics
tanon,] Great Britain
l Horgan, 3 Ireland
(Can gp,J Canada
(iusgpj Australia
[SA gp, ] South Africa
182 gp. 3 Hew Zealand

M 19 Hn ?A

Uerr,] British Commonwealth, Freedom and Seas
amor,] Towards Industrial Renaissance
iepardson, J Borah and Freedom of Seas
Dove a Karris,] Ceylon Report
anon, 3 After Hgami Trek
( a * on ’ 3 Var Against Poverty in India
aton, 3 Great Britain
; H °rgan, 3 Ireland
J an 8P. J Canada
"*® 5P.3 Australia
SP.J South Africa
1,2 8P, J Hew Zealand

491

y P l 19 IQ ?5 Uune 1929)

(Xerr,J Naval Disarmaaent

(Horsfall & Hicheas,] Uneaployment

(Feethan, 1 East Africa

(Shepardson, 1 Hoover

(Hindus,] Russia

(anon,! Australian Labour

(anon.J India in Suspense

(anon.l Great Britain

(Horgan,3 Ireland

(Can gp.l Canada

( Aus gp, ] Austral ia

(SA gp, 1 South Africa

[12 gp, 1 Kev Zealand

Hilton Young Report

Val 19 So 76 (Sept 192Q)

(Kerr,] Freeh Start

(Hindus,] Young Russia

(anon,! GB and France in I Africa

(Siegfried,] Lateran Agreements

(Shepardscn, 3 Prohibition

(H Feed, 3 SA: Native's Point of View

(Horsfall et al,J Great Britain

Idorgan,] Ireland

(Can gp, 3 Canada

(Aus gp.J Australia

ISA gp, J South Africa

HZ gp, J Bev Zealand

M 20 Bo 77 (Pec 192&1

l Kerr,] London Conference

tShepardson, J HacDonald in US

(Asquith, 3 Prerogative of Dissolution

(Harris,) India and 1930

tSalter.l United States of Europe

tH Butler,] International Aspects of Coal

(anon,) Great Britain

Morgan.) Ireland

(Can gp,] Canada

{ *us gp,] Australia

lSA gp, J South Africa

MZ 8P» 1 Bcv Zealand

[ Kerr , J Where Are Vo Going?

! Bosanquet , 3 Economic Reformation
(Shepardson, J Crime in US

[Cunnings,] Impression of China
ICoatmn.J India
[ Kacdonald , 1 Kyoto Conference

[anon,] Great Britain
(Horgan.J Ireland
[Can gp, ] Canada
[Brigden et al,3 Australia
ISA gp,] South Africa
IFZ gp,] Few Zealand

(Lothiaa, ] Towards Peace or Var’

(Brand fi Horsfall,] Finance
(Coatnan,] Gandhi Movement
(Eliot, ] Problen of Japan

C ? UX,J Kln S Alfonso and Spain

r AfricaD Education in Kenya

ICoote,] Great Britain
l Borgan, 3 Ireland
‘Can gpJ Canada
(Ciblin et al , ] Australia
ISA gp, ] South Africa
1*2 gp, J Hew Zealand

Ilothian,] Crisis in India

|H A Snith ot al,] Task of Imperial Conference
I Shepardson,] Hoover
IH Butler, ] imperial Economic Unity
H Butler, 3 England from Without
Shanghai gp,] China in 1930
aton, ] India
Ccote , ] Great Britain
“°rgan, ] Ireland
: J an gp, J Canada

1 Icholas & Copland, 3 Australia
SP» 1 South Africa
Z 8P. 3 Few Zealand

493

/n: 21 No 81 1930)

IH Butler,] Vhere is Europe Going?
IShepardson, ] United States
IH A Smith,) Imperial Conference
(Hodson,] England in Depression
[anon,3 India

[Hindus,] Russian Realities

[H Moore,] Crown and Dominions

IF Clarke.3 Canada: Immigrant's Impression

(H Reed,] Africa from South

[Coote,] Great Britain

(Horgan.l Ireland

[ Can gp, 3 Canada

(Melville et al.) Australia

ISA gp,) South Africa

(HZ gp.) Sew Zealand

Proceedings of Inperial Conference

TqI .21-Hq. . 62. .(March 1931)

(Lothian,) India: Constitution or Chaos

(Hindus,) Russian Realities

(H Butler,) US in Great Depression

(Keswick & Shanghai gp, ) China

(Gillouin,) Church and State in France

(Isenonger,) Unrest on India Frontier

(Valker,) Governor-General and High Conmissioner in SA

(Coote,) Great Britain

[Horgan, 3 ) re land

[Can gp, ) Canada

[Bland & K Bailey,) Australia

ISA gp,) South Africa

iBZ gp,) Hew Zealand

itol 21 »n 83 (June 1931)

I Horsfall,) Britain's Problen
ianon,) France and Germany
!Farfcman.) Five Years Plan
^Hodson.) Economic Safeguards in India

• Shepardson, 3 Hoover at Kid-Term

• Keswick & Shanghai gp,) China

•Stephens,) India after Conference
•aeon, ) Great Britain
•Coote,) Great Britain
•Horgan,) Ireland

i Can gp, ) Canada
‘Shann et al , ) Australia
[Si 8P> ) South Africa
112 8P.) Hew Zealand

r

[Lothian,] Foundation ior Disarmament
[Curtis, 1 Shanghai

[Brand & Horsfall,] Crisis and Background

[Shepardson, J American Politics

[Hodson, 1 Macmillan Report

[Stephens, J India

[Morgan, ) Ireland

[Can gp, J Canada

[Copland,] Australia

ISA gp,J South Africa

[HZ gp,] Hew Zealand

[Brand & Horsfall,] GB and Financial Earthquake

(Shepardson,] European Problems of US

(H Butler,] World and Crisis

(Hindus,! Russian Realities

(Kirchen.l Germany in Storm

(anon, 1 Manchurian Crisis

(Coatman,] India

(anon,] Groat Britain

CHorgan, 1 Ireland

(Can gp, J Canada

IK Bailey & Shann, ] Australia

ISA gp,] South Africa

(HZ gp, 3 Hew Zealand

(H Butler, J International Crisis

(Hodson, ] Imperial Preference

IVhyte,] China, Japan and Manchuria

l Coatman, J Results of Round Table Conference

(H Butler,] Reparations in Practice

(Hale,] United States

[Stephens, ] India

ICoote & Wadsworth,) Great Britain

l Horgan, ] Irish Free State

JCan gp, J Canada

IK Bailey et al.) Australia

£ SA gp,] South Africa

HZgp,} Hew Zealand

i

22 Ho S7 (June 1932)

[Bodson,! Ottawa

[Horsfall,! Reflections on Crisis

[Dove * Morgan, 3 Ireland and the Treaty

[Shepardson, J United States

[Salter,] Disarmament

[VhyteJ Far East

[Hubbard.l Shanghai Standpoint

[Stephens,] India

[Hodsoa,] Great Britain

(Can gp, 1 Canada

[K Bailey, Mills et al,3 Australia
[SA gp, 3 South Africa
[IZ gp, 3 Hew Zealand

fol 22. Hq 58 (Sept 1932)

(H Butler,] Towards World Conference
(Hodsoa.l Future of India
[Hodsoa,] Ottawa
(Eliot,) Tragedy of Japan
[ Horgaa, J Ireland

[Ebbutt,] Crisis in Central Europe

[Hale,] United States

l Chance 1 1 or , J ttanchukuo

(Stephens,] India

(Eernays, 3 Great Britain

l Stevenson, ] Canada

[ Aus gp, J Australia

ISA gp, 3 South Africa

(IZ gp, 3 New Zealand

India Constitutional Reforms Decision

&L 23 Mo S9_£Hec_1222I

(Lothian, J Foundation for Disarmament
(Brand,] Task of Economic Conference
(facdonald based on Hodson, 3 Ottawa
(loung, 3 Lytton Report
(Shepardson, ) President Elect
(Hindus, 1 Russia
(Horgan.) Ireland
(Stephens,] India
(Beraays, 3 Great Britain

(C an gp, ) Canada

(Copland et al,3 Australia

(^ L Hodson et al, 1 Southern Africa

1 12 SP. 3 New Zealand

406

fol 23 So 9Q (March 1933)

[Horsfall,] War Debts and Recovery

[ Lothian, ] Opportunity at Washington

[Horgan,] Victory of de Valera

[anon,] Japan and League

[Coatman,] Future Government of India

[Hale,] United States

[anon,] Trade and Industry

[Condliffe.l Foreign Law In Empire

[Bernays,] Great Britain

[Can gp, 1 Canada

( Aue gp, 3 Australia

[SA gp, 3 South Africa

tSZ gp, 3 low Zealand

ypl 23 So 9.1 Uune 1933>

[Lothian,] Recoil from Freedom
[Shepardson, J Roosevelt’s Pregram
( Sbbutt , J Nazi Germany
[Perry,] Vorld Debts

[Coatnan d Stephens, 3 Indian Vhlte Paper

[Hubbard,] China after Manchuria

[Toynbee,] Treaty Revision

[Malherbe, J Poor Vhite in S Africa

lanon,] Great Britain

[Horgan,] Irish Free State

[Can gp, ) Canada

[Aus gp, 1 Australia

ISA gp,] South Africa

ISZ gp. ] Few Zealand

Vol 23 ¥n Q2 (Sept 1933 )

ILothian,] Fruits of Anarchy
IHodson.l Policy for Pound
[Renton,! Comnonwealth Tribunal
f Shepardson, 3 New Deal

[PiessG & Copland,] Australian View of Vorld Conference

[ Porry, ] Capitalism and Communism

[Stephens,] India

[anon,] Trade Prospects

[anon,] Shipping Subsidies

fanon,] Great Britain

[Horgan, 3 Irish Free State

[Caa gp, ] Canada

[Giblln,] Australia

l SA gp, ] South Africa

1,2 gp,) Few Zealand

k

gfll_£4 Ip-93

[Lothian, 3 Future of League?

[ Shepardson , 3 Rooccve 1 t

[anon, 3 Japan's Bid

lBod&on,3 Commonwealth Relations

[ Kltrany, 3 Problem of South-East Europe

[Plesse.l Australia and Japan

[Ferry, 3 Vas Koses Right?

[anon, 3 H The Dole"

[Stephens,] India
[anon, I Great Britain
[ Horgan, J Ireland
[Can gp, 3 Canada
[ Yadham, 1 Austral ia
IIZ gp, 1 Hew Zealand

Vol 24 Ho 94 (March 1934)

[Lothian,] Empire, League and Security

[Hodson.l Shipping

(H Macdonald, 3 Rewf oundland

(Copland.] Australian Economist Looks at US

(anon,) northern Ireland and Partition

(Hale,) United States

(G K A Bell,] Church in Third Reich

[Stephens,] India

[Hodson,] Great Britain

[Horgan,] Irish Free State

[Can gp, ) Canada

CAusgp,] Australia

[SA gp, 3 South Africa

[HZ gp, 3 Hew Zealand

Vol 2d Ho 95 (June 1934)

[Brand, 3 John Dove

l Lothian, 3 Isolation, Alliance or Kellogg Pact
l Fuller, ] Air Power and Imperial Defence
IShepardson, J American Trend
(Gunther,] Fascism in Austria
(Salter,] China and World Depression
IShepardson & Can gp, ] St Lawrence Waterway
(Stephens,] India
(Horgan, ] Irish Free State
(Hodson et al,l Great 3ritain
(Cangp,] Canada
(Ausgp. ] Australia
gp. 1 South Africa
IIZ gp, 3 Haw Zealand

y P l 24 So 95 <Sopt 1Q3A)

[Lothian, J Havies and Pacific

[Horsfall,] Blackshirts

[Coupland, 3 Future of Trusteeship

[Hodson, 3 British Agriculture and Empire Trad*

[Hale, 3 Hew Deal

ISA gp, 3 Protectorates and Union

[Kennedy, 1 Crisis in Canadian Constitution

[anon, 3 Cl vitas Dei

[Horgan, 3 Irish Free State

[anon, 3 Great Britain

(Can gp, J Canada

Uus gp, J Australia

(SA gp, 1 South Africa

[SZ gp, J Hew Zealand

Y q I 25 la . 9 ? .( Dec 193 4)

[Lothian, J Power Politics in Pacific
[HorganJ Ireland and Commonwealth
[anon,] Policy of Pius XI
[Hodson, ) Empire Migration
(Hindus,] Moscow

(anon,! Canada and Commonwealth Security

[anon, 3 Third League of Nations

tfeatts,] Indian Politics

[anon, 3 Groat Britain

[Horgan,] Irish Free State

[Can gp, 3 Canada

[Xus gp, 3 Australia

ISA gp, 1 South Africa

(SZ gp, J Hew Zealand

Xal 25 Hq 95 {March 11251

CLothlan,] Commonwealth and World
(Hodson,] Economic Illusion
1 3lack, ] Ulster and Irish Problem
(A R Paterson,] Gotani Show
(Greenwood, ] Germany and Europe
Ueatts,] After India Report
(Horsfall, 3 South African Protectorates
(Hale, 3 Hew Deal

(Nicholas, 3 Federalism in Australia

UnonJ Great Britain

(Horgan.J Ireland

(Can gp.] Canada

Uus gp, ] Australia

(SA gp, 3 South Africa

UZ gp, 3 Hew Zealand

499

frl 25 Ho 99 (June 1935 >

[Lothian,! Germany Rearmed

[T Bird, 3 Commercial Aviation

[SA gp,) S Africa and Empire Defence

[Canham, 3 Vashingtoa and Vorid

[G Fitzgerald,] Last Partition of Africa?

[Hodson,3 Economics and Var

[Yeatts,3 India

CHorgan,3 De Valera's Dilemmas

Canon,] Great Britain

[Can gp, 1 Canada

CAusgp, J Australia

CSA gp, 3 South Africa

C 12 gp,3 Hew Zealand

[anon.3 Arthur Richmond Atkinson

ifnl 25 Ho 100 CSept 1935 )

CHodson,] Twenty-five Years
C Lothian,! Europe, League and Abyssinia
CHodson,] Agricultural Policy and Health
'Chancellor,! Japan in China
CHodson,! neutrality and Sanctions
CCanhan, 3 Havoc and Ha vo- Sotos in 'JS
CSA gp,l Hativc Policy in S Africa
E Coatman, J British Eapire Broadcasting
Canon,) Reform in Protectorates
CYeatts,) India in Transition
CHorgan,! Irish Deadlock
Canon,) Great Britain
tCan gp, 3 Canada
C Aus gp, 3 Australia
CSA gp,) South Africa
CSZ gp, J Hew Zealand

fri 26 No 101 (Dec 1935)

[Lothian, ) League in Crisis

[Hodson,3 Great 3ritaia and Europe

[Canhan, 3 America Seeps Out

(Bywaters, 3 laval Conference

(Plesse.3 Australian Defence Policy

[Soloveytchik, 3 Conroonwealths of the Horth

(F Scott, 3 Kenya Settlers' Case

[aaon.3 German Foreign Policy

(Hodson.l Federalism and Economic Control

(Yeatts,3 India

(Horgan,3 Ireland and League

t anon, 3 Great Britain

[Can gp, 3 Canada

{Aus gp, 3 Australia and the Leagues
ISA gp, 3 South Africa
[fZ gp, 3 Hew Zealand
{ Aus gp, 3 Sir Vi 1 lian Harrison Hoore

YoL 26 No 1Q2 (March 1930)

tGrigg.J King and Empire
{Lothian, 1 Foot of Discontents
{d'Ormesson, 3 France and Crisis
Mbyte,) End of Vashington Treaties
{AS Parker, 3 Egypt
laaon,] March of Sanctions
(Chancellor,] Japan Moves On
[Hodson.3 Colonial Raw Materials
[Canham, 3 America
(Malcolm,] Rudyard Kipling
[Yeatts, 3 Indian Miscellany
(Horgan.3 de Valera's Fifth Year
(anon, 3 Great Br itain
(Cangp.l Canada
(Aus gp, 3 Austral i*
tSA gp,» South Africa
SP«3 Zealand

)

gpl 26 Ho 103 (June 133ft!

[Lothian,! World Crisis

[Sodcon, 1 Co-ordination of Defence

[0 F Hudson,] "Stabilisation" of East Asia

[fockay,] Broadcasting in Democratic State

[Foot,] Legislature for Palestine?

[Bywaters,] Naval Treaty

[SA gp, 3 Hati\r e Policy in S Africa

[B T Reynolds,] Unemployment

treatts, ] India

tdorgan,] Irish Policies

[anon,] Great Britain

[Can gp, 3 Canada

[Aus gp, 3 Australia

[SA gp, 3 South Africa

[SZ gp, 3 »ew Zealand

Yol 26 Kq 104 \Se.pt 1936)

[Lothian, 1 Co muon wealth and League
(de Madariaga , » Spain
(anon,3 Chinese Triangle
[Canham, 1 Roosevelt versus Landon
[anon,] Middle Sea

[Aus gp, 1 Empire Migration: Australian View

[anon,] Philippines

[anon,] Neutrality

[anon,] S V Africa Commission

CHorgan,] de Valera Changes Front

[featts,] Indian Trends

Canon,] Great Britain

[Can gp, 1 Canada

CAus gp, ] Australia

CSA gp, 3 South Africa

IFZgp,] Few Zealand

502

I fli 27 No 1Q5 (Dec 1936 )

[Lothian,] Danger Signals

[Kodson.l Army in Inperial Defence

[Logie. 1 World Exchanges

[de Xadariaga,] Two Spains

[ Canham, 1 Aner i ca

[Barbour, J Palestine

[godson, 1 Agadir to Nuremfceig

[J A Spender, 3 Egyptian Treaty

[anon,3 French Canada

[Teatts.l India

[Borgan, 1 Free State or Republic?

[anon,3 Great Britain

[Can gp, 3 Canada

[Aus gp, 3 Australia

[SA gp, 3 South Africa

[IZ gp, J New Zealand

7ol 27 No 100 (March 1937)

[Hodson,] Crown, Constitution and Commonwealth

[Lothian, 3 Power Politics ar.d Inperial Conference

[Hodson,] Intervention in Spain

[Vint,] Chinese Comnunism

CKacLachlan, 3 Birth Rate and Empire

[Hindus,] Russia's Strength

[SA gp, 1 Rand in Economy of S Africa

fHorgar.,] Irish Republican Kingdon

ranon, 1 Empire and Crisis

fYeatts, J India

fCanham, ] Roosevelt's Tight-Rope
tanon,] Great Britain
[Can gp, ] Canada
iAus gp, 3 Australia
gp. 3 South Africa
[SZ gp, ] Few Zealand

503

ynl 27 JQ..LQ7 (June 1937)

C K Bailey,] King and His Peoples

C Lothian, 1 Problem of Germany

C Hodson, 1 Empire and Vorld Trade

[ Vislenann, 3 Czeohosl ovals i a

[R Jones,] British Hews Abroad

CCan & SA gps, 1 Dominions and Imperial Defence

[ Soloveytchik, ] Northern Europe

[Horgan,] Irish Election

[Canhan, 3 America

[Inglis, 3 Crisis in India

[anon,3 Great Britain

[Can gp, 1 Canada

CAusgp, 3 Australia

[SA gp,J South Africa

IK gp, 3 Hew Zealand

701 2? HQ.-jQg <g*pt 19?7>

[Hodson,] Imperial Conference

[Lothian,] New Vorld Situation

[Vint,] Far East

[Toynbee,] Palestine Report

[Can gp, ] Canada and Privy Council

[Crovrther.3 Booms, Slumps and Armaments

[Canhan, 3 Araei lea

[Horgan, 1 Irish Voter's Decision

[Inglis, 1 Indian Xilestone

[anon,] Great Britain

’Can gp, 3 Canada

[ Aus gp, 1 Australia

ISA gp,3 South Africa

[JZ gp,3 Hew Zealand

Imperial Conference, 1937: Proceedings

7ol 28 Ho IQS (Dec 1937)

‘ Lothian , 3 Power and Opinion
[anon, 3 Kind of Japan
[Toynbee,] Palestine and Arab Vorld
[Loch, 3 France

[Horgan, 3 Exit Irish Free State
[Canhan, 3 America
[Hodson, J Colonial Tariffs
[Graves, J Turkey
‘Plesse, 3 Defence of Australia
* Inglis, 3 India
; anon, 3 Great Britain
Can gp, 3 Canada
; Aus gPiI Australia
;SA gp,3 South Africa
; *Z gp, ] New Zealand

504

fol 28 So 110 (March 1<m>

[Hodson, 3 Air and Citizen

[Binyon, 1 Immortal Heritage CVor graves)

[G E Hubbard,) Japan's Challenge

[Brand,] Politic® and Currencies

[Hodson, 3 Commonwealth Relations

[R Xontague, 3 Rationalism in H Africa

[Canham, 3 American Policy

CHorgan, 3 Re-enter Ireland

[Spaight,) Bombing Xenace

[ Ingl Is, 3 Indio

[anon,) Great Britain

[Can gp, 3 Canada

[Aus gp, 3 Australia

[SA gp, ) South Africa

[BZ gp, J Hew Zealand

Vol 26 Xo 111 (June 1935)

[Lothian,] Commonwealth and Dictatorships

[K Hurray,] Agriculture on Relief

[Hodson, 3 Commonwealth Defence

[V Harris, 3 Letters of John Dove

[Canham, 3 America in Balance

[Rozinsky.l Fast and Future of Warfare

[Korgan,] Anglo-Irish Agreement

[J Balogb.3 Hungary

[ Ingl is, 1 India

f anon. 3 Great Britain

[Can gp, 3 Canada

[Aus gp, 3 Austral ia

ISA gp, J South Africa

tFZ gp, ] lev Zealand

M 20 Ifl 112 iSsgfc 15.321.

[Hodson,) Empire Secuiity
[Canham, 3 Vail Street
[anon, 3 Folitlcal Refugees
[anon, 3 Vest Indies
[Sprigge.i 3ritain and Italy
[anon,] A. R. F.

[Horgan, 3 de Valera's Victory
[anon, ] Poland, Neighbours and Vest
Hnglis,) India
<F L V Vood, 3 New Deals
tanon,] Great Britain
[Can gp, ) Canada
Uus gp, 3 Austral ia
[SA gp. 1 South Africa
gp, ] s ew Zealand

L

!jI_ 3 Q Ko 113 (Dec 'QSft l

[Horsfall,] Crisis and Future
[ 7oigt , 3 Czechosl o vak i a
[Sodson et al,3 Overseas Reactions
[godson,! Sydney Conference
[Conhara.3 American Unity

[Logie, 3 Economic Regime of the Third Reich

[G F Hudson, 3 Soviet Union

[Horgan.3 Irish People

[Inglis,! India

[anon, 3 Great Britain

[Can gp, 3 Canada

[ Aus gp, 3 Australia

ISA gp, 3 South Africa

HZgp, 3 Few Zealand

Documentary Anthology of Crisis

ynl 29 NQ 114..<«acc3l-19.39>

[Horsfall, J Han Power and War Peril

[Hodson,3 Commonwealth after Munich

[Bridgenvan, Alexander, Laski & Toynbee,! Palesti

CCanham, 1 America

[Grier, 3 British Vest Africa

[Chancellor,! China

(HZ gp, 3 Hew Zealand

[Hall, 3 Dust Bowls of Empire

(Inglis, 3 Obstacles to Indian Federation

[Horgan, 3 Ireland

[anon.3 Great Britain

[Can gp, 3 Canada

f Aus gp, 1 Austral ia

(SA gp, ] South Africa

500

gg]_ 39 ffc 115 (Jung 1Q3Q3

[Lothian, 1 Grand Alliance
[Harlow, 1 Palestine
rgodson.l "Union Now"

[R Murray, 1 Germany's Eastern Neighbours

[Lowbam, 1 Indian States

[Rozinski.l German Military Xtnd

[Bodsor. & Hichens, 1 British Shipping in Orient

[Conham, 3 America Prepares

[via Minister for Netherlands, 3 Jet her lands Indies

[Con gp, 3 Canada and Var Danger

[Horgan, 3 Ireland

[Inglis, ] Gandhi'© Feast

British Policy: Documents fed Hudson]

l anon, 3 Great Britain

{ Aus gp, 3 Australia

ISA gp, 1 South Afi ica

ISZ gp.l New Zealand

Official Publications on Commonweal tl

Toi 29 No no. jgfipLjaaai

[Hodson, 3 Freedom
taaon,] Anglo- Japanese Relations
IGrigg,) Britain's Strength
(Prof A ?! Fraser,) Newfoundland
l Hodson, 1 British Jews
[Hodson, 1 Union: Oceanic or Continental
tCanharc, 1 Alter ica and Crisis
[Ausgp, 1 Australian Defence
[Inglis, 1 Indian Federation
fleith-Ross, 3 Vorld Trade
[Horgan,! Disunited Ireland
[Hodson ed, > British Policy: Documents
fanon,! Gre« t Britain
[Can gp, 3 Canada
f* J sgp, 3 Australia
[Si 8p,3 South Africa
gp,l New Zealand

. Official Publications on Commonwealth

»

507

r

30 Eq 117 (Pec 1939)

[ Coupland,] Var and Peace
[anon, 3 Strategy of Var
[T Balogh.l Var Economics
[anon, 3 Home Front
[anon. 3 France at Var
[Canham, 1 America and Var
[Horgan.l Heutral Ireland
[lnglis.3 India and Var
[Crowther.3 Great Britain
[Car gp, 3 Canada
[Aus gp,] Australia
[SA gp, 1 South Africa
[luxford, J Sew Zealand
Documents [Lothian speech!

Official Publications on Commonwealth

7ol 30 go 113 <Xaroh 1940)

[Coupland & Livingstone! The Issue

[anon,] Civilisation of Finland

[anon,] Strategy of Var. II

[anon.J Sharing Cost

lanon,] Inside Germany

l Canham, J America

ICrowther ,1 Great Britain

IHorgan,] Ireland

flngl Is, 3 India

(Can gp, 3 Canada

[Aus gp, 3 Austral la

( SA gp, 3 South Africa

[Ton Haas t, 3 Few Zealand

Documents [Brunner, Roosevelt and Gwyerl

Official Publications on Commonweal th

lQl_.30 Ho 119 (June 19AQ.I

[ Horsfall,] Decisive Hour
[Pritchard,] Strategy of Var. I 'I
[Brand,] Financial Peal i tie*

[via Grigg, ) French Army

[Canham, 1 American Hood

tanon,] South-East Europe

lanon,] Shipping Control

linglis,] India

IBorgan,] Irish Developments

ICrowther,] Great Britain

[Can gp, ] Canada

Uus gp.3 Australia

[ 5A gp, ] South Africa

IP L V Vood.l Hew Zealand

Official Publications on Commonwealth

508

U 1 30 gQ 120 <Sept_l

[Curtis,] Sir Abe Bailey

[anon,] Hitler and Common Sense

[Pritchard, 1 Strategy of Var. IV

[Logie, 3 Var Economy

[anon,] Commonweal th at Var

[Canham,] American Reaction

[Inglis.3 India

[Horgan,] Divided Ireland

[Crowther,] Great Britain

[Can gp, 3 Canada

[Aus gp, 3 Australia

[SA gp, 3 Sou tli Africa

[A F Castle,] Hew Zealand

Var Gifts from Colonial Empire

Ynl .ii Wo 121 CDec 1940)

l Coupland, 3 Lionel Kichens
[anon,) Second Vinter
[anon,] Reconstruction
[anon,J Strategy of Var. 7
[anon,] Food Shortage
[anon.J Howe Guard
CLAmery,] Indian Settlement
[Horgan,] Ireland
[Crowther,] Great Britain
[SA gp, 1 South Africa
[ Aus gp, 1 Austral ia
[C H Veston.i Hew Zealand

Sal. 31 go 12? ffarc-h 19.411

[Grigg,] Philip Kerr

CCoupland & Livingstone,] Two Orders

Canon, 3 Strategy of Var. VI

C Logie, 3 Var Economy

Canon,] Reconstruction. I. Building

C/ia Livingstone,! Northern Ireland

C Canham, 3 American Arsenal

C Inglis, 3 India

CCrowther.) Great Britain

CCan gp, 3 Canada

CAus gp, J Australia

ISA gp, 3 South Africa

CHunter,] New Zealand ,

Uerr,] AngIo-Geraan Rivalry C reprint fron «o u

509

yn 1 31 Wo 123 CJunt> ‘ 01 1 v

CGrigg, 1 Riddle of 1941

[HC O'Neill,) Strategy of War. 7I[

(Samuel,! Reconstruction, ri
(J Anery,! Yugoslavia

CCoupland & L Anwry, ] India In Post-Var Vorld

(Horsfall,! Budget

(Canhan, 1 America Strength

(Horgan et al,3 Ireland

(Inglis,! Stalemate In India

[Crowther, 1 Great Britain

[Can gp, 3 Canada

(Ausgp, ) Australia

[SA gp,l South Africa

(Scholef ield, J New Zealand

TqI SlJifl-124 - S e pt j941 3

(Horsfall, J lew Phase

(Horsfall,! Var Production

(H C O'Neill,! Strategy of Var. VIII

(Livingstone,! Reconstruction. Ill: Education

(H A R Gibb,! Arab Nationalism

(Zimnern.l Outlook for Ethiopia

ICanham, 1 America

(Horgan,! Divided Ireland

( Inglis, ! Indian Pol (tics

(Brooke,! Great Britain

(Can gp, 1 Canada

(Aus gp, 1 Australia

(SA gp, 1 South Africa

IF L V Wood,! New Zealand

Yol 32 N»; <2fi (D*c 1941)

(Brand,) Acglo-Aaer lean Co-operation

(Falls,! Strategy of War. IX

(anon, 1 Future of Foreign Service

(anon,! Japan's Few Order

(anon,! Iranian Background

(Horgan, J Irish Developments

(Inglis,! India

(Brooke,! Great Britain

(Can gp, 1 Canada

(Aus gp, ] Austral la

ISA gp, j South Africa

(E Parry,! New Zealand

k

510

gp l 32 ffo 126 (March 1942 >

[Korrah.3 America Enters
[anon.J Commonwealth Control
[D Jay i 3 *an and Vojian Power
[anon, 3 Strategy of Var. X
[Humphreys, 1 Latin America
CCanham, 1 United States
[anon, 3 Irish Events
(Inglit>, 3 India's Role
[Brooke, 3 Great Britain
[Can gp, 3 Canada
ISA gp, 3 South Africa
[Von Haast,] Hew Zealand
Uus gp, 3 Australia

lol 32 Ho 12? (June 1942)

[Korrah,] Prospects of 1942

(Brooke,] Parliament in Var

[GriggJ High Command

CCoote,] Strategy of Var. XI

(S Brown, 3 Cripps Mission from England

tlnglis.3 Cripps XSssion from India

[Canham.l USA

fanon, 3 Ireland

[Brooke,] Great Britain

(Can gp, 3 Canada

ISC Bailey **t al,l Australia

(SA gp, 3 South Africa

[HZ gp, 3 Hew Zealand

M 32 fo 123 1 9122.

[ Xorrah, 3 Three Tears
[anon, 3 Twenty Tears On
[Horsfall, 3 Production
[Brooke, 3 Parliament
tCoote, 3 Strategy of Var. XII
rfelim, 3 Education in Empire
flnglis.3 India
tOannam,] America
[Brooke,] Great Britain
Ifensergh,! Ireland
l Can gp,] Canada
l *us gp, ] Australia
IR H L Shepherd et al , 3 South Africa
gp, 3 Jew Zealand

fr y! 33 flo 1 29 (Dec 1Q4?)

[Xorrah, 1 Turning Point
[Hailey, 3 Future of Colonies
[Horsfall,] Vages and Prices
[anon, 3 British Achievement
[Coote,3 Strategy of Vor. XIII
[Canham, 3 America's Vlll
[anon, 3 Brazil enters Var
[Hoi burn, J India
[Brooke, 3 Great Biitaln
[anon, 3 Ireland
[Can gp, 3 Canada
[Aus gp, 3 Australia
[SA gp, J South Africa
[FZ gp, ] New Zealand

tai 33.M.13Q CKarch 1943>

[For rah, 3 Casablanca

[anon, 3 Beveridge Plan

[anon, 3 Darlan and After

Canon, 3 Farming Front

CKalcolm, ) African Problem

[Coote.l Strategy of Var. XIV

C Hoi burn, 1 India

[Brooke, 3 Great Britain

[anon,l Ireland

[Can gp, 3 Canada

[Aus gp, 3 Australia

[SA gp, J South Africa

CFZ gp, 3 Hew Zealand

Ifll 33 Ho 131 <Ju nc 13121

Canon, 1 Four fears* Flan
Canon,! Europe on Eve
CF Sykes, 3 Air Transput t
CCoote, I Strategy of Var. XV
CH Henderson,) Unitas and Bancor
C Brooke, J Sequel to Beveridge
CKaiin, 3 Education in Empire. II
[Phillips, 3 China and Britain
CCanham. 3 United States
CHolburn k Hodson,3 India
1 Brooke, 3 Great Britain
1 anon, 3 Ireland
l ^an gp, 3 Canada
C4u s gp, 3 Australia
Cs A gp, ] South Africa
gp, 1 ir^w Zealand

(Jfolcolm, J Patrick Duncan

(Hodson,3 Conmonwoalth and Settlenent

{Horsfall, 1 Foundations of Prosperity

[anon, 3 First Leaf Falls

(anon, J Russia in Future

[anoD, 3 Hot Springs

ICcote, 3 Strategy cif Var. XVI

{Canbam, 3 American Contrasts

l Hoi burn, 1 India

{Brooke, J Great Britain

(Hansergh, J Ireland

(Aus gp, J Australia

(SA gp, 3 South Africa

[HZ gp, J New Zealand

(anon, 3 Expanding Horizons
[anon, 3 Powers and Peace
ICcote, J Strategy of Var. XVII
[anon, 1 Air Transport. II
[anon, 3 Education for Greatness
fCanham, 1 America
[Hoi burn, 3 India
fBrooke.3 Great Britain
(Kansergh, 1 Ireland
(Can gp, 3 Canada
[ Auc gp, 3 Australia
(SA gp, 3 South Africa
IHZ gp, 3 New Zealand

l anon, 3 Common Counsel
t anon, 3 Coalition
lanon.3 Germany from Vi thin
IGcodhart, 3 Var Crimes
Ullen, 3 Forty Years On
ICcote,! Strategy of Var. XVIII
ICanham, 3 America
IHolburn,! India
I Brooke, 3 Great Britain

lAus gp, ] Australia

lSA gp, J South Afr ica
INZgpJ New Zealand
IG V Brown, 3 Canada

513

frl 34 No 135 (June

[anon, 3 Conference

[anon, 3 Few Europe

[anon,] Delegated Legislation

[anon, 3 France

[anon, 3 Control of Hines

[anon, 3 Var Finance

[anon, 3 New Era in V Indies

(Coote,3 Strategy uf Var. XIX

[Canbam, 3 America

l Hoi burn, 3 India

l Brooke, 3 Great Britain

[Xansergh, 3 Ireland

[Can gp, 3 Canada

(Aus gp, 3 Australia

[SA gp, J South Africa

[HZ gp, 3 New Zealand

Yoi 3 . Q o..i3$-.<Sept 1 944)

CXorrah, 3 Organization of Security

Canon, 1 Employment Policy

Canon, 3 Conference of 1944

CTerestchenko, 1 Russia's Foreign Policy

Canon, 3 Future of Farming

CCoote.3 Strategy of Var. XX

CCanham, 3 Presidential Campaign

C Hoi burn, l India

f Brooke, 3 Great Britain

CXansergli, 3 Ireland

[Can gp, 3 Canada

CAus gp, 3 Australia

CSA gp, » South Afi ica

CBZ gp, 3 New Zealand

514

Iel_35 No-L3T_.-CI>ec 1944 >

[jCorrah, ] Concert of Vorld
[Horsfall. ] Social Security
[Gilpl 11 .! Monetary Fund
[ via Hailey, 1 Interest ia Colonies
[Coote,! Strategy of Var. XXI

[ R X Xacdonnel 1 , 1 Air Transport - Canadian View

(Kalin. J Education in Empire. Ill

(anon,] Liberation and After

[Canham, 3 American Outlook

[FLow, J India

(Brooke.3 Great Britain

CAus gp, 3 Australia

[SA gp, 3 South Africa

[11 gp, 1 New Zealand

lol 35 Mq .i3£.i3& rc h 194 5?

[Kalcolra.l Geoffrey Dawson

[Korrah,] Tasks of Triumvirs

[via Chief of Naval Information, . Sea Power

[Freeman,! New Europe

fHodson,] Opportunity in India

[Rand ley-Page, 1 After Chicago

[H Beeley,] Empire and Arab East

[Coote, J Strategy of Var. XXII

C Canham, ] Fourth Term

IF Low, J India

[Brooke,] Great Britain

CK Wilson,] Canada

CAus gp, ] Austral la

ISA gp, 1 South Africa

CK gp,l New Zealand

IflL.35 No 139 fJvM? 19451

CXorrah.3 Europe Delivered
tCanhara, 1 America and Vorld Order
fCoote.J Strategy of Var. XXI I r
Bailey,] Commonwealth Relations
tHHolson,] Housing Problems
iaaon,] Burma

[ Hand ley- Page, ] Air Transport
IHolburn,] India
[ Brooke,] Great Britain
1 Brady,] Canadian Democracy
! A “S gp, ] Australia
lS A gp.l South Africa
E,Z gp,l New Zealand

u

515

gpl 35 Hq 140 (Sept 194Ry

[Xorrah.l Heirs of Victory
[Hodson.l Vhat Next in India?

[Kaud.l Twilight between Var and Peace

[aaon, 1 Ireland Re-e»erges

[X Turner,) Germany

[Canhan,) United States

CCoote,) Strategy of Var. XXIV

[Broad,) Var and Veolth of Britain

[S Bailey,) China

[Hoi burn,) Indio

[Brooke,) Great 3rltaln

[Can gp, ) Canada

[Aus gp, ) Australia

[SA gp, ) South Africa

[HZ gp, 3 Hew Zealand

Ypl 36 No 141 (Dec 1945)

[Xorrah.J Schism of Europe

CHodson,] UN and Atonic Bomb

[Freeman,) Fourth Republic

[X Turner,] Germany

[Altrincham,] Empire and Middle East

[A H McDonald,] Pacific Islands

[Canhan, 1 America and Commonwealth

[anon,] Great Illusion

[Pakeman,] Soul bury Report

[Canham, 1 America

[Brooke,] Great Britain

[Can gp, ] Canada

[Picken, J Australia

[Brookes & Kidd,) South Africa

CShearer,) New Zealand

iol 36 No 1 42 (March 1945)

Canon,) Herbert Baker

CHorsfall,) Finance of Recovery

CXorrah (intro),] Speeches on Vorld Government

Canon,) Trusteeship System

CRednan,] China

CH Steele,) Jean-Baptiste [Quebec)

[Canhan, ] America
CHodson,] India

t Reiner,] Neighbour's Empire [Indonesia)

CHolburn,] India

tRLaw,) Great Britain

lJ A Gibson,} Canada

[Sydney gp, 3 Australia

£ SA gp,] South Africa

l Uwn.) New Zealand

ftjT 36 Ho 143 (June

[Jforrah,] Babel

[Curtis, J Geroan of Resistance

[Hutton,] Lean Kine

(G Maxwell,] Malaya

[Canham, ] United States

ID V Glass,] Population and Empire

[Horgan,] de Valera’s "Republic"

lanon,] Great Britain

[G Jackson, 3 Canada

[Aus gp.J Australia

[ Robertson/ McCaus land, J South Africa

[Scholefleld, 1 New Zealand

[Holburn, ] India

?el 36.fla..lAi„£Sept 1945)

[Korrah,] Hollow Continent

[Altrincham,] Palestine

[D Xaclachlan, ] B.B.C.

tD Rickett, 3 Atomic Energy

[C Dundas.l Fifth Province of Union

f Hodson, 1 India’s Task

f Canham, 1 Vashi ngton

fC Jeffries,] Service in Transition

[Tyson,] India

[Horgan,] Ireland

[Angus, 3 Canada

[Stock,] Australia

[Stratford,] South Africa

IF L V Vood.3 New Zealand

Ifil 27 NO 145 ].94P;_

[Korrah,] Par tnershlp and Policy
[Brand, J Thoughts on US
[J Foster.3 Nuremberg
CXarquand.J Colour Policy in S Africa
tK Turner,! Four Cot Cf Hand
tG Norman, J Governance of France
IH Steele,) Canadian Immigration Policy
t Canham, J America
l Tyson ,J India

[ S Robinson,] United Kingdom
{ Horgan, 3 Ireland
c Badger ,3 Australia
^ Stratford, 3 South Africa
tEunter.l New Zealand

517

Vol 3?-J.Q_lA.6_-<March 1947 >

[Altrincham,] Enpire and X East

[ R Butler,] Treat/ Settleutent

[Brand,] Economic Progress

[Gey 1,1 Indonesia

[anon,] S Africa and UN

[SA gp] SA and United Rations

[D K Clark a J Sparrow,! Conscription

[anon,] Burma

[Canham, ] Isolationist Revived

[Horgan,] Ireland

[Tyson,] India

[anon, 3 United Kingdom

[Can gp, 3 Canada

[Prest,] Australia

[SA gp, 3 South Africa

[IZ gp, 3 Few Zealand

Yol 37 Vo 147 (June 1947)

[Korrah.3 Crown Itinerant
[ffodson.3 Intolerance
[Brooke, 3 Middle Classes
[Con O'Neill, 1 Poker at Moscow
[anon,] Deathbed of Indian Empire
[lansergh,] Inter-Asian Relations
C Yicpen, 1 Atomic En«rgy

[Robbins & D Robertson,! Sterling Balances

[Canham,] America

[Tyson,] India

[anon,] United Kingdom

C Horgan,] Ireland

[Can gp, ] Canada

CSawer et al , 3 Australia

t SA gp, ] South Africa

[JZ gp, 3 Sew Zealand

YQl 37 Ho 3 43 <Sept. 1947 L

Morrali,! Heiress and Inheritance
tBareau.3 Marshall's Advice
Uodson.3 Valediction to India
HicCausland, 3 Land of Five Races
£ Packer, 3 Southward Bastion
Canon,] Burna

I anon, 3 Hundred Millions for Colonies

C Canham. 3 Two-Vorld Policy

fG A Johnson,] India

tCoote.l United Kingdom

l Horgan, 3 Ireland

£V A Mackintosh,] Canada

Uus gp, ] Australia

tScholef ield, ! Uew Zealand

7 nl 38 No 149 (Dec 1947)

fKorrah, 1 The Lords

[Hodson, 3 Does Russia mean Var?

[Turner, 3 Plight of Conquered
[Pickles,] France
[V L Holland,] China

[Barbour,] Resigning Mandate [Palestine]

[pakeman,] Dominion of Ceylon

[Canham, 3 America's Faith

[G A Johnson,] India

[Coots,] United Kingdom

[Horgan, ] Ireland

[K Vilson, ] Canada

[Aus gp, 3 Australia

[SA gp,) South Africa

[HZ gp, ) Hew Zealand

Tnl 3fl No 150 (Xafcli 1S46)

[Xorrah, 1 Two Views
[Curtis, J Untenpered Kortar
[Altrincham, 3 Britain's Role
[anon, 3 American Econouic Policy
[Dunfield,! Uewfoondland
IK Turner, 3 Bizocia
l anon, 3 British Agriculture
ICanham, 3 united States

ICoote a Sayers <5 Ireland), 3 United Kingdom

[Tyson, 3 India

(F K Innes,3 Pakistan

(Horgan, 3 Ireland

IK Vilson, 3 Canada

(Sawer.3 Austral ia

(Scholef ield , 1 New Zealand

(Hodson,) Conmon weal th Relations

519

Y fll 38 Ho 151 (Junp 194 ft)

[JCorrah, 3 Defence of Europe

[Brand, J Commonwealth and Western Onion

[Caroe.J Palestine in Asia

[Cockin, 1 Spiritual Commonwealth

[Hodson,) British Subject

( Fiehaus, 1 S V Africa and Union

[Canham,) America Guarantor

[R Humphreys,) Spanish for 'Monroe Doctrine' [

[Coote & Sayers <H Ire),) United Kingdom

[Tyson,) India

tlnnes, J Pakistan

[Horgan,) Ireland

[Stevenson,) Canada

[Packer,) Australia

[SAgp, ) South Africa

[Shearer,! Hew Zealand

lal 3d go i.52..£5fip. t . 1943 >

[Korrah, 3 Half a Conference
[Jacob S Falls,) .Soviet. Russia
CKaxwell-Fyfe, 3 "United Europe"

[Brand & Curtis,) Debate Continued
C Goo Id- Ada ms, J Italy, Colonies and Ourselves
[Ranee, 1 Communism in Burma
(Canham,] America

[Coote & Sayers <F Ire), 3 United Kingdom

[Horgan,) Ireland

[Tyson,) India

Clones,) Pakistan

[Stevenson,) Canada

CSawer) Australia

[XcCausland, ) South Africa

[Hunter , 3 Mew Zealand

CHodcon, ) Commonwealth Relations

C Anerica)

520

i

ifli 39 Ho 153 <Deo 194fi)

iXorrah, ] SI Vis Pacem
{anon,] Autumn Conferences
(D Cooper, J France

[»la Imperial Defence College] Insurrection in Kalaua

[Korton, 3 Apartheid 7

[Hcdson, 3 Indian States

CHorgan, 3 Ireland and Commonwealth

[Canham, J Truman's Triumph

CBoardrcan & Sayers <S Ire),] United Kingdom

[Dunfield.3 Hewfoundlarid

[Tyson,] India

[InnesJ Pakistan

[ Ste ve nson , 3 Ca nada

[Aus gp, 3 Australia

(HofmeyrJ South Africa

[F L V Vood, 3 Sew Zealand

7o1 30 No 154 (March 1S49)

! Cape, 3 Jan Hendrik Hofreeyr

IXorrob, 3 Atlantic Pact and Vester c Union

[Picken, 3 Australian View of Empire

[X Turner, 1 Contiol of V Germany

[Xllverton,] Indirect Pule in V Africa

[Caroe,] Persian Golf

[G F Hudson,] Civil Yai in China

t Canham, 3 Truman’s Honeymoon

[Morgan, 1 Republic of Ireland

iS V Hason & Sayers <H ire/,1 United Kingdom

l InnesJ Pakistan

t Angus, 3 Canada

IAusgp, 3 Australia

[Stratford & Robertson,] South Africa

1IZ gpj Rew Zealand

[PakemanJ Ceylon

ft,! 39 Ho 155 (June 1Q4Q)

[Jforrah,] Crown Without Sceptre

[Brookes, J Apartheid

[ Eorgan, 3 Ireland and Atlantic Pact

[ anon , 1 Party Fight in Canada

[Huxley, 3 Greater Rhodesia

[Sunn.J Federation in Caribbean

[Tress,] Finance of Welfare State

[Canham, 1 America and Communist World

(S W Mason & Sayers Of Ire),} United Kingdom

[TysoD.l India

[p T Ensor,] Pakistan

[Can gp,] Canada

[Stock,] Australia

[Forton & Robertson,! South Africa

[Von Hoast, 3 Few Zealand

(Hodson.l Commonwealth Relations

Ifll 39 ISO. CScp.t I94P>

[Brand,] Dollar Crisis

l Vint,] Bonn Constitution

[Sydney gp, J Common Policy

[Evil 1, 3 Man-power and Defence

[Caroe, 3 Pakistan and the Tribes

[Canham, 3 Military Assistant Progran

[Brooke & Sayers <N Ire),) United Kingdom

CKorgan.3 Ireland

[Tyson, 3 India

[ Innes, 3 Pakistan

[Can gp,3 Canada

[Chisholm, 3 Australia

IGraaff.) South Africa

CScholef ield, 3 New Zealand

[Hodson.l Common wealth Relations

522

r

gal 40 Hq. 157-CBec 1949>

[Jforrah,] Handful of Silver

[anon.3 Devaluation

(J Foster,] Parliament of Europe

[Can gp ft Curtis,] Commonwealth Eolations Conference

[anon,] Greece and Enemies

[Sawer.l Australian Banks Case

[G Sansone,] Red Banners over Asia

[anon, 3 Africans to be Clerks

[Canhan, 3 Paradoxes in USA

[Brooke ft Sayers <H Ir&>,3 United Kingdom

CHorgan.3 Ireland

[Innes,3 Pakistan

[Ausgp, 3 Australia

CJCarquand h Robertson,! South Africa

[Lawn, 3 Hew Zealand

?oL 40 No 153 Ofarch. 1950)

[J V Ilott, 3 Vi 1 1 lam Downie Stewart

iKorrah, ] UK Elections

[anon,] Colombo and Conuionwealth

[Geyl,] Indonesian Settlement

[Sedgwick,] Trust in Africa [Protectorates]

[Utley,] Christian Democracy

[Canhan, 3 Vashington

[R Frost, ] East Africa

[Brooke h Sayers Ire),] United Kingdom

[Horgan,] Ireland

[Tyson,] India

[Innes, 1 Pakistan

[Can gp, 1 Canada

IPicken.3 Australia

fSA gp, 1 South Africa

[Hunter,] Hew Zealand

CS A Pakeman, 3 Ceylon

ynl 40 Ko 159 (June 1950

iXorrah,) Challenge to Vest

fC F 0 Clarke,] Germany In Europe

fHodson,] Kashmir and Jammu

(Xalcolm, 3 Cne Rhodesia or Two?

fListowel,] British Caribbean

[Canham.l Senator Sees Red

(H Steele,] Peoples of Canada

(Brooke a Sayers <F Ire), 3 United Kingdom

(Horgan, 3 Ireland

(Tyson, 3 India

( Innas, ] Pakistan

(Con gp, 3 Canada

(A H McDonald,) Australia

(SA gp, 3 South Africa

(HZ gp, 1 Few Zealand

£ul iLJiQ.10.? 195 0/

l Horrah, 3 UN In Action

(H V Macdonnell,) Mackenzie King

ID Harris, 3 Sterling

laQon,] Schuman Plan

t Can gp, 1 Forth American Defense

(Caroe.3 Russia's Eastern Marches

(T Johnston, 3 Scottish Covenant

(Canham, 3 Mobilizing the US

(Brooke 3c Sayers <S Ire),J United Kingdom

(Horgan.3 Ireland

(Tyson,] India

Hones, J Pakistan

ISawer.] Australia

(Brookes, 3 South Africa

(HZ gp, 3 Few Zea3and

(anon, 3 British Commonweal tli Relations

lol 41 No 151 175Q1

(Brand & H Lawrence,) Jan Christiaan Smuts

(Xorrah, I Arms for Germans

tJCisch,] Public Expenditure

(XcLachlan,] Danger Spots of 1951

(A Head,) Hanning Defences

CCanhan, J Truman

(A E Haaren, 3 Soil of Bast Africa

(Brooke «5c Sayers <H Ire),) United Kingdom

(Horgan, J Ireland

(lanes,) Pakistan

(Cangp, ] Canada

(Packer,) Australia

(Kidd, ] South Africa

(G E Vood,) Few Zealand

524

Ynl 41 Ho 162 (March 1Q51 )

[JCorrah,] Korea and UK
[Altrincham,] Anglo-Egyptian Relations
[J Amery, J Commonwealth at Strasbourg
[Caroe, 3 Sepal in Transition
[Kidd,] Cape Coloured Franchise
rCanham, 3 America

[Brooke & Sayers <H Ire),] United Kingdom

[Horgan.l Ireland

[Tyson,] India

CInnes.3 Pakistan

[G V Ferguson, 3 Canada

[Sawer,] Australia

[HZ gp, 1 Hew Zealand

[Pakeman,] Ceylon

[anon,] Commonwealth Relations

Declaration by Commonwealth FKs

lol 41. Ka .1.03 . Uvne 1951)

Otorrah,] Staff for Cold Var

[via Horsfall,] Economics of Farlianent

[Hodson & Kidd, J Ha lan and the Commonweal th

ID R Gillie,] France

(Han’oury, 3 Outlawry of Coiununlsn

(Canham, 3 KcArthur

[anoaj Titoist Schism

(Brooke & Sayers <H Ireland),] United Kingdom

[Horgan,] Ireland

(Tyson, 3 India

(Ensor.l Pakistan

ICan gp, 3 Canada

(Sawer, 3 Australia

(Kidd Si Brookes,! South Africa

(HZ gp, 3 Hew Zealand

M 41 No 164 fSept 19511

Htorrah, 3 Oil Crisis
fE Xunro, 3 Lesson of Persia
fG Hudson, J Far Eastern Background
t Guy Vlnt,J Views of Korea
ICanham, 3 America in Asia

IHalcolm, 3 Paxturlunt Montes: Central Africa
H Freeman, 3 Bonn Balance Sheet
1 Brooke Si Sayers <H Ireland),! United Kingdom
t Horgan, ] Ireland
t Tyson,] India
tEnsor, ] Pakistan
^Stevenson, ] Canada

Bailey & Sawer,] Australia
t5 A gp, ] South Africa
gp, 3 Hew Zealand

525

I

Bf.

Ifl *2 So 165 (Dec 1951)

[Xorrah,] Churchill's Return
[Innes, 3 Liaqat Ali Khan
[anon.J Labour
[anon.3 Economic Problems
[anon,] Islam in US
[Pringle,] European Army
[Canham,] Vhite House

[Xorrah. J Amery & Sayers <H Tre),] United Kingdom

[Korgan,] Ireland

[Tyson,] India

[Innes,] Pakistan

[Stevenson,] Canada

[Aus gp,3 Australia

[SAgp, 1 South Africa

[ XZ gp, ] Pew Zealand

V01 42 So 166 <Karch 1052)

[Xorrah,] Passing of Ci own

[Xynors,] Sterling Area

[ Leitb-Fuss, 1 Egyptian Imbroglio

[Redman,] Reconditioned Japan

l Canham, 1 Anerican Sweepstakes

[Baring,] High Commission Territories

IXacLeod & Sayers <5 Ire),] United Kingdon

[Horgan,] Ireland

[Tyson,] India

[Innes, 3 Fakistan

CX Freedman & KcGeachy,] Canada

[Sawer,3 Australia

[Lawn, J Sew Zealand

CSA gp, ] Wrecking a Constitution

M 42 go 167 (June 19521

[via Lazards, 1 Outlook for Sterling
fBeloff,] Britain and European Federation
[Curtis,] Real Issue
U Lawrence,] Harris v Donges
[Canham,] Lame Duck Polities
[anon,] Malaya

IXacLeod a Sayers %'B Ire), 3 United Kingdom
[ Horgan, 1 Ireland
[Innes,] Pakistan
[Can gp, 3 Canada

[Aus,] Australia: Dileiaio-J of Defence
[SA gp, ] South Africa
[0 E Vocd , ] Sew Zealand
CPakeman,] Ceylon

Yol A2--JQ. 163 <ISe?t mai

[Jforrah,] Coronation and Commonwealth

[Siegfried.3 Resurgent France

[Kirkpatrick.] German Ally

[anon,] Education for Scientific Age

rO Voods, 1 Self-Government in Gold Coast

(Canham.l Presidential Timber

[anon,] 300,000 Houses a Year

[Boyle & Sayers <F Ire),] United Kingdom

[Korgan,] Ireland

[Tyson,] India

[ Innes, ] Pakistan

[Can gp, 3 Canada

[ Aus gp, 1 Australia

[K Lawrence,] South Africa

[ FZ gp, 3 Few Zealand

Yol 42. Kq- 16 9 . . s Pec 1952)

[Xorrah,] Coronation and Commonwealth II
[Canham, 3 Elsenhower
[Caroe,] Soviet Imperialism
[Vheeler,] Persia

[Angus,] Corsmon wealth Trade Conference
(anon,3 Egyptian Revolution
[ G Roberts, ] Kenya

[Boyle & Sayers (K Ire),] United Kingdom

[Korgan,] Ireland

[Innes,] Pakistan

[Aus gp.l Australia

[SA gp, 1 South Africa

[FZ gp, 1 Few Zealand

?cl 43 No 170 (Xarch 19531

IXorrah,] Last Empire-Builder

f Altrincham, 1 Rhodes and Rhodesia

[Kisch,] Economic Development of Commonweal

fP Duncan,] Sotyagxaho in S Africa

t Canham, 1 Washing ton

tFeynet,] Fiance and French Union

tEoyle & Sayers <F Ire>,l United Kingdom

tHorgan,] Ireland

tXcInnes,) India

( Innes, J Pakistan

[Can gp,] Canada

[Aus gp,] Australia

ISA gp, ] South Africa

U H A Ilott & R S Farker.l Sew Zealand

527

YqI 43 Bq 171 CJun&_lQ52X

flforrah, 1 Gentler Breeze

f G Hudson,] Asia after Stalin

[via Brand,] Butler's Budget

[J Anery,] Future of Canal Zone

[Milverton,] ffew State in Africa CC Af)

[Canhan, 1 President

[D Drummond,] Feopling Australia

[Boyle ft Sayers OJ Ire>,l United Kingdom

[Morgan,] Ireland

[Kclnncs,] India

[Innes,] Pakistan

[Angus ft H V Xacdonnell, 1 Canada

[Aus gp, 1 Australia

[Robertson ft H Lawrence,] South Africa
[RZ gp,] Rew Zealand

Yol 43 No 172 (Sept 1953)

[Korrah, based on Falls, 3 After Armistice

[Hanning et al,l Two Friends of FT

[Korrah,] Coronation and Coranoiiweal th III

[Can gp, 1 Queen of Canada

[Aus gp, 3 Taxing Powers in Federation

[anon,] End of Dollar Aid

CKacLachlan, 1 European Defence Community

[Canham, 1 Fresident and Congress

CCaine.J Malaya after Errargency

[anon,] Commonwealth Relations

[Boyle ft .Sayers <R Ire),] United Kingdom

[Horgan,] Ireland

CKcInnes,] India

[Innes,] Pakistan

[H Lawrence ft de Graaff, 1 South Africa
[J T Martin,] Few Zealand
[Stevenson,] Canada

528

VqI_.44-.1q . 173 (Dec 1953)

[Horrah,! Keeping in Step

(Harsch.3 Anerica's Vatch

[ Beutscher, 3 Soviet Enigma

[anon, 3 State Trading

tCaroe.l K East after Abadan

[Canham, 3 Republicans to Grindstone

(Gell.3 lew Parties in S Africa

( Morrab et al,3 Coronation and Commonwealth IV

[Boyle & Sayers <S Ire),] United Kingdon

[Horgan,] Ireland

[Mclnnoc, 3 India

[ Innes, ] Pakistan

[Stevenson,] Canada

[ Aus gp.l Australia

tSA gp, 3 South Africa

[ Bernard, 1 Hew Zealand

YqI 44 1q 12± XKflicL 195 4}

CKorrah,] Berlin Conference

[Horsfall,] Milner Today

I Jebb, J United nations

IKiscb, 3 Sydney and After

[ Canham, 1 Washington

[J H Freeman, 3 Germany

[Schuller,! Apartheid and Scriptures

[Batterbee,3 Commonwealth Civil Services

[Boyle & Sayers <E Ire), 3 United Kingdon

[ Horgan ,1 Ire land

[Me Innes, 3 India

[P T Ensor, 3 Pakistan

(Stevenson,! Canada

(Aus gp. 3 Australia

( HZ gp, 3 Sew Zealand

lol 4 4 .H q ., 175 (June 1&54I

(Morrah,] Dien Bien Phu

[ Leith- Ross, 1 Cross-Purposes in Egypt

[anon,] Economic Outlook

[Canham, 3 America's Political Circus

[Alport,] Kenya

[Schuller & Verwoerd,] Apartheid in Practice

[Boyle & Sayers <5 Ire),] Uni tod Kingdom

[Horgan,] Ireland

[Me Innes, 3 India

[Ensor,] Pakistan

[Stevenson,] Canada

[Aus gp,J Australia

ISA gp, 3 South Africa

IBelshaw, 3 Hew Zealand

[ Todd, 3 Rhodesia & Hyasaland

Yal 41. 1 o . .1 76 . < Sept 105.4.2

[Korrah, ] Coexistence

[Caroe.J Persian Settlement

(G Hudson, J China Wins Peace

[V Butterworth, 1 American Locks at Europe

[7 Feather,] It Can Happen Here (Comnunist Intrigue]

(Kajuader, J Foreign Policy of Hehru

(Canham, 1 Washington and Geneva

[Ritchie,] Canada's Economic Horizons

[S V Jlason & Sayers <H Ire),] United Kingdom

(Horgan, J Ireland

ISiddiqui,] Pakistan

(Stevenson,] Canada

[ Aus gp, J Australia

(Delius & Brookes,] South Africa

(Shearer,! Hew Zealand

\[o1_45_Hq _lZ2L_(necL_L95 41

(Korrah.] Conference

(anon.l Hature of Commonwealth

(Reilly,] Reviving France

UCoeppler, ] After E D C

(Low,] Reform in Buganda

[Siddiqui,] Crisis in Pakistan

(Canham, 1 America

(Aus gp, ] Australia Faces Asia

(Horgan,] Ireland

( JCaj umder, ] India

(Can gp, 3 Canada

(Brookes,] South Africa

(HZ gp, ] Hew Zealand

(Todd,] Rhodesia and Nyasaland

l K Wallace,] northern Ireland

ISiddiqui,] Pakistan: Kashmir

530

Vol 45 Ho 178 (March 1055)

IKorrah, 1 Disengagement

(Kiall,) American and Vorld

IKisch.J Road to Convertibility

IB Hodgkin,) Middle East Defence

l anon, ) Public Loss or Private Profit [Railways)

(Canham, ) America's Long Pull

[0 Woods,) lascent Dominion [Gold Coast)

[Utley & Sayers <H Ire),) United Kingdom

[Horgan,) Ireland

[ Kajumder, ) India

ISiddiqui.) Pakistan

[RcGeachy et al,) Canada

[SA gp,3 South Africa

[ Aus gp, 3 Australia

l HZ gp,) Hew Zealand

tA Low, 1 East Africa

Vol 45 Ho 179 (June 1955)

[KorrahJ Nation's Livelihood

[Falls,) Strategy of Deterrence

[Beloff.3 Socialism and Denocracy

f Hansergh, 1 Whitehall and Commonwealth

[Birdwood, ) Dividing the Waters [Punjabi

(Canhaic, ) America

(Fawcett,) Law of Shallow Seas

[Utley & Sayers <K Ire),) United Kingdom

[Horgan, ) Ireland

(Kajumder,) Indio

ISiddiqui,) Pakistan

(Stevenson,) Canada

ISA gp,) South Africa

(Aus gp, ) Australia

(HZ gp,) Hew Zealand

(Todd,) Rhodesia and Hyasaland

531

Vol 45 Fo 180 (Se pi 1 QRR >

(Morrah,) Seeds of Olive

C Huxley , 1 Economic Man in E Africa

I Coroe,) Buffer States

IR Williams,) Vooing in Belgrade

IE Bridges,) Crichel Down

[Canton,) Eisenhower

[anon,) Suclear Energy

[Utley & Sayers (H Ire),) United Kingdom

(Horgan,) Ireland

(Majumder,) India

ISiddiqui , ) Pakistan

l Ste ve nson , ) Canada

ISA gp,J South Africa

CAusgp,] Australia

(SZ gp,) Mew Zealand

[A Low,J East Africa

Vq1_46..Hq .lSi_.(Pec 1955)

(Brand,! Dougal Orne Malcolm

(Morrah,) Lionel Curtis

(Morrah,) Conservatism

(via Brand,] World Economy in 1956

(Huxley,) African Independence

(S Watson,) Trade Unionism

(Canhan, ) President and Succession

(Innes,) In Search of Constitution (Pakistan)

(Utley & Sayers <H Ire),) Unitod Kingdom

(Horgan, ) Ireland

(Majumder,) India

ISiddiqui, 3 Pakistan

(Can gp, ) Canada

(SA gp,l South Africa

(Aus gp, 3 Australia

(HZ gp,3 Few Zealand

Vol 46 Hq 182 (March lQBfii

532

[Malcolm,! Lionel Curtis
(Brand,) Edward, Lord Altrincham
C Morrah, 3 Suspended Sentence

tK Macdonald,] Tovarishcti Errant [visit to India!

II Lang, 3 Transition in S E Asia

[Stringer,] American Econony

(anon, J Armament of IATO

ICavell,] Canada and Asia

(Legum, J Youngest Republic (Sudani

[Utley & Sayers <» Ire), 3 United Kingdom

IHorgan, J Ireland

(Kajumder, I India

( Siddiqui, 3 Pakistan

( D V Slater, 3 Canada

(SA gp,3 South Africa

( Aus gp, 3 Australia

[HZ gp,3 Hew Zealand

(A Low, 3 East Africa

Vn 1 Afi »n 1K3 lung 1 Q56

( Morrah, J SATO at Crossroads
[Hodson, 3 Future of Commonwealth
[Franks,] Controlling Inflation
(anon, 3 France in 8 Africa
[Siddiqui,] Pakistan and Neighbours
(Stringer,) America

[Elton,] Editor and His Times (Dawson)

(Utley & Sayers <H Ire),J United Kingdom

(Morgan,) Ireland

(Majumder, ) India

l Siddiqui,) Pakistan

(Stevenson,) Canada

ISA gp, 3 South Africa

l Aus gp, I Australia

IHeany.J Hew Zealand

(Todd, I Rhodesia and Nyasaland

533

Vol 46 Bo 184 (Sept lQSfil

(Korrah,3 Challenge to Law
[Kelly,] Comrade Ozynandlas C Stalin]
[Darshen,] Painting Unions Red
[anon,] Staff for Cold Var
[Kajumder,] India and neighbours
[Stringer,] Elsenhower Era
[Vard, J Hew States ol Australia?

[Utley & Sayers <H Ire),] United Kingdom

[Horgan, ] Ireland

IBZ gp,J Sew Zealand

[Siddiqui, 1 Pakistan

[Stevenson,] Canada

ISA gp.J South Africa

[Chisholm,] Australia

l A Low,] East Africa

(De c 1956)

[Xorrah.J After Cease-Fire

[via Maud,] Cost of Suez

[Hodson,] India and Pakistan

[H Suzman,} Hative Areas in Union

[Stringer,] Eisenhower

[Aus gp, 3 Arbitration in Australia

(Huxley,] Eirth of Ghana

[Utley & Sayers <H Iro),] United Kingdom

[Horgan,] Ireland

( Aikaan, I Hew Zealand

[Aus gp, 1 Australia

[Siddiqui,! Pakistan

[Brady & J Bird,! Canada

[Todd, 3 Rhodesia and Hyasaland

YQl 47 SO. ICO ^ torch -13.521

IMorrah, I Real Police Force

ICadogan,! UHs Today

IHodson, 3 Commonwealth and Crisis

IKoeppler,] Vatch on Elbe

(H Lukes,] Enosis and Background

[Stringer,] Eisenhower Doctrine

ISA gp, 3 S African Senate Act

tanon, 3 Trade Unionist's Appeal

IHorgan.l Ireland

[Aus gp. 1 Australia

[Siddiqui.l Pakistan

[Stevenson, 1 Canada

[SA gp,] South Africa

(F L V Wood,] Hew Zealand

fX Barrington-Vard, 1 East Africa

CUtley & Sayers <K Ire),] United Kingdom

£

I

534

Yol 47 lo. 187 (June 1Q57>

(Xorrah.3 Time for Frankness

[Caro*,] Baghdad Pact

(D Pickett,) lew Fiscal Europe

CJ E Hartshorn,) Britain's Nuclear Lead

[via Philip Mason, ] Federating the Islands

[Stringer,] Second Term

[SA gp,] Apartheid

[anon,] Industrial Suicide Pact

[Utley & Sayers <1 Ire),] United Kingdom

[Horgan,] Ireland

[Xajunder,] India

[ Siddiqui ,J Pakistan
l Stevenson, 3 Canada
l Aus gp, J Australia
ISA gp, 1 South Africa
IG E Vocd , J New Zealand
l Todd, J Rhodesia and Nyasaland

Yq1-4T_£q„ ISe (Sept 195 7)

[Caroe,3 Arabia and Vest
[J Slessor, ] Questions on Defence
[J Grimond,] Economics of Old Age
[Caine,] Xerdeka [Malaya]

[Stringer,] Civil Rights

[via Lord Heyworth.3 ligerian background

[Utley & Sayers (X Ire),] United Kingdom

[Horgan,] Ireland

f Xajunder,] India

[ Siddiqui , J Pakistan

[ StovGncon, J Canada

[Aus gp.J Australia

[ Burnard, ] lew Zealand

[ A Low, ] Kenya

VpI 43 Nq 1S9 1957-1.

CXorrah,] Sputnicana

[Brand,] Crisis of Sterling

[anon.J Girdle Round Earth [Sputniks)

[Koeppler.) Adenauer

[Stringer,] Washington

[Plowden, ) Franks Report

[Kirkwood,] Race in British Africa

[Utley & Sayers <fi Jre),J United Kingdom

[Horgan,] Ireland

t Siddiqui , J Pakistan

[Stevenson,] Canada

l Aus gp, 3 Australia

t Belshaw, 3 Sew Zealand

[Todd,] Rhodesia and Syasaland

535

Vq1_.48-.Hc 190 (March IQfift)

(Xorrah,) Crisis of Hope

(via Brand,] Banker's Counsel

t Hailey to nominate,] Sew View of Africa

[D Harris,! Indonesia

(A Low,] Constitution for Kenya

( Stringer , J Sputniks over Vashlngton

(Hudson,] British Honduras

(Utley & Sayers <H Ire),] United Kingdom

(Horgan,] Ireland

IHaJumder,] India

[Siddiqui , J Pakistan

[Stevenson,] Canada

(Horton,] South Africa

C Aus gp, ] Australia

(HZ gp,J Hew Zealand

VoI-AS-Ha. 19.1- (June 1958)

(Xorrah,! Unsealed Summit

(via Sir P Reilly,] Audi Alteram Partem: Soviet View
(Carce.l New Arab Pattern
t Rybczynski . ] Common Market

(D King-Hall,) Earth under Scrutiny (Geophysical Year)

(Stringer,) America

(Aus gp, ) Australian Univorsi ties

(Utley & Sayers <H Ire),] United Kingdom

(Horgan,] Ireland

(Siddiqui,] Pakistan

( Stevenson , J Canada

(Horton,) South Africa

(HZ gp,3 Hew Zealand

(Todd,) Rhodesia and Hyasaland

mi 4.8 IQ--192 ^Sept .19.5.&I
(Korrah, ] Vatch on Gulf

(de Jouvenel and Papcu.l Views of de Gaulle

(Cockin, ) Anglican Church

(H Luke,] Maltese Constitution

(Stringer,) Vashlngton

(R Williams, 3 Indus Basin

(Utley St Sayers <N Ire),J United Kingdom

(Horgan,! Ireland

(Siddiqui,) Pakistan

( Can gp, 3 Canada

(Robertson.) South Africa

(Aus gp, 3 Australia

(Shearer,] Hew Zealand

(Low,! East Africa

t

536

Vol 49 Iq 193 <Dcc 195fl)

[Morrah,) Europe and Challengers

CE Denning,! Britain, Aoerica and China

CMonnet,! Fifth Republic

[K Little,) Race Relations in Britain

[Aus gp.) Snowy Vaters

C Stringer,) Flood Tide ior Denocrats

IBareau,) Montreal Conference

IG D Vood a Sayers,) United Kingdom

[Horgan,) Ireland

[ Siddiqui , ) Pakistan

[Can gp, ) Canada

[Kidd et al,3 South Africa

[ HZ gp, ) Hew Zealand

[Todd,) Rhodesia and Hyasaland

V q 1. .4.9. JlQ..lSi_(Iar ch 1959)

[Morrah,) Reconnaisance in Moscow

[KoepplerJ Berlin

[Caroe,] Persia under Strain

[via Karris,) France and Free Trade Area

CC Collins, 1 Ceylon

[Canham,) President against Inflation

[Mansergh.l Changing Commonwealth

CG D Vood & Sayers <H Iro),) United Kingdom

C Horgan,) Ireland

t Maj under, 1 India

[Siddiqui,) Pakistan

[Can gp,) Canada

CHorton,) South Africa

[Aus gp,) Australia

[ BZ gp, ) Hew Zealand

537

yol 49 So 195 (Jure 1959)

[Horrah,] Treadmill at Geneva
CCaroe, 1 Challenge of Tibet
[Stevenson,! St Lawrence Seaway
[Aus gp.l Australia and New Guinea
[Stringer,! After Dulles
C Voodhouse, J Settlement in Cyprus
[Edmonds,] GB and Iraq

CG D Wood & Sayers <H Irc),l United Kingdom

[Morgan,! Ireland

CSiddiqui,] Pakistan

[Stevenson,] Canada

CSA gp, J South Africa

C HZ gp, J Hew Zealand

[Todd,] Rhodesia and Hyasaland

gfll i9 Sa 1959?

[Horrah,] Choice for Africa l Devlin RepcrtJ

[Brookes,] Law and Libery in S Africa

laaoa,] Tory Years

[Twining,! Pan- Africanism

l aaon.J Russia & China as Traders

[Horgan,! de Valera's Failure

[Stringer,! Kiddle-of-tfce-Road President

[anon,! Communism in Trade Unions

[G D Wood 4 Sayers <H Ire),! United Kingdom

[Horgan,] Ireland

[ Xajusnder, 1 India

[ Siddiqui , J Pakistan

[Stevenson, 3 Canada

ISA gp, ! South Africa

[Aus gp, 1 Australia

[Burnard,! Hew Zealand

Itol. . 5 .QJKB - 19? 19-59-1

[Morrah,] Summit via Paris
laaon, ) Chinese Expansion
[Greening,] Duplessis and Heirs (Quebec!
iBoyd,] Being Australian in 1059
[anon,] Algeria

[Stringer,) Washington after Kruschev
IFiggures,] Ve are Seven
[Vi 11 ink,] Higeria

tG D Wood 4 Sayers <H Ire),] United Kingdom

l Horgan,] Ireland

ISiddiqui , J Pakistan

[Stevenson,] Canada

ISA gp, ] South Africa

[Aus gp, ] Australia

’Barton,] Sew Zealand

l Todd,] Rhodesia & Hyasaland

538

VqI-50-Iq 198 (Xarch iQfim

[Xorrah,] Future of Socialism

fvia ed staff * Guardian, 1 Labour in Wilderness

IT Lean,] Inpact of Broadcasting

[Thompson,] Academic Apartheid

CCaroo,] Centenary of Oil

ICorell Barnes,] Federation in Vest Indies

[Stringer,] Vhite House Sweepstakes

[anon,] Indo- Pakistani Relations

[G P Vood & Sayers <H Ire),] United Kingdom

[ Korgan, 3 Ireland

[ Xajuader, J India

[ Siddiqui , I Pakistan

[Stevenson et al,] Canada

ISA gp,3 South Africa

[ Aus gp, 1 Australia

[ SZ gp,I lev Zealand

Vol 50 So 199 (June I960)

[Horsfall,] South African Tragedy

[Brand,] Philip Kerr

[SA gp, 3 S Africa in Turmoil

[F Handley-Page, 1 Girdle Round Barth (Civil Aviation!

[ Stringer, 1 Hegro in America

[anon,] Law of Sea

[T Lean.] Inpact of Broadcasting II

IG D Vood & Sayers <N Ire),] United Kingdom

[Horgan,] Ireland

CXajunder,] India

[Siddiqui,] Pakistan

[Stevenson,] Canada

[ Robertson et ai,l South Africa

[Aus gp,J Australia

[Robson,] Few Zealand

[Todd,3 Rhodesia (t Syasaland

539

VqI 5-0 So 20.0 (Sect 10 60) t..m

lag Issue.

[Horrah,] Commonwealth: UK View

C Brady,] Canadian Viow

[Aus gp, ] Australian View

[ Allman, 1 lew Zealand Viow

[Thompson,] Sou til African View

CXajumder,] Indian View

[Sarwarhasan, ] View from Pakistan

[Todd,] Central African View

[Canham, ] View from the US

[Stringer,] Presidential Campaign

[G D Wood A Sayers <H Ire),J United Kingdom

[Horgan,3 Ireland

[Slddlqul , ] Pakistan

[Stevenson,] Canada

[Delius,] South Africa

[J R Smith A F Holmes] Hew Zealand

Yfli 51 Mo 201 {Dec 1960)

[Horrah,] Republic of S Africa

[Huxley,] Ethos of Hegro Africa

[anon,3 Cold Var in Tropics

[anon, 3 Xonckton Report

[Pickles,] Franco-African Community

[J Bishop,] Congolese Vacuum

[Stringer,] President for Revival

[G D Vood A Sayers <S Ire), 3 United Kingdom

[Horgan,] Ireland

f Siddiqui , 3 Pakistan

[Stevenson,] Canada

[SA gp, 3 South Africa

[ Aus gp, 3 Australia

[Burnard,] Hew Zealand

[Todd,3 Rhodesia & Hyasaland

Vol 51 Ho 202 (Xarch 1961?

[Horrah,] Peril and Opportunity

[via Harris,] Dollar

CR Hah ins, 3 United Rations Tomorrow

[D King-Hall,] Harvest from Space [Satellites]

[Shapiro, 3 Pillars of Communism

[Stringer,] Kennedy

CHayter, J Vest Berlin

IG D Vood A Sayers <H Ire),J United Kingdom

IHcrgan,] Ireland

[Moraes,! India

[Siddiqui,! Pakistan

[Stevenson,] Canada

ISA gp,3 South Africa

l Aus gp, ] Australia

IF Holnes.l Sew Zealand

510

VqI 51 Ho 203 (Juno 1QK1)

C Xorrah, 3 Leaf Falls IS Africa!

[Caroe.l Beau in the Eye (Communist Iaperialism!
(Norton,) S Africa Departs
EG Hudson, ] Laos Disputed

EH Brandon,! Washington's Southern Neighbours

EH Grenfell,! Choice for Central Africa

ECollins,! New Hopes

EHowick,! Transition ia Kenya

EG D Wood a Sayers <5 Ire),! United Kingdom

IHorgan,! Ireland

ESiddiqul , 3 Pakistan

1 Stevenson , 1 Canada

EAusgp, 1 Australia

[Barton,! lev Zealand

ITcdd.J Khodesia & fiyasaland

gol-51-lQJ2.0 4 .. ( Sept 1951 )

[Morrah,! Chink in the Curtain

[via Horsfall,) Wages Policy

EAiknan,] Sanoa

EG A K Hills,) Spain and Vest

[Stringer,] Presidential Shakedown

[ Vicherenesingha. ) Authoritarianism in Ceylon

CG D Wood h Sayers <8 Ire),] United Kingdom

[Horgan,) Ireland

E Siddiqui , ] Pakistan

(Stevenson,) Canada

[Norton,) South Africa

EAus gp, J Australia

ENZ gp,] New Zealand

VqI 52 fls .205 mil

EKorrah, 1 Meaning of Megatons

ERoll,! Conmonwealth aad Common Markets

Eanon, ) Federation Dissolved ESyria)

ETwining,] Equipping Africa

[Collins, J Hew American Mood

[Aus gp, ] Australia and ESC

lanon,) Bigeria's First Year

[G D Wood & Sayers (8 Ire),) United Kingdom

[Horgan,] Ireland

Ida Costa,! India

[Siddiqui,! Pakistan

[Can gp, 1 Canada

[Robertson,] South Africa

[F Holmes, ] Hev Zealand

[Todd,] Rhodesia & Hyasalaad

541

Vol .52 Iq 2Q6 (March

IXorrah,) Uncertain Thaw

[P Xason, ] Xigration in Commonwealth

C P.aison, 1 Genova and After

C Volfondon, 1 University Outlook

CC A X Hills,) Portugal Oversea

[Davenport,) South-Vest Africa

[Stringer,! Hew Kennedy Bra

[anon,! Commonwealth Year

[G D Vood a Sayers <H Ire),) United Kicgdon

[ Morgan, J Ireland

[da Costa ,1 India

[Siddiqui,] Pakistan

[Stevenson,) Canada

l Aus gp, J Australia

l iZ gp, ) Sew Zealand

VQl-52 Fo 207 (June 1962)

(Korrah,) Commonwealth and Common Market
[Caroe,] Constitution for Pakistan
[BeloffJ UN after Hammarskjold
[anon,! Liberal Revival
[A Richards, J Tribe and Nation in E Africa
[anon,] Quebec

[Stringer,] America's Grand Design
[Huggins.] Failure of Federation [V Indies]

[G D Vood & Sayers (N Ire),) United Kingdom

[Horgan,] Ireland

[Siddiqui,] Pakistan

[Stevenson,] Canada

[Aus gp,J Australia

[ SZ gp, 3 Hew Zealand

[Todd,! Rhodesia 4 Hyasaland

[Robertson,! South Africa

YqX 52 No 2<?8 <Se?t 19.6&1

l Morrah, 3 Britain in Europe

IHodson,! Anglo-American Focus [Ditchley!

lanon,! PUkilgton and Commonwealth [Broadcasting!

[Twining,! Republic of Tanganyika

[anon,! Uniting Malaysia

[Collins,! Business Against Kennedy

IH Grenfell ,3 Central Africa in 1963

[G D Vocd & Sayers (B lre),J United Kingdom

[Morgan,! Ireland

[da Costa,) India

[Siddiqui,] Pakistan

[Stevenson,] Canada

t Aus gp, 3 Australia

tNZ gp. ] Few Zealand

ISA gp, ) South Africa

542

Vol 53 Bo 209 (Dec 1Q69)

fMorrah,] Castro Disarmed

t Stringer, ] Reds in Latin America

[Can, Aus & BZ gps,J Britain in Europe

CG Hudson,] Between Delhi and Peking

(Stringer,] Reforn for Congress

(G Ponsonby,] Future of Railways

tG D Wood a Sayers <H Ire),) United Kingdon

[Horgan,] Ireland

( Siddiqui , J Pakistan

[Stevenson,) Canada

[ HZ gp, ] lev Zealand

[DTK Vi 11 Ians,] Rhodesia Si Hyasaland

Vcl 52_ao..2:.Q AKarch 1S& 31

[Xorrah,] Retreat from Brussels

ID King-Hall,] Space

[anon,] Anglican in St Peter's

[Gladvyn,] Prospects of Gaul 1 ism

[anon,] Octogenarian Chancellor [Adenauer]

[anon,] Election in Italy

[anon,] S Rhodesia Polarized

[Collins,] America and Allies

[Gellner,] Canada and NATO

[Kirk & Sayers (N Ire),J United Kingdon

[Horgan,] Ireland

( da Costa, 1 India

(Siddiqui,] Pakistan

(Stevenson,! Canada

[ Aus gp, ] Australia

[HZ gp, J low Zealand

C SA gp, ] South Africa

543

Vol 53 Ho 211 (June 1QK3>

fMorrah, 1 Forward from Brussels

[via India House, J The Indian Army

CAus gp, ] less-Vhite Australia

[Furlonge,] Kiddle East Imbroglio

EXazrui,) Constitutional Experiment in Africa

[Stringer, J Xilder Kennedy

EMarquand,] Afrikaans for Liberty

EP Kirk A Sayers <1 Ire),] United Kingdom

[Horgan,] Ireland

[da Costa,] India

[Siddiqui , 1 Pakistan

[J Stevenson,] Canada

l Aus gp, ] Australia

[HZ gp,J Hew Zealand

ISA gp,I South Africa

Vol S3 &Q .212 tSep.t 19&3)

[Korrah,3 Cold Peace

[Buxton,] Rift in East

[Hartley Bull,] Atlantic Alliance

[DTK Vi 1 liams.l Rhodesian Divorce

[Collins,] Towards Second Term

[D C Vatt.l Appeasement Reconsidered

[Kirk & Sayers <5 Ire), 3 United Kingdom

C Horgan,] Ireland

[da Costa,] India

( Siddiqui , 3 Pakistan

[Stevenson,] Canada

[HZ gp,3 Hew Zealand

[DTK Williams,) Rhodesia & Hyasaland
[SA gp,l South Africa

Vol 54 Ho 21? <£>es 19-611

[Horsfall, J Lord Brand

[J Holmes, ) Can Commonwealth Survive?

Canon,] Talking about Dollars

[Maud,] High Commission Territories

l Aus gp, 3 Vorld View from Canberra

ICollins, J America and Thaw

IGrunburt,] Underworld England

[Kirk A Sayers (8 Ire),) United Kingdom

[Horgan,] Ireland

[da Costa,] India

[Siddiqui,] Pakistan

[Stevenson,] Canada

l HZ gp,] Hew Zealand

[Davenport et al,3 South Africa

544

Vol 54 lo 214 (March IQ fiA)

[JforrahJ Fire Extinguisher CE Africa!

[Blundell,] Kenya

[Goode, 1 Malaysia and neighbours

[ Lewis, J Kennedy Round

( Aus gp, 3 Australian Aborigines

(Collins,) Sew Precidont

tForsey,) French and English in Canada

( I re monger & Sayers <F Ire),) United Kingdom

( Siddlqui , ] Pakistan

[ Stevenson, 1 Canada

[Aus gp, ) Australia

Cl Z gp, ) Sew Zealand

[ Horgan, 3 Ireland

[ SA gp, ) South Africa

YQi 54 IQ 2 15 Uune 1304?

IKorrah,} Marlborough House
lRaison k ] Is Commonwealth a Farce?
t Kansergh, 3 Plovden Report
[Caroe,] India and Pakistan
[Aus gp, 3 Land to be Peopled
[Howick.3 After Independence
[Stringer, 3 Lyndon Johnson
t-E V , 3 Ceylon Today

E Ire monger & Sayers (S Ire), 3 United Kingdom

[ da Costa, 3 India

[Siddiqui.3 Pakistan

[Stevenson,) Canada

[ FZ gp, 1 lev Zealand

f Horgan, J Ireland

[Robertson & Xarquand, 3 South Africa

Vol 54 So 2ie <Scpt 196.11

(Morrah,) Conference
lEeatcn,) Independent Deterrent
[J H Bussell,) Lesson of Rivonia
C Caroe, 3 Arabia Felix
[V Vhlte,) Economists at Geneva

[E L VI 11 lans, 3 Succession States of Federation 1C Af)

[ iremenger 4 Sayers <S Ire),) United Kingdom

Ida Costa, 3 India

[ Siddlqui , 3 Pakistan

[Stevenson, 3 Canada

[ HZ gp, 3 Few Zealand

[ Aus gp, 3 Australia

[Morgan, 3 Ireland

[Delius, 3 South Africa

545

VQl-.55.lta 217 (Dec 1Q6A)

[ Xorrah, 1 Commonwealth Secretariat

IG Cunningham,} Labour's Commonweal th Policy

[Collins,] President of Center

[Gladwyn, ) Sanctions and Racial Var

[Austin,) Ghana and Commonwealth

IBurridge,] Xalta

tlngrey,) Latin American Trad©

[ Iremonger & Sayers (S Ire),} United Kingdom

(da Costa,} India

l Siddiqui , ) Pakistan

[Stevenson,] Canada

[Prest,) Australia

l SZ gp, J Bew Zealand

[Horgan,] Ireland

Vol 55 So 218 (March 1065)

CHorrah,) Churchill

CR Bonham Carter,] Sterling Under Strain

[Beaton,] Bombshell in China l Indian Defence]

CR Duffy,} Blazon of Canada

CAus gp.l "Confrontation": Australian View

CSA gp, ) Dynamite Against Apartheid

[Collins,) Great Society

[Redmayne,) Agriculture and Commonwealth

[Iremonger & Sayers <1 Ire),J United Kingdom

[da Costa,) India

[Siddiqui,) Pakistan

[Stevenson,) Canada

CAus gp,) Australia

[ HZ gp, ) Hew Zealand

[Spicer,) Central Africa

[Horgan,] Ireland

yol 55 Ho 219 ( June 1 9651

(Hampden,) Percy Horsfall
(Patterson,) Britain and Immigrants
(G Smith,) Ve Are Seven [ EFTA1
(C Crowe,) Panorama from Aden
(Lean,) Africa Listens

(Hills,) Rock of Contention (Gibraltar)
(Collins,) Johncon Doct r i ne

(H V Hacdonnel 1 , ) Fluid Federation (Canada)
[Iremonger & Sayers <S Ire),) United Kingdom
(Siddiqui,) Pakistan
( Can gp, ) Canada
{ Aus gp, ) Australia
l SZ gp, J Bew Zealand
i Horgan, J Ireland
(Robertson, 3 South Africa

VqI 5 5 Iq .220 (Se pt 1965)

[anon,] Prine Ministers' Meeting

[Beaton,] Round Commonweal th

(Sherman,] Britain and Immigrants II

[Critchley,] Vestera Defence

(anon,] Curroat American Mood

[Customer,] BOAC and Commonwealth Partners

[ I re monger 4 Sayers <H Ire),] United Kingdom

tSiddiqui,] Pakistan

[Can gp.l Canada

[ Aus gp,l Australia

[HZ gp, 1 Hew Zealand

CHorgan,] Ireland

[SA gp, ] South Africa

Yal 5£-lQ. 221 Qec 1905)

[Beaton,] Var in Commonwealth
[Marshall,] Commonwealth Court
(Onslow,] Burma

[Collins,] Johnsonian Diplomacy

[Hayter,] France's African Children

[G Sinclair,] Britain and Immigrants III

( I re monger 4 Sayers <N Ire), 3 United Kingdom

[Spicer,] Central Africa

{ da Costa, J India

ISiddiqui,] Pakistan

[Can gp, ] Canada

( Aus gp, J Australia

f KZ gp, 3 Hew Zealand

[Morgan,] Ireland

Vo i 56 Ho 222 (March 1 9.6.61

[ Beaton, J Policy for Rhodesia

[Beaton,] Commonwealth under Attack

[B Howard,] Smith's Rhodesia

[Robertson,] Rhodesian Tragedy

[R Higgins,] Britain at UH

[G Smith,] Atlantic Free Trade

[R Hornby,] Lagos Precedent IPMc Conference!

[Collins,] Vietnam's Burden

[Beresford,] Plan for Agriculture

l Iremonger, J United Kingdom

[Aus, Can & SZ gps.J The Great Migration

CGrigg,] India: Shastri

[ HZ gp, 3 lew Zealand

[Morgan,] Ireland

[ Centl ivres & Korrah.J Richard Feetham

547

Vol 56 No 223 CJuIt 1966 ) onwards;

Almost all articles were attributed.

John Spicer contributed unattributed articles on Fhcdceia to noc. 223 to
228; John Rorgan on Ireland, nos. 223 and 225; and John Sayers on Northern
Ireland, no. 223.

I

EDMSL TABLE AUTHORS mm

AIKM AF, C C, <FZ): 185, 200. 204.

ALEXAFDER, A: 114.

ALLEH, Sir Carleton: 134.

ALFORT, C J X, Lord: 175.

ALTRIFCHAX, Lord, Csee Grlgg).

AXERY, Julian: 123, 162, 165, 171.

AXERY, L S: 17, 121, 123.

AFGUS, Henry F (Can): 144, 154, 169, 171.

ASQUITH, Hon Cyril: 77.

ATKIFSGN, Xeredith, «'Aus>: 25, 29, 30, 33, 35, 36.
ATKIISON, Arthur Richmond, (XZ> ; 6, 13.

AUSTIF, Dennis: 217.

BACHELDER, (US): 56.

BADGER, Colin R, <Aus> : 145.

BAILEY, J C: 53.

BAILEY, Frof Kenneth H, (Aus>:52, 35-87, 107, 127, 139,
BAILEY, Sydney: 140.

BAKER, Herbert: 43, 44.

BAKER, Roy Stannard: 43.

BALOGH, Joseph: 111.

BALOGH, Thomas, Baron: 117.

BARBOUR, Nevill: 105, 149.

BAREAU, Paul: 148, 193.

BARING, Sir Evelyn, lord Howl ok: ICG, 203, 215.

BARNES, V L Gore 11: 198.

BARRIFGTON-VARB, Mark: 136.

BARR I FGTOF-VARD, R H: 48, 50-55, 57, 53, 60, 63, 63.
BARTOR Dr C F, <JZ): 197, 203.

BATTERBEE, Sir Harry: 174.

BAVIN, T R, (Aus): 9

B5AT0S, Leonard: 216, 213, 220-223.

BSELEY, Harold: 136.

BEER, G L. (US) : 20, 22, 23, 26-30.

BELL, Rt Rev G K A, (Bp of Chichester): 94.

BELL, Gertrude: 53.

BELOFF, Max, Lord: 167, 179, 207.

BFLSHAV, Prof H, (FZ): 175. 169.

BERSSFORD, Tristram: 222.

BERNAYS, R H: 88-9C.

BIFYOF, Laurence: 11C.

BIRD, John, (Can): 135.

BIRD, T; 99.

BIRDVOOD, Lord: 179.

BISHOP, Janes: 201.

BLACK, Rt Hon Arthur, <N Ire): 93.

BLAND, Francis Armand, <Aus>« 82.

BLUNDELL, Sir Michael, (Kenya): 214.

BOARDKAN, H: 153.

BONHAX CARTER, R: 218.

BONN, Dr Moritz: 9, 39.

164.

549

BCSAIQUET : 73.

BOURDILLON, F B: 62.

BOVLEY, Prof Sir Arthur Lyon: 72.

BOYD, Robin, (Aus): 197.

BOYLE, Sir Edward: 168-175.

BRADY, Prof Alexander, (Can): 139. 135. 200.

BFABD, R H, (lord Brand): 6, 7. 14, 16, 17, 19-21, 33, 35, 36, 38, 40, 41,

45, 50, 53, 54, 58-60, 73, 75, 79, 84, 85, 89,
95. 110, 113, 119, 125, 140, 145, 146, 151,

152. 156, 161, 181, 182, 189, 199.

BRARD0N, Henry, (US): 203.

BRIDGEHAN, Canon: 114.

BRIDGES, Sir Edward: 130.

BRIGDEU, Janes BristocJc, (Au*>: 78.

BROOKE, Henry, Lord: 124-141, 1.47, 156-164.

BROOKES, Edgar, (SA): 141, 155, 160, 163, 176, 177, 196.

BROVN, Prof Georg** V, (Can): 134.

BROVN, Sir Stuart: 127.

BULL, Hartley: 212.

BURNARD, Charles S, <JTZ> ; 173, 138, 196, 201.

BURRIDGE, (Kalta)i 217.

BUTLER, Harold: 63, 71, 73, 74, 77, 30, 31, 32, 35, 30, 33.

BUTLER, Rohan: 140.

BUTTERVCRTH, Volt on, (US): 176.

BUXTON ; 212.

BYVATER, H C: 101. 103.

CADOGAN, Sir Alexander: 136.

CAINE, Sir Sydney: 172, 166.

CANHAH, Erwin, <US> : 99-102, 104-120, 122-124, 126-129, 131-181, 194, 200.
CAPE, John, (SA): 154.

CAREY, (Hong Kong): 63.

CAROE, Sir Olaf: 151, 154, 156, 150, 162, 169. 173, 176, 180, 187, 188,

191, 194 , 195, 198, 203, 207, 215, 216.

CASTLE, A F, <NZ); 120.

CAUX (see DE CALX).

CA7ELL R G V, (Can): 132.

CESTLIVRES, Albert van de Sandt, (SA): 222.

CHANCELLOR, Christopher: 88, 100, 102, 114.

CHAPLIN, Sir Drummond: 64.

CHSVALLE Y, M, (France): 39.

CHILDS. Villi am Hacbride: 11, 46.

CHIROL, Sir Valentine: 35.

CHISHOLM, Alan R. (Aus): 156, 184.

CHRISTIE. Loring C. (Can/UK): 54.

CLARK, D K; 146.

CLARKE, CFO: 159-
CLARKE, Prof F, (SA): 66, 31.

CLEFNELL : 63.

COATNAN, John: 62-79, 35, 36, 90, 91, 100.

COCKIN, Rt Rev F A, (Bp of Bristol): 151, 192.

COLLINS, Sir Charles: 194.

COLLINS, Frederic V, (US): 203, 205, 208, 210, 212-214, 217-222.

COLVIN, Ian, <3A) ; 14.

COSDLIKFE, Prof ?J B: 90.

550

COOPER, Sir Duff: 153.

COOTB, Capt Colin: 79, 80-83, 36, 127-140, 148-152.

COPLAHD, Proi Douglas Berry, <Aus>: 30, 34, 89, 92, 94.

COUPLAHD, Sir Reginald: 26-29, 31, 32, 96, 117, 118, 121-123.

CRAIK G l: 4, 7, 9, 15.

CRITCHLEY, Julian: 220,

CRCNE, Frank Linden: 65.

CRGVE, Sir Colin: 219.

CRGVTHER, Geoffrey: 103, 117, 113-123.

CUHXIKGS, HR: 73.

CUKNIKGHAX, G: 217.

CURTIS, Lionel: 32, 33, 35, 40, 43, 44, 47, 57, 72, 84, 120, 143, 150,
167.

CUSTOMER : 220.

DA COSTA, Eric, (India): 205, 205, 208, 210-210, 215-218, 221.

DAFOE, J V, (Can ) : 62.

DARSHEH, Bob: 184.

DAVEBPCRT, T R H, (SA>: 206, 213.

DAVSON , Geoffrey: 39, 41, 43, 47, 48.

DE BURGH, V C: 11.

DECAUX, Ernest, (Spain); 79.

DE JOUVEHEL, Bertrand, (France): 192.

DELIUS, Anthony, (SAJ: 17G, 200, 216.

DE KADARIAGA, Don Salvador, (Spain): 104, 105.

DENNING, Sir Eslei : 193.

DEUTSCHEF, Isaac: 173.

D' QRMESSGN , CoEte, (France): 102.

DOVE, John: 37, 39, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47, 51, 53, 54, 56, 59, 09, 72, 74.
DRUMMOND, David, <AuS>: 171.

DUFFY, R, (Can): 218.

DUNCAN, Sir Patrick: 12, 14, lf>, 17, 24, 27-29, 32, 00.

DUNCAN, Patrick <jr>:170.

DUNDAS, Sir Charles, <SA): 143.

DUNFIELD, Brian, <Newf>: 150, 153.

EBBUTT, Korina n: 38, 91.

EDK3KDS, C J: 195.

EGGLESTOS, F V, (Aus): 8, 15, 26, 31, 34, 37, 42, 43.

ELIOT, Sir Charles: 79, 38.

ELTOK, Lord: 183.

ENS0R, P T, (Fakistan): 155, 163, 164, 174, 175.

EVILL, Sir Douglas: 156.

FABER, G C: 55.

FALLS, Capt Cyril: 125, 172, 179.
FARBXAS, Michael : 83.

FAVCETT, J E S: 179.

FEATHER, Victor: 176.

FEETHAM, Richard, (SA): 13, 24, 49.
FERGUSON, George V, (Can): 162.
FIGGURES, F E: 197.

FISHER, HAL: 50.

FITZGERALD, G; 99.

FITZPATRICK, Sir Percy, (SA): 23.
FOOT, Isaac: 103.

75 .

FORSEY, Eugene, (Can): 214.

152,

FOSTER, John: 157.

FRAIKS, Sir Oliver, Lord: 183.

FRASER, Prof A K, (Newf ) : H6.

FRASER, Lovat: 13.

FRAZER, Rev A G: 61.

FREEDKAF, Max, (Can): 166.

FREEXA5, J H: 138, 141, 164, 174.

FROST, Richard A: 158.

FULLER, Gen J F C: 95.

FURLOFGE, Sir Geoffrey: 211.

GELL, C V M, <SA): 173.

GELLIER, John, (Can): 210.

GEYL, Prof P: 146, 158.

GIBB. Prof H A R: 124.

GIBLIF, Lyndhurst Falkiner, (Aus): 70, 92 .

GIBSOF, J A, (Can): 142.

GILLIE, D R: 163.

GILLOUTH, Ren6: 32.

GILPIF, A C: 137.

GLADVYtf, Lord, (see JEBB).

GLASS, Dr David V: 143.

GOODE , Sir VillUm A C: 214.

GCODHART, Prof A L: 134.

GCOLD-ADAKS, R: 152.

GRAAFF, Sir J P de Villiera, <SA): 150, 172.

GRAHAM, VI 11 lam E, <Aus> : 32.

GRAFT, VillldJi Lawson, (Can): 13.

GRAVES, Philip: 109.

GREEFIFG, V E, (Can): 197.

G REEF WOOD, Powys: 98.

GRENFELL, h'arry: 203, 208.

GRIER, Sir Seiwyn: 114.

GRIGG, Sir Edward, Lord Altrincham: 8, 12, 13, 15-18, 41, 44, 55, 102, 116

122, 127, 141, 144, 146, 150, 162, 170

GRIGG, John: 222.

GRIMOHD, Joseph: 183.

GRUNBUR7 : 213.

GUSTHER, ?J : 95.

HAAREK, A E: 161.

HARSCH, Joseph G, (US): 173.

HAILEY, Lord Malcolm: 43, 129.

HALE, R, (US): 44, 36, 88, 90, 94, 96, 9S.

HALL, Sir Daniel: 51. 114.

HAKPDFH, Lord: 219.

HAWBUFY, Dr H: 163.

HAHDLEY-PAGE, Sir Frederick; 133. 139, 199.

HASKEY, Lord: 42, 46.

HARLOV, Prof Vincent T: 115.

HARRIS, H Vi Ison: 68.

HARRIS, Reginald: 71.

HARRIS, V B; 54.

HARTSHOFF, J E: 187.

3AVTREY, R G: 67.

HATTER, Sir VI 11 lam Goodenough: 202, 221.

HEAD, Anthony: 161. 552

HEADLAH-XORLEY, J V: 28, 38-45
HEANEY, A 0, (HZ): 183.

HENDERSON, Sir Hubert: 131.

HEVSON, Rt Rev H H, <Bp of Durham): 70.

HICHENS, Lionel: 19, 75, 115.

HIGGINBOTTON, (India): 59.

HIGGINS, R: 222.

HILL, Father, <SA>: 34.

HILLS. GAM: 204, 206, 219.

HINDUS, Maurice: 75, 76, 81, 82, 85, 89, 97, 106.

HODGKIN, Edward: 178.

HODGKIN, H T, (China): 71.

HODSON, Henry 7 : 81, 83, 84, 86-89, 92-103, 105-116, 131, 132, 138, 140-
142, 144, 147-153, 155, 156, 159, 163, 183, 185, 186, 190, 208.
HODSON, V L, (Rhodesia); 89.

HOFKEYR, Jan H, <SA>: 153.

HOGARTH, DC: 41.

HOLBURN, J T, (India): 129-137, 139-140, 142, 143.

EOLLAND, Bernard: 4.

EOLLAND, R E, (India): 12, 13.

EOLLAND, V L: 149.

EOLKES, Frank V, <NZ> : 200, 202, 205.

EOLKES, John, (Can): 213.

EORGAN, J J, (Ireland): 59, 62-321, 123-125, i43-223, 225.

HORNBY, Richard: 222.

HORSFALL, Percy: 15, 16, 36, 42-62, 68, 69, 75, 76, 79, 83-85, 87, 90,
96, 98, 113, 114, 119, 123, 124, 125, 129, 132, 237, 142, 174,

199, 213.

HOVAED, B, (Rhodesia): 222.

HOVICK, Lord, (see BARING).

HUBBARD, G E: 67, 87, 91, 110.

HUDSON, Geoffrey F: 103, 113, 154, 164, 171, 176, 203, 209.

HUGGINS, Lady Molly: 207.

HUMPHREYS, Dr Robin: 126, 151.

HUNTER, Sir Thomas, (NZ>: 122, 145, 152, 153.

HUTTON, Maurice Injlis: 143.

HUXLEY, Mrs Slspeth: 155, 180, 131, 185, 201.

I LOTT , J M A (Sir John), <NZ> : 170.

I LOTT, J V, (NZ) : 153.

1XGREY : 217.

INGLIS, A, (India): 107-128.

INFES, F M, (Pakistan): 150-154, 156-162, 165-173.

IREKONGER, T L: 214-222.

ISEKONGER, F: 82.

JACKSON, Gilbert, (Can): 143.

JACOB, Gen Sir Jan: 152.

JAY, Douglas; 126. ^

JEBB, Sir Gladwyn (Lord Gladwyn): 174, 210, 217.

JEFFRIES, Sir C: 144.

JOHNSON, G A (India): 143, 149.

JOHNSTON, Ton: 160.

JOHNSTON, V ?: 5, 10.

553

JOSES, Prof J H: 61.

JOSES, Sir Henry: 27.

JOSES, Sir Roderick: 107.

KELLY, Sir David: 184,

KEB8BDY, V P X, (Can): 96.

KERR, P H (Lord Lothian): 1-6, 8, 16-25, 27, 29-31, 34, 36, 38, 41, 42,

44-46, 48, 50-52, 54-65, 67, 68, 70-80, 82, 84,
89-109 , 111, 115, 117, (122).

KIDD, Hubert. (SA): 141, 161-163, 193.

KIBG-HALL, Desmond: 191, 202, 210.

KIRCHEB, Herr: 85.

KIRK, Sir Peter: 210-213.

KIRKPATRICK, Sir Ivone: 168.

KIRKWOOD, Kenneth: 189.

KISCH, Sir Cecil: 161, 170, 174, 178.

KOEPPLER, H: 177, 186, 189, 194.

KYLIE, E J, (Can): 12.

LABG, Iain: 182.

LASKI, Seville: 114.

LATHAH, J G, (Aus): 7, 21.

LAV, Sir Richard: 142.

LAVS, George, (KZ): 142, 157, 166.

LAVREICE, Harry G, ISA): 161, 167, 168, 171, 172.

LAVREBCE, T E: 40.

LAYTOH, Valter Thomas, 1st Baron: 49.

LEAH, T: 198, 199, 219.

LEEPER, A V A: 34, 35, 38.

LEGUX, Colin: 182.

LEITH-RCSS, Sir Frederick: 116, 166, 175.

LEVHAX, C E : 115.

LEVIS, E H Roy: 214.

LIGHTFOOT, Gerald, (Aus): 8, 21, 29.

LISTOVEL, Lord: 159.

LITTLE. Kenneth: 193.

LIVIHGSTONE, Sir Richard: 118, 122, 124.

LLOYD- WILL I AMS. Eric, <C Af>: 216.

LOCH, David: 109.

LOCKHART, J G: 51, 53.

LOGIE, G K: 105, 113. 120, 122.

LOW, Anthony, (E Af): 177, 178, 180, 182, 184, 188, 190, 192.

LOW, Sir Frances, (India): 137. 138.

LUKE, Sir Harry: 186, 192.

LUXFORD, J H, (SZ): 117.

KacCALLUK, Sir K V, (Aus): 6.

KcCAUSLAHD, D E, (SA): 143, 148. 152.

KcCLURE, Sir Vi Ilian: 62, 67, 73.

HcDOHALD, A H, (Aus): 141, 159.

KacDOBALD, Xalcoln: 78, 89, 94, 182.

KacDOHHELL, H V, (Can): 160, 171, 219.

HacDQHHELL, R K, (Can): 137.

XcGEACHY , J B, (Can): 166, 178.

HacGREGOR, J, <*Z) : 21.

KcIBHES, Beil, (India): 170-175.

KACKAY, R V G: 103.

554

MACKIITOSH, V A, (Can): 148.

MacLACHLAI, D H: 106, 144, 161, 172.

KacLEOD, Iain: 166, 167.

MADARIAGA, (see DE MADARIAGA).

MAJUMDBR, ¥, (India): 176-184, 187, 188, 190, 194, 196. 198-200.

MAKIIS, Sir Roger: 202.

MALCOLM, Sir D 0: 6, 28, 30, 43, 58, 102, 130, 132, 138, 159, 164, 182.
MALHBRBE, E G, (SA>: 91.

MALIM, Frederick Blagden: 128, 131, 137.

KAHIIIG, Sir Henry, (HZ): 172.

MAHSEP.GH, Hicholas: 128, 132, 133, 135, 136, 147, 179, 194, 215.

MARAIS, J S, (SA): 73.

KARQUAND, Leo, <SA): 145, 157, 211, 215.

KARRIS, A Denzil: 160, 190.

KARRIS, Sir V: l, 3, 5, 7, 9, 12, 74, 77, 111.

MARSHALL, H H: 221.

MART II, J T, (HZ): 172.

MASOM, Philip: 206.

KASOH, S V: 154, 155, 176.

MAUD, Sir John, Lord Redcl if fe-Kaud: 140, 213.

HAV0R, Janes, (Can): 14.

MAX VEIL, Sir George: 143.

MAXVELL-FYFE, Sir David: 152.

KAZRUI , Ali A: 211.

MELVILLE, Leslie Galfreid, (Aus): 81.

MESTOI, Sir Jan*s, Lord: 32.

KIALL, Leonard, (US): 178.

MILLS, Richard Charles, (Aus): 39, 87.

K1LIER, Lord Alfred: 39, 56.

MILVERTON. Lord: 154. 171.

MITRAIY, Dr David: 93.

MOLSOK, Hugh: 139.

MOHSET, Jean: 193.

MONTAGUE, R: 110.

MOOPE, Prof V Harrison, (Aus): 5, 26-28, 36, 81.

MORAES, Frank, (India): 202.

MORPAH, Dcrnot: 126-130, 136-145, 147-155, 157-166, 168-187, 189-198,
200-212, 214-218.

KUHPO, Elizabeth: 164.

MURRAY, Keith: 111.

MURRAY, Ralph: 115.

MYHORS, Humphrey: 166.

NAH1EF., Sir Lewis: 30, 51.

HICHOLAS, H S, (Aus): 27, 28, 32, 33, 38, 42, 43, 80, 98.

H1COLLS, (India): 50.

HIEHAUS, (SA): 151.

N0RKAI, G: 145. _ _

NCRTOB, Victor, (SA): 153, 155, 190, 191, 194, 203, 204.

NUNS, GFF: 155.

OLIYBR, F S: 3-10, 12, 26.

O'HEILL, Sir Con: 147.

O'HEILL, Herbert C: 123, 124.

OBSLOV, Cranley: 221.

ORMESSOB, (see D'ORKESSOfi).

PACKER, Gerald, (Aus): 148, 151, 161.

PAKBXAI, S A, (Ceylon); 141, 140, 154, 158, 162
PAPOU, K. (Algeria): 102.

PARKER, A Stanley: 102.

PARKBR, Prof R S, <H2>: 170.

PARRY. Evan, (HZ): 125.

PATBRSOH, Dr A R: 98.

PATBRSOH, Sir Reginald: 71.

PATTERSOH, Sheila: 219.

PEDBH, J B, (Aus): 30.

PEEL, Hon (Sir) Sidney: 4.

PSRCY , Lord Eustace: 12, 32.

PERRY, J F (Peter): 6, 6, 19, 28, 91-93.

PETERS, Sir Vi Ilian: 47.

P5YHET, Henri: 170.

PHILLIPS, Allison: 17.

PHILLIPS, (China): 131.

PICKEH , David Kennedy, (JZ & Aus): 31, 141, 154
PICKLES, Mrs Dorothy: 149, 201.

PI ESSE, Edmund Leolin, (Aus): 92, 93, 101, 109.
PLOVDEH, Sir Edwin: 189.

POHSOHBY, Gilbert: 209.

P0RTUS, Garnet Vere, (Aus): 46, 58.

PREST, Vilfred, (Aus) : 146, 21?.

PRIHGLE, John: 165.

PRITCHARD. Maj-Gen H L: 119, 120.

PYBUS, Sir (Fercy) John: 42, 52.

RAISOH, Timothy: 206, 215.

RAICE, Sir Hubert: 152.

RED3LIFFE- MAUD, Lord, (see MAUD) .

REDKAH, H Vere: 142, 166.

REDKAYHE, Geoffrey B: 218.

REED, Justice Hay t home: 76. 81.

REED, Sir Stanley, (India): 47.
REILLY, Patrick: 177.

RE I HER, Dr G J: 142.

RBHTOH, Sir Alexander Vood: 92.
REYHOLDS, Major B ?: 103.

RICE, (Kenya): 51.

RICHARDS, Audrey: 207.

RICKETT, (Sir) Deni®: 144, 187.
RITCHIE, Ronald, (Can): 176.

ROBBIHS, Prol L: 147.

ROBERTS, Granville: 169.

ROBBRTSOfi, Dennis: 147.

ROBERTSOB, H H, <SA): 143, 154, 155,

219, 222.

157, 171,

, 167.

, 158.

192, 199,

ROBERTSOK, Sir Malcolm: 00.
ROBIHSOH, Stanley: 144, 145.
ROBSOH, Dr J L, <*Z>: 199.
ROLL, Eric, Lord: 205.

ROSE, Archibald: 52, 60.
ROZIHSKY, Dr H: 111. H5.
RUSSELL, A E, <HZ>: 7.

205.

207,

555

215,

556

RUSSELL, J Hamilton. <SA): 216.

RYBCZYHSKI , Tadeus2: 191.

SALTBR, Sir Arthur: 77, 87, 95.

SAMUEL, Lord: 123.

SAIDBR93H, John. (Aus): 22.

SAISOME, Sir George: 157.

SARVARHASAI, K, (Pakistan): 200.

SAOIDERS, (Poland): 44.

SAVER, Geoffrey, (Aus): 147, 150, 152, 157, 160, 162-164, 166.

SAYERS, John E, <H Ire): 150-176, 178-221, 223.

SCHOLEFIELD, Dr Guy, (FZ): 123, 143, 148, 150, 156.

SCHULLER, Erwin, <SA): 174, 175.

SCOTT, Ernest, (Aus); 3, 4, 29.

SCOTT, Lord Francis, (Kenya): 101.

SCOTT, H S: 79.

SCOTT, S D, (Can): 10.

SEDGWICK, Ronney: 158.

SBTOH, K C, (India): 9.

SETOH-VATSCH, K V: 16, 17.

SHAHN, Edward Owen Glblin, (Aus): 41, 83, 55.

SHAPIRO, LB: 202.

SHEARER, J 0, (HZ): 141, 151, 176, 192.

SHEPARDSON, Vhitney, (US): 39-41, 52-59, 62, 63, 69-78, 80, 81, 83-85, 87,

89, 91-93, 95.

SHERXAH, Alfred: 220.

SIDDIQUI, Osiian, (Pakistan): 176-221.

SIDEBOTHAM, H: 44.

SIEGFRIED, Andr6: 72, 76, 168.

SIK0H, Leon: 30.

SIICLAIR. Sir George: 221.

SLATER, D V. (Can): 182.

SLESSOR, Sir John: 188.

SMITH, Geoffrey; 219, 222.

SMITH, Prof H A: 80, 81.

SMITH, J R, (HZ): 200.

SOLOVEYTCHIK, G: 101, 107.

SPAIGHT, J K: 110.

SP ARROW, J: 146.

SPEHDER, J A: 105.

SPICER, John, (C Ai); 218, 221, 223-228.

SPRIGGE, C J S: 112.

STEELE, Lt Col Harwood, (Can): 142, 145, 159.

STEPHEHS, I X, (India): 83, 84, 86, 87-89, 91, 92-95.

STEVESSOH, J A, (Can): 8, 11, 61, 64, 88, 151-153, 164, 165, 172-176, 179,

180, 183, 184, 186-191, 195-204, 206-218.

STOCK, Reginald L, (Aus): 144, 155.

STRATFORD, Robin, <SA): 144, 145, 154.

STRIHGER, Villian H, (US): 182-193, 195-202, 204, 20o, 207, 209, 211, 215.
STR0HG, Archibald, (Aus): 18, 22.

SUZKA5, Helen, <SA): 185.

SYKES, Sir F: 131.

TBRESTCHEHKO, (Russia): 136.

THOMPSOH, Leonard, <SA): 198, 200.

k

557

TODD, ? Garfield, <C Af>: 175. 177. 179. 183, 185, 187. 189. 191, 193. 195.

197. 199. 200, 201, 203. 205. 207.

TOYHBEB, Arnold: 26, 27. 31, 37. 91, 108, 109, 114.

TR2SS, R C: 155.

TRSVELYAS, George M: 40. 49, 52.

TUKHER, Sir Mark: 140, 141, 145, 149, 150, 154.

TVIIIIG, Lord: 196, 205, 208.

TYIDALL, J, (SA) : 6.

TYSOS, G V, (India); 144-147, 150-153, 155, 156, 158-160, 162-166, 168.
UTLEY, T E (Peter): 158, 178-192.

VERVOERD, H, (SA): 175.

VOIGT, F A: 113.

VOS HAAST, H F, <HZ>: 118, 126, 155.

VADHAX, Prof Samuel MacXahon, (Aus): 93.

VADSVORTH, A P: 86.

VALKER, Prof Eric A, <SA) : 62.

VALLACE, Kartio, (H Ire): 177.

VASD, Prof John Hanning, (Aus): 184.

VATSOH, Hon J C, (Aus): 2.

VATSOH, Sam: 181.

VATT, D C: 212.

VESTOH, C H, (HZ): 121.

VHEELER, Geoiirey: 169.

VHITE, Vyndham: 216.

VHYTE, Sir A Frederick: 43, 66, 70, 72, 86, 87, 102.

VICHEREKESI IGHA , C, (Ceylon): 204.

VILLERT, Sir Arthur: 48.

VILLIAXS, DTK, <C Af): 209, 212.

VILLIAXS, Harold: 32.

VILLIAXS, L F Rushbrook, (India): 29, 31, 34, 36, 44, 45, 54, 55, 57, 58,

68, 180, 192.

VILLIH5C, Sir Henry: 197.

VILLISOH, Sir J S, (Can): 1-10.

VILSOH, J D: 17.

VILSOH, Kenneth, (Can): 138, 149. 150.

VIST, Guy: 106, 108, 156. 164.

VISE, E F: 48, 49.

VISKEMAHH, Elizabeth: 107.

VISPEH, Dr H E: 147.

VOLFEHDEB, Sir John: 206.

VOOD, F L V, (HZ): 112, 119, 124, 144. 153, 186,

VOOD, G David: 193-209.

VOOD, George E, (HZ): 161, 167, 187.

VOODHO'JSS , CM: 195.

VOODS, Oliver: 168, 178.

VROHG, Hume H, (Can): 64.

VYSDHAK, Hon Hugh A, (Lord Leconfie.d),
YEATTS, naurice V K, (India): 97-106.
YGUHG, G K: 48.

YOUHG, Col Patrick: 49, 89.

ZIXXERS, Sir A E: 14, 17, 19, 21-24, 26,

(SA) : 22

30, 32,

25, 28, 32-34.

33, 34, 124.

558

Abbreviations used:

CHP

EHR

LA.

ILL

LA.

LCfS

LlCfl

E2L

JlL

mu

Efi

£&

El

LEES

Canadian Historical Review
English Historical Review
Foreign Affairs
Historical Journal
International Affairs

Journal of Comnonwealth Political Studies
(ret It led Journal of Conwonwealth and
Cooperative Politics from 1974)

Journal of Ioperial and Conoonwealtb history
Nation and Athenaeum

National Review (later National and English
Review >

New Zealand Journal of History
Pol iti cal Quar terl y
Quarterly Review
Round Table

Transactions of the Royal Historical Society

A) MA1USCRIPT SOURCES

Round Table (Bodleian) Bodleian Library (with Curtis Papers)

Round Table (Office) Bodleian Library (uncatalogued,

transferred 1994)

R H, 3aron Brand
Prof Sir Reginald Coupland
Lionel Curtis
Geoffrey Dawson (Robinson)
Edward Grigg, Baron
Altrincham
Malcolm, Lord Hailey
Lionel Hichens
Philip Kerr, Marquess of
Lothian

Sir I vi son Macadam
Sir Dougal Malcolm

Alfred, Viscount Milner
F S Oliver

2nd Earl of Sel borne
Sir Arthur Steel -Malt land
Sir Alfred Zimnern

Bodleian Library
Rhodes House
Bodleian Library
Bodleian Library

Kicrofiln in Bodleian Library
Rhodes House
Bodleian Library

Scottish Record Office
Bodleian Library (with Curtis Papers)
Rhodes House; Bodleian Library (with
Curtis Papers)

Bodleian Library
Rational Library of Scotland
Bodleian Library
Scottish Record Office
Bodleian Library

b) mm squkcss

1) PRIMARY SOURCES:

HSVSfAPERS AID PERIODICALS

The Bound Table

The Tines

The Tines literary Supplement

Cuttings in Curtis, Round Table and other Papers

ROUHD TABLE STUDIES ETC

[V S Karris,] Memorandum of Conversations which took place between a few
English and South African friends at intervals during the summer of
1909 <1900).

[L Curtis,] Memoranda on Canada and the British Commonwealth, ("The
Original* or "Green Memorandum") <1910, interleaved).

[L Curtis,] Effect of the Existing Imperial System on the United Kingdom
[chapter 6 of 'Green Memorandum" , reprinted separately] (1910).

CL Curtis,] The Form of an Organic Union of the Empire [1910).

IL Curtis,] Form of Union [revised and reissued 1911)

[L Curtis,] Memorandum t ' Auckland Memorandum") (1910).

£L Curtis, edl Round Table Studies ["Annotated Memorandum" : sped lie
criticises interleaved, general criticism following] <1911).

IL Curtis,] The Australian People [1911]

IL Curtis,] Mew Zealand Notes 1 19121

IL Hichens and F S 01i7er,l An Analysis ol the System of Government
Throughout the British Empire <1912).

(L Curtis,) Bound Table Studies, Second Series, Instalments A-E [ revised

and privately reprinted as "The Project of a Commonwealth, Part One "
<1915) and published as “ The Commonwealth of Nations, Part One H
<1916)) <1912-15).

L Curtis, The Round Table Movement, Its Past and Its Future
(letchworth, 1913: address in Toronto of 16 Hov 1913).

£L Curtis, edl Round Table Studies, First Series, Volume Two [Annotated

"Australian People' and 'Hew Zealand Notes", with further criticisms
of “Green Memorandum" 3 <1914).

CL Curtis,] A Practical Enquiry into the Nature of Citizenship in the
British Empire . . . Rough Draft of the general results...
[■Strawberry Memorandum": draft of "Project, Part III") (plain and
interleaved, 1914),

[L Curtis, J The Problem of the Commonwealth <1915) [differs slightly from
1916 published edition!.

[L Curtis, J Motes on the Progress of the Movement in Australia <1916).

[Sir V Duke,] Suggestions for Constitutional Progress in Indian Polity
<1916).

L Curtis, A letter to Philip Kerr, 13 November 1916 <1916).

The Round Table in Canada: How the Movement Began, Vbat It Hopes to
Accomplish (Toronto, 1917).

P Kerr, rhat the British Empire Really Stands For (Toronto, 1917: address
Of 30 July 1912).

Memorandum on Bound Table York <1921).

L Curtis, Memorandum for Discussion at Blickling <1932).

560

CL Curtis,) Round Table Studies, Third Series, Instalments A-B {Preface
and chapters 1 - 34 of "Civitas Dei" <1934-37)1 (1929).

Round Table Policy (1937).

Memorandum on Round Table Aims and Policy (1945).

lote: a large number of Round Table articles were reprinted as
pamphlets for private circulation and public sale, particularly
during the two wars. The Canadian and Hew Zealand Round Tabic groups
also issued a smaller number of pamphlets. These have not been
listed separately.

SE1E C 1EI1-VQMS B’f

B-SQWTO TABLED

Amery, L S, The Problem of the Army (London, 1903).

f -imperial Defence and Foreign Policy" in C S Goldnaa (ed>, The

Empire and the Century (London, 1905).

1 The Fundamental Fallacies of Free Trade (Conpatriots Club, London,

1906).

1 Union and Strength: A Series of Papers on Imperial Questions

(London, 1912).

, The Case Against Home Rule (Horning Post articles, London, 1912).

, "The Constitutional Development ol South Africa", TKHS . 4th series,

vol 1 (1915), pp 216-35.

, The Empire in the New Era (London, 1926).

, Empire and Prosperity (London, 1930).

, The Forward View (London, 193b).

, "The Problem of the Cession ol Xandated Territories", Uu. Vol XVI

(1937), pp 3-22.

, The German Colonial Claim (London, 1939).

, India and Freedom (London, 1942).

, Criticism of Curtis's " Faith and Vorks " (panphlet reprinted from

Oxford Times, 14 and 19 June 1943).

, Thoughts on the Constitution (Chichele lectures, Oxford, 1946).

, The British Commonwealth and Vorld Affairs (London, 1948).

, My Political Life (3 vols, London, 1953-56).

Barnes, John and Hicholson, David (eds), The Leo Amery Diaries, Volume l
(London, 1980).

, The Empire at Bay: The Leo Amery Diaries, 1929-45 (London, 1988).

Brand, R H, 1st Baron, The Union of South Africa (Oxford, 1909).

f Var and National Finance {Round Table articles 1912-21 with

introduction! (London, 1921).

, Vhy I am not a Socialist (Liberal Hew Vay Series, London, 1931).

f The International Gold Problen (London. 1931).

(ed>, The Letters of John Dove (London, 1938).

t -Lord Kilner and General Smuts", The Listener, Vol L (15 Oct 1953),

pp 631-32.

Caroe, Sir Olaf, The Veils of Power (London, 1951).

> The Soviet Empire (London, 1953 and 1966).

, The Pathans (London, 1958).

Cecil, Lord Robert, The Vay of Peace (London, 1928).

f j Great Experiment: An Autobiography (Few York, 1941).

t An Emergency Policy (London, 1948).

t All the Vay (London, 1949).

Chirol , Sir Valentine, Indian Unrest (London, 1910).

561

, India Old and lieu (London, 1921).

Coupland, Sir Reginald, Vilberforce (London, 1923).

, The Quebec Act (Oxford, 1925).

, Raffles (London, 1926).

, Kirk on the Zambesi (Oxford, 1928).

, The American Revolution and the British Empire (London. 1930).

, The SriihishhAiifi MLondbrij.! 49000, . l !*»«>.

, The Empire in These Days (London, 1935).

, The Exploitation of East Africa (London, 1939).

, Tie Cripps Mission, (Oxford, 1942).

. The Indian Problem, 1833-1935 (Oxford, 1942).

, Indian Politics , 1936-42 (Oxford, 1943).

, The Future of India (Oxford, 1943).

, India: A Re-Statement (London, 1945).

Curtis, Lionel, The Government of South Africa <2 vols, Capo Town, 1908).

, The Conmonvoalth of fat Jons, Part One (London, 1916).

, The Problem of the Commonweal tb (London, 1916).

(od), Canadian Criticism of 'The Problem of the Coomcnhoal th ' and

the Author's Reply thereto (London, 1916).

, Four Studies of Indian Government (Allahabad, 1917).

, Letters to the People of India on Responsible Government (Calcutta,

1917 and London, 191S).

, Dyarchy [collected Indian papers! (London, 1920).

[ ), "Cutting Ireland in Two", Atlantic Monthly, Vol 134 (1924),

pp 323-37.

, "South Africa Since the Union", Atlantic Monthly, Vol 140 (1927),

pp 253-63.

( The Capital Question of China (London, 1932, reissued 1970).

, Civitas Dei (London, 3 vols, 1934 and 1937; one-volume editions

1938, Hew York 1939 and reissued as The Commonwealth of Gcd, (1950).

t with Margery Perham, The Protectorates of South Africa (Oxford,

1935).

t -World Order', U, Vol XVIII (1939), pp 301-320.

, Decision (Oxford, 1941).

, Action (Oxford, 1942).

, faith and Vorks (Oxford, 1943).

t Open Letter to Lords, Commons and Press (Oxford, 1943).

, The Vay to Peace (Oxford, 1944).

. -An Imperial Parliament" in BBC, Experiment in Freedom: Six

Broadcast Discussions (London, 1944).

Vor ld Var: its Cause and Cure [incorporates wartime pamphlets

’Decision, Action, Faith and Vorks etc] (Oxford, 1945; repr Lothian
Foundation, London. 1992 with Foreword by H V Hodson and Introduction
by Deborah Lavin).

Par or Peace (London, 1946).

freedom and International Peace (Glasgow, 1946).

’ -South Africa's Future in the Commonwealth" , The Listener,

Vol XXXVII <3 April 1947). pp 489-91.
rh* W/t^tor Kay to Peace (Oxford, 1947).

’ « One of Milner's Young Men". Asbridge Quarterly, Bo 1 (July 1947),

- PP 4U» 8 1 Look Back" , Tie Listener. Vcl XLV1I <1948), pp 749-50.

*Tbe Political Repercussions of Atomic Power in K L Ol.pnant e-
al , The Atomic Age (London, 1949).

, Vorld Revolution In the Cause of Peace (Oxford, 1949).

, The Open Road to Freedom (Oxford, 1950).

, An Address to British Electors (Oxford, 1950).

, Vith Milner in South Africa C early diariesJ (Oxford, 1951).

» "The Fifties Seen Fifty Years' Hence", LL Vol 27 (1951),

pp 273-84.

. "The Interpreter's House", Efi, Vol 22 (1951), pp 291-95.

, Vhere Should Ve Mow Turn? (Oxford, 1952).

, Vindows of Freedom and Other Papers (Oxford, 1952).

[Note: see Ruth Pryor, A Bibliography of the Vorks of Lionel George
Curtis , (London Dip Lib thesis, 1955). This omits nany of Curtis's
FT articles] .

Dawson, Geoffrey (n6 Robinson), "The Prospects of a United South Africa" in
C S Goldnan (ed), The Empire and the Century (London, 1905).

Grigg, Edward, 1st Baron Altrincham, The Greatest Experiment in History
(New Haven, 1924).

, Three Parties or Two? (London, 1931).

, The Post -Victorians (London, 1933).

, The Constitutional Problem in Kenya (Cust Lecture, Pott ingham,

1934).

f * The Merits and Defects of the Locarno Treaty", IA, Vol XIV (1935),

pp 176-97.

, The Faith of an Englishman (London, 1936).

, Britain looks at Germany (London, 1938).

, The British Commonwealth (London, 1943).

, British Foreign Policy (London, 1944).

, "Federalism and the Connonwealth" , Vol CXXX1II <Oct 1949)

pp 323-38.

, Kenya's Opportunity (London, 1955).

Gwynn, Stephen (ed), The Anvil of War: F S Oliver's Letters to his Brother
(London, 1936).

Hailey, Xalcoln, 1st Baron, An African Survey (London, 1938, revised 1957).

, "Some Problems dealt with in the African Survey", LL, Vol XVIII

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